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ABSTRACT 
The 1960's and the 1970's were decades of extraordinarily rapid change in 
South Korea. The military coup that took place in May, 1961 presaged eighteen years of 
increasingly harsh and oppressive authoritarian rule under the leadership of Park 
Chung-hee, during which time South Korea shed its centuries old dependency upon 
rural agrarianism and emerged as one of the world's premier industrial economies. At 
the forefront of this advance was the textile and garment industry; a manufacturing 
complex characterised by a myriad of sweat-shop factories in which the overwhelming 
majority of employees were girls and young women. 
Working conditions in these establishments were of a universally low standard, 
and all notions of workers' rights and dignities were sacrificed for the government- 
sponsored imperative to maximise exports and minimise costs. To facilitate this 
circumstance, the Park Chung-hee regime constructed a nation-wide trade union 
organisation that was, in effect, nothing more than an agent of the state: 
unrepresentative of, and unresponsive to, the interests of workers in all industries. 
With little, or no, support from male co-workers, and despite their political 
naivety and the traditionally subordinate status of Korean females, the women textile 
and garment workers confronted the state, the employers, and their `official' trade union 
representatives, and succeeded in forming the nucleus of a fully democratic labour 
organisation. The enterprise-level democratic trade unions thus formed were not 
isolated or transient phenomena but included educational and vocational `outreach' 
programmes of mutual support, the purposes of which were to enhance individual 
awareness and extend the concepts of solidarity and collectivity throughout the 
industrial sector. 
One of the purposes of this dissertation is to make visible the hidden history of 
these women. Writers and commentators on South Korean industrial relations share a 
common disregard for the achievements of the women activists of the 1970's and, 
instead, locate elsewhere the birth of democratic trade unionism. This study takes 
advantage of unique access to the life histories and personal records of many 
individuals, both male and female, who were actively involved in the events of the 
period. It presents a narrative of the lives and the attainments of women workers whose 
struggles have gone largely unrecorded, and whose outstanding accomplishments have, 
until now, remained uncelebrated. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Background 
There are two extraordinary lacunae in the collective psyche of the people of 
South Korea. The first concerns the circumstances surrounding the execution of the man 
who, above all others, was instrumental in defining the salient characteristics and 
economic dynamic of modern industrial South Korea. The second is centred upon the 
role played by the one section of South Korean society that contributed most to the 
metamorphosis from repression to democratisation that began during the era of his 
dictatorship. 
In the early evening of 26 October, 1979, the president of South Korea, Park 
Chung-hee, sat down to dine with three of his closest friends and colleagues. Less than 
two hours later, and with the meal still in progress, the president's oldest friend drew a 
revolver from the waistband of his trousers and fired one shot at the president's chief 
bodyguard, striking him in the wrist. The gunman then stood up, pointed the revolver 
at the man who had been almost like a brother to him for more than thirty years, and 
who was the leader of his country, and shot him in the chest. Some moments later he 
approached the prostrate Park Chung-hee and dispatched him with a single shot to the 
head. 
In many, if not all, countries the assassination of the president or prime 
minister arouses intense and protracted speculation and comment which, in turn, tends 
to ignite similar reactions abroad. Interest is not normally restricted to idle gossip but 
is manifested in the publication of a plethora of books and articles purporting to offer 
the definitive explanation of the event; the factors which led to it, and the implications 
and repercussions which would likely flow from it. Not so in South Korea where, for 
reasons not easy to ascertain, the details of the violent death of a man who had single- 
handedly dominated every aspect of social and political life for little short of two 
decades was regarded with almost universal indifference. Despite the period of 
instability that was inevitable following such an event, the general tenor of the 
explanatory and placatory messages promulgated by the `public relations' machinery 
of the South Korean state appeared to satisfy the South Korean populace and few, if 
any, questions were asked. That circumstance remains extant to this day: no serious 
works focusing solely upon the assassination itself have been published, and the 
collective attitude appears to be that all that needs to be known is already known. This 
popular incuriosity about an occurrence that might otherwise be expected to have 
aroused, and continue to arouse, at least some degree of inquiry and controversy 
constitutes the first lacuna identified above. 
During the era of his national stewardship, from May, 1961 until October, 
1979, Park Chung-hee supervised the radical change in the South Korean economy from 
one that was predominantly agrarian and relatively backward to one that figured among 
the leading industrial nations of the world. Such an extraordinary transformation could 
not have been achieved without sacrifice and, in the case of South Korea, the brunt of 
that sacrifice was borne by manual workers in the textile and garment industry, most of 
whom were women. The true extent of the price paid by girls and young women for the 
achievement of what came to be known as the `Korean miracle' and, far more 
importantly, the contribution those women made to the emancipation of their gender 
2 
and to the democratisation of the labour movement constitute both the second `blind 
spot' in the collective mind of the South Korean people and the core of this study. These 
two phenomena; the absence of interest in the murder of a long-serving and powerful 
head of state and the dismissal of the pivotal role played by women workers, are 
inextricably interlinked, and in seeking to redress the latter, this thesis will throw new 
light upon the former. 
1.1 Main Arguments And Research Questions 
It has become almost a truism that major studies of the history of the trade 
union movement in South Korea have dealt inadequately with the period of the 1970's. 
Such studies of that decade which do exist in the literature are, without exception, 
poorly supported by data and signally lacking in informed critical analysis. 
Furthermore, few academics or other experts in the South Korean industrial relations 
arena have paid more than scant attention to any consideration of the experiences and 
the contribution of women workers. In what may be referred to as `the conventional 
view' of the labour movement in the 1970's there is, therefore, an almost total neglect 
of the significance of the involvement of women, and a disregard of their efforts to 
establish democratic trade unions during this crucial period. Proponents of the 
conventional view have been highly selective in the specific topics and events isolated 
for analysis and discussion, and this marked selectivity has resulted not only in 
obfuscation and distortion of the contextual circumstances, but is also, as will be 
demonstrated, an exemplar of historical reductionism. 
The key objective of this research is to assemble all available facts pertinent 
to women workers of the period in question and analyse them from a number of 
3 
perspectives. In the facilitation of this objective every opportunity will be afforded to 
the expression of the views of women who were personally involved in the struggle. 
In so doing, it is anticipated that a more perceptive appreciation based, for the first 
time, upon experience rather than upon supposition and theory, will be gained of just 
how high was the price paid by the women of South Korea in the name of economic 
development. This research will explore several interrelated themes which are crucial 
for a full understanding of the involvement of women in the democratic trade union 
movement in the 1970's. The major theme is centred upon how the concentration of 
women in the textile and garment industry provided both the imperative and the 
initiative for organised industrial action. Emphasis will be placed upon how the 
manipulation of gender relations dominated the labour control process, the nature of 
the mechanisms of male-controlled trade unions, and the processes by which women 
workers were able to challenge that control. 
The key factors which will be argued in this study are: 
1. That prior to the initiatives taken by women workers in the textile and garment 
industry in the early 1970's the trade union organisation extant in South Korea was 
a corrupt and male-dominated agent of the state, whose meaningful endeavours on 
behalf of its grass-roots membership were negligible, 
2. That throughout the period under consideration the Park Chung-hee regime 
colluded with the `official' leadership of the labour movement and employers in a 
concerted policy to obstruct and restrict the emergence of democratic trade 
unionism, 
3. That despite this institutional opposition, and in the absence of support from male 
co-workers, women workers overcame deeply embedded cultural mores and 
formed trade unions in locations where none had existed previously and, where 
male-dominated organisations had been in place, used the democratic process to 
replace the established hierarchy, 
4. That, once established, the female-led labour organisations initiated the systematic 
implementation of educational and vocational programmes the purposes of which 
were to enhance the individual circumstances of workers and facilitate the spread 
of the democratic ideal throughout the industrial sector, 
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5. That the extraordinary achievements of the women workers of the 1970's 
destroyed the stereotypical image of the passive, timid, obedient, and unworldly 
Asian female and showed them to be courageous, determined, compassionate, and 
intelligent individuals capable of generating and sustaining a co-operative spirit of 
the highest order, 
6. That the long and bitter struggle endured by women was not motivated solely by 
parochial self-interest but included a genuine awareness and regard for wider 
political and social implications and dynamics. Thus, the outcomes of their 
activities were not only beneficial to the circumstances of workers, but also 
brought about fundamental changes to the cultural and political history of South 
Korea, 
7. Finally, that the main body of South Korean industrial relations literature has 
ignored the achievements of the women activists of the 1970's and post-dated the 
birth of democratic trade unionism in that country by almost two decades. 
In support of the assertions identified above specific questions will be 
addressed which are both elementary and profound: 
i. What was the importance of the textile and garment industry to the South 
Korean economy in the 1960's and 1970's? 
ii. What was the true nature of the work and life circumstances experienced by 
the girls and young women employed in that sector? 
iii. How did those circumstances arise, and what were the levers of power which 
maintained them in place? 
iv. What was the role, status, and influence of the organised trade union 
movement extant in South Korea prior to the involvement of women? 
v. What was the genesis, evolution, and degrees of success and failure of that 
involvement, and how important were the contributions, both positive and 
negative, of individual personalities? 
vi. Why was President Park Chung-hee assassinated, and to what extent was the 
assassination a direct result of the politicised activities of women workers? 
vii. What were the key differences between male-led and female-led trade unions, 
and in what ways did women activists change the face of South Korean labour 
movement organisation? 
viii. What has been the legacy, in the wider society, of the efforts and achievements 
of the female textile and garment workers of the 1970's? 
ix. In summation of the above questions, was the price of the `Korean miracle', in 
human terms, too high? 
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1.2 Structure Of The Study 
Chapter Two will consist of an examination of the tripartite interrelationship 
between the state, capital and labour. In the economic development strategies of most 
developing countries the state exercises a dominant role in determining the basic 
character of the country's industrial relations system. This was certainly true in the 
case of South Korea, where the state claimed to be the primary architect of the nation's 
economic development. This posture was characterised by the effective exclusion of 
workers from all decision-making processes in regard to policy and production. By the 
early 1970s, however, democratic local-level trade unions, imbued with a militant and 
adversarial disposition to management, emerged and grew rapidly. This chapter has 
several objectives: first, it will attempt to characterise the salient features of the 
industrial relations philosophy of the South Korean state and the socio-economic and 
socio-political models upon which the government of President Park Chung-hee 
single-mindedly pursued export oriented strategies. The second objective is to analyse 
Park's `Yushin' reform as it impacted upon the state's labour policies, and its 
repercussions for the union activities of women. The third objective is to examine the 
provisions of the Korean Labour Standard Laws, both in theory and in practice, and 
consider how those instruments were implemented and manipulated by the Park 
Chung-hee government. The final objective is to offer a coherent analysis of the 
consequences of the constitutional role played by the state and the implications for 
South Korean industrial relations structures. 
Chapter Three will enunciate what is referred to throughout the study as the 
`conventional view' of the involvement of women in the 1970's labour movement. To 
this end, abstracts from a selection of works which can, in toto, be fairly regarded as 
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representative, and which, indeed, constitute the common currency in contemporary 
South Korean discourse, will be discussed. Whilst the majority of relevant studies 
have emanated from a predominantly masculine perspective and, therefore, make up 
the dominant strand in the conventional view, there is, nevertheless, a distinct feminist 
`conventional' strand, albeit relatively insubstantial, and any exposition of the 
generally held view of women in the South Korean labour movement would be 
incomplete without some recognition of that element. However, due to the paucity of 
available data on the subject, the discussion will, of necessity, be brief. Finally, an 
analysis of each of the above perspectives will be presented and, in so doing, lay the 
groundwork for the exposition of an alternative view; one which will be supported, not 
least, by evidence gained from women workers who were themselves actively 
involved in the democratic trade union movement in the 1970's. 
Chapter Four will clarify the research methodology employed, and will 
expand upon the case studies selected for scrutiny and describe the relevance, in the 
context of the study, of the individual interview subjects. The chapter will also focus 
upon two specific areas of conceptual ambivalence, the resolutions of which dictated 
the philosophical and structural dynamics of this thesis. The first concerns the author's 
preference for evidential rather than theoretical considerations, whilst the second 
reflects a deep uncertainty about the true value of statistical data in the science of 
social enquiry. The closing section in the chapter will focus upon the nature and 
sources of primary data. 
Chapter Five, although predominantly descriptive, is of great importance 
because, in its addressing of the evolution of the Korean textile and garment industry, 
it encapsulates the protracted and inexorable historical process whereby the Korean 
7 
peninsula became `acclirnatised' to military and economic domination by external 
powers. The chapter also points up the extraordinary re-emergence of Japan as a major 
industrial player after that nation's defeat in the Second World War, and its rapid 
penetration into the post-war South Korean economy. Seoul is much more than the 
capital city of South Korea and the locus of most of the events portrayed in this study, 
it does, in fact, command an almost mystical regard in the minds of all South Koreans. 
It is, therefore, pertinent to devote one section of this chapter to an explanation of how 
this circumstance came about. Within the industrial environs of metropolitan Seoul 
lies the Pyung-hwa Shichang, or Peace Market, the collection of buildings housing a 
warren of more than 850 sweat-shop garment factories employing, in 1970, in excess 
of 27,000 workers, mostly women, in what can only be described as Dickensian 
conditions. The circumstances of the Peace Market, and the endurance of those who 
laboured there, are keys to the entirety of this study: thus, a close examination of its 
history, and of the characteristics of those who profited from its existence, merits the 
chapter's final section. 
Chapter Six is devoted to a discussion centred upon the nature of the female 
workforce in the textile and garment industry, their social origins and status, their 
aspirations, cultural legacies, economic circumstances and political sensibilities. The 
first section will outline theoretical issues in an analysis of gender in relation to 
culture, and will address the question of why female labour power was favoured by the 
holders and users of capital. The opportunity will be taken at this stage to elucidate 
the reasons for the high growth of female participation in the South Korean 
industrialisation process. The final section will summarise the major discussions in the 
chapter and their impacts upon the social life and social status of women workers. 
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Those impacts will be illustrated by the utilisation of primary research profiles and 
life stories. 
Chapter Seven will focus upon conditions experienced within the Peace 
Market factory setting, and will include detailed job descriptions, the garment 
production process, employment relations, and conditions encountered by girls and 
young women for whom the factory was not merely a place of work, but which was 
also their `home'. The occupational effects upon workers' health will be examined, as 
will be the nature and causes of some of the tensions which arose between workers 
themselves and between workers and management. Having scrutinised what the 
women were required to do in the factory, and the material circumstances in which 
they laboured, the chapter will conclude with an analysis of how much they were paid 
for their efforts and the purchasing power of that remuneration. This chapter 
effectively paints in the circumstances which combined to provide the seed-bed from 
which democratic trade unionism would emerge. 
Prior to the iconoclastic initiative taken by women workers in the textile and 
garment industry, trade unionism in South Korea was characterised by two identifying 
features: first, it was exclusively male dominated and, second, it had a propensity to 
align with state and capital rather than with rank and file membership. Chapter Eight 
traces the historical development of the Korean labour movement and describes the 
process whereby successive governments were able to control and manipulate to their 
own ends organisations whose objectives were, ostensibly, to protect the rights of 
workers. The implications of Park Chung-hee's Yushin reforms on trade union activity 
will be discussed, as will be the crucial issue of the conflict between women workers 
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and the company-sponsored, `yellow' or oyong, unions. The final section of the 
chapter will consist of an overview of the reaction generated among the international 
labour community by evidence, emanating from women workers in South Korea, of 
the oppression of organised labour by the Park regime. 
As a reflection of the author's deep conviction that the contributions of 
individual personalities can exert an extraordinary and disproportionate influence upon 
historical events, Chapter Nine is devoted to the development of this belief and a 
discussion of the impacts upon the South Korean labour movement of two such 
biographies. Yi So-sun and Han Soon-nim, both women, and both endowed with 
courage, determination, and intelligence. However, whilst the contribution of the 
former to the furtherance of democratisation in the workplace was positive in the 
extreme, and continues to the present day, that of the latter proved to be negative, 
damaging, and ephemeral. 
Chapter Ten is, of necessity, the longest chapter in the study, for it details two 
of the most socially important events in the history of South Korea: the actual birth of 
democratic trade unionism brought about by the efforts of women workers in the 
textile and garment industry, and the death of Park Chung-hee, the incumbent 
President. Although these two phenomena took place almost a decade apart, the 
research presented in Chapter Ten will establish a clear, direct, and undeniable linkage 
between them. It will draw upon the personal accounts of the founder members of the 
first `autonomous' trade union, and illustrate graphically the lengths to which the state 
and the employers were prepared to go in their attempts to inhibit the realisation of the 
ambitions of the new organisation. The oral testimony, recorded on tape, of the high- 
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profile political figure who brought the life of Park Chung-hee, and of his oppressive 
regime, to an abrupt end provides an insight into his motive that has not previously 
been aired, and casts serious doubt upon the `official' explanation. 
The final chapter forms the conclusion of this study, and draws together all 
the diverse strands and themes which have been developed in previous chapters. In so 
doing, the seriously flawed nature of the `conventional view' of the role of women in 
the process of democratisation in South Korea will be demonstrated, and the true 
dimension of the contribution made by those women, and their rightful place in South 
Korean history, will be established. 
CHAPTER TWO 
STATE AND ORGANISED LABOUR: BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION 
'I am the state " 
(Louis XIV) 
2.0 Introduction 
It can be argued that the modern history of South Korea began as recently as 16 
May, 1961, the day upon which General Park Chung-hee led the military coup that 
overthrew the legitimate, yet highly unstable, government of Chang Myon. History 
began in the sense that all which had gone before can be seen as having led inexorably 
to that single momentous event, whilst all that followed stemmed directly from it. The 
brevity of this time span, allied with the enormous changes which took place within it, 
constitutes a social and political milieu whose characteristics can be radically distorted 
by even the slightest misinterpretation or misrepresentation. Within the broader context 
of this chapter, two such instances will be considered and realigned; one being the 
erroneous conflation, and thus confusion, of terminology, and the other being a 
fundamental misreading of historical fact. 
Following a brief summary of Korean political administrations between 1945 
and 1987, successive sections will examine pertinent circumstances which existed prior 
to the inception of the Yushin reform, discuss some of that reform's salient 
characteristics, and illustrate the totality of its impact on the South Korean labour 
movement in general and the young women workers in the garment industry in 
particular. In so doing, two significant outcomes will emerge: Park Chung-hee's 
inexorable progression along the path to what can only be termed paranoia, and, at least 
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in terms of national economic growth versus human suffering and mass exploitation, an 
assertion of the axiom that the `end' justifies the `means'. 
2.1 Political Administrations In South Korea 1945-1987 
There were seven political administrations in South Korea between 1945 and 
1987: 
American Military Government 1945-1948 
The American Military Government (AMG) governed the Korean peninsula 
south of the 38th parallel of latitude as an `occupied area' rather than as a `liberated 
area', even though Korea had not been a `party of belligerency' during the Second 
World War (Ha Bong-gyu, 1989). This was a period of direct rule by an external power 
during which Koreans were systematically denied meaningful active participation in the 
political process of government. Reflecting the fervent anti-communist ideology 
prevalent in the United States, the AMG favoured the rightist-conservative element in 
Korean politics and thereby paved the way for the traditional `landlord class' to re-exert 
its influence and restore its social privilege. This rightist bias also enabled the revival 
and retention of the Japanese colonial bureaucracy. Factionalism among the right-wing 
groups was already in evidence, however, with the Korean Independence Party, led by 
Kim Ku, disassociating from the Rhee Seung-man faction because they feared that 
partition would become permanent (Yang Sung-chul, 1981). 
The First Republic 1948-1960: Rhee Seung-man's Liberal Party 
Rhee Seung-man's Liberal Party', the leadership of which consisted largely of 
nationalists returning from exile abroad and Koreans who had benefited from the 
Japanese colonial presence, formed what the United Nations General Assembly referred 
to as: "the only and lawful government of Korea" (Ha Bong-gyu, 1989) in July, 1948. 
Corrupt and reactionary, and informed by a US inspired Manichaean view of politics in 
which all that was anti-communist was good, Rhee's administration promoted no 
constructive plans for economic development; took no steps to democratise the political 
process, instead restricted the power of both the political opposition and the National 
Assembly, and failed in its policy of social reconstruction. Guilty of excesses which 
matched those experienced under the Japanese, the Rhee government entered a period 
during which its legitimacy was increasingly questioned. The Korean War (1950-1953) 
effectively suspended coherent internal political activity. Having amended the 
constitution in 1954 to remove the two-year limit on presidential terms in office, Rhee's 
subsequent manipulation of the electoral process would have enabled him to remain in 
power indefinitely. The full extent of administrative improbity was publicly revealed 
during the rigged election of 1960 which returned Rhee for a fourth term as president. 
Nation-wide demonstrations, led by university students, and participated in by students 
from both middle and high schools (Kuah Kang-man, 1968), precipitated the downfall 
of the First Republic in April, 1960 (Bedeski, 1994). 
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The Second Republic 1960-1961: Chang Myon's Democratic Party 
During a three-month period of interim government, led by Acting President 
Ho Chong, the Constitution was revised to provide for free and fair elections; a 
bicameral legislature, and the replacement of the presidential system with a 
parliamentary system (Korea Annual 1980). The subsequent administration of Premier 
Chang Myon's Democratic Party set out to strengthen the legislature and weaken the 
executive, while measures to devolve power to the regions were put into effect. The 
general orientation and long-term economic development plans of the Chang regime 
appeared highly promising (Kihl Young-whan, 1988), but they were not to be allowed 
time to come to fruition. The problems which confronted the Liberal government were 
not new, but had persisted throughout the period of the First Republic, and were too 
complex to resolve in less than one year (Ha Bong-gyu, 1989). Internecine feuding, 
mainly between the old and the new factions both in government and in the military, 
blunted the progressive thrust of the administration, while university students 
emboldened by their success in the `April Revolution' became increasingly vocal once 
again. Social disorder was met with hesitancy and indecision on the part of government 
and provided the pretext for a military coup that overthrew the Second Republic on 16 
May, 1961. 
Military Rule 1961-1963 
General Park Chung-hee came to power as one of the leaders of the coup in 
May, 1961. In the single-minded pursuit of economic development, as the primary 
means whereby the military junta could gain political legitimacy, Park Chung-hee began 
by prohibiting elections for two years and suspending all political and labour 
institutions, and rebuilding them in accord with his own preference (Yang Sung-chul, 
1981). Throughout his 18 years as the leader of South Korea, Park held resolutely to the 
view that: "Excessive interest in politics is one of the greatest obstacles to economic 
development" (Quoted in Kim Nak-joong, 1982). The main instrument of `overt' 
political rule, and what would subsequently become one of Park's `rubber stamp' 
institutions, was the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), founded in 1962 by Park and 
his close associate Kim Jong-pil. In reality, however, the true locus of socio-political 
power was the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, founded by the same two 
individuals, which became an all-pervasive and: "... awesome instrument for silencing 
dissidents" (Ha Bong-gyu, 1989). 
The Third Republic 1963-1972: Park Chung-hee's Democratic Republican Party 
The military leadership, having changed into civilian clothes, permitted what 
Ha Bong-gyu (1989) refers to as: "a period of relative democracy" in the 1960's during 
which party politics on a limited scale were allowed and national elections for the 
presidency and the National Assembly were conducted in a: "reasonably honest 
manner" (Ha Bong-gyu, 1989). Park Chung-bee's strongest weapon against the 
opposition, and the reason for the electoral successes of the DRP, was the spectacularly 
high rate of economic growth and the explosive achievements of export-oriented 
industries. These were achieved at great social cost, however, and the disparity between 
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the wealth of the nation and the poverty of its workers fuelled increasing popular 
resentment. In response to internal and international pressures Park Chung-hee 
suspended the constitution and declared Martial Law in October, 1972. 
The Fourth Republic 1972-1979: Park Chung-hee's Autocratic Rule 
The `Yushin Constitution', introduced in 1972, heralded a return to and, 
indeed, an enhancement of, arbitrary, authoritarian, and repressive rule. The Democratic 
Republican Party, the supposed party of government, became ineffective, and all the 
levers of power were in the hands of Park Chung-hee himself. Growing social unrest 
was met with an increasingly harsh reaction by the state; nation-wide rebellion was 
almost inevitable and, indeed, broke out. The means by which the state reacted to this 
burgeoning civil disorder were the direct triggers for Park's assassination by one of his 
closest friends in October, 1979. The vacuum left by the abrupt demise of a president 
who had acquired absolute power and a comprehensive apparatus of repression was not 
to be filled easily. The Prime Minister under Park Chung-hee, Choi Gyu-ha, assumed 
the presidency in December, 1979 but, deprived of the patronage of Park Chung-hee 
and lacking any independent political base, he stood little chance of remaining in office 
without the support of the army and its Chief of Staff, General Chun Doo-hwan. 
The Fifth Republic 1980-1987: Chun Doo-hwan's Autocratic Rule 
Support for Choi Gyu-ha was not forthcoming, and in August, 1980 Choi was 
`persuaded' to resign (Lee Man-woo, 1990). Chun Doo-hwan relinquished his army 
commission at the same time and, on 30 August, was himself elected president by the 
National Conference for Unification, the `rubber stamp' electoral college for the 
president created by Park Chung-hee. As the only candidate, Chun Doo-hwan received 
2,524 votes out of a possible 2,525; one vote being declared invalid. Chun assumed the 
presidency of the Fifth Republic on 1 September, 1980 (Ha Bong-gyu, 1989) 
2.2 Socio-Economic and Political Background 
The thirteen years between the creation of South Korea as a separate nation and 
the military take-over by Park Chung-hee were turbulent in the extreme and were 
dominated by three major elements; the period of rule, and the legacy, of the AMG; the 
Korean War 1950-1953, and the continuing threat, sometimes warranted and sometimes 
`manufactured', from communist North Korea (Kim Kihwan, 1993). 
The authoritarian nature of the first `indigenous' government in South Korea 
was determined by the US imperative to establish a political order conducive to its own 
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interests, and was reinforced by the corrupt and manipulative conduct of the president 
of the First Republic, Rhee Seung-man (Calverley, 1982). Indeed, it was the dramatic 
escalation of the authoritarianism of his administration; the overt repression of the 
political left, and the blatant misuse of state machinery, which gave increasing 
momentum to a coalition of opposition parties, and which heaped fuel on the fire of 
widespread popular unrest (Sohn Hak-kyu, 1989). This burgeoning atmosphere of 
opposition and insurgency culminated in 1960 with the `April 19 Student Revolution', 
an event marked by unmitigated violence on the part of the state police, which brought 
about not only the deaths of two hundred demonstrators, but also the almost immediate 
collapse of Rhee's government. The success of popular, extra-institutional, resistance 
was to remain within the collective psyche of subsequent anti-authoritarian movements 
in South Korea. 
An interim government led by Ho Chong was superseded by what was, in 
effect, South Korea's first experiment with parliamentary democracy in the form of the 
Chang Myon administration, the Second Republic. It endured for only nine months, 
however, because it contained an inherent ambivalence. On the one hand, it came to 
power on the strength of a popular, revolutionary uprising, while on the other, its 
fundamental conservatism prevented it from responding to the demands for the 
punishment of the corrupt elements in the Rhee administration, and the equally radical 
demands for changes in relations with both the United States and North Korea (Ha 
Bong-gyu, 1989). As a reflection of this disquiet, approximately one million people 
took part in some two thousand street demonstrations during Chang Myon's brief period 
in office (Ogle, 1990). The accompanying internecine factional conflicts, corrosive as 
they were, were not confined to the body politic but were reflected, with far greater 
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significance, in the army. Following the demise of Rhee Seung-man, two opposing 
groups became clearly delineated within the higher echelons of the military; those 
older, senior officers who had collaborated with the Rhee Seung-man regime, and those 
more junior generals who wanted to purge that older element (Ha Bong-gyu, 1989). It 
was this younger group, led by General Park Chung-hee, who seized the initiative on 16 
May, 1961. 
2.3 Park Chun2-hee: Military Politician 
The military revolution is not the destruction of democracy in Korea. 
Rather it is a way for saving it: it is a surgical operation intended to excise a 
malignant social, political, and economic tumour. The revolution was 
staged with the compassion of a benevolent surgeon who sometimes must 
cause pain in order to preserve life and restore health (Park Chung-hee, 
1962). 
In his major work `Our Nation's Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction' 
published in 1962, Park Chung-hee spells out in detail his interpretation of the socio- 
political history of Korea, the endemic malaise that was the legacy of that history, and 
his vision for the future. Being, as he unquestionably was, such a seminal figure in the 
unfolding, and defining characteristics, of South Korean history, it is considered useful 
to examine briefly the nature and background of the man who was to hold his country in 
an iron grip for almost two decades, and who was to be instrumental in the restructure 
of its economy and the eradication of its democracy. 
Born in 1917 to peasant farmer stock in Kyongsang Bukdo province, in the 
south-east of the Korean peninsula, Park Chung-hee was the youngest of seven children. 
His first full-time employment, at the age of twenty, was as a teacher at the local 
primary school, where he remained for two years before enrolling at the Manchukuo 
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Military Academy in 1939. Graduating two years later at the top of his class, Park was 
immediately selected to attend the Imperial Japanese Military Academy in Tokyo. This 
was followed by one year of commissioned service in the Japanese army before he was 
discharged at the end of the Second World War. Having decided that military service 
was his forte, Park entered the Korean Military Academy in 1946, from which he 
graduated later in the same year with the rank of captain2 (Yang Sung-chul, 1981). 
Park was both a charismatic and an enigmatic individual, austere, idealistic, 
highly intelligent, intensely patriotic but, as will be shown, fatally flawed. One of the 
most intriguing, and as yet not fully explained, events in his life took place in 1948 
when Park was court-martialled and sentenced to death for his active involvement in the 
South Korean Workers' Party, a communist underground movement that had infiltrated 
the military. Partly due to the enthusiasm with which he co-operated with those 
delegated to investigate his misdemeanour, Park was pardoned and reinstated (Yang 
sung-chul, 1981). The fact that, some twelve years later, he was to ground his social, 
political, economic, and cultural philosophy on a robust and uncompromising anti- 
communist ethic poses as many questions about his intellectual and ideological 
flexibility as it does about the experiences which precipitated his Damascene conversion 
during those intervening years. 3 Advancement came swiftly during the Korean War, 
and Park Chung-hee's record of promotion bears testimony both to his ability to 
`reinvent' himself, and to his unique leadership qualities: by the age of thirty-six he was 
a Brigadier General and five years later he became Chief of Staff of the First Army 
(Park Chung-hee, 1962). 
One of the fundamental components of all political ideologies is an 
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understanding, or an interpretation, of human nature (Leach, 1991) and, both in his 
published works and the declared principles upon which he based the policies of his 
administration, Park demonstrates the extent to which he was imbued with the ethos of 
the military and its concept of the `disembodied' human being. With these 
considerations in mind, the essential characteristics of the Army of the Republic of 
Korea (ROKA) prior to the military coup in May, 1961 can be seen to afford crucial 
insights into the nature of the state machinery that evolved subsequently. 
Having expanded greatly after the Korean War as a result of substantial 
investment of US capital and expertise, the ROKA consisted of some 600,000 men at 
the time of the military coup (Ha Bong-gyu, 1989). There were, however, growing 
internal grievances and a decreasing morale amongst the officer corps of this huge 
military institution, a rising level of discontent due largely to post-war promotion 
bottlenecks. To this degree of tension must be added the facts that the ROKA was 
neither democratically-trained nor democratically-minded. For a variety of reasons, not 
least its relatively recent formation, it had neither a deeply-embedded foundation in 
professionalism nor had it developed any tradition of political neutrality, unlike its 
counterparts in the US and the United Kingdom. The experience of the Korean War 
propelled the ROKA into an unprecedented position vis-ä-vis skill, managerial 
techniques, specialisation, and the facility to design and maintain institutional 
structures. Such was the measure of the proficiency of the ROKA that General Park 
Chung-hee and a core of only twenty middle-ranking officers needed to mobilise fewer 
than 1,600 men to execute the almost bloodless coup in a matter of hours (Ha Bong- 
gyu, 1989). It will be shown how the politicisation of the army, and its direct 
involvement in national politics, was an essential pre-condition for Park Chung-hee's 
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rise to power. 
A further prerequisite for military rule was the `de-politicisation' of civil 
society. By 22 May, 1961, a mere six days after the initiation of the military coup, over 
2,000 politicians, including the deposed premier Chang Myon and his close associates, 
had been arrested. By the end of the summer, 17,000 civil servants and 2,000 senior 
army officers had been either taken into custody or summarily dismissed (Ha Bong-gyu, 
1989). The fact that, as has been indicated above, the Second Republic of Chang Myon 
represented South Korea's first venture into the realm of parliamentary democracy 
magnifies the radical nature of such sweeping measures. 
As a product of the military institution, it is unsurprising that Park Chung-hee 
should develop into an exemplar of the `military politician'. Indeed, a direct correlation 
is evident between his military and political careers inasmuch as it is possible to read 
across the profound emphasis he continued to place on modernisation, authoritarianism, 
the importance and value of the intelligence services and, perhaps above all, the fervent 
anti-communism mentioned above. It was this latter element that Park asserts was the 
trigger for his military coup (Park Chung-hee, 1962). South Korean students, who had 
played leading roles in the waves of social unrest which had swept the country for more 
than a year, announced that they had contacted their counterparts in the North and had 
agreed upon a process of unification. The first proclamation made by Park's 
`revolutionary military government' declared that the coup had been essential, 
principally in order to pre-empt a communist take-over4 (Park Chung-hee, 1962). 
The fundamental objective of the Park Chung-hee junta was, in fact, twofold, 
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the elimination of leftist elements in the country and the construction of a national 
economy (Cole, 1971). For the nascent labour movement in South Korea these dual 
aims were to become inextricably interlinked. As will be shown, the construction of a 
national economy in accordance with Park Chung-hee's Yushin (`revitalising reform') 
model was dependent upon the rigid control and exploitation of the labour force, and all 
opposition to the measures adopted to establish and maintain such control would be 
automatically, and expediently, labelled `communist'. 
For Park, anti-communism is the ultimate truth, and everything contrary to it 
must be suppressed ruthlessly (ECCKP, 1975). 
The first formal, administrative structure to replace the Chang Myon cabinet 
assumed the title of Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) and was 
chaired by Park Chung-hee himself. It immediately discarded the Constitution of the 
Second Republic by the implementation on 6 June, 1961 of the Law Regarding 
Extraordinary Measures for National Reconstruction. This first illustration of the Park 
Chung-hee imperative to cloak all repressive intention with a veneer of legitimate 
legislative instruments referred all executive, legislative, and judicial powers to the 
SCNR. Although at this stage the appropriation was collective, Park had taken his 
second step towards personal and absolute power. 
It is imperative and even inevitable in this transitional stage of our 
revolution that we maintain a strong ruling machinery. As the task of 
national reconstruction gradually achieves success, however, the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches of government should be separated and 
assume their respective responsibilities for the public welfare (Park Chung- 
hee, 1962). 
After two years of rule by the `revolutionary military government' there was, 
indeed, a formal return to civil government; however, this entailed nothing more than 
Park and his cohorts changing out of army uniform into civilian suits. Furthermore, the 
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promised separation of powers was never to materialise: on the contrary, under Park's 
stewardship they would become seamlessly unified (ECCKP, 1975). 
2.4 State And Labour: Background 
It is important to note that on successful completion of the military coup, the 
SCNR faced neither a coherent working-class in South Korea nor a systematically 
organised labour movement. The former can be explained, in part at least, by the facts 
that the devastation of the Korean War added ideological homogeneity to an already 
culturally homogeneous population and narrowed markedly the range of debate on 
development issues. There had been a total reliance upon US aid to facilitate the 
rebuilding of the country, and import-substitute industries were largely undeveloped, 
inhibiting the formation of occupation-specific groups and thus, by extension, a 
recognisable working-class. As in all industrialised, or industrialising, societies, whilst 
the constituents of a `working-class' may be in place and may be multiplying in 
number, until and unless those constituent parts coalesce into at least a semblance of a 
cohesive whole, empowered by that collectivity to further the cause of mutual economic 
and political advancement, such aggregations cannot be considered in `class' terms 
(Thompson, 1966). 
With reference to the absence of a coherently organised labour movement, it is 
necessary to look only briefly at history. It is not too great a simplification to view the 
development of the pre-1961 Korean labour movement as comprising three phases. The 
first phase was its development as an integral part of the anti-colonial, national 
independence movement during the period of Japanese rule. Within three months of 
liberation from the Japanese, there emerged a highly militant, left-wing trade union 
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leadership entitled Chun Pyong5 (National Council of Korean Unions). In the second 
phase, this leadership took over the entire labour movement within a remarkably short 
space of time (Kim Nak-joong and Kim Yun-hwan, 1970). The extreme nature of the 
Chun Pyong leadership was anathema to the AMG because of the clear threat it posed 
to US interests in South Korea, and by dint of a concerted and protracted application of 
all available measures and resources, the AMG succeeded in virtually eliminating Chun 
Pyong, whose membership fell in less than three years from a peak of more than 
500,000 to almost zero (Ha Bong-gyu, 1989). Of equal significance, and in order to fill 
the vacuum left by the demise of Chun Pyong, the third phase began when the AMG 
fostered the emergence of a more amenable and malleable labour leadership in the form 
of Hangoog Noryon (later to become the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, and to be 
referred to hereafter as the FKTU). From its beginning, the FKTU was closely aligned 
with the ruling administration (Lee Jeong-taik, 1988). From the First Republic of Rhee 
Seung-man (1948-1960) to the present day, the FKTU has been an ancillary 
organisation of the government in office and has been used consistently as a political 
instrument of reinforcement. 
That there was little state intervention in the activities of organised labour in 
the early part of the 1960's cannot be construed as being indicative of a pro-labour 
mind-set on the part of the Park regime. The mass of industrial workers was still 
relatively small, albeit growing at a rapid rate, and their embryonic organisations were 
seen to pose no immediate threat or constraint to the declared intentions of the military 
dictatorship. 
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2.5 The Yushin Reform 
The word `Yushin' (revitalising reform) was first used in the context of this 
study by Yuri Chu-chong, the Minister of Culture and Information, when he referred to 
President Park Chung-hee's suspension of the Constitution and declaration of Martial 
Law on 17 October, 1972 as: "the October Yushin". In simple terms, the Yushin model 
describes the process whereby the president constitutionally legitimised the 
concentration of all political and economic power into his own hands. In common with 
such evocations as `gulag', `final solution', and `ethnic cleansing', the rubric `Yushin' 
carries deeply ingrained and ambiguous connotations. It is necessary only to voice the 
phrase in South Korean society to elicit images and responses of an intensely polarised 
nature. For the overwhelming majority of the labour movement, religious organisations, 
and the intellectual community, `Yushin' encapsulates all that was evil and socially 
destructive about the Park Chung-hee era, yet in that same society there still remains a 
strand of opinion that harks back to the period 1972-1979 with a degree of what can 
only be termed nostalgia. It is, perhaps , akin to the 
hackneyed yet prevalent attachment 
to fascism expressed in the catch-phrase: "at least he made the trains run on time" when 
critics of Italy's Benito Mussolini are confronted. 
The erroneous conflation, and thus confusion, of terminology referred to in the 
introduction to this chapter is that which occurs with the labels `Yushin Constitution' 
and `Yushin System', which appear to be considered as identical and interchangeable in 
much written and verbal discourse. There is, in fact, a clear and important distinction 
between them, insofar as the former can be strictly defined as the tangible document 
discussed below, whilst the latter was the mutable process that flowed from it. The 
crucial point is that the Yushin System was not defined by the Yushin Constitution but 
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was only facilitated by it. Any number of widely differing policies could have been 
grounded upon that same document, and it was specifically Park Chung-hee's use, or 
misuse, of the Constitution that gave the Yushin System its particular characteristics. A 
different president, or Park himself with a different mind-set or in different 
circumstances, could have governed within the same parameters encapsulated in the 
Yushin Constitution and yet have achieved more universally favourable outcomes6. It 
can, after all, be argued that there is nothing wrong with a `dictator's charter' providing 
the dictator for whom the charter is drafted is both wise and compassionate. Such a 
licence could even be considered as `democratic' if it had the approval, and represented 
the preference, of the majority of the populace. By the end of 1972, however, and after 
more than a decade in power, Park Chung-hee had forfeited any claim he might 
previously have had to either of the exemplary qualities of wisdom and compassion. 
2.6 Background To Yushin 
Two processes germane to the events of October, 1972 began to unfold during 
the 1960's; one internal and the other international. The internal process was that of the 
growing opposition, on many fronts, to the Park regime and which constitutes the core 
of this study. The international process, on the other hand, acquired added and 
dramatic momentum on 25 July, 1969 when US President Richard Nixon spelled out 
what came to be known as his `Guam Doctrine'. This shift in US foreign policy was 
driven by the imperative for that nation to extricate itself from the conflict in Vietnam. 
In essence, the Guam Doctrine stated that unless any nation in Asia was confronted by a 
threat from a nuclear power, the US would not intervene. Furthermore, Nixon made it 
clear that US military aid programmes, particularly where they involved the disposition 
of American troops on foreign soil, would be attenuated. Changes in the international 
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stance of the US were not confined to broad generalisations or hypotheses, the 
acceleration of US/China rapprochement and moves towards agreement on peaceful co- 
existence between Washington and Moscow added to the sense of alarm being felt by 
the South Korean government (Ha Bong-gyu, 1989). These shifts in policy and intent 
must, after all, be viewed from the perspective of a nation that was founded on the basis 
of the Cold War and whose security, and thus existence, was entirely dependent upon 
the continuing commitment of the US to its `containment' strategy. 
Internally, Park Chung-hee faced three discrete challenges: one being from 
within his own party, the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), the second being from 
the main opposition party, the New Democratic Party (NDP), which, on 29 September, 
1970, elected Kim Dae-jung as its leader, and the third being the burgeoning extra- 
parliamentary dissident movements which included religious organisations, students, 
intellectuals, and the growing mass of disaffected workers (Sohn Hak-kyu, 1989). The 
first of the above challenges was countered by a series of purges, expulsions, and 
enforced resignations which effectively de-politicised and marginalised any individual 
or faction that was perceived to constitute a threat to Park's leadership and authority in 
the DRP. The suppression and eradication of the other two challenges was the raison 
d'etre of the Yushin reform, and all that was required to facilitate its implementation 
was a sufficiently convincing justification. 
Confronted by the potentially disastrous consequences, as he saw them, of the 
withdrawal of the US security umbrella, Park Chung-hee had two distinct options: he 
could initiate a rapid and overt expansion of South Korea's military capability in order 
to point up to any would-be aggressor the inadvisability of such an adventure, or he 
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could embark upon a process designed to reduce tension between North and South and 
thereby pave the way for a relationship of `peaceful co-existence' or even unification 
(Sohn Hak-kyu, 1989). 7 It is entirely consonant with his philosophy of government that 
Park elected to embrace both options, and his responses to these international 
diplomatic, and internal socio-political, developments illustrate both his opportunism 
and his duplicity. Opportunist insofar as he believed that he could utilise the national 
security issue to justify his assumption of absolute power, and duplicitous in the way 
that his public actions bore no relation to his private intent. 
Within months of US President Richard Nixon's `isolationist' pronouncement 
on the island of Guam, the Park administration launched a peace initiative aimed at the 
Kim Il-Sung regime in North Korea. This initiative appeared to be of real substance and 
was strongly encouraged by the United States and positively received by Kim Il-Sung. 
By August, 1971 a dialogue, mediated by the South Korean Red Cross, resulted in 
secret exchanges taking place in the following December. In the very same month, and 
much to the chagrin of the US State Department, Park Chung-hee declared a State of 
National Emergency on the grounds that: "fanatical war preparations of the North 
Korean puppet" were taking place (ECCKP, 1975). Casting some doubt on the veracity 
of these grounds, a US State Department spokesman asserted that: 
The US has no evidence to support the claim that North Korea has acted 
provocatively (Quoted in Ha Bong-gyu, 1989). 
Thus, the first major step toward the achievement of `legitimate' authoritarian 
rule was accomplished despite there being no legal basis for Park's proclamation other 
than his inaugural oath to "defend the state". 
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Almost as though the State of National Emergency and, more pertinently, the 
alleged justification for it, were incidental to the primary focus, Park permitted the 
North/South diplomatic initiatives to escalate to such an extent that, on 4 July, 1972, a 
joint communique was issued declaring that: 
First, unification shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts and 
not subject to external imposition or interference. Second, unification shall 
be achieved through peaceful means, and not through the use of force 
against each other. Third, as a homogenous people, a great national unity 
shall be sought above all, transcending differences in ideologies and systems 
(Quoted in Sohn Hak-kyu, 1989). 
Barely three months after this historic announcement, and amid a widespread 
atmosphere of excitement and optimism generated by it, Park Chung-hee issued the 
proclamation of Martial Law which brought his manoeuvring for absolute power finally 
to fruition. In the light of the reality of events, and despite his protestations to the 
contrary, the introduction of the Yushin reforms could not be justified on the basis of a 
threat to national security (ECCKP, 1975). It is considered that a more credible 
explanation for the Park regime's apparent enthusiasm for detente with the North is that 
the `peace' process bought time in which to complete a military build-up; while the real 
reason behind the introduction of the Yushin reforms, far from being to protect the 
nation from external threat, was a palpable expression of Park's fundamentally anti- 
democratic nature and his single-minded determination to crush all internal opposition. 
2.7 Pre-Yushin Legislation 
Labour legislation implemented by the US occupation administration in Japan 
after that nation's surrender in August, 1945 mirrored the legislation that had evolved in 
the United States; whilst the Labour Standard Law (LSL), first enacted in Korea in 
1953, was no more than a verbatim translation of the counterpart instrument previously 
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imposed in Japan (Sohn Hak-kyu, 1989). For reasons discussed elsewhere in this study 
the US administration in Japan was far more in tune with Japanese domestic 
circumstances post-World War II than was the case with the AMG in Seoul during its 
incumbency from September, 1945 until June, 1947. Whereas the `American model' of 
labour management might be seen to have proved efficacious in Japan, it was singularly 
unsuited to Korean social, cultural, and industrial circumstances. It was a `modern' 
piece of legislation; modern, that is, in Korean terms, which prescribed all the usual 
protections implicit in the administration of labour forces in advanced nations but, as 
will be shown, in South Korea during the 1960's and 1970's only some large 
companies dependent upon skilled employees saw it as being in their interest to comply 
with its provisions. Smaller firms, epitomised by the myriad of `sweat-shops' in the 
Peace Market which constitute the focus of this study, could ignore the LSL with 
impunity, even such fundamental entitlements as payment for overtime or night work 
being routinely denied. The precise means whereby small-scale employers of unskilled 
labour could overtly bypass the requirements of state legislation and, indeed, how the 
state colluded with such evasion, will be discussed under separate headings. 
The imperative to take cultural and social differences into account before 
legislation deemed appropriate in one society can, with a modicum of anticipation of 
success, be transplanted into another is both interesting and important, especially so in 
the case of South Korea. It is, therefore, considered useful and relevant to examine the 
issue in closer detail. 
It is a matter of historical record that the process of developing a sophisticated 
framework of labour law in the United States was both protracted and substantially 
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influenced by the activities of workers, as opposed to constituting merely the reflections 
of governmental or managerial preference (Porges, 1991). For example, legislation 
defining the evolution of the collective bargaining system in the US can be traced 
through the Clayton Act of 1914, the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932, the Wagner Act of 
1935, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959: almost half a 
century of the gradual modification and enshrinement into law of the rights and the 
protection of workers. Thus, the structure, the spirit, and the application of labour laws 
in the United States resulted from a dialectic extending over many years between 
American governments, the American judiciary, American management, and the 
American labour force. Crucially, that dialectic was grounded upon the circumstances 
and problems specific to the American industrial experience, and the outcome, not 
unreasonably, was a labour organisation that it was anticipated would be particularly 
suited to the United States (Huntington, 1968). With that in mind, it is submitted that a 
degree of insouciance or hubris, or both, would be necessary to assume that identical, or 
even similar, outcomes could be achieved by the application in totally different 
circumstances of such a singular template. 
Numerous references are made throughout this study to the pervasive influence 
of traditional Confucian ideals in Korean society and there is no doubt that, although the 
latter part of the twentieth century witnessed a dilution of that influence due to the 
infiltration of western mores, those ancient principles continue to play a significant part 
in Korean life. This is certainly true in respect to the individual's attitude not only to the 
concept of `authority', but also to the very idea of what is `right' and what is `wrong' 
(Lee Man-woo, 1990). These collective psychological traits are fundamental to any 
explanation of societal behaviour and throw into the starkest contrast the differences 
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between personalities and circumstances in Korea and those which pertained in the 
United States during the period of the formulation of that nation's labour system. They 
do, therefore, merit further consideration in this study. 
Confucianism not only embraces the concept of authoritarian rule, but 
positively encourages its adherents to serve the ruler without question and without 
reference to any extraneous `law', whether that ruler be the monarch, the head of the 
family, or the boss of the company. Thus, the concept of `the supremacy of the law' 
generally held in non-Confucian western societies, that fundamental and universal 
principle of fairness and `just deserts' to which all citizens, with no exception and no 
matter how exalted, are subordinate, runs counter to the grain of traditional Korean 
thought. When community harmony is threatened with disruption by civil or political 
conflict, hierarchical authority immediately exerts itself, and any judgement of the 
`rightness' or `wrongness' of an action is suspended in favour of the preservation of 
peace and order. In effect, `the law' is whatever the monarch, the head of the family, or 
the company boss says it is. 
The importance of `conformity' within the Korean psyche is not only in accord 
with the Confucian ethic but has also been substantially reinforced by the fact that over 
the past 4,300 years the Korean peninsula has been subjected to invasion by a foreign 
power, on average, every five years (Pae Sung-moon, 1992). It is submitted that any 
nation whose history is so characterised by invasion and enforced subjugation is likely 
to become socialised into a clearly discernible state of routine obedience within which 
individualism is signally absent. Any society modified in such a way would have no 
tradition of deciding important public issues for itself through the exercise of debate 
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and deliberation and would, therefore, appear ideally conducive to the acceptance, 
through force of habit, of authoritative and dictatorial rule. Furthermore, any coherent 
enquiry into the truth or falsity of a proposition is unlikely to prove successful when the 
art of rigorous debate has atrophied, the overriding imperative becomes one of finding 
conciliation in amicable discourse, even at the expense of the truth. Lee Man-woo 
(1990) sums up succinctly the Korean character, in the context of this section, thus: 
Given the importance of loyalty, hierarchy, family, unity, and uniformity 
emphasised by Confucianism, the potential for arbitrariness and 
authoritarianism is embedded within the culture. The collective 
consciousness of the Korean people still retains many traditional cultural 
traits. Aversion to individualism, diversity, abstract conceptualisation, and 
rationalism is still deeply ingrained. They believe people must share 
homogenous substance and quality in personality, ideas, and the way of life. 
Hence, 
.... management treats 
labour as the enemy (Lee Man-woo, 1990) 
When confronted by a first generation labour force made up almost entirely of 
individual workers each of whom is deeply imbued with an almost spiritual aversion to 
any form of disobedience of established authority, it is not difficult to envisage the 
plethora of inherent difficulties confronting any extra-institutional attempts at labour 
organisation. 
Yet another historical difference between the United States and South Korea, 
and one that further detracted from the likelihood of the US labour organisation model 
being appropriate for direct application by the AMG in Seoul, is the fact that in the 
United States industrialisation preceded unionisation. Thus the process of unionisation 
was one of reaction to problems and circumstances actually being experienced. In 
Korea, on the other hand, labour law was imposed upon a workforce prior to 
industrialisation and, therefore, prior to the experience of labour problems which would 
be unique to the Korean circumstance (Porges, 1991). It is, perhaps, unsurprising that, 
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given the levels of social and political chaos which existed in Korea after World War 11 
and which are discussed in more detail elsewhere in this study, a system for the 
management of labour that was designed in the context of a radically different culture to 
meet substantially different agendas stood little realistic chance of unqualified success. 
In the latter half of the 1960's a number of factors combined to mitigate against 
the Park Chung-hee regime's initial policy of detachment from involvement in the 
shaping of trade union structure and leadership. Most fundamental of these was that the 
extraordinary pace of industrialisation forced the regime to confront a problem endemic 
to all developing societies (Frankel, 1995; Young, 1993; Seidman, 1994; Jayant, et at., 
1996); that is, how best to integrate a rapidly growing labour force consisting entirely of 
first generation industrial workers into a newly industrialised system. Another important 
factor was Park Chung-hee's Second Five Year Plan, initiated in 1967, which required 
a shift from `import substitution' industrialisation and domestic capital mobilisation to 
`export oriented' industrialisation based on foreign capital (Lee Jeong-taik, 1988; Cho 
Soon-kyung, 1987; Amsden, 1989; Lee Ok-jie, 1990; Hart-Landsberg, 1993; Janelli, 
1993; Haggard and Cheng, 1987); the success of which depended upon the maintenance 
of an international comparative advantage in low-wage, passive labour. However, as 
both the size and the political awareness of the labour force grew, and as union 
organisations became more sophisticated, there was a commensurate increase in the 
collective preparedness to confront the state; clearly an unwelcome development that 
demanded governmental attention. The reality of the threat posed by organised labour 
became apparent towards the end of 1968 and early in 1969 when a series of large-scale 
industrial disputes brought about the closure of a number of American-owned 
electronics factories and the loss of much-needed foreign investment (Baker, 1979, 
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Ogle, 1990). Park Chung-hee's predictable response to this labour crisis was to 
institutionalise the direct control of labour in a manner corresponding to the accelerating 
dynamic toward the authoritarianisation of politics discussed elsewhere. 
The turning point in Park's labour policy came in December, 1969 with the 
enactment of the Provisional Exceptional Law Concerning Labour Unions in Foreign 
Invested Firms (PELFIF). As its title suggests, this piece of legislation restricted the 
rights of workers in companies which were either foreign-owned or the recipients of 
foreign investment. Apart from acting as a portent of what was to come, PELFIF had 
minimal immediate effect on unionisation because at the time of its inception foreign 
capital in South Korea was relatively small; forming only 4.3% of total investment. 
(Choi Jang-jip, 1989). Its subsequent impact was to be far more profound, however. 
Economic difficulties and social unrest increased throughout 1970 and 1971 as 
did the number of violations of civil liberties. Unarguably the single most significant 
event, in the context of the emergence of the democratic labour movement, to take place 
during this period was the public self-immolation on 13 November, 1970, of the young 
male textile worker Chun Tae-il8 (You Jong-il, 1995; Kim Hwang-joe, 1993; Cho 
Young-nae, 1984). It was apparent that the society of South Korea was caught 
inextricably in an ever-tightening spiral of opposition to the state, a vortex within which 
opposition was met by harsh reaction which, in turn, generated further opposition and 
even more severe suppression. The frequency of arrests; the use of torture; the absence 
of clemency except in response to massive international pressure and protest; the routine 
use of improper trial procedures, and the severity of punishments meted out, were all 
indicative of the abandonment by the state of the guarantees of civil justice and the 
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ever-widening gap between the ruler and the ruled. 9 (Interviews, Lee Don-Myung and 
Hong Sung-woo, human rights lawyers, March, 1999). But such a downward spiral 
requires two primary actors, and while the Korean people were being subjected to 
increasingly onerous and punitive restrictions, Park Chung-hee was becoming more 
clearly established on an ineluctable path to isolation. 
Finally, on 6 December, 1971, the State of National Emergency referred to 
above was declared on the dual pretext of the threat from North Korea and the 
heightening of international tension. That the true reason for the state of emergency was 
the domestic crisis was graphically confirmed on 27 December when a special bill was 
passed at a secret and illegal sitting of the National Assembly (Yang Sung-chul, 1981). 
The ensuing Law Concerning Special Measures for Safeguarding National Security 
(LSMSNS) granted to Park Chung-hee extraordinary emergency powers which included 
the rights to ban public assemblies and demonstrations, to control "irresponsible 
debates" in the mass media, to freeze wages, rents and prices, to intervene in labour 
disputes, and to mobilise any material or human resources for national purposes (Ha 
Bong-gyu, 1989). It is not easy to reconcile these provisions with either the imperative 
to counter a threat from North Korea or respond to an increase in international tension. 
It is far less difficult, however, to conclude that the Park administration was all too 
aware of the reality of the economic rewards for subjugating the labour force and 
stifling the vox populi. The development of the Korean economy had, after all, become 
a major public issue, and economic progress had been seen by Park, from the earliest 
days of his Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, as the only means by which 
the regime could acquire international legitimacy. 
35 
It is at this juncture that the fundamental misreading of historical fact referred 
to in the introduction to this chapter occurs. The overwhelming majority of South 
Korean industrial relations studies identify the Yushin Constitution as the exemplar, the 
high point, of the subjugation and suppression of the South Korean labour movement. 
As has been described previously, the very mention of the soubriquet `Yushin' can 
trigger a conditioned reflex of association with the sudden implementation of ruthless 
and uncompromising anti-labour legislation. In contradistinction to this widely held 
conviction, however, the view of the author is that it was the LSMSNS, with its 
transformation of collective bargaining practices into a compulsory arbitration 
procedure supervised by the state, and its prohibition of all industrial action, that was 
the watershed in the industrial relations arena during the Park Chung-hee era. The 
Yushin Constitution was not to come into effect for another ten months. 
On 17 October, 1972 a State of Martial Law was proclaimed and, in a manner 
corresponding to the events of the previous December, the pretext for the proclamation 
bore only tenuous connection with the actual motive. The dual justification presented 
was that national unity was essential before meaningful dialogue with North Korea 
could be safely undertaken and, once again, international diplomatic circumstances 
(Sohn Hak-kyu, 1989). These included Park's uncertainty about the outcomes of both 
Sino-US rapprochement and Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalisation; the severing of 
Japan's official ties with Taiwan, and the deteriorating situation in Vietnam. Park also 
felt considerable, and perhaps understandable, insecurity over the withdrawal from 
South Korea of some 20,000 military personnel of the US 7 t" Division that had begun in 
March, 1971 (Ha Bong-gyu, 1989). 
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The immediate effects of the Martial Law decree were the suspension of the 
Constitution (what little of it remained), the dissolution of the National Assembly, and 
the complete revocation of all freedoms of speech and assembly. It also facilitated a 
significant reinforcement of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) and other 
secret service organisations which were omnipresent in labour organisations, 
universities, and the mass media (Ha Bong-gyu, 1989). What the decree constituted in 
reality was a `coup in office', the disassembly of the Third Republic, and a precursor for 
Park's assumption of absolute power: by the end of October, 1972 it was given 
permanence in the form of the Yushin Constitution. 
In the short transition period between the Third and Fourth Republics, a 
National Conference for Unification (NCU) was formed in order to retain at least a 
semblance of the democratic process, Park Chung-hee, as incumbent president, assumed 
the chairmanship. The NCU was to consist of no less than two thousand, and no more 
than five thousand, members who were publicly elected but who were prohibited from 
alignment with any political party and who were prohibited from the discussion of any 
overtly political issues during their individual election campaigns (Ha Bong-gyu, 1989). 
The NCU was clearly destined to become little more than a `rubber stamp' for decisions 
made exclusively by Park Chung-hee himself. On 23 December, 1972, Park was elected 
first President of the Fourth Republic. 
2.8 The Yushin Constitution: Salient Features 
The overriding tenor of the new Constitution was the great distinction and 
emphasis it placed on the office of president, the administrative structure of the Fourth 
Republic being based entirely on the changes made to the relationships between that 
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office and all other branches of government. In so doing, it gave legal form to the 
decline of party politics that Park Chung-hee had initiated during the latter part of the 
1960's. Whilst the constitutions of the Second and Third Republics had guaranteed the 
plurality of the political party system, any effort to encourage the growth of political 
parties was absent from the Yushin Constitution. On the contrary, the previous 
requirement for all candidates for elective office, including those of membership of the 
National Assembly and the office of President itself, to be endorsed by a recognised 
political party, was removed (Sohn Hak-kyu, 1989). Factionalism had been at the centre 
of many problems experienced in South Korea since the time of partition, and the 
resultant plethora of independent, unendorsed candidates would clearly lend credence to 
the `divide and rule' axiom. Having acquired his `rubber stamp', Park Chung-hee's 
marked preference for a strong executive over strong legislative and judicial systems 
was to be allowed free rein, and his inherent distaste for `politics' was to find a more 
propitious ambience. 
Under the provisions of the Yushin Constitution, limitations on presidential 
terms were also removed; he was empowered to make political appointments; nominate 
one-third of the members of the National Assembly and, perhaps most crucial of all, as 
will be illustrated below, issue any decree he deemed appropriate. The structures of the 
one-house National Assembly, and the Supreme Court, were weakened, and on the 
question of local self-government, the devolutionary process begun by Chang Myon 
that would detract substantially from the absolute power of the president, Park was 
unequivocal: 
Local assemblies under the present Constitution shall not be formed until the 
unification of the fatherland has been achieved (Article 10, The Constitution 
of the Republic of Korea 1972). 
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Having used emergency legislation to great effect, albeit with questionable 
legitimacy, it is not surprising that Park should enshrine such powers in his new 
constitution. Article 53 informed the Korean people that. 
In time of natural calamity or a grave financial or economic crisis, and in 
case the national security or the public safety and order is seriously 
threatened ..... the president shall 
have power to take necessary emergency 
measures in the whole range of the state affairs, including internal affairs, 
foreign affairs, national defence, economic, financial, and judicial affairs 
(Ibid. ). 
The precise interpretation of `calamity', `crisis', `necessary emergency measures', and 
`seriously threatened' is clearly fundamental to the practical efficacy of this instrument 
and, as in all other administrative matters, such interpretation was at the sole discretion 
of Park Chung-hee himself. 
The utility of the martial law device was also reflected in the Yushin 
Constitution, as was the breadth of the president's latitude to declare it: 
... 
in time of war, armed conflict or similar national emergency, when there 
was a military necessity, or a necessity to maintain the public safety and 
order by mobilisation of the military forces (Article 54(l) Ibid. ). 
The latitude afforded to the `interpreter' of key words and phrases is, once again, of 
crucial importance. 
From May, 1961 until December, 1972 Park Chung-hee had skilfully 
constructed a multifaceted apparatus for the control of all aspects and levels of South 
Korean society, an apparatus he had frequently utilised in order to bend and manipulate 
the constitution to suit his purpose. His actions were now no longer subject to judicial 
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review (Article 53(4) Ibid. ), and he was the sole arbiter of their legality. In effect, the 
constitution, in Park's hands, had itself had become the ultimate control mechanism. 
Park used the presidential emergency powers invested in him by the Yushin 
Constitution on numerous occasions, and to support the contention that it was Park's 
use of the Constitution that formed the `Yushin System', not the Constitution itself, 
three idiosyncratic examples are submitted. On 9 January, 1974, Emergency Decree No. 
1 was issued: 
It shall be prohibited for any person to deny, oppose, misrepresent, or 
defame the constitution of the Republic of Korea. Any person who violates 
or defames the present emergency measures shall be subject to arrest, 
detention, search or seizure, without warrant thereof, and shall be tried and 
sentenced in the emergency courts martial and shall be punished by 
imprisonment (Laws and Documents, Korea Annual 1975). 
Thus, all criticism of Park was outlawed. Under this instrument countless persons were 
arrested, 203 were tried and, in April, 1975,8 were executed1° (ECCKP, 1975). 
Emergency Decree No. 4, promulgated on 3 April, 1974 was designed to counter anti- 
Park activities on the part of students, that segment of Korean society that had long been 
a thorn in the side of successive administrations, and singled out the National 
Democratic Youth and Student Federation. Not only did the decree prohibit the joining 
of that organisation, it also made it illegal for any citizen to: "praise, encourage, or 
sympathise with it" (Ibid. ). 13 May, 1975 witnessed the issue of Emergency Decree 
No. 9 which made it a criminal offence to: "spread false rumours" (Laws and 
Documents, Korea Annual 1977). 
These examples, and others of similar ilk, which effectively rendered any 
criticism of the state, in public or in private, and in any form whatsoever, an indictable 
40 
offence, are direct reflections both of Park's intent and of his paranoia; they are not 
attributable to the Yushin Constitution per se. 
The aim of our revolution was not to ignore the value of democracy but to 
lay a solid foundation for rebuilding true democracy.......... the author 
believes that the democracy we aim to build in this revolutionary period 
should be the one that meets social and political reality, and not the 
unworkable West European democracy (Park Chung-hee, 1962). 
After his assassination, one of his associates recalled: 
The impression that Park's domain was infested with his intelligence agents 
permeated every nook and cranny of the society. A sense of the immediacy 
of his governance pervaded the whole country. Bureaucrats, politicians, 
judges, military men, diplomats, businessmen, journalists, professors and 
scholars - not to mention his minions and sycophants - all performed for a 
one-man audience, "the personage on high". When it was necessary to refer 
to him in private conversations, even his critics resorted to hushed 
euphemisms (Quoted in Clifford, 1994). 
The irony is that instead of `Koreanising' democracy, Park destroyed it. 
As has already been highlighted, the labour movement was not greatly affected 
by the provisions of the Yushin Constitution because the fundamental changes in 
policies pertinent to labour had been enacted ten months previously in the Law 
Concerning Special Measures for Safeguarding National Security. Neither the 
Constitution itself, nor the subsequent revisions to labour laws which were to take place 
in March, 1973 and December, 1974 were, of themselves, of major import; they were, 
in fact, little more than restatements of LSMSNS. However, LSMSNS did have a dual 
implication for the labour movement that was to engender major repercussions and 
developments. On the one hand there was the institutionalisation of direct control by the 
state over the growing number of newly-organised unions, and on the other there was 
the added impetus given to the emergence of politically dissident worker groups which 
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were to initiate a cleavage within the labour movement. One side of the cleavage was 
represented by the official, company-dominated, and state-sponsored structure with the 
FKTU at the top, and the other by the unofficial, autonomous, `democratic' 
organisations, led by women workers in the textile and garment industry. For obvious 
reasons the two factions were bitterly antagonistic toward each other, and although the 
`democratic' organisations (which were subsequently to come within the aegis of the 
Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU)) were technically illegal, they could, 
with substantial justification, claim moral legitimacy. Whilst the FKTU continued to 
constitute an integral part of the state mechanism, the activities of the autonomous 
unions rapidly made them both the only centre for the labour rights movement, and a 
political opposition force (Choi Jang-jip, 1989). 
2.9 Economic Overview 
Although subsequent chapters will address the levels of oppression and 
exploitation endured by workers during the period under consideration; ever-worsening 
conditions which flowed directly from Park Chung-hee's systematic tightening of the 
restrictions imposed on organised labour, it is pertinent at this juncture to comment 
upon the broad economic circumstances within which such restrictions were imposed. 
The evidence of South Korea throughout the incumbency of Park Chung-hee 
(1961-1979) may be seen as running directly counter to the hypothesis that the more 
economically successful a country is, the greater the opportunity for improving the 
quality of life for the mass of the population, and for facilitating the advance of social 
democratisation. In the Korean case, extraordinary economic success was achieved 
largely by strategies which markedly reduced the quality of life for the majority of 
42 
working people, and which removed even the most fundamental of human rights. Three 
characteristics of the growth of the Korean economy as a whole are worthy of mention: 
a. Its speed. GNP growth averaged 8.5% per annum between 1962 and 1980, 
and 10% per annum in the peak years 1967-1976, 
b. Reliance upon exports. Merchandise export growth averaged 30% from 
1962-1981, far above any other country in the world. 
c. Relatively fast inflation 
(Calverley, 1982) 
Interestingly, Calverley lists one more indicator of the Korean economy and, in 
so doing, falls foul of one of the statistical problems, that of the trustworthiness of the 
source, highlighted in Chapter Four. For the same period covered by the three 
characteristics noted above, Calverley compliments the economy for: 
Its equity. The distribution of income in Korea between urban and rural 
sectors and among the population is one of the most equitable of developing 
countries (Ibid. ). 
Those tens of thousands of workers, mainly women, who laboured 
interminably in the sweat-shops of the Peace Market and the surrounding area would 
have found such an assertion somewhat difficult to reconcile with their own experience. 
Difficult, that is, until they noted the sources of the figures upon which the compliment 
was based. Those sources were the Bank of Korea, an institution under the control of 
Park Chung-hee, and the Economic Planning Board, originally entitled the Ministry of 
Reconstruction, and led by the Deputy Prime Minister who. "received his instructions 
directly from the President" (Kim Kihwan, 1993). 
Statistics which do accord with all the primary and personal evidence garnered 
by the author, and which were produced by the Christian Institute for the Study of 
Justice and Development (CISJD), clearly illustrate that, far from being distinguished 
by its equity, income inequality progressively increased during the Yushin period, and 
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substantiate the reality of the practical application of Park Chung-hee's `growth first, 
distribution later' imperative, and of his regime's harsh labour controls. Between 1970 
and 1978 the income share of GNP of the top 20% of the population increased from 
41.6% to 46.7%, whilst that of the middle 40% fell from 38.8% to 37.8%, and that of 
the lowest 40%, the band in which those selfsame women workers were located, fell 
even more substantially from 19.6% to 15.5% (CISJD 1980 and 1987). In a World 
Development Report published in 1981 by the World Bank, South Korea was credited 
with the highest rate of growth in manufacturing production and industrial exports of 
the 124 countries surveyed during the two decades 1960 - 1979, and was second only to 
Singapore in the highest rate of GNP growth per capita. In real terms, the value of 
exports from Korea increased from $US41 million in 1961 to $US 10.23 billion in 1978 
(World Bank, 1981). 
The added irony behind these statistics was that the contribution made by the 
textile and garment industry to this extraordinarily rapid economic expansion was 
greater than any other single industry, with an annual growth rate between 1967 and 
1971 of 28.5%; in 1972 36.2%, and in 1973 39.9%. Meanwhile, between 1970 and 1973 
the price of rice increased by more than 62% (World Bank Economic Report, 1976). 
Chapter Seven will highlight the paucity of the wages paid to the women and young 
girls who comprised the majority of the workforce in the textile and garment industry 
and the ease with which employers could avoid paying even what was due, let alone 
contemplate wage increases. Against this backdrop of a booming economy, chronic low 
wages for those who contributed most to its achievement, an ever-widening gap 
between the rich minority and the poor majority, and a steep escalation in the price of 
staple domestic commodities, it is unsurprising that the rising level of expectation 
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among workers was matched by their increasing dissatisfaction. The combination of a 
low paid industrial workforce and a rapid expansion of employment had initiated the 
formation of a homogeneous, first generation, working-class, but it was one for which 
formal representation in the workplace had been almost completely emasculated by 
anti-labour legislation (Sohn Hak-kyu, 1989). Nevertheless, the speed of economic 
growth and urbanisation was bound to create strains within Korean society; tensions 
which would inevitably raise the political expectations of the emerging working-class 
and undermine the traditional respect for authority. With the proper performance of 
trade union organisations reduced to virtually nil, an institutional vacuum ensued; a 
vacuum which would be filled by church groups, students, intellectuals and, most 
important of all not only in the context of this study but in the evolution of the Korean 
labour movement as a whole, young women workers in the textile and garment industry. 
45 
NOTES 
1 Rhee Seung-man was from an aristocratic (yangban) background and had been in 
political exile in the United States for more than thirty years. He was in his seventies 
when he returned to Korea after WWII. He had no experience of administering large- 
scale operations, and no interest in economic matters (Oh Kie-chiang, 1999). 
2 It is of interest to note that Park Chung-hee's fellow trainee-officers at the Academy 
included Chang To-yong (Army Chief of Staff at the time of the 1961 coup and, 
therefore, its `nominal' leader in terms of military seniority), Chong Il-kwon (appointed 
Premier of the Third Republic by Park Chung-hee, and instrumental in the formulation 
of the Yushin Constitution), and Kim Jae-kyu, Park's assassin (Ha Bong-gyu, 1989). 
3 This is by no means the only detail of Park's life which remains uncertain. Even the 
number of times he was married is shrouded in mystery, and ranges between one and 
three (Yang Sung-chul, 1981). 
4 That the 1961 coup was actually planned prior to the fall of Rhee Seung-man renders 
spurious and opportunistic Park Chung-hee's claim that it was precipitated by socio- 
political unrest under Chang Myon (Sohn Hak-kyu, 1989). 
5 Chun Pyong is dealt with in more detail in Chapter Nine. 
6 The latitude afforded by the Yushin Constitution to the Park administration is 
exemplified by the frequency with which admirable provisions, admirable, that is, from 
a liberal democratic perspective, are qualified with such caveats as: "within the scope 
defined by law" and "shall be determined by law". For example, Article 29(1) states: 
The right to association, collective bargaining and collective action of 
workers shall be guaranteed within the scope defined by law (author's 
italics) (The Constitution of the Republic of Korea 1972, Laws and 
Documents, Korea Annual 1975). 
7 It is of importance to note that, constitutionally, unification of North Korea and South 
Korea was not an `optional extra' to be used as a bargaining chip on the whim of the 
president but was, instead, a fundamental tenet. Article 46 of The Constitution of the 
Republic of Korea 1972 states: 
Before the President assumes his office, he shall take the following oath: I 
do solemnly swear before the people that, by observing the Constitution, 
defending the State, endeavouring to promote freedom and welfare of the 
people and pursuing the peaceful unification of the fatherland (author's 
italics), I shall faithfully execute the duties of the office of the President 
(Ibid. ). 
8 The degree to which this symbolic act brought the issues of labour to the forefront of 
South Korean debate, and galvanised the democratic movement into positive action is 
discussed in Chapter Eleven. 
9 The precise nature and magnitude of these infringements is dealt with in detail in later 
chapters. 
10 In July, 1974, poet Kim Chi-ha was sentenced to death for writing a poem critical of 
Park Chung-hee. When his defence lawyer, Kang Shin-ok, commented that justice in 
Korea was now more harsh than under Japanese colonial rule, he was awarded a ten 
year prison sentence and barred from practising law for twenty years (Kang Sug-won, 
1977). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF WOMEN IN THE 
1970's KOREAN LABOUR MOVEMENT 
3.0 Introduction 
As a discipline, industrial relations has iieº'er beeil vc/y interested in the 
experiences of women, as workers or u.,; trade unionists. The centre of 
attention has long been occupied by men. The workers, the organisers, the 
strikers; all have been men. One looks in vain. for the contributions of 
women: their organising drives, their strikes, are 'ri. s., sing ' from the 
history books. Of women, we learn mostly that they ºi'ere cheap, unskilled 
labour; potential strike-breakers who threatened to take away men '. s 
, 
jobs 
(Forrest, 1993). 
In the many accounts of trade unionism in Korea, there is a neglect of the role 
and place of women. It is argued that this neglect is part of a general outlook, reflected 
in public assessments of the society, that systematically ignores the social and political 
involvement and activity of women in the construction and development of the society. 
More specifically, it is submitted that the portrayal of the contribution of Korean women 
labour activists of the 1970's has fallen victim to precisely this type of analysis. 
To present as a tangible account the `conventional view' of the involvement of 
women in the 1970's labour movement, abstracts are taken from a selection of works 
which can be regarded as representative of this type of analysis (e. g. Choi Byung-soo, 
1984; Sohn Hak-kyu, 1989; Choi Jang-jip, 1989; Kim Kum-soo, 1989). Although the 
majority of studies focusing upon this issue have been produced by men, there are 
distinctive feminist views which, despite being of lesser substance, are relevant and 
worthy of note. The account would be incomplete were this element to be omitted. The 
feminist perspectives emanate both from western disciplines (e. g. Karl, 1995, Heyzer, 
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1986, Enloe, 1983) and from within South Korea itself (e. g. Cho Wha-soon, 1988; Shin 
In-ryong, 1984 and 1985, Kim Sun-kyung, 1997, Soon Young Song Yoon, 1977). 
However, due to the shortage of material, the discussion will be relatively brief 
An exposition of the above perspectives in this chapter will, in effect, lay the 
groundwork for the construction of an alternative view. This alternative account is 
supported, not least, by evidence gained from women workers who were actively 
involved in the democratic trade union movement in the 1970's. The author subscribes 
unequivocally to the belief that a person with experience is never at the mercy of a 
person with an argument. 
3.1 General Characteristics 
It is accepted as given, by those who have contributed to, and systematically 
reinforced, the widely accepted image of industrial relations of the period in question, 
that in terms of union democracy, authoritarian leadership, labour aristocracy, union 
corruption and union legitimacy, there exists a clear bifurcation of South Korean trade 
union philosophy and activity. As defined in the work of Pang Yong-suk and Lee Mok- 
hee (1990), one strand of Korean unionism was the national-level union epitomised by 
the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), whose leaders were appointed either 
directly by the military government or by the managers of individual enterprises, thus 
seriously compromising any possibility of autonomy, and whose administrations and 
organisations were, as a consequence, largely characterised by a marked anti-labour 
ethos. One of the first acts undertaken by the Park Chung-hee regime following the 
military coup of 16 May, 1961 was the dissolution of all social and political institutions, 
including trade unions (Lee Jeong-taik, 1988, Deyo, 1987). Three months later, nine 
4 
Park Chung-hee placemen (Lee Kyu-chul (Chair of Reformim-, Committee), Han Ki-soo 
(Secretary and spokesperson), Lee Kang-cho (Organiser), Cho Chang-hwa (Financial 
Secretary), Kim Kang-soo, Cho Kyu-dong, An Kang-soo, Choi Jae-joon, Kim Joon-ho 
(Members), FKTU, 1979), re-formed and reorganised the FKTU. This was done in a 
manner that accorded with the `special education' they had received from the Korean 
Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) over a period of one week immediately prior to the 
reformation (Lee Mok-hee, 1996). Under such circumstances it is difficult to reconcile 
the purpose and dynamic of the post-coup FKTU as one that provided advantageous 
representation of members' interests. 
The second strand of philosophy and activism in the Korean labour sphere is 
commonly, and collectively, referred to as the `democratic' trade union movement; that 
is, the informally-institutionalised, officially unrecognised, popular movement that 
developed outside the aegis and control of both the FKTU and the Ministry of Labour. 
Most of the branch unions which constituted the democratic movement were located 
within the light manufacturing sector; notably textiles, electronics, and garments, and 
were required by law to be affiliated with a national-level union (Deyo, 1987). In the 
case of garment and textile workers this was the National Textile Workers Union 
(NTWU). The national-level union was, in turn, compelled by legislation to affiliate 
with the FKTU. Although nominally and bureaucratically bound to the regime- 
prescribed Federation, the roots of the democratic movement lie in the refusal by local 
level union leaders, who were predominantly female, to accede either to FKTU control 
or manipulation by capital. 
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3.2 The Conventional View 
When 1 was finally able to return to my home after two and a half years in 
hiding, from 1978 to 1981,1 was deeply hurt to find that many unjustified 
labels had been hung on me. Apparently, I was a paternalist, an economic 
unionist, a pragmatist, a revisionist, and a romantic (Chung Myong-ja, 1998, 
executive member of the Dong-il Textile branch union throughout the 
1970's). 
The salient features of the allegedly minimal role played by women in the 
1970's Korean trade union movement are held to be that it was purely economic in 
character, devoid of political perspective, with a wilful absence of solidarity with like- 
minded organisations, and that it was not grounded on any coherent ideology (Kim 
Kum-soo, 1989, Chang Myung-kuk, 1991). Endowed with such all-encompassing and 
fundamental defects, it is not surprising that the legacy bequeathed by the women 
activists of the 1970's to the labour movement as a whole is considered to be negligible. 
3.2.1 Economic Unionism 
At the core of the conventional assessment of the activities of Korean women 
labour activists in the 1970's lies the conviction that they were merely bargaining agents 
intent upon securing a larger slice of the economic cake. The scope of their collective 
ambition did not, it is contended, extend to the procurement of the entire cake, or to that 
of the factory in which it was produced. Male writers and commentators such as Min 
Young-sik, 1987: Park Hyun-chae, 1987; Kim Kum-soo, 1984,1989, Her Sang-soo, 
1990; Chang Myung-kuk, 1991, Choi Byung-soo, 1984, Chong In, 1987, and You Jong- 
il, 1996, share a common theme in the assertion that the principal characteristic of the 
1970's women's labour movement was economic, and that the motivation for initial 
formation, and the singular goal of all ongoing union activities, was centred solely upon 
the imperative to improve working conditions Furthermore, and underlining this 
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inward-looking trait, it is held that the simplistic and single-minded efforts to increase 
wages and improve fringe benefits were confined to individual enterprise unions; no 
efforts were made to combine with other branches, and no suggestion that there was any 
awareness of the added strength that solidarity would engender. References are 
frequently made to a statistic that of the 9,536 disputes recorded between 1971 and 1979 
almost 75% were triggered by demands for wage increases, the payment for overtime 
work, or the payment of wages which were overdue (e. g. Park Hyun-chae, 1985). Often 
quoted are the examples of the Pangnim textile workers' strike in 1974 (see Chapter 
Eight), which centred upon the demand for the remittance of unpaid over-time, and the 
Hae-tae sweet factory workers' efforts in 1979 to have their working day reduced to 
eight hours (Soon Jum-soon, 1984). Neither of these individual enterprise actions can be 
regarded as achievements of major significance by themselves and, if analytical focus is 
centred almost exclusively on these, and similar incidents, the impression can indeed be 
gained of a concentration on the purely parochial and exclusively economic. 
Whilst accepting that the issue of low wages was a powerful instrument in the 
efforts to mobilise workers during the period, Kim Kurn-soo (1989) insists that the total 
absence of additional ideological underpinning or, indeed, any coherent structure 
whatsoever, detracted markedly from the practical effectiveness of the movement. 
Focusing on an agenda limited to wages and working conditions was strategically 
inappropriate in circumstances in which the real objectives were crystal clear. The 
economic policy of the Park regime, especially in the first years of the 1970's, was 
exclusively export-based and, as far as Park was concerned, crucial to the success of 
that protracted export drive was the imperative to establish and maintain comparative 
advantage in world markets by keeping labour costs as low as possible. Dissipating the 
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potential power and influence of mobilised labour on a fragmented scenario of isolated 
wage claims was not only a case of attacking the symptom rather than the illness, it was 
fundamentally nave and ultimately futile. 
Two complementary factors underlie these conventional and widespread 
criticisms, based on a view of trade union consciousness of the women workers. First, it 
is argued that the women did not understand the Marxist theory of economics wherein 
capitalism is, of necessity, a form of exploitation that can only be resolved by revolution 
and, second, they did not recognise the need for workers and intellectuals to come 
together in political alliance to remedy the `crisis of capitalism'. Because they had no 
awareness of the wider implications of the Yushin reforms, nor any knowledge of 
historical materialism, the women activists failed to recognise the magnitude of the 
change that was necessary or the means by which it could be brought about (Chong In, 
1985; Kim Kum-soo, 1989; Chang Mong-kuk, 1991). In other words, and on a more 
practical level, there is the implied criticism that Korean women workers were narrowly 
focused because they did not consciously recognise that the fundamental tenet for the 
proper function of any trade union movement is to extend its strategic sphere of interest 
beyond a narrow focus on wages and conditions, and work towards the assertion of the 
power of organised labour in the formation and implementation of political and social 
policy. 
Chong In (1985) elaborates this argument by suggesting that the economic 
unionism that characterised the women's movement constituted a positive danger to the 
nascent labour movement as a whole. He submits the proposition that when confronted 
by a regime intent upon the repression of labour, a loosely bound organisation 
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motivated only by economic and self-regarding considerations would not possess either 
the confidence, the resolve, or the resilience to resist the gathering opposition to trade 
union development. Chong cites the events following the assassination of President Park 
Chung-hee in 1979 as both a confirmation of his viewpoint and a clear indication that 
labour activists in the 1980's benefited little, if at all, from any legacy bequeathed by 
their predecessors in the 1970's. The incoming military dictator, General Chun Doo- 
hwan, revised radically the labour legislation put in place by the previous administration 
and ordered the complete restructuring of trade union organisation from industrial level 
to enterprise level. Women activists in the democratically organised unions were 
dismissed from their employment under the terms of the new legislation, were sent to 
`re-education' camps, and some were imprisoned, all without any resistance whatsoever 
(Choi Byung-soo, 1985). They were, in effect, totally defeated almost by a single stroke 
of the dictator's pen, and the conventional assumption is that these events provided 
ample evidence that the activists of the 1980's had gained nothing of lasting value from 
the endeavours of the 1970's women trade unionists. They had inherited no ideological 
bedrock, no strategic awareness, and no political consciousness simply because those 
crucial elements were absent from the collective mind-set of their predecessors, who 
had been driven only by parochial self-interest. The accepted view is that, in their 
short-sighted attempts to achieve immediate, and localised, outcomes, the activists of 
the 1970's had developed no universal labour principles or long-term perspectives, and 
they had thus failed to create a coherent and adaptable basis that would translate across 
the decades and upon which responses to attacks by the state on the labour movement 
might be grounded. 
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3.2.2 Lack Of Political Perspective 
It is clear that the criticisms contained within the previous section are 
inextricably linked with the accusation that the 1970's women activists were devoid of 
political perspective. Whilst accepting the validity of economic considerations, Chang 
Myung-kuk (1994) is unequivocal in his declaration that such considerations, and the 
activities they stimulate, must take second place to an all-encompassing and universally 
accepted political consciousness. In his 1984 study, Choi Byung-soo insists that 
although the 1970's women applied all their efforts to the achievement of purely 
economic ends, they lost the initiative even in that limited sphere simply because of 
their political immaturity and their inability to grasp the most fundamental socio- 
political realities. Throughout the 1960's and the 1970's, Park Chung-hee adapted and 
redrafted the South Korean Constitution and labour legislation virtually at will (Park 
Young-ki, 1986), and although each successive alteration and innovation invariably 
increased the repression of working people, according to these commentators there 
appeared to be no comprehension among women workers of the political process that 
was unfolding, of the serious consequences of allowing that process to go unchecked, or 
of any means by which it might be challenged. 
In his critical assessment Kim Kum-soo (1986) finds an explanation for the 
perceived failure of the 1970's women to pass on a baton of any consequence to their 
counterparts in the 1980's: the concentration on working conditions at the expense of 
the development of a universal labour rationale and a sound political base resulted in an 
absence of influence with both the political opposition parties and, perhaps more 
crucially, the wider Korean society. He is saying, in effect, that beyond the narrow 
confines of individual factory walls, little, if any, impact was generated by the activities 
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of those women trade unionists inside the factories. Thus there is identified a duality of 
prerequisites for a mature, effective, and progressive trade union movement: to combine 
with intellectuals in order to formulate an all-encompassing theoretical and ideological 
base, and to align positively with the officially recognised political opposition in order 
to utilise a formally structured channel for dialogue between trade union and 
government; a channel that should have been, but was not, provided by the FKTU. 
Despite recognition being afforded to the efforts of women to organise 
educational programmes for the purpose of encouraging union members to participate 
more comprehensively in union activities, sharp criticism is levelled against both the 
content of those programmes, and the fact that they were conducted, by and large, under 
the aegis of the church. During the 1970's, there were two pre-eminent religious 
organisations dedicated to the cause of Korean working people, the Protestant Urban 
Industrial Mission (UIM), and the Young Catholic Workers' Organisation (JOC, from 
the French Jeunesse Ouvriere Chretienne). According to Kim Kum-soo (1986), lectures 
and discussion groups instituted and directed by these religious bodies were restricted to 
such fundamentals as why trade unions were necessary, explanations of labour laws and 
how they affected individual workers, the gender inequalities explicit in the division of 
labour, and an introduction to the art of negotiation. What was notable by its absence 
was any reference to political matters. Thus, it is claimed, rank and file union members 
and leaders alike remained ignorant of the true nature of the obstacles which confronted 
them. Yet again, such a serious omission could only render inevitable the attenuation of 
meaningful labour movement development. MinYoung-sik (1987) lays the blame for 
the opportunism and revisionism that he detects in the 1970's women's labour 
movement firmly at the church's door, inasmuch as whatever degree of solidarity there 
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may have been among the women, the nature of the church's influence ensured that it 
existed between church groups, rather than between branch union groups. Women were 
encouraged to consider their own circumstances and to devise strategies for improving 
them in a very localised way. In so doing, they effectively reinterpreted and, at least in 
part, rejected the fundamental tenets of labour collectivism. Chang Myung-kuk's 1991 
study picks up on the detail of church involvement in the education of workers and 
blames that for the development of a paternalistic and dependent ethos among the 
embryonic democratic unions. Chang's paternalism is evidently that less favourable 
interpretation of the concept whereby authority figures regard their subjects as being so 
helpless and childlike as to stand in the same need of control and guidance as children. 
This development led, in turn, to a diminution of self-confidence on the part of the 
young women, an over dependence upon influences originating outside the industrial 
sphere, and their inevitable failure to appreciate, and realise, their potential. 
The alleged reluctance of church bodies to structure the education programmes 
around a political framework, and elect instead to focus on general and simplistic 
expositions of human rights and work entitlements, left the women workers bereft of the 
theoretical base essential for engendering and sustaining meaningful labour activism. It 
is argued that this lack of political consciousness and increasing dependence upon 
clerics who had infiltrated the workplace restrained women union leaders from taking 
initiatives themselves, and from recognising the importance of seeking solidarity with 
other democratic unions. Instead, they directed their efforts toward the survival of their 
own branches when they should have been linking up with like-minded organisations in 
order to protest from a position of collective strenth against the government's anti- Z: ) 
labour policies and the acquiescence of the national-level unions. Due to this failure to 
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observe the maxim: "United we stand, divided we fall", the democratic unions formed 
by the women fell easy prey to the onslaught of the state machine, and were picked off 
one by one. 
Choi Byung-soo (1985) makes much of an extract from a discussion paper 
drafted by the Chonggye Union in 1990 on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of 
the death of Chun Tae-il. When looking back to the 1970's, the paper records: 
We cannot help but confess our great mistake, even though we cannot go 
back and change events. Although we were deeply affected by the 
continuous oppression of the trade union movement and union activists by 
the government, we stood back and adopted very negative strategies aimed 
at the survival of our own organisation. We believed that Martial Law 
would eventually be repealed and that the atmosphere in society would 
begin to improve; then we would be able to recover from our suffering and 
begin to combine with other union organisations. It was distressing to see 
the Ban-do Union dissolved by the government, but it only made us feel 
fortunate that we were still surviving. We did not feel able to resist the 
government's harsh labour policies because, like the remainder of Korean 
society, we were frightened. As full-time union officers we concentrated on 
day to day union activities and ignored the tribulations of our colleagues in 
other unions which were under greater pressure than ours. Our laziness and 
cowardliness were the main causes of the weakening of the labour 
movement. We deeply regret that we were unable to mobilise our members 
to resist at such a crucial moment (Choi Byung-soo, 1985). 
In the event, the Chonggye Union was dissolved by the military regime of 
Chun Doo-hwan in January, 1981 and remained an underground movement until 1984. 
While the leadership of the Chonggye Union stand accused of not learning any lessons 
from events which were overtaking their fellow unions, organisations which succumbed 
subsequently were judged equally remiss in failing to respond to Chonggye's fate. Choi 
Byung-soo (1985) goes further by stating that the failure of the 1970's women workers 
to recognise the need for solidarity with other democratic unions was concomitant with 
the more pernicious failure to pursue a class-based solidarity. At a time when a unified 
democratic trade union could have acted as a catalyst for a much wider social 
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movement, its failure to materialise left a vacuum that was all too readily filled by 
ecclesiastical and/or radical student organisations, all of which had agendas of their 
own, and none of which conformed fully with the aspirations of the embryonic working 
class. The women activists of the 1970's must thereby accept a degree of responsibility 
for failing to seize an opportunity that, had it been taken, might have proved the 
precursor and progenitor of a popular movement that could have realigned the 
subsequent political, economic, and social history of South Korea. 
Such is the range and depth of criticism levelled against the democratic 
endeavours which took place in the South Korea of the 1970's, that some commentators 
(for example Her Sang-soo, 1991) go so far as to suggest that there was, in fact, no such 
entity that could reasonably assume the nomenclature of `trade union movement' at all 
during the decade in question. And even if such an entity did exist, its fragility and 
inadequacy condemned it to the status of an isolated and insignificant historical event. A 
labour movement worthy of the name cannot consist entirely of discrete and 
spontaneous actions limited to individual and gender specific workplaces, especially 
when those singular actions are so readily crushed by the vigorous application of 
governmental labour legislation. If an emergent social organisation fails to capture the 
imagination and commitment of successive generations, regardless of the magnitude 
and severity of obstacles placed in its path, it can only be regarded as, at best, a transient 
phenomenon. 
Not only is the title `trade union' denied, for those same critics also cast 
aspersions on the `democratic' prefix insofar as it is submitted that the influence exerted 
over the women activists and leaders by church figures with their ecclesiastical agendas 
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effectively deprived those women of secular, universally applicable, and industry- 
focused autonomy. That distraction from the `worker goal' was enhanced by the 
articulate and dedicated involvement of university student bodies whose exclusive 
objective was seen not to be that of improving the lives of oppressed workers, but the 
achievement of national reunification, an objective whose attainment would be greatly 
facilitated by utilising the labour movement merely as a convenient vehicle. 
In his 1990 seminar, held at the Chun Tae-il Foundation, Yang Syung-cho 
(1990) included an element of cultural male chauvinism in his explanation of the 
democratic unions' lack of meaningful and lasting impact. He suggested that because 
the leading figures in those unions were, by and large, young single women employed in 
light manufacturing, male workers in the heavy engineering and chemical industries 
viewed it as being beneath their dignity to consider regarding those figures, and their 
aspirations, as paradigms. Yang quotes, as a case in point, the 1974 strike by male 
employees of Hyundai Shipbuilding, an industrial action that failed to develop either 
into unionisation or towards affiliation with the democratic movement and which, 
instead, petered out into obscurity. Hence, it can be surmised that, even had women 
leaders succeeded in coalescing the individual democratic branch unions into a fully 
functioning whole, the process of solidarity would have been halted at the gender 
boundary and the project would have foundered. Her Sang-soo (in Yang Syung-cho, 
1990) also dwells briefly on this gender issue, and repeats an assumption that is deeply 
embedded in the conventional wisdom inasmuch as young women activists were by no 
means dedicated to the cause of democratic trade unionism, even had they fully 
comprehended its meaning, simply because the real focus of their ambition was to find a 
husband as soon as possible and immediately cease working in the factories. The 
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corollary is that the great majority of women workers were never really serious about 
the labour movement, they were merely dilettu, ltes who regarded paid employment as a 
stepping-stone, and one that should be abandoned at the earliest opportunity. 
3.2.3 Inequality Of Risk 
Conventional wisdom does not limit its disparagement of the contribution 
made by women workers in the 1970's to the non-existence of theoretical framework or 
ill-conceived and incoherent collective actions. There is a further assertion that a variety 
of other considerations combined to place women in a much more favourable position 
from which to take a positive stand against both the state and the employers than was 
the case with their male counterparts (Shin In-ryong, 1985, Kim Young-ok, 1986; Lee 
Tae-ho, 1985; Interview, Im Myung-jin, February, 1999). The implication of this type 
of analysis is that the women workers failed to exploit the advantages they had in 
developing trade unionism. 
The overwhelming majority of female workers did not have families which 
were dependent upon their income for survival. Male workers were regarded as the 
bread-winners, whilst women were considered to be working for `pocket money', a little 
extra sum with which they could indulge themselves with small luxuries, or put away to 
increase their marriage dowry. If a woman did make a contribution to her paternal 
family, it would only be as a supplement to the income of the principal wage-earner. 
Women were, first and foremost, temporary workers who had neither the need nor the 
inclination to consider factory work as a career. If they were to get into open conflict 
with the authorities and have court action taken against them, they would not be overly 
affected by gaining a criminal record, whereas for a male worker to be so branded, the 
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impact upon his future employment opportunities could be catastrophic. Even if a prison 
sentence was awarded, the punishment would still be less for a woman than for a man, 
his incarceration could spell disaster for his family, while the woman would suffer a 
mere inconvenience (Lee Tae-ho, 1985, Shin Rhin-young, 1985). On the occasions 
when women workers were dismissed for taking industrial action, the penalty was 
ameliorated by the fact that they would not be homeless, as they always had a family 
home to return to, and from where they could await marriage or contemplate alternative 
job opportunities. Should a man lose his job, however, the immediate result would have 
been the loss of his home, and his family condemned to penury (Interview, Choi Jang- 
jip, March, 1999). 
From the above circumstances it can be deduced that the failure of women 
workers in the 1970's, and especially of their leaders, to lay relevant and viable 
foundations for a flourishing labour movement is difficult to either excuse or explain. 
Even taking into account the harsh and unforgiving political and economic atmosphere 
of the time, in comparison with their male counterparts, the women had so much to gain 
and so little to lose. 
3.3 Korean Views Of Feminism 
As has been stated earlier, the feminist strand of conventional wisdom 
concerning the involvement of women in the 1970's labour movement is sparse, it also 
consists of two uncoordinated, and largely uncomplementary, elements . 
The body of 
work produced by Korean feminists is particularly insubstantial in its analysis of the 
events of the decade under review, whilst that emanating from the west tends to follow a 
stereotypical, and thus inappropriate, model. 
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As a backdrop to this brief section, and as an indication of what might be 
referred to as the state's view of gender difference when applied to the activities of the 
workforce, a phrase that entered common parlance in the latter part of the 1970's is 
worthy of mention. "You won't get a free lunch here, but you will get a free book" 
refers to a pamphlet written by Hong Ji-young (1977), a leading propagandist employed 
by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). The objective of the booklet, 
which was produced in huge numbers and distributed free to male and female workers 
alike, was to spell out the dual message of why, on the one hand, young women were 
attracted to collective activities such as the UIM and JOC groups, and the labour 
movement as a whole, and why, on the other, they were temperamentally unsuited to 
such activities. 
Hong Ji-young (1977) firstly declared that it was part of the female nature to 
be far more susceptible than men to the supposedly humanitarian appeal of communist 
and religion-based labour reform organisations. Lacking the capacity for logical thought 
and moral judgement, women were unable to distinguish between right and wrong, truth 
and falsehood; they were easy prey for articulate and persuasive demagogues. Second, 
the congenital sentimentality, especially of young girls, drew them inexorably toward 
group situations where they could find comfort in numbers, and precluded the 
development of individuality and self-respect. At the same time, women were far more 
vain than men, and were driven to seek higher wages simply by the desire to have more 
money to spend upon themselves and upon their appearance. Third, because they were 
dominated by their emotions, female workers were too easily excited and prone to 
reckless and precipitate action; forms of behaviour which employers, official union 
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leaders, and other administrators found very difficult to deal with. Fourth, women were 
cunning, when they caused trouble in the workplace, as they frequently did, their 
reaction to admonishment was to break down in tears and become hysterical, fully 
aware that their male supervisors would be embarrassed and discomfited, and that they 
would, more often than not, escape censure by means of this ruse. 
There was much more on similar lines in the booklet, but it is submitted that 
sufficient has been reviewed above to provide a flavour of its tone and direction, as well 
as an idea of the nature of the social atmosphere in which it was promulgated, The 
gender-divisive impact it achieved within the Korean working population, and the 
reinforcement it lent to those opposed to the involvement of women in the labour 
movement, are not difficult to assess. 
In what relatively little they do have to say on the matter, Korean feminists 
such as Chong Hyun-back (1990), Cho Soon-kyung (1990), and Park Kee-nam (1990), 
make much of what they regard as an absence of any degree of gender awareness on the 
part of the democratic unions' women leaders. This lack of awareness manifested itself 
in a failure to address and promote specific issues pertinent to women when they were 
engaged in negotiations with employers. Issues such as job discrimination, promotion 
discrimination, maternity leave, flexible working hours, and so on, were ignored, while 
demands centred upon wages were largely concerned with actually being paid sums that 
were overdue or which were owed for working overtime, rather than with the much 
more fundamental question of wage inequality. Blame for this lack of gender awareness 
is laid at the door of the women leaders themselves who, it is claimed, made no attempt 
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to introduce educational measures focused on a feminist agenda for the benefit of both 
themselves and their members. 
An apparent paradox is revealed in research carried out by Park Kee-nam 
(1990), which suggests that working women were more aware of class and political 
issues and anomalies than they were of gender inequalities. This finding is, perhaps, not 
quite as contradistinctive to the male conventional view with regard to the accusation of 
a lack of political awareness as it might at first appear, to know more about Subject A 
than about Subject B could be indicative merely of knowing very little about Subject A 
and absolutely nothing about Subject B. 
One of the most significant outcomes of this failure on the part of the women 
leaders to recognise and act upon gender specific issues was that employers were able to 
continue to populate their workforces with young, inexperienced single girls. Had the 
problems of combining marriage and running the family home with work in the factory 
been satisfactorily addressed, more women would have been able to remain in a wage- 
earning capacity. With the collective strength of their members behind them, it is argued 
that the women leaders could, and should, have negotiated such an outcome (Chung 
Hyun-back, 1990, Cho Soon-kyung, 1990). As it was, however, the errors of omission 
in collective bargaining practices perpetuated the disadvantages experienced by women 
at work, and played into the hands of the employers, who regarded more mature and 
self-assertive married women as constituting a disruptive and troublesome influence on 
the factory floor. Indeed, one of the major selling points publicised by the Park Chung- 
hee regime in its efforts to attract foreign investment into the economy was the 
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depiction of the Korean female workforce as young, docile, disciplined, nimble- 
fingered, hard-working, and cheap (Young, 1993). 
Criticism levelled by Korean feminist writers is not targeted only at the women 
union leaders, and Kim Seung-kyung (1997) is especially scathing about the general 
attitude and level of job expectation which she believes to be representative of the 
women workers of the 1970's as a whole: 
Women regard themselves as little more than temporary workers. They are 
willing to provide the low-paid unskilled labour needed for light industry, 
and their focus on family diverts their attention from labour issues and 
makes them more difficult to organise (Kim Seung-kyung, 1997). 
Western feminist writers have also turned their attention to the circumstances 
of the Asian working woman of the 1970's and have elected to cast her firmly in the 
role of the victim (e. g. Karl, 1995, Young, 1989, Heyzer, 1986, Nam, 1994, Enloe, 
1993). The victim of patriarchal and traditionally patrilinear social mores, the victim of 
state legislation, the victim of employer-generated occupational discrimination, the 
victim of oppression by male fellow-workers and, above all, the victim of her own 
socialised character. Asian women are portrayed as passive, obedient, and compliant, 
inherent characteristics which render them highly susceptible to exploitation in both the 
public and the private spheres, and which clearly run counter to the concept of active 
involvement in a trade union movement. Karl (1995) uses this model to explain why, 
when such a high proportion of the pan-Asian workforce is comprised of women, so 
few of them aspire to positions of leadership in trade unions and, instead, appear content 
with mere passive membership. 
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Most of the relevant western feminist literature focuses on analyses of the 
impact of women upon industrialisation in the Newly Industrialised Countries (NIC's) 
and Late Developing Countries (LDC's) and, within that focus, concentrate upon the 
universally exploitative nature of working conditions (Nash, et al, 1983, Lim, 1983). 
That such conditions can exist in the latter half of the twentieth century is ascribed to 
the contention that dutiful acceptance of one's lot is an intrinsic component of the Asian 
female character, in marked distinction to the character of the Asian male (Enloe, 1983) 
The enormous influx of young women workers, with their aforementioned 
reluctance to participate in any form of collective activity, into the export-led industries 
of the NIC's has frequently been identified as the predominant reason for the general 
weakness of the trade union movement in the NIC's (Karl, 1995). By implication, 
Korean women have been included in the conventional western feminist analyses of the 
plight of working women throughout Asia and, by definition, theories on remedial 
measures are equally general in character. 
3.4 Summary 
Commentators of virtually all persuasions agree that the `official' trade union 
structure as it existed in South Korea in the 1970's was representative of the great mass 
of the working population in name only. The FKTU was led by men who had been put 
in place by the Park Chung-hee regime, and whose sole purpose was to put the most 
favourable slant on government labour policy and relay it to the national workforce. In 
effect, they inverted the universally acknowledged function of a trade union 
organisation, and instead of representing the workers to the government, the FKTU 
represented government to workers. Token gestures, designed to give the impression 
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that the FKTU did, indeed, have the interests of the workforce as its guiding principle, 
were frequently made both in print and in public speeches, but few were convinced by 
such clearly orchestrated, and overtly bogus, manoeuvres. 
The main opposition to the official structure sprang from democratically based 
branch unions located, primarily, in the light manufacturing sector. The membership 
and leadership of these branch unions was made up almost exclusively of women and, 
whilst there is widespread, albeit not unanimous, acceptance that, unlike the FKTU, the 
women's unions were, indeed, democratic, there is general agreement that their efforts 
were ill-conceived, inadequate, and of little, if any, lasting consequence. 
Explanations for the failure of women workers to make any meaningful impact 
on the labour movement include the unsuitability of the female temperament, their lack 
of industrial relations knowledge and trade union theory, the fact that they were 
interested only in themselves as individuals and in their own wage and working 
conditions, and the total absence of political consciousness. The comparative 
unimportance to women of the, hopefully short, time they would spend working in the 
factories detracted from any enthusiasm to participate in labour movement activities, 
and rendered half-hearted, at best, any contribution they might be persuaded to make. 
By their nature, young women were particularly susceptible to the blandishments of 
religious organisations, and were easily diverted from labour issues to agendas which 
were at variance with those of a democratic trade union movement. Finally, and perhaps 
most tellingly, the traditional cultural gender divisions which were prevalent in the 
country at the time rendered it virtually impossible for women to win the support of the 
male workforce. 
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The principal objective of this dissertation is to critically examine these claims 
about trade unionism and women workers. In contrast with previous studies, the focus 
below is on the women workers themselves. As a first step towards this examination, 
the methodology of the research is presented. 
68 
CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
"Truth is independent of facts always" 
(Oscar Wilde) 
4.0 Introduction 
The research was conducted over a period of three years, involving the 
collection and analysis of published and unpublished materials; interviews with key 
informants, from the Peace Market, and elsewhere; many informal discussions with a 
wide range of people in Korea who provided insights into the events covered by the 
thesis, and reflection by the author on her own life and involvement with the Peace 
Market and trade unions. Taken together, this provides a rich body of material which 
constitutes the data for the report. 
This chapter provides an introduction to, and reflection on, the different aspects 
of the research process followed by the author. In the first section the principal methods 
of data collection are presented. Two main sources are used: interviews with 
individuals and groups, and published/unpublished material, including dairies. These 
materials are informed by the author's own biography, so some mention is made of the 
importance of this reference point. In the second section the problem of statistics in a 
Korean context is reviewed. The point of doing this is to locate the ambiguity of 
statistics and explain the cautions which should be invoked when considering Korean 
statistics on labour. Finally, in the last section, the process of doing research is 
reviewed. This provides the basis for the following chapters. 
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4.1 Methodology 
In accordance with the author's declared preference for the experiential rather 
than the theoretical, this study is grounded predominantly upon evidence gained from 
direct contact with many of the major players in the events portrayed. The author's own 
involvement in the textile and garment industry in Seoul during the 1970's, allied with 
the high regard in which her mother and late brother are held in the South Korean labour 
movement, enabled unique access to the most pivotal sources, both personal and 
documentary (see biographical reference p. iv). That is what sets this thesis apart from 
any previous works on the subject. Other than the author's own life history, the bulk of 
evidence gathering took place during two field trips to Seoul, from October, 1997 to 
January, 1998 and from November, 1998 to April, 1999. Individual interviews and 
group discussions provided much of the recorded evidence but considerable use was 
also made of unpublished personal diaries kept during the period under examination and 
loaned to the author. In total, 79 individual interviews and four group discussions, 
involving 28 participants, were conducted and the oral evidence thus tape-recorded 
amounted to some 180 hours. Subsequent to completion of the second field research trip 
27 additional interviews to clarify issues previously discussed, or to resolve new 
questions, have been conducted via telephone, e-mail, and facsimile. 
The author subscribes to the view of Burgess (1988) insofar as the level of 
interaction between interviewer and interviewee enabled by informal conversation, as 
opposed to the technique of a formally structured interview, can be an invaluable 
adjunct to empirical social research, providing that the interviewer has drawn up, and 
adheres to, a concrete and predetermined plan. The intrinsic importance of biography is 
emphasised throughout this thesis, and it is submitted that the technique of 
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`knowledgeable conversation', especially if it is conducted in an atmosphere of mutual 
trust and shared experience, is the approach most likely to unlock fully comprehensive 
and relevant accounts. This view is complimentary to the assertion of Palmer (1928), as 
quoted in Burgess (1988), that the intersection of life history and social structure is one 
of the cornerstones of qualitative social research. 
4.1.1 Interviews and Group Discussions 
In the light of the importance placed upon the contributions made by individual 
personalities who were germane to the events portrayed, in preference, that is, to any 
degree of reliance upon the published works of writers whom may well not have been 
personally involved, it is essential to identify those individuals and indicate their 
relevance in the context of this study. To simplify this endeavour, interview subjects 
will be presented in tabular form. 
Chonggye Garment Union 
35 women workers from the 
1970's, including: 
Dong-il Textile Union 
7 women workers from the 
1970's, including: 
a. Worker in the Peace Market from the age of 16; 
founder member of the union; Vice-President of 
the union 1970; President 1971-1976. 
b. Worker in the Peace Market from the age of 15; 
founder member of the union; first head of the 
union women's section. 
c. Second head of the union women's section 
1971-1974; President of the JOC (Young Catholic 
Workers) 1975-1977; current (2000) President of 
The Federation of Korean Women Workers Trade 
Unions; imprisoned in 1979. 
d. Two executive members active since 1972; each 
served 18 months imprisonment 1977-1979; both 
still working in the Peace Market. 
a. Last President of the union, dismissed in 1978, 
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served 1 year in prison. Currently (2000) member 
of the Inchon Regional Labour Committee. 
b. Two executive members 1974-1978, one of 
whom was imprisoned in 1978. 
YH Textile Union 
3 women workers from the 
1970's: a. First President of the union 1975-1979. 
b. General Secretary 1975-1979, imprisoned 
in 1979 and 1981. Currently (2000) leader of the 
Buchun Regional Office of the Korean Women 
Workers United. 
c. Vice-President of the union 1975-1979. 
Lee Hee-ho Wife of Kim Dae-jung, President of South Korea 
1998- ; actively supportive of the women's 
labour movement in the 1970's. Kim Dae-jung 
and Lee Hee-ho have been friends of Yi So-sun, 
the mother of the author, for many years (see 
Chapter Nine). 
Prior to the second field research trip it became apparent that concentration 
upon the main players in the emergence and development of democratic trade unions 
might result in a degree of distortion of the overall picture. For that reason interviews 
were arranged and conducted with individual activists from five other companies in 
which efforts were made to organise autonomous unions in the 1970's. Those 
companies were: 
i. Won-pung Textiles -7 interviewees 
ii. Ban-do Textiles -2 interviewees 
iii. Sam-won Textiles -2 interviewees 
iv. So-tong Textiles -1 interviewee 
v. Nam-a Garments -1 interviewee (NB Workers at Nam-a 
attempted, but failed, to form a democratic union) 
Although the focus of this study is essentially concerned with the role of 
women in the South Korean labour movement in the 1970's, and most of the above 
subjects are female, it was clearly imperative to consider the male perspective. Not least 
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because prior to the initiatives taken by women in the 1970's all the levers of power, 
whether they be social, political, economic, or cultural, lay in the hands of men. Thus it 
is that the ratio of female to male interview subjects included in this study is markedly 
in excess of the ratio of female to male employees in the textile and garment industry. 
The `male component' in the research includes: 
Kim Young-sam President of South Korea 1992-1998, leader of the 
main opposition party during the Park Chung-hee 
era. (NB On completion of a lengthy interview 
Kim Young-sam said: "I am happy to talk for the 
first time about this matter, which was a turning 
point both in my political life and in Korean 
politics" (Interview, Kim Young-sam, December, 
1998) 
Lee Moon-young Professor, Koryo University, Seoul, expelled by 
Park Chung-hee. Close associate and advisor to 
President Kim Dae-jung (see Chapter Ten). 
Ko Un Poet. Was imprisoned with Lee Moon-young and 
only released after the assassination of Park 
Chung-hee (see Chapter Ten). 
Choi Jang-Jip Professor, Koryo University, Seoul. 
Sohn Hak-kyu Politician, served as a minister in the Kim Young- 
sam administration. 
(NB Both Choi and Sohn have written definitive works on South Korean politics, 
economics, and trade union history. They have provided invaluable source material for 
this thesis and are held in the highest regard by the author. However, their 
understatements of the contributions made by women to the Korean labour movement 
are vigorously challenged). 
Lee Mok-hee Full-time officer in the National Textile Workers 
Union (NTWU) 1978-1980; writer on Korean 
labour affairs. 
Kim Seung-ho Full-time officer in the NTWU 1978-1980. 
Lee Yun-bo Full-time officer in the NTWU 1972-1992, 
responsible for union education policy. 
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Lee Tae-ho Journalist and writer on Korean labour affairs; 
dismissed from Dong-a Ilbo daily newspaper in 
1974 for organising a journalist's trade union at 
Dong-a Ilbo. 
Hong Sung-woo Lawyer in the 1970's. 
Lee Don-myung Lawyer in the 1970's. 
(NB Both were dedicated to the legal defence of workers, students, and dissident 
political groups in the 1970's. They also acted as defence counsellors at the trials of Yi 
So-sun (see Chapter Nine), and the author's youngest brother, Chun Tae-sam, when he 
was arrested for participating in trade union activities in 1981. These two lawyers 
provided much valuable information concerning the attitudes of the state and the 
judiciary towards labour organisation). 
Cho Syung-hyuk Member of the Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) in 
the 1970's; Protestant priest. 
Im Myong-jin Member of the Urban Industrial Mission in the 
1970's; Protestant priest; was arrested and 
imprisoned with Lee Moon-young and Ko Un (see 
above). 
Fr Donal O'Keeffe Society of St Columban; member of the JOC in 
the 1970's. 
Chang Ki-pyo Law student in the 1970's (see Chapter Nine). 
Kim Young-dae Cutter (jaedansha) in the Peace Market in the 
1970's; became active member of Chonggye 
Union in early 1980's; President of the union 
1985-1988; founder member and first General 
Secretary (1990) of the organisation that would 
subsequently become the Korean Confederation of 
Trade Unions (KCTU); current (2000) Vice- 
President of the KCTU. 
Kim Kum-soo Full-time officer in the Federation of Korean 
Trade Unions (FKTU) 1978-1979; writer on 
Korean labour affairs. 
Hwang San-sung Chief Labour Inspector at the Peace Market 1974- 
1978. 
Choi Yong-gap Owner of one of the factories in the Peace Market 
1957-1992; represented the employers in the first 
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formal negotiations with the Chonggye Union (see 
Chapters Five and Ten). 
Chung Dong-ho President of the FKTU 1976-1979. 
Kim Sae-kwun 
Lee Kwang-taik Both were involved with the Christian Academic 
Education Programme (CAEP) in the 1970's and 
were also closely associated with the Chonggye 
Union education programme (see Chapter Ten). 
To facilitate the exploration of social issues, Kitzinger (1994) promotes the use 
of the discussion group as a means of concentrating collective attention upon a specific 
topic, and she asserts that one of its primary advantages is the potential to `draw out' 
comprehensive contributions from otherwise reticent participants. In furtherance of this 
philosophy, the author engaged, whenever possible, in the practice of group discussion 
prior to individual interview in order both to `break the ice' and to act as a stimulant to 
memory. One especially fruitful group discussion was conceived at the celebration of Yi 
So-sun's 70th birthday on 19 December, 1998. At the celebration, attended by more than 
five hundred leading political, labour movement, and academic figures, including Lee 
Hee-ho, the wife of the President of South Korea, a number of the most prominent and 
respected activists from the 1970's democratic labour movement agreed that they could 
contribute more to the current trade union scene if they acted collectively rather than 
merely as individuals. Thus, on 10 January, 1999, twelve 1970's trade union ex- 
presidents, nine women and three men, met on the premises of the Chun Tae-il 
Foundation in Seoul and formed a new organisation to be entitled The Commemorative 
Committee of the 1970's Democratic Labour Movement. The author was privileged to 
be invited to attend the preparatory meeting and, on completion of formal business, was 
permitted to focus the subsequent lengthy discussion upon issues central to the 
75 
objectives of this study. This was a unique opportunity, rarely, if ever, had there been 
such an assembly of personalities, each of whom had played pivotal roles in the struggle 
for democratic trade unionism, and each of whom was prepared, and had the 
opportunity, to exchange the minutiae of their experience. The value gained from this 
meeting, and the contribution it made to the fulfilment of this study, is inestimable. 
Three other discussion groups were also organised with the specific intention of 
exploring matters germane to this study, and each proved to be of great value. The first 
involved seven women workers from the Chonggye Garment Union; the second 
comprised six women workers from the Dong-il Textile Union, and the third was 
attended by three women workers from the Won-pung Textile Union. 
4.1.2 Primary Sources 
Every effort was made to be as meticulous with the selection and acceptance of 
primary source material as was the case with all other data. If there was the slightest 
element of doubt concerning the veracity of documentation, it was rejected unless 
corroborative evidence could be located. 
Previously Published Material 
i. Official documents published by the Office of Labour Affairs; the Federation of 
Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), and the National Textile Workers Union 
(NTWU); 
ii. Korea Annuals for the years 1970 - 1981; 
iii. Union histories published by the Chonggye Garment Union, Dong-il Textile 
Union, and YH Wig and Garment Union; 
iv. National daily newspapers; 
v. Periodicals and magazines; 
vi. Material from the international trade union and human rights communities. 
Unpublished Material 
i. The diaries of Chun Tae-il, the author's eldest brother, which include his 
research into the employee establishment and working conditions in the Peace 
Market, 
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ii. The personal archive of Yi So-sun, the author's mother, that has been 
accumulated since the death of her son, Chun Tae-il, in November, 1970. It 
includes minutes, memoranda, internal discussion papers, speeches, and 
statements concerning Chonggye Union matters, as well as a wealth of material 
dealing with the activities of other democratic unions and the state/labour 
interface; 
iii. A tape recording of part of the trial of Kim Jae-gyu, Park Chung-hee's assassin, 
and his written statement of appeal submitted to the Supreme Court on 28 
January, 1980, 
iv. Diaries, letters, and photographs from the 1970's, loaned by individual women 
workers; 
v. Cho Kum-bun was a female president of the Ban-do Textile Union (see Chapter 
Nine) during the 1970's, until it was forcibly disbanded by President Chun Do- 
hwan in 1981. Throughout the lifetime of her union she collected assiduously 
every document produced and received. She felt that it was her duty to look after 
these records until the story they tell could be written down. Cho Kum-bun feels 
a deep emotional attachment to the two bags of papers she has protected for 
almost thirty years, and the author is privileged to have been entrusted with 
them. 
vi. Lee Yun-bo was a full-time officer in the government-sponsored NTWU (see 
above) who decided to keep his own private record of NTWU business during 
the 1970's. To this end, he photocopied every document of importance that 
passed through his hands. He generously agreed to allow the author full access 
to material that has never previously been available to researchers. It includes 
confidential internal memoranda and reports detailing the fraught relationships 
between the national-level textile and garment union and the local and regional- 
level unions in South Korea, as well as that which existed between the NTWU 
and the international trade union community (see Chapter Eight). 
4.2 Statistical Ambiguities 
Throughout the report references are made to the conviction that the main body 
of work devoted to South Korean industrial relations is marred by the use of 
inappropriate data. The data in question falls into two distinct categories: first, there is 
the misapplication to the South Korean case of stereotypical assumptions, especially 
those connected with gender and traditional social mores; and second, there is the 
quintessentially ambiguous nature inherent with statistics. The identification and 
rectification of stereotypical assumptions is addressed elsewhere, this section will 
consider the `problem' of statistics, and will explain the reasons why statistical data 
plays little part in this work. 
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It is axiomatic that statistical data of comparable provenance can be used to 
both prove and refute the same point in any argument. ' The reason for this intellectually 
debilitating circumstance is, in the view of the author, that the main determinants of 
outcome in the compilation of statistical evidence, especially on labour issues, are: i. the 
method by which the figures in question were originally obtained, ii. how they were 
interpreted; iii. the manner in which they were presented, and iv., the nature of the 
preferred conclusion. It is the author's submission that, in the Korean context, the last 
mentioned provision invariably takes precedence over the other three, and dictates the 
degree of selectivity employed. Unless the observer is cognisant of each of these 
factors, and is aware of all other postulates, the rational value of the tables, graphs, 
percentages and pie-charts which correctly constitute so great a part of much academic 
work, is negligible. Furthermore, by disputing the veracity and validity of the statistics 
presented as evidence for the counter-argument, usually the first tactic of refutation, 
tacit acceptance of the protean nature of statistics is, in effect, being granted by all sides 
in a given debate. Nevertheless, the proclivity of numbers to mask subjectivity, to a far 
greater degree than is possible with prose, explains, at least in part, why there remains a 
remarkable facility in virtually all areas of social discourse to continue to offer numbers 
not merely as corroboration, but frequently as the principal ground for theory and policy 
development. 
It is actually quite rare, in the experience of the author, for social commentators 
to declare from the outset that there is, indeed, a potential for ambiguity in their use of 
statistical data. One relevant instance is worthy of note, however, and is illustrative of a 
wider dichotomy. Cho Hyung, a professor of sociology at the prestigious Ewha 
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University for Women in Seoul, produced an otherwise lucid and useful paper in 1986 
that opened with the statement: 
Reports of labour statistics in Korea, mostly from government sources, 
suffer from limitations imposed by the inadequacy of data in terms of the 
coverage of work and the way workers are aggregated and disaggregated. 
Recognising the limitation, this paper will try to show, by reorganising the 
existing data, the trends and the pattern of women's participation in the 
labour force in Korea (Cho Hyung, 1986) (author's italics). 
The seductive power of statistics proved irresistible, and the principle of never using 
evidence that is known to be inadequate or inappropriate was circumvented. The 
`reorganisation' of false or questionable data serves no useful purpose and, as in the 
example quoted above, can only result in intensifying the already dense obfuscation that 
exists in this particular field. 
Giddens (1993) draws attention to the notion of the `average' as a specific area 
of concern in research methodology, and indicates how misleading the term can be 
when it is used without amplification. This study will include a number of examples of 
works on South Korean economics and industrial relations, works which are integral to 
the `conventional view', wherein averages are fundamental components of evidence, 
and where the definition of the term as `median', `mode', or `mean' is absent. Failure to 
define what is meant by `average' has rendered meaningful interpretation difficult, and 
has provided clear bases for distortion. 
Problems associated with the integration of statistical data in social, political, 
and economic contexts, are exacerbated when access to evidence and method is 
restricted to agents of an oppressive and authoritarian regime, in such circumstances 
statistical data must be either taken at face value or discarded entirely. In the 1960's and 
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1970's it was imperative to President Park Chung-hee that the image of South Korea 
that he created in the minds of potential foreign investors was that of a rapidly 
expanding industrial economy blessed with a capable. contented, and compliant 
workforce, free from the corrosive influences of a radical labour movement. It was, 
therefore, essential that all performance data accessible to outside agencies reflected 
and reinforced this imperative. To this end, control exerted over the promulgation of 
performance related information in all forms of the mass media was such that any 
critical examination of the plethora of statistical data which emanated from government 
controlled institutions was precluded. Thus, volume upon volume of such information 
remained unchallenged, and in due course became part of common currency or, in other 
words, provided much of the foundation of `the conventional view' (e. g. Korea 
Annuals, 1970-1979; Frank, 1975, Lim Young-il, 1981, Calverley, 1982, Kim Cae-one, 
1986; Brown, 1973) 
. 
This was by no means the full extent of the problem; before they 
could be manipulated to advantage by the minions of Park Chung-hee, these mountains 
of statistics had to originate from somewhere. There is a case for construing that 
government departments did, on occasions, resort to simply plucking numbers out of 
thin air but, in the main, these `performance' statistics had their origins in periodic 
returns which all employers were required by law to complete. It is known, and will be 
clearly demonstrated in this study, that falsification of information submitted regularly 
to government by employers was a routine practice. In order to evade many of the 
provisions of labour legislation in force at the time, and to secure allocation into the 
most advantageous tax category, it was seen as propitious by factory owners in the 
textile and garment industry to understate the actual establishment of their enterprises 
(see Chapter Five). After these already fictitious figures had been further `creatively 
adjusted' by the state they were likely to bear little, if any, relation to the truth, and the 
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basis they provide for rational debate upon issues such as economic performance, 
wages, working conditions, working hours, health and safety, and profit, must be 
regarded as tenuous in the extreme. 
In the event where establishment declarations submitted by employers to 
central government are understated, it follows logically that information regarding 
working hours must also be `adjusted' to a commensurate extent, otherwise `too few' 
people would be shown to be doing an impossible amount of work. A pertinent example 
of the outcome of this circumstance, and one that underscores and reinforces the 
author's dispute with conventional wisdom, can be found in the works of Cho Soon, one 
of South Korea's leading economists. In his 1994 publication The Dynamics of Korean 
Economic Development he quotes the `average working hours per week in the Korean 
manufacturing industry in 1970' as being 52.5 hours, and notes that this figure is some 
ten hours greater than was the case in Japan. Cho Soon gives the sources of his statistics 
as the International Labour Organisation and the Korean Ministry of Labour. It may 
well be that in some industries in 1970 workers were, indeed, working between 8 and 9 
hours per day, 6 days per week, however, this was certainly not the experience of 
women in the textile and garment factories. From the author's personal knowledge, 
from research conducted by the Chonggye Union and other democratic unions, and 
from all the interviews with workers of the period, it is indisputable that the `normal' 
working day encompassed 16 hours, with only two days off per month. A working 
week in excess of 100 hours was by no means unusual, and places the notion of `the 
average' in its proper perspective. 
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It is accepted that the expression of social truths in numerical form can, with 
certain caveats, be an efficient and scientifically valid strategy that can enhance the 
simplicity and clarity of exposition and contribute to the avoidance of prolixity. But if 
the conditions which must be met in order to fully legitimise the reliance upon statistics 
are not adhered to, the practice is, at best, of dubious value and may well be deliberately 
or accidentally misleading. This study will show that much of the literature intrinsic to 
the formulation of the `conventional view' of the South Korean labour movement of the 
1960's and 1970's has been based, to greater or lesser degrees, upon statistical data of 
doubtful provenance. 
In cognisance of the foregoing reservations, the guiding principle adopted in 
the construction of this thesis has been that a statistic will not be included unless its 
`pedigree' can withstand the most objective and robust scrutiny or unless, in quoting it, 
the factual circumstance is understated. In the context of the theme of this study, social 
truths find expression in the words and experiences of the individuals who were actually 
and personally involved. Regardless of what may have been promulgated by Park 
Chung-hee's propaganda machinery, or what may have been recorded and repeated by 
commentators and academics since the 1970's, the heartfelt and often bitter testaments 
of the women workers who struggled throughout that era are submitted as representing 
the closest it is possible to get to the truth. 
4.3 Research Circumstances And Process 
The combination of working in one of the sweat-shop factories in the Peace 
Market, as the sister of Chun Tae-il and the daughter of Yi So-sun, the `father' and 
`mother' of democratic trade unionism in South Korea, and being immersed in South 
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Korean industrial relations affairs since earliest childhood, has placed the author in a 
unique and fortuitous position. The family home has always been a regular meeting 
place for democratic trade union activists, where the main topic of conversation has 
centred upon the travails and vicissitudes of beleaguered and exploited workers, and the 
ambitions, the achievements, and the failures, of those pledged to restructure the trade 
union movement. The author has first-hand knowledge of many of the events recorded 
in this thesis, and few of the named individuals in the study are not known intimately by 
the author and/or her mother. 
One of the problems that bedevils research based upon inter-personal dialogue 
is the difficulty in ascertaining whether or not the truth is being told. At the core of both 
the problem and its resolution there lies the concept of the bond of mutual trust. For 
reasons which are enunciated elsewhere, academic researchers and other intellectuals 
whose origins are outside the sphere of manual labour tend to be regarded with a degree 
of reserve, if not antipathy, by many of the textile and garment workers from the 1960's 
and 1970's. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that research handicapped by this 
circumstance may be inaccurate or incomplete. The author's `privileged' position, 
evinced by personal history and shared experience, has enabled access to material 
undisclosed heretofore; has facilitated frank and honest dialogue between all players 
involved, and has made possible a more fully informed assessment of the adequacy of 
relevant data already in the public domain. 2 
While South Korea is the principle site for data collection, supplementary 
research was conducted in the United Kingdom, almost exclusively at the Bodleian 
Library, Oxford, or at two of its dependent libraries, the Oriental Institute and the 
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Japanese Library. Facilities at these institutions are unparalleled in the author's 
experience, and their collections of `Korea-specific' works, written both in English and 
in Hangul, are as extensive and comprehensive as any to be found in Korean 
universities. Had access to the Bodleian Library not been afforded, this study would 
have been difficult, if not impossible, to complete. 
Systematic research focused specifically upon the compilation of this thesis 
began in January, 1997, and the original timetable programmed completion and 
submission by mid-2000. Elements intrinsic to the schedule included development of 
the physical structure and base argument, two field research trips to South Korea, and 
one year allocated to writing-up the study. The over-run of some six months was due to 
three unanticipated factors. Firstly, problems were experienced with establishing contact 
with some contributors crucial to the research during the second field trip to Seoul. 
Furthermore, it frequently transpired that, when contacts were arranged, new evidence 
emerged which pointed to additional personalities whose testimonies would prove of 
value. Thus, instead of the twelve weeks scheduled, the second field trip lasted for five 
months. Secondly, locating and arranging mutually convenient appointments with the 
individuals who participated in the 27 interviews conducted by telephone, e-mail, and 
facsimile subsequent to the second field trip proved more time-consuming than 
expected. Finally, and despite much generous assistance from colleagues, the 
transcription and systematic collation of the 180 hours of tape-recorded material 
accumulated during both research trips demanded considerably more time than had been 
forecast. 
Throughout the entire period of research and writing, regular and frequent 
supervisory contact has been maintained on a bimonthly level. This support and 
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guidance has, typically, consisted of prearranged personal tutorials, supplemented by 
telephone calls, and the exchange of e-mails. During periods of absence from the United 
Kingdom, however, total reliance was placed upon e-mail contact: this restriction did 
not prove inhibiting in any way. 
As a final comment, it should be noted that submission of this dissertation does 
not represent the full realisation of its objectives. In attempting to recover the history of 
one particular social group of Korean women, it is hoped that the evidence and 
arguments presented will provide a stimulus for further debate, not only upon the 
contribution of women workers in the 1970's, but upon the wider and more fundamental 
issues of gender relations in South Korean society. 
4.4 Summary 
The primary evidence for the report has been gained via extensive field work in 
Korea, principally during 1998 and 1999. It has been complemented by information and 
data provided by colleagues and key informants in the form of published and 
unpublished material, telephone calls, e-mails, letters, and diaries. The result is an 
extensive body of material which provides the base of the research report. 
This approach has enabled the critical assessment of official statistics and 
reports, and the development of a critical assessment of the events involving women 
workers and trade unions in the 1970's, and subsequently. Further, it allows a critical 
evaluation of many of the histories and accounts of trade unions in South Korea. In 
particular, it provides the base for arguing that any adequate history of trade unionism 
and the politics of labour conflict in South Korea must foreground the struggles by the 
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women textile and garment workers in the 1970's. These events are crucial for an 
understanding of the way unionism developed during, and subsequent to, this period. 
The remainder of the thesis will develop this theme, beginning with an examination of 
the evolution of the Korean textile and garment industry. 
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NOTES 
' The extent to which the use of statistics can be instrumental in both proving and 
disproving the same point is both interesting and worrying. In the United Kingdom, for 
example, it has been seen in recent years how the government of the day will use 
statistical evidence to demonstrate conclusively that the National Health Service waiting 
lists are decreasing, the number of policemen on the streets is increasing, the burden of 
taxation is reducing, the homeless are getting fewer, and participation in a common 
European currency would be beneficial. Coincident with each of these claims, 
opposition parties will summon equally well researched data to `prove' the diametric 
cases. The list of apparently blatant contradictions is almost endless, and the disquieting 
fact is that, in virtually every instance, all assertions are equally valid, or equally otiose, 
dependent upon the observer's point of view. 
2 The suspicion with which political and social researchers are regarded by many of the 
women activists of the 1960's and 1970's was constantly reiterated during the author's 
meetings with her old colleagues and friends. Stated simply, they were tired of being 
interviewed by people with whom they shared no common ground, and whose motives 
and agendas were unclear. There was a general feeling that these `outsiders' arrived 
with preconceived theories and, far from representing accurately and fairly the workers' 
accounts, they preferred to adjust what was said in order to support those 
preconceptions. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE TEXTILE AND GARMENT INDUSTRY: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION 
"What experience and history teach is this - that people and governments never 
have learnt anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it ". 
(G W Hegel) 
5.0 Introduction 
Although the focus of this study is centred upon the vicissitudes of the Korean 
textile and garment industry during the decade of the 1970's, it would be a 
misconception to assume that this period marked the nadir in the fortunes of those who 
laboured in spinning, weaving, and clothing manufacture. For centuries this industry, 
above all others, has suffered from the incursions, the manipulations, the duplicity, and 
the opportunism of external forces. Textile and garment workers have borne the brunt of 
colonial oppression, and have illustrated with the utmost clarity the typically tripartite 
segmentation of global capitalism into core, middle, and peripheral economies 
(Cumings, 1987). What differentiates the 1970's from the more extended time span 
reviewed in this section is the harsh reality that during the 1970's the seeds of 
exploitation were sown from within rather than from without. 
The very brief historical precis presented in this section will afford but a 
flavour of the inequitable and punitive circumstances with which Korean textile workers 
have been forced to contend since well before the beginning of the 19th century. It will 
also provide an insight into the means by which Korea has found herself forced into the 
role of a catspaw in the wider, acquisitive machinations of more powerful and more 
belligerent nations. 
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5.1 Pre-Colonial Period 
(NB It should be noted that the Korean Peninsula was not divided into two discrete 
nations until 1948, therefore, all references to `Korea' in this section pertain to the 
entire peninsula unless specifically identified otherwise). 
Although Korea became what may be referred to as a `tributary' state of the 
Chinese Empire in 1637, it was also, from very early on, the fulcrum of intrigue and 
rivalry between China and Japan. The Korean cotton textile industry, and the potential 
market for imported raw materials and finished garments that the Korean population 
represented, were the linchpins of this external rivalry. In 1876 a treaty was signed by 
the two competing nations, without consideration being afforded to the interests of the 
Korean people, the terms of which forced the opening up of Korean seaports for 
international trade. In the initial stages the textiles imported into Korea originated 
predominantly in Great Britain but were actually shipped by Chinese and Japanese 
merchant companies. Although the fabrics imported from Britain were of finer quality 
than those produced domestically, they were not of immediate threat to the Korean 
industry because their fineness was achieved at the expense of durability, a factor of 
great importance to manual labourers, who were prepared to sacrifice style and relative 
luxury for apparel that was hard-wearing. Nevertheless, by 1894 foreign textiles 
constituted approximately 80% of total Korean imports (Kajimura, 1983). 
The concessions gained from the 1876 treaty did not assuage Japan's 
expansionist ambitions, however, and eighteen years after its signing, in August 1894, 
the first Sino-Japanese War broke out, primarily on the issue of who was to `control' 
Korea (Palmer, 1962). Chinese forces proved no match against the army and navy of 
Japan, each of which had been modelled along European lines, and after a mere eight 
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months of conflict the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed. Although the treaty formally 
established Korea's independence, this was simply a device used by the Japanese to 
negate Chinese interests in the peninsula and leave the way clear for subsequent 
annexation. From the time of the war settlement, China was excluded from involvement 
in the shipping of foreign-sourced material into Korea. 
From 1898 to 1904 the Russians penetrated deeper into the northern part of 
Korea, securing commercial concessions along the Yalu River, and thereby threatening 
Japan's dominance of the region. Japan's Korean intentions were not to be thwarted, 
however, and this Russian adventure precipitated the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, 
during which the Japanese inflicted a series of heavy defeats in land battles fought along 
the Yalu River, and in Manchuria. After the Russian Baltic Fleet was virtually destroyed 
by Admiral Togo off Tsushima, an island lying between Korea and Japan, in May 
1905, the Russians were forced to sue for peace. It is interesting to note that the 
substantial loss of prestige on the part of the Russians in their rebuffed incursion into 
Korea contributed to the outbreak of the Revolution of 1905 (Palmer, 1962). Indeed, 
whether it be the Chinese, the Japanese, the Russians, the British, or the Americans, 
history has shown that coveting the diverse spoils of the Korean Peninsula has proved, 
and is, indeed, continuing to prove, a costly and often dangerous endeavour for foreign 
adventurers. 
Prior to the signing of the 1876 treaty, the textile industry in Korea equalled 
that of agriculture in the national economy. Cotton was the dominant indigenous raw 
material and was grown by a large proportion of Korean farmers. This was especially 
true in the south of the country, where the climate is more amenable, but it was also 
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applicable to some of the less harsh, and more protected, areas in the north. In addition 
to cotton growing and processing, there was also a lesser diversification on many farms 
into the production of silk. 
The common pattern of the pre-colonial industry was one in which each farmer 
grew and harvested his cotton crop which was then spun and woven by the women and 
girls of his immediate family. After the clothing needs of the family had been met, most 
of the remaining output was used locally as barter-goods, but there was normally a 
limited surplus for market sale. At least half of the pre-colonialisation Korean farms 
followed this basic model. There is also evidence of a more formally organised 
industrial structure in many rural areas, especially in the warmer south, in which 
`entrepreneurs' recruited networks of female `out-workers' who were, thus, enabled to 
further supplement their household agricultural income by spinning and weaving full- 
time at home. It is of interest, and relevance, to note that, very much in line with the 
ever-pervading Confucian ethos, the remuneration awarded to these female out-workers 
never reached even one half of that afforded to other, male, labourers but was, more 
conventionally, about one-fifth (Kajimura, 1983). The common thread running through 
all of Korean history of the exploitation of the Korean female, in all aspects of life, is a 
very long one indeed. 
Internal trade in the cotton textile produce of these out-worker networks 
thrived up until 1876 and was, for reasons alluded to above, characterised almost 
exclusively by a `south to north' pattern. Also prior to 1876, trade in cotton and finished 
textile goods beyond the boundaries of the peninsula was, to all intents and purposes, 
negligible. 
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Once the involvement of Chinese merchants had been forcibly curtailed, Japan 
could turn its attention to `correcting' the predominance of British textiles and finished 
garments appearing on the Korean market. In this objective, Japan was to employ the 
`imitate to dominate' policy that was subsequently to prove so successful in many other 
industries, and in many other markets, all over the world (Cho Ki-joon, 1982). 
Appreciating the proclivity of the Korean people to prefer their own unique fabrics to 
those of other producer nations, even though in many cases the foreign product was 
cheaper, the Japanese commandeered many of the best Korean spinners and weavers 
and transported them to Japan. Using Japanese raw cotton, these workers, and 
eventually the Japanese themselves, were able to reproduce a very close approximation 
of the Korean material which was then shipped to the peninsula. Whilst this ruse was in 
its infancy, and the counterfeit product not difficult to discern by the moderately 
knowledgeable, the bulk of exports went to the north, where cotton growing and 
processing was less prevalent and where consumer awareness was less acute. No 
chances were taken, however, and in order to minimise the possibility of detection the 
fabrics and finished garments were not shipped directly to the north, but were routed, 
instead, via the port of Pusan, in the south. There the Japanese labels on the garments 
were removed and Korean labels attached in their place. These inferior articles were 
then transported to the north to be purchased by the more gullible, and more needy, 
consumers resident there. This duplicity not only helped to line the pockets of the 
Japanese, and some Korean, producers and merchants, it also accelerated the decline of 
the `genuine' domestic industry (Cho Ki-joon, 1982). Thus, between 1876 and 1894 the 
bulk of textiles imported into Korea were of British origin, between 1895 and 1904 
Japan had cornered approximately half of this import trade, and from 1905 onwards 
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materials arriving at Korean ports were almost exclusively of Japanese manufacture 
(Kajimura, 1983). The commensurate atrophy of the indigenous textile industry was 
virtually assured. 
The crucial lesson that inferior imitation is doomed to eventual failure if no 
further development is put in hand was well learned by the Japanese. The design and 
implementation of increasingly more sophisticated rnechanisation processes led to a 
steady improvement in the quality of Japanese textiles, and a concomitant reduction in 
the price of the finished articles. The fruits of this development signalled the beginning 
of a major invasion of the nation-wide Korean direct manufacturing sector, and the 
beginning of the end of the Korean `home weaving' industry (Lee Ok-jie, 1990). The 
smaller farmers were forbidden to continue to plant their traditional cotton crop and 
were, instead, required to adopt a new variety that originated in the United States: this 
imposition cleverly facilitated the eradication of the familiar, and eased the introduction 
and, more importantly, the acceptance, of substitution. Furthermore, the Japanese 
colonial authorities directed to whom, and for how much, their crops had to be sold. In 
truth, the greatest value of these farming communities to the Japanese was merely as 
consumers of finished goods (Kajimura, 1983). Thus, by 1905, when the colonisation of 
Korea was virtually complete, Japanese capital had overwhelmed the Korean textile 
industry, other foreign interests had been discouraged and, apart from the `self- 
sufficiency' endeavours of the very largest farming households, the industry was 
dominated by the external, capitalist power of Japan. 
It is important to note that throughout the process outlined above, the Japanese 
textile industry had been the beneficiary of substantial support and protection from the 
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government in Tokyo, whereas the Korean government, subjected as it was to 
increasing diplomatic pressure and military threat by Japan, was in no position to offer 
any help whatsoever to its own spinners, weavers, and manufacturers. 
5.2 Colonial Period: 1905-1945 
As has been discussed above, the question of who controlled Korea had been a 
bone of contention between China, Japan, and Russia for a protracted period throughout 
which Korea itself was little more than a pawn. Largely by dint of its greater military 
might and, perhaps, its more tightly focused foreign policy, Japan had gained 
supremacy over the other competing external powers. Following the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-5, Japan assumed formal responsibility for Korean foreign relations and 
was, to all intents and purposes, the ruling authority. Although internationally 
recognised annexation did not take effect until 1910, Korea's colonial era can be said to 
have begun in 1905 because, by that date, its role in the Japanese scheme of things had 
been clearly delineated and was largely unchallenged. 
To achieve their prescribed ends, the Japanese were quite ruthless in their 
social and industrial reconstruction, the essence of which was to ensure that Korean 
cotton growing and processing became entirely dependent upon external direction in 
order to secure the eradication of competition in the Korean consumer market. The 
farming household production capacity was systematically destroyed by the police, who 
confiscated all domestic spinning and weaving tools, looms, and other accoutrements, 
and burned all stocks of home-produced fabrics. The strong arm of the new colonial law 
was applied directly, and terminally, to the indienous textile industry (Cho Young- In 
bum, 1983). Thus, the earliest years of colonialisation witnessed the prohibition of all 
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home weaving, and the rural self-sufficiency in clothing that had been so much a part of 
Korean social tradition was brought to an end. 
That such radical social, cultural, and industrial transformations were 
accomplished in so brief a period serves to underline the relative dominance of the 
Japanese military capability of the time, the fragility and vulnerability of the Korean 
monarchical social structure, and the single-mindedness with which Japan set about 
turning theory into practice. By 1928 almost 70% of the textile market in Korea was 
reliant upon imported materials and, furthermore, well in excess of 80% of the cotton 
grown in Korea - the American variety forcibly introduced by the Japanese - was 
exported to Japan for processing into finished garments (Lee Ok-jie, 1990). Whilst it 
may be comforting for liberal philosophers to espouse the conviction that `might' is not 
necessarily `right', the harsh lessons of history suggest that, in this life at least, the 
meek, or the weak, inherit very little. 
It is ironic to reflect that whilst severe restrictions upon Korean industrial 
development were imposed, from the very beginning, by the Japanese, one of the few 
industries that did enjoy significant growth was that involved in the distillation of 
alcohol from rice and potatoes. This was not, however, a response to any change in the 
social habits of the Korean people, but merely reflected the increased demand for such 
luxuries that resulted from the growing number of Japanese nationals arriving on the 
peninsula (Cho Ki-joon, 1982). 
Although the occupation of Korea by the Japanese was characterised pre- 
eminently by an overt policy of enforced industrial and social deconstruction followed 
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by restructuring in accordance with Japanese preference and advantage, the colonial 
administration was not unaware of the imperative to contain any labour reactions which 
might prove destabilising. As it was considered likely that the mass of Korean workers 
would react unfavourably to their total domination by foreign employers, a number of 
small and medium-sized, Korean-owned, enterprises were tolerated. Two important 
caveats ameliorated the commercial effects of this governmental policy. First, 
circumstances imposed by the Japanese guaranteed that working conditions in these 
relatively insubstantial establishments would be much harsher than in the well- 
equipped, modern, Japanese-owned factories, and second, the smaller enterprises could 
never compete with their Japanese counterparts either on price or on quality (Lee Ok- 
jie, 1990). Thus, by making this concession, the overall profits accrued by Japanese- 
owned textile companies were very little affected, if at all, and, more importantly, the 
relatively high number of workers employed in the labour intensive and ill-equipped 
Korean establishments would regard Japanese employers and working conditions in a 
more favourable, even desirable, light. In this way, any resentment that might be 
fomented in the workplace would, more likely, be directed against their own, Korean, 
bosses rather than against the colonial authority (Grajdanzev, 1944). 
All societies have what Evelyn Waugh referred to as `grey faced men who did 
well out of the war' (Waugh, 1961), and the Korean experience under the yoke of the 
Japanese added credence to that sentiment. By co-operating enthusiastically with their 
colonial masters, some Korean businessmen were permitted to invest their capital in 
modern textile factories equipped with the most up to date Japanese machinery. Such 
preferment required them to use only Japanese spun yarn and to sell only to prescribed 
outlets at strictly regulated prices. Despite these restrictions, however, the foundations 
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of some of Korea's largest textile corporations were laid during those early years of 
occupation, as was the hard core of wealthy Korean textile barons who would, in the 
1960's and 1970's, collude with Park Chung-hee and continue the pattern of 
exploitation that had been set in train during the colonial period. 
During the eight years after 1929 the number of textile factories in Korea 
increased from 241 to 426, and by 1938 there were six very large-scale spinning and 
weaving companies, all but one of which were Japanese-owned. As a measure of the 
degree of imbalance that existed between Japanese-owned and Korean-owned textile 
factories, in 1939 68% of factories employing fewer than thirty workers were Korean- 
owned and were attributed a mere 5.9% of total textile production, whereas the 7% of 
factories employing in excess of two hundred workers were almost exclusively 
Japanese-owned and contributed 85.8% of total production (Grajdanzev, 1944). 
From as early as 1931 Japan had been manoeuvring for another war with 
China, and although one did not materialise until the summer of 1937, Japan's 
increasingly bellicose stance in Manchuria in the early 1930's heightened the 
importance of Korea's potential as a `war workshop' (Palmer, 1962). Major investment 
of Japanese capital took place not only in the textile industry but also in heavy 
mechanical and chemical engineering. Textile production capacity tends to be 
quantified by the number of yarn spindles in operation: in 1934 there were 15,000 
spindles in Korean factories; by the end of the colonial period in 1945 that number had 
risen to 213,776; the overwhelming majority, 89%, of which were owned by the 
Japanese. Between 1930 and 1943 the value of Korean industrial output increased by 
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over 700%. At the heart of this dramatic upsurge lay the perennial third-world curse of 
low wages (KTITI, 1985). 
As a measure of the comparative advantage emanating from a low-wage, 
peripheral, economy, during the colonial period wages paid by the Japanese to Korean 
textile workers were less than half those paid to their equivalents in mainland Japan. 
Whilst in both countries the earnings of female workers were considerably less than the 
earnings of males, Japanese women still received more than Korean males (Lee Ok-jie, 
1990). A survey conducted in 1929 by the government in Tokyo confirmed that Korean 
male earnings were barely above what the government assessed to be subsistence level, 
it did not comment upon the implicit financial plight of Korean women workers 
(Grajdanzev, 1944). 
The question of how many hours were worked each day under the Japanese is 
one that cannot be answered with any degree of reliability. The practice of textile 
factory owners falsifying returns is one that has a long history in Korea, and is a matter 
addressed in more detail elsewhere in this study. The fact that official records for 1933 
indicate that in excess of 80% of Korean textile workers were working more than twelve 
hours per day, and that almost three-quarters of there averaged only ten rest days per 
year (Kang Dong-jin, 1983), suggests that the reality was somewhat less equitable. 
Much in accord with the traditional Confucian ethic, women worked longer hours than 
men for less than half the male rate of pay under the Japanese: the exploitative 
conditions of employment that were to be the inheritance of the women workers of the 
1970's were thereby reinforced during the period of colonial rule (Lee Ok-jie, 1990). 
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Thus it is clear that, from a Japanese perspective, the restructuring of the textile 
industry in Korea proved to be a richly rewarding exercise. It was the industry, above all 
others, that returned the largest profit on capital invested. The seductive combination of 
low wages, long working hours, preferential fiscal arrangements, and generous 
government subsidy attracted a return on capital in excess of 42% in the latter years of 
the 1930's and early years of the 1940's, compared with a 13.8% return on capital in the 
chemical industry and 28.6% in the metal and machine sectors (Ahn Byung jik, 1981). 
An even more poignant presage of the 1970's was the fact that the labour 
movement in the textile industry, which had been active during the early years of 
Japanese occupation, was branded as a subversive and communist inspired organisation 
and, as such, was savagely repressed and driven underground during the 1930's 
(Grajdanzev, 1944). Freedoms of speech, assembly, and association were denied, and 
the only means by which worker activists could communicate with each other was 
under the protective aegis of the Christian church. Many of the western missionaries 
resident in Korea at the time were American and, as it was much in Japan's trade 
interest to maintain good relations with the United States, those church figures were 
able to offer support to the beleaguered members of the labour movement without fear 
of retribution (Kim Yun-hwan, 1982). Never was the dictum of Alphonse Karr more 
apposite: "plus ca change, plus c'est la memo chose" 
No country can occupy another for the length of time that Japan dominated the 
Korean Peninsula without leaving an enduring legacy. It is true that for more than a 
decade after World War II anti-Japanese feelings ran very high and, indeed, many 
Koreans still retain a degree of antipathy towards their erstwhile masters. Nevertheless, 
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the undeniable influence of Japan on Korea's economic development, especially during 
the 1960's and 1970's, is germane to this study and should, therefore, not go 
unremarked. Many senior policymakers in `modern', post-war, Korea received much of 
their formal education from the Japanese and internalised many Japanese social and 
commercial mores. Many Koreans who were subsequently to become `movers and 
shakers' in Seoul were deeply impressed by Japanese history, particularly the Meiji era, 
during which a small group of oligarchs guided Japan towards the achievement of the 
twin goals of mercantile enrichment and military strength. It may be considered ironic 
that although many Korean political leaders overtly resented the oligarchs who 
colonised Korea, they did not shy away from using them as role models (Kim Kihwan 
and Leipziger, 1993). 
5.3 The American Military Government And Rhee Seung-man : 1945 - 1960 
We have seen that the focus of Japanese policy in Korea during the colonial 
period was to deconstruct the industrial fabric of the country and then rebuild it along 
lines geared specifically to the maximisation of profit, with all the spoils thus accrued in 
the peripheral economy being directed back to the seat of colonial power. From a purely 
Japanese point of view, the exercise had proved highly successful. After Japan's 
unconditional surrender on 15 August, 1945 and the imposition of an American Military 
Government (AMG) on the peninsula, policy emphases shifted, and although the 
accumulation of profit no longer held the position of main motive, the core objectives 
of the AMG's Korean policy meant that Korea continued to serve the whim and the 
interest of a foreign player. 
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The primary goals of the AMG were to secure a pro-US regime in the south of 
Korea that would, by definition, be strongly anti-communist, and to engineer social 
stability. The achievement of the first goal effectively marginalised and alienated most 
of the Korean nationalist leaders and their followers, whilst achievement of the second 
led to the administrative authorities invariably throwing their weight behind the 
employers in subsequent labour disputes, and suppressing emergent worker 
organisations which were seeking a democratic voice in what they fervently hoped 
would now be a more liberated workplace. 
The occupation of the Korean south by the Americans was not as well-planned 
or as efficiently conducted as was the case with their occupation of Japan. All 
indications suggest that the US regarded the circumstances in Korea as being essentially 
the same as those in that other Asian country a few miles to the east. What worked in 
Japan would, by definition, be equally effective in Korea. It was to transpire, however, 
that whilst their social, cultural, political, and economic intelligence concerning Japan 
was accurate, and a comprehensive policy based upon that intelligence well thought 
through, the Americans were to find that the Japanese template simply did not fit the 
circumstances in Korea. In contradistinction to their counterparts in Tokyo, the AMG in 
Seoul did not have any `Korean experts' among its number, and locating reliable 
sources of advice, of a kind that would accord with US preconditions, on matters 
Korean was to prove problematic. One of the major stumbling blocks was that all the 
political factions in the south, with the exception of that led by Rhee Seung-man, had 
expressed willingness to negotiate with the communist north over the question of 
national unification, a stance that was anathema to the US (Ha Bong-gyu, 1989). As a 
consequence, the AMG moved in a direction virtually guaranteed to enrage the majority 
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of the Korean population by seeking guidance from the very bureaucrats and individuals 
who had collaborated and held high office during the time of subjugation by Japan. The 
old colonial bureaucratic structure was maintained and even the colonial police force, 
the members of which had gone into hiding, was reinstated in the same uniforms that 
had been issued by the Japanese (Lee Ok-jie, 1990). History is littered with revolutions 
of one sort or another which, contrary to contemporary rhetoric, not only fail to sweep 
clean the Augean stables but, on the contrary, succeed only in adding to the corruption 
that was one of the main causes of the revolt in the first place. Every change of national 
administration that has taken place in Korea, including that of the present day, has 
reinforced this apparent paradox. The same faces seem to float to the top no matter what 
the complexion happens to be of the political and social regimes holding sway at any 
given time. The mishandling of the textile industry by the AMG was a classic case in 
point. 
As has been indicated previously, the overwhelming majority of the most 
productive textile companies in Korea were owned by the Japanese. When these `enemy 
holdings' fell into the hands of the Americans a decision clearly had to be made as to 
the means of their disposal. Much against the wishes of the nationalists and the workers, 
the AMG opted for a process of what can only be referred to as `privatisation'. Valued 
at some three billion won in 1947, the component parts of the spinning and weaving 
industry - which was the largest single manufacturing sector to be disposed of - were 
virtually given away to selected recipients for a mere one-tenth of that amount (Kang 
Man-gil, 1985). What is more, the new owners were afforded preferential loans by the 
AMG and were given fifteen years in which to pay off the purchase price. As this all 
occurred during a time of rampant inflation, the actual cost was considerably below 
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even the paltry nominal amount. To add insult to injury, at least from the point of view 
of Korean workers, even the textile factories which had been taken over immediately 
after the departure of the Japanese and were being run by `People's Committees' were 
taken out of worker control by the AMG and added to the booty to be handed over to a 
list of dubious new owners (Kang Man-gil, 1985). The fortunate beneficiaries of this 
most favourable of business opportunities turned out to be the very same Korean 
capitalists who had enjoyed similar patronage under the Japanese, and who now found 
little difficulty in convincing the AMG of their loyalty to the new administration and 
their desire to further the goals of the United States. 
In 1948 the AMG transferred political control of South Korea to their 
placeman, Rhee Seung-man, and the new administration's largesse toward the favoured 
few continued as before, with many financial privileges and tariff exemptions being 
awarded to those industrialists with close political connections (Hamilton, 1986). 
However, irrespective of the establishment of textile conglomerates in South Korea 
following the defeat of Japan, and the huge individual fortunes which were amassed 
under the incumbencies of the Japanese, the AMG, and Rhee Seung-man, the wider 
characterisation of the South Korean textile industry between 1945 and 1960 was one of 
decline. The truth of the matter is that the USA, unlike Japan some forty-odd years 
previously, was not overly interested in South Korea's economic reorganisation. It had 
no coherent and informed policy geared to the construction of a self-supporting 
economy and, as far as textiles were concerned, appeared content merely to facilitate the 
import of cheap raw cotton from the US and allow Korean farmers to look elsewhere for 
a worthwhile crop into which to diversify (Park Chan-il, 1981). Furthermore, and very 
much in line with the ethos of preferment, the allocation of that imported raw material 
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was entirely within the gift of the government, whether the A IG or, later, that of Rhee 
Seung-man. Thus, those firms with political connections rapidly assumed monopoly 
status while the smaller, unfavoured, factories which had to scrape by on what little raw 
materials they could get, either went out of business or were reduced to the role of 
subcontractors. Purely by default, the opportunity to re-establish the link between 
agriculture and industry, the connection crucial to self-sufficiency, was missed. As had 
been the case during the colonial period, the Korean textile industry was, yet again, 
destined to become dependent upon external supply. 
The Korean War (1950-53) between North and South not only devastated the 
entire infrastructure in South Korea, but its aftermath witnessed a further diminution of 
the possibilities for national industrial self-sufficiency, and a reinforcement of the 
dependency culture. Foreign aid, mostly from the United States, in the form of 
consumption goods was traded to produce counterpart funds that were taken up, in the 
main, by military expenditure. Aid in the form of cheap raw materials was preferentially 
allocated to the favoured and well-connected large enterprises, while much of the grant 
aid found its way into the same accounts in the shape of low interest loans (Kang Man- 
gil, 1985). 
In its dealings with `organised' labour, the Rhee administration followed 
closely the pattern set by the AMG and thereby emphasised, if emphasis was needed, 
the closeness of the bond that had developed between industrialists and government. 
Although in 1945 the AMG had repealed the labour laws which had been put in place 
by the Japanese, and enacted instead legislation identical to that which it had introduced 
into occupied Japan, the South Korean statutes were characterised more by their 
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avoidance than by their observance (Lee Ok-jie, 1990). No matter to what extent, or 
how blatantly, the Korean employers violated the provisions of the law during the late 
1940's, the US administration would make token gestures of issuing repeated warnings 
to the employers when workers protested against the exploitative conditions under 
which they were living, before taking action, but in order to avoid putting the 
convenient, stabilising, government/employer relationship in jeopardy, such action was 
invariably directed against the labour force (FKTU, 1979). During the Rhee Seung-man 
incumbency, precisely the same inverted logic was applied, albeit for a different, and far 
more corrupt, motive. Most of the owners of the largest textile companies were either 
related to, or were close associates of, Rhee himself: for example, Rhee's adopted son 
was the head of the Chosun Spinning and Weaving Company, and the financial director 
of Rhee's Liberal Party was the owner of Daehan Spinning and Weaving. In both 
companies, Chosun in 1951 and Daehan in 1955, major disputes were suppressed with 
vigour (Kim Yun-hwan, 1982). 
In April, 1960 the reign, and the corruption, of Rhee Seung-man's First 
Republic was brought to an abrupt end by student-led popular revolution. The Second 
Republic of Chang Myon's Democratic Party was to last for just one year before 
General Park Chung-hee appeared centre-stage. Despite the `revolutionary pledges' 
sworn by the new military regime, the trials and the tribulations of the Korean textile 
and garment industry were far from over. 
5.4 The Wider Perspective 
As we have seen, the low wage potential of Korea has proved a powerful 
magnet to foreign, capitalist `carpetbagger' enterprises since the 19th century and, as a 
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consequence, the textile industry, in particular, was dominated and manipulated by 
external forces. However, after the expulsion of the Japanese, and the handover of 
power by the AMG to a Korean administration, it might reasonably have been assumed 
that South Korea would be in a position to regain full responsibility for, and full benefit 
from, its `own' textile and garment industries. This was not to be. What appeared to 
many as a golden opportunity for a new beginning was lost and, bearing in mind the 
richly merited antipathy felt by most Koreans for their erstwhile colonial masters, it is 
difficult to contain surprise at the speed with which Japanese influence was, once again, 
to be felt in the mills and sweat-shop factories of Seoul. 
As Bolton (1976) explains, by the second half of the 1970's the major segment 
of world textile production was under the control of a mere 38 companies functioning 
along an organised and collective policy line. Thus, whether it was by means of 
company management interconnection, cartel, or share ownership arrangements, the 
relationship that was forged between these major players effectively prevented free 
competition in the global market. Furthermore, and by extension, decisions which 
impinged upon the living and working conditions of countless labourers around the 
world rested in the hands of a very few, foreign-based, individuals. What is particularly 
pertinent is the fact that when we look at the locations of the head-offices of these 38 
companies, we find that there were just seven countries of origin, five western European 
nations, as well as the United States and Japan. As each of these countries had been, or 
remained, colonial powers, it was not easy for developing countries to disassociate 
routine economic decisions from the actual presence of imperialism. Of those 38 
dominant companies in the global scene of the 1970's, eight were Japanese; all but one 
of which occupied positions in the top half of the overall league table. An important part 
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of the collective arrangements agreed by the major international players was the 
allocation of `areas of influence' (Bolton, 1976). In the case of South Korea, that 
influence was exerted inevitably, and ironically, by Japan, whose investment in Korean 
textile manufacturing grew rapidly during the 1960's. Indeed, by 1978, there were at 
least 57 joint venture companies in Korea, and out of the leading twenty Korean textile 
companies, eight were fully controlled by Japanese capital (Bolton, 1976). 
Thus, from the position of a comprehensively defeated nation in 1946, and 
driven by the imperative to secure and take advantage of a low wage workforce, Japan 
had manoeuvred into a situation whereby the Korean textile industry was, once again, 
little more than an extension and an expansion of the Japanese economy. What might 
have appeared inconceivable less than a generation previously, that the ex-colonial 
power could ever again play a significant part in directing the Korean economy, was 
now actually taking place. Japanese involvement was not restricted to the input of 
capital, but rapidly diversified into the supply of raw materials, especially in the 
synthetic fibre sector, the sourcing of more advanced technology, and the development 
of a sophisticated marketing network. 
One of the numerous reasons why it was crucial for Park Chung-hee to 
maintain good relations with the United States was that America constituted the main 
market for Korean textile products. In 1975,39% of output went to the US (UN 
Statistics of Commodities, 1975), and by 1977,9.5% of all clothing and textiles on the 
American market was of South Korean origin. 30% of output in 1975 was exported to 
EC countries, while 16.5% was destined for Japan (Lee Ok-jie, 1990). 
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It must be reiterated that the Korean textile industry was not only of great 
interest to Japan but was, in fact, the pre-eminent component of Park Chung-hee's 
industrial development programme at least until the rnid-1970's, when the emphasis 
began to shift towards the heavy and chemical sectors. In 1976, for example, textiles 
occupied the first rank, constituting 35.4% of South Korea's total exports. The 
magnitude of this performance can only be fully appreciated when it is recalled that 
whilst total exports in 1961 were $US 41 million, by 1978 they had escalated to $US 
10.23 billion (Ha Bong-gyu, 1989). The growth rate of the textile and clothing industry 
was equally remarkable; while the growth of manufacturing as a whole increased by 
230.3% between 1970 and 1974, that of the clothing industry during the same period 
reached 516.4%. Commensurate with this dramatic upsurge in output, the number of 
workers employed in the industry increased by more than 52% in the two years from 
1973 to 1975; that was from just over 190,000 to almost 290,000 (Korean Economy 
Annual, 1976). 
According to the Park regime's Fourth Five-Year Plan (1977-1981), cut short 
by Park's assassination in 1979, the textile sector would continue to grow, albeit at a 
slightly reduced rate, and the predicted textile exports for the final year of the plan were 
a little short of $US 4 billion. This constituted 26.4 % of total exports in 1981 and 
would maintain textiles in the vanguard of the export-oriented programme. To be the 
major contributor in such an extraordinary economic explosion is indicative of the 
efficacy of the US-Japan-South Korea tripartite relationship. It revealed the extent of the 
stranglehold attained over Korean industry by external forces, and the degree of 
exploitation suffered by Korean workers at the hands of their own national 
administration. 
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The garment sector of the textile industry consisted, in the main, of small 
companies concentrated within the Seoul metropolitan region and epitomised by the 
Peace Market, in central Seoul. It was within this infamous establishment that hundreds 
of separate owners employed thousands of young women and girls, the suffering and 
the achievements of whom form the core and the raison d 'Care of this study. 
5.5 Seoul: The Development Of A Capital City 
For most South Koreans, Seoul represents much more than merely the capital 
city of their nation; the collective concept of Seoul being, in many ways, far removed 
from that of London held by the British, Washington by the Americans, or Beijing by 
the Chinese. In the Korean psyche Seoul is not only the hub of government, commerce, 
and education, but is also the spiritual heart of the country, almost the personification 
of what it is to be South Korean and, as such, the `idea' of Seoul exerts a powerful, 
almost magnetic, attraction over South Koreans of all shades of the social spectrum 
(Kim Joo-chul, 1997). When residents opine that `Seoul has lost its soul' because of the 
ever-increasing overcrowding, pollution, traffic congestion, crime, and other assorted 
urban ills, their concern is not directed at the capital in isolation, but is a harbinger of 
their disquiet about the future of South Korea as a whole. 
The events which unfolded during the 1960's and 1970's, and which are the 
focus of this study, all took place within the Seoul metropolitan region and it is, 
therefore, considered appropriate to take a brief overview of the origin and evolution of 
this fascinating, complex, and troubled city. Although Korea has a well recorded history 
extending for more than five thousand years, Seoul did not acquire the status of capital 
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city until the emergence of the Yi Dynasty in 1394, during which period it was known 
as Hanyang. Situated, as it is, in the centre of the peninsula, close to an ice-free seaport, 
and on the major trade artery of the Han river, Seoul was a natural choice, and an ideal 
location, from which a king could oversee his nation. However, twentieth century 
geopolitics were to devalue the choice somewhat, for the division of the peninsula after 
the Second World War resulted in Seoul being a mere 35 kilometres south of the 38th 
parallel of latitude, the arbitrary border-line between North and South Korea. The 
vulnerability that such an outcome lent to South Korea's seat of government was amply 
demonstrated when Seoul was occupied by communist forces on two occasions during 
the Korean War, necessitating the temporary transfer of administrative functions to 
Pusan. 
Built along traditional lines as a walled city, the original Seoul had four gates, 
one at each of the compass cardinal-points, with the area that was enclosed by the wall 
forming what is now referred to as `central' Seoul. The spiritual quality that plays so 
great a part in Seoul's appeal to Koreans was inculcated from the beginning insofar as 
all the early development was based strictly on the disciplines of geomancy, orfeng shui 
(Kim Joo-chul, 1997). This set of principles dictated both the precise location of the 
centre of development, and the orientation of buildings and streets, in order to achieve 
an aura and a mood of harmony and peace. 
Constrained by its physical enclosure, which limited its size to no more than 16 
square kilometres, and in the light of a strict closed-door policy, deeply rooted in 
Confucianism, that was adhered to by the rulers of Korea prior to the signing of the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1876 (see above), it is not surprising to find that, for the 
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greater part of its 600 year history, Seoul maintained a comparatively stable population. 
The inhabitants were not culturally predisposed toward commercialism or industrial 
expansion and their numbers fluctuated only between 100,000 - 120,000 (Kim Joo- 
chul, 1997). What structural expansion that did take place was linked largely to the 
growth of administrative, educational, and religious facilities. It was this controlled and 
exclusive characteristic that gave rise to the sobriquet `the hermit kingdom'. 
The process of annexation and colonialisation by the Japanese in the latter part 
of the 19t1' century and early 20th century witnessed a radical upheaval in all aspects of 
Korean life. Not only were industrialisation and a bureaucratic system of government 
forcibly introduced, but a clear and deliberate policy to dismantle Korean identity was 
undertaken. Seoul was renamed Kyongsong and its walled-city character and geomantic 
ethos were modified almost beyond recognition. By 1936, the city had gained a 
population approaching one million, and because Japanese residents and military 
personnel had commandeered the central areas, pushing Koreans to the periphery, 
Seoul's physical size expanded to encompass 134 square kilometres (Kim Joo-chul, 
1997). Most importantly, it was under the influence of the Japanese that Seoul not only 
enhanced its role as the centre for national administration, but it also rapidly assumed a 
position of dominance in business and finance. 
After the Second World War, with the Japanese defeated and colonial rule 
supposedly at an end, the next phase in the capital's troubled history began. Large 
numbers of ex-patriots returning from Manchuria, China and, of course, Japan, swelled 
the masses of migrants from rural areas who gravitated towards Seoul during the period 
of ideological conflict that was sweeping the peninsula. By 1949 the population had 
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increased to 1.6 million and the size of the city had more than doubled since 1936 (Kim 
Joo-chul, 1997). The post-war infrastructure could not cope with such an influx, 
however, and great swathes of makeshift squatter encampments began to spring up in 
many parts of the city. This was the beginning of a planning and housing trauma that 
was to bedevil Seoul for more than a generation, and one which the author was to 
experience at first hand. 
By the time the armistice was signed at the end of the Korean War in July 
1953, some 47% of all buildings in Korea had been destroyed (Kirr Joo-chul, 1997), 
and a great surge of what were, in effect, refugees flooded into Seoul in search of 
employment and a place in which to try to rebuild some sort of a life. With legitimate 
employment opportunities virtually non-existent, it was almost inevitable that a `black 
economy' would blossom in the city during this period. Necessity resulted in small, 
unregulated, one-man, or one-family, businesses springing up throughout the city. As is 
the way, different craft specialisations tended to group together in particular districts. 
For example, the textile and garment producing enterprises gravitated to the Chonggye- 
chun district in the very centre of Seoul where, as will be described in the following 
section, the myriad of ramshackle huts in which tailors and seamstresses plied their 
trade would be swept away to be replaced by the Peace Market and other, similar, 
`establishments of ill-repute' (Hart-Landsberg, 1993). 
Confronted by the level of devastation wrought by the war, and with minimal 
financial resources at its disposal, the city administration was ill-equipped to formulate 
any coherent development policy. Whether by accident or intent, the practical outcome 
of this incapacity on the part of the authorities was an overly harsh and insensitive 
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attempt at `slum clearance': a determination that was frequently manifested in the 
simple expedient of driving bulldozers through the aggregations of tin and plywood 
shacks, each of which housed up to three entire families (Interview, ex-Peace Market 
factory owner, December, 1998). At a time of civil and political instability, such abuse 
of an already deeply wounded and impoverished population, one that had only recently 
emerged from an agonising civil war, was likely to foment unrest. 
Ostensibly in order to rectify what were perceived to be the root causes of this 
social disenchantment and mismanagement, the military coup of Park Chung-hee and 
his accomplices took place in May, 1961. Unlike his American and Korean 
predecessors, but much in common with the Japanese colonialists, Park had a clear 
vision of exactly the direction South Korea should take. Park wasted no time in shifting 
the national agenda from disorganised agrarianism to one focused upon state controlled 
export-oriented industrialisation. Park Chung-hee followed the pattern set by the 
Japanese whereby the growth of Seoul was closely tied to the economic development of 
the nation as a whole. Thus, one of the spin-offs of his radical policy shift was an 
explosive expansion of the capital city. While other areas in the south of the country 
were targeted as the sites for the development of heavier industries such as steel 
production and fabrication, and the building of automobiles, the capital and its 
surrounding region was identified as the locus for light manufacturing and high-tech 
enterprises. Factories in their hundreds appeared almost overnight. During the first year 
alone of the military regime's incumbency the number of `legitimate' and, therefore, 
`recordable', light manufacturing establishments in Seoul increased by more than 120% 
(Kim Joo-chul, 1997). The migration of workers from the countryside to the city 
accelerated in concert, and by 1969 the city occupied over 600 square kilometres and 
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held a population in excess of 5 million. The rate of increase continued throughout the 
1970's, and during that decade an average of 300,000 new residents arrived each year 
(Kim Joo-chul, 1997). 
The city administration, dictated as it was by the Park philosophy, was 
confronted with a dichotomy: on the one hand, there was a requirement to foster the 
highly labour-intensive new industries which were blossoming within the city limits 
and, on the other, the problem of accommodating the ever-expanding army of essential 
labourers became more and more pressing. In 1971, for example, it was estimated that 
in excess of one million Koreans were living in `unauthorised' temporary dwellings in 
Seoul (Hart-Landsberg, 1993). Thus, it was during this period that a series of building 
projects were undertaken which exhibited a singular lack of imagination and a 
concentration solely upon the utilitarian. Whereas, north of the Han River there was still 
a preponderance of single-storey houses which reflected traditional Korean architectural 
preference, the region south of the river exhibited a departure from such norms and, 
instead, suffered the development of US-style grid street patterns accessing endless, 
monotonous, high-rise apartment blocks which dominate the cityscape to this day. To 
the older residents these blocks are constant reminders of the `loss of soul' of Seoul. 
Despite numerous `decentralisation' measures enacted by the Park regime. the 
`magnetic' attraction of their capital continued to draw hopeful immigrants from the 
farms and villages until well into the 1980's (Kim Joo-chul, 1997). 
The briefest glance at the most recent census figures is sufficient to drive home 
the enormity of the expansion that has occurred in Seoul over a period of little more 
than one generation. In 1997, the population of the city exceeded 11 million people, 
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more than 80% of whom have lived there for less than thirty years. The city boundaries 
enclose an area in excess of 605 square kilometres; which affords a density of some 
16,000 inhabitants per square kilometre. Furthermore, the Seoul metropolitan region, 
which includes surrounding satellite towns and industrial complexes, contains 46% of 
the entire population of South Korea. By the end of the current year, 2000, it has been 
estimated that it will constitute the third most populated region in the world, behind 
only Mexico City and Sao Paulo (Kim Joo-chul, 1997). From its beginning as a walled 
city of peace and harmony, Seoul has become a gigantic urban sprawl that an increasing 
number of commentators are forecasting will witness extreme environmental 
degradation and a massive upsurge of crime unless drastic corrective measures are 
formulated and adopted. Whether Seoul has, indeed, `lost its soul' is clearly arguable, 
the proposition that it has lost its Korean identity is indisputable. 
5.6 The Peace Market 
Cutting through the middle of Seoul city, and running in an east-west direction, 
is a four-lane highway that was constructed in the early seventies by the Park Chung- 
hee regime. Seoul sports stadium lies some two-and-a-half kilometres east of City Hall, 
and the highway passes approximately four hundred metres to the north of the stadium. 
The area between the stadium and the highway, which at this point takes the form of an 
extended flyover, is the Chonggye-chun district, and is dominated by the group of 
buildings which, collectively, are known as the Peace Market. 
' 
The Peace Market was at the root of so many problems for Park Chung-hee 
in the 1970's because, from the very beginning of the decade, his opponents 
used it as a focus for anti-government protest. But the unwelcome attention 
paid to the wider implications of conditions in the Peace Market was not 
limited to South Korean resistance groups and student organisations, the 
North Korean government and other foreigners also elected to make it an 
issue of substance from 1970 onwards. 2 For example, in 1972, when there 
was a summit conference to pave the way for unification between the South 
and the North, 3 the North Korean delegation gave notice that they would 
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like to see the Peace Market whilst they were in Seoul. Although this was a 
highly sensitive matter for Park Chung-hee, he felt compelled to accede to 
the request, and was coerced into granting state approval for the allocation 
of 20 million won [approximately $US40,000 at the 1972 exchange rate] to 
be spent on the external decoration of the Peace Market buildings. After the 
event, Park was even more unhappy with the Peace Market, especially the 
union activity that was taking place there. It was difficult not to see the 
Peace Market as a volcano waiting to erupt (Interview, Head of the Labour 
Inspectorate at the Peace Market 1974-1978, February 1999). 
Throughout the 1970's, the `collective' Peace Market was the epicentre of the 
production and wholesale distribution of ready-made garments in South Korea. The 
Peace, Dong-hwa, and Tong-il markets together constituted a production and sales 
system wherein each of the many small factories was complemented by a wholesale 
and/or retail outlet. The architectural pattern was identical in each of the buildings, with 
factories located on the first and second floors and shops occupying the entirety of the 
ground floors. However, by the end of the decade, and for reasons which will be 
explained in detail in a later chapter, the factories had begun to relocate to other areas, 
and the business ethos of the Peace Market shifted from a combination of production 
and sales to one focused entirely upon marketing. Indeed, by the beginning of the 
1990's, the Seoul Peace Market had acquired an international reputation as the place to 
go in order to purchase high quality, ready made garments in bulk and at a good price. It 
attracted, and continues to attract, retailers, large and small, from China, Japan, Taiwan, 
the former Soviet Union, and many other countries whose merchants and traders are 
ever on the lookout for quality and value. 
5.6.1 Historical Development 
As has been explained previously, one of the salient characteristics of the 
aftermath of the Korean War was the veritable flood of refugees that poured into the 
capital city. In the absence of any coherent planning or control mechanisms, this tide of 
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impoverished humanity was left to its own devices to find somewhere to live and, 
hopefully, some form of remunerative employment. For their part, those who had some 
expertise, or ambition, in the garment and textile field tended to congregate in the 
Chonggye-chun district, where they constituted, in effect, a raw material of enormous 
potential for any likely entrepreneur. One such enterprising individual was Ko Dal-soo, 
the owner of a Seoul construction company, who was quick to identify the possibilities 
for profit that the thousands of displaced persons who had arrived in the city represented 
(Interview, ex-Peace Market factory owner, December, 1998). 
Having gained `temporary building approval' from City Hall, Ko Dal-soo 
began to construct a large number of rudimentary wooden shacks, each about six square 
metres in size, which he then rented out at exorbitant rates. This `development', which 
rapidly became what could only be described as a stench-ridden slum, was the 
beginning of the Peace Market. By 1957, four years after the formal cessation of 
hostilities between North and South Korea, the tenants of this myriad of workshops had 
benefited to such an extent from the huge demand for clothing that the most successful 
of them could afford to join together and fund a clearance and rebuilding programme. 
An observer in the 1960's, driving west on the aforementioned new flyover towards 
City Hall, would have been able to overlook the first manifestations of this programme. 
Two long, narrow, three-storey buildings, connected by a bridge over an alley-way, had 
been erected to replace the original ramshackle workshops, which had been demolished. 
These connected buildings, running parallel with the highway and extending over some 
six hundred metres, were the `new' Peace Market, and the great majority of their 
occupants were the former tenants of the slum workshops. 
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The ground floors of the new buildings were divided into cubicles which were 
used as wholesale or retail outlets for the garments being produced in the factories on 
the first and second floors. The nature of these garments varied from season to season: 
in the autumn and winter, jackets, overcoats, and sweaters predominated, whereas in the 
summer, lightweight jackets, trousers, and shirts made up the bulk of the output. 
Because most of the really skilled machinists had gravitated to the Peace Market, the 
area acquired a reputation for quality among consumers, `Made in Seoul' was a mark of 
distinction and, as a consequence, it became increasingly difficult for provincial 
manufacturers to compete. They either went bankrupt, or relocated to the Chonggye- 
chun area. The Peace Market increased in capacity almost daily, and it was not long 
before the district had cornered the nation-wide commercial market in ready-made 
garments. 
Day-to-day administration of the Peace Market buildings was in the hands of 
the Peace Market Corporation; a body made up of representatives of the owners of 
individual factories. Bearing in mind the nature of the main interest of the members of 
the board; that is, the maximisation of profit, it is not surprising that although the 
Corporation was legally mandated to assume responsibility only for the security, 
maintenance, and cleaning of the buildings, it was not long before its primary function 
became that of `mouthpiece' for employers, and protector of employers' rights (Diary, 
Chun Tae-il, 1969). By the end of 1968, the two smaller market buildings, Dong-hwa 
and Tong-il, had been completed. They were both to the south of, and close to, the 
Peace Market, and were administered along identical lines. 
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5.6.2 Employee Establishment 
Attention is drawn elsewhere in this study to the difficulty in ascertaining 
precisely how many workers were employed in the `collective' Peace Market. Although 
notable more for its evasion than for its observance, the Labour Standard Law did make 
clear prescription in regard to the number of persons who could be employed in 
workplaces of a given size. Whilst this provision was largely concerned with the 
question of health and safety, considerations rarely at the forefront of Korean employer 
consciousness, the number of workers on a factory's payroll also had a fundamental 
impact upon tax liability; a factor of somewhat more pressing urgency. It was, 
therefore, very much in the interest of a factory owner's balance sheet that he understate 
the number in his employ in all the returns made to the Ministry of Labour Affairs. This 
common, if not universal, practice renders many industrial relations statistics of the 
period virtually useless. 
For example, according to figures released by the Ministry in 1970, the 
number of factories in operation in the three markets discussed in this section was 428, 
and the total number of workers employed in those factories was approximately 7,600 
(Ministry of Labour Affairs Annual Report, 1970). After allowing for acceptable 
fluctuations, the figures provided convenient confirmation that the maximum number of 
employees per factory did not exceed the legal limit of sixteen. These claims 
did not 
accord with Chun Tae-il's experience and so, in the same year, he conducted 
his own 
protracted and painstaking survey of employment patterns in the three markets. 
4 The 
results of his research demonstrated all too clearly the magnitude of the corporate 
deception that had become commonplace. Having affirmed a distrust of labour statistics, 
the author does, nevertheless, submit that the evidence provided by Chun Tae-il 
bears a 
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relationship to the actuality that is closer than can be claimed for any alternative that is 
likely to become available. According to his research, the true number of factories in the 
three markets was 860, almost exactly double the officially declared number, whilst the 
total of those employed was, at 26,800, more than three times greater than the official 
amount (Diary, Chun Tae-il, 1970). A simple calculation confirms that, far from 
remaining within the legal maximum of sixteen employees per factory, the truth was 
that, on average, the number employed was approximately twice the maximum required 
by law. 
Chun Tae-il's breakdown of the figures he had obtained showed that Dong- 
hwa Market consisted of 160 factories employing 4,800 workers (an average of 30 
workers per factory), Tong-il Market had 200 factories employing 8,000 workers (an 
average of 40 workers per factory), and the Peace Market was made up of 500 factories 
employing 14,000 workers (an average of 28 workers per factory). Of the 26,800 
workers, 85.9 percent were women between the ages of 14 to 24. and more than half of 
them were below the age of 18 (Diary, Chun Tae-il, 1970) 
Taking a closer scrutiny at the Peace Market, Chun Tae-il found that of the 
14,000 employees, 5,000 were either oya or bocho-machinists (all female), an 
equivalent number of shidas, or machinists' helpers (all female), and 500 cutters, each 
of whom had an assistant (all male). The balance was made up of approximately 500 
female madomes, 500 shiaggaes (mostly male) plus managers (all male), shop 
assistants, and associated staff. 5 Thus, between 85 and 90 percent of all those employed 
in the Peace Market were women or young girls (Diary, Chun Tae-il, 1970). 
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5.6.3 Peace Market Employers 
In an interview in December, 1998 with a Peace Market factory owner who had 
been involved in the Peace Market development from the beginning, the author was 
informed that approximately 50 percent of the 860 original factory owners were 
refugees from North Korea, and some 10 percent of those had been anti-communist 
prisoners of war. The remaining 50 percent of owners were from the countryside in the 
South and had been drawn to Seoul after the devastation wreaked by the Korean War. 
Few, if any, of the employers were educated, and their manner tended to be rough and 
uncultured. They were driven by a single-minded determination to make a success of 
their businesses and, in most cases, their entire family would be involved, in one way or 
another, in the production and sales process. 
The factory I worked in was owned by a North Korean family. The wife 
looked after the factory while her husband took charge of sales down in the 
shop. We had no electric iron and I had to use one that was heated by 
charcoal. It was quite dangerous with sparks flying around and it was so 
easy to damage the fabrics or the finished clothes. I tried hard to be careful, 
but whenever I made a mistake they used very common and abusive 
language. They often hit me and threatened me with dismissal. They had no 
tolerance at all towards the workers. But that sort of behaviour was quite 
normal in those days. Despite all the violence and humiliation I did not have 
any alternative and I begged them to let me stay in my job. It was the only 
chance I had to learn how to be a machinist (Interview, Peace Market 
woman worker 6, February 1999). 
Most of the owners had started out with very little capital, in many cases just 
sufficient to buy three or four, often second-hand, sewing machines and their first batch 
of fabric. Such was the demand for clothing of all descriptions, however, that it was by 
no means uncommon for these very small-scale entrepreneurs to have increased their 
establishments tenfold within the space of two or three years. The saying among them in 
the 1970's was: "What is made, is sold", and this maxim was never more true than 
during the periods leading up to the major national holidays at Harvest Festival and 
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New Year, when retailers would be lining up, laden with cash, and eager to secure as 
much stock as the wholesaler could produce (Interview, ex-Peace Market factory owner, 
December, 1998). 
The retired factory owner mentioned above, who was interviewed in an hotel 
close to his home in the exclusive Sheo Chodong district of Seoul, provided a flavour of 
the business atmosphere of the period, and an indication of how relatively easy it was to 
accumulate wealth in the garment industry. A precis of his comments was noted: 
I started a small garment factory in the Chonggye-chun district in 1954, 
shortly after the end of the Korean War. By 1963 1 had made a huge fortune 
and decided to leave the Peace Market and invest my capital, about 3 billion 
won, in the transportation business -a bus and taxi company. But because I 
had no experience in that line of work I went bankrupt in less than two 
years. I was deeply depressed and had no alternative but to go back to the 
Peace Market. On 5 May, 1966 I began again with just 150,000 won, which 
was all I had. I acquired five Japanese motor sewing machines on a half- 
lease arrangement and started to make women's blouses. After three years I 
had fully recovered my business. I invested some of my capital, and bought 
two wholesale stores in the Dongdae-moon Market, and I also bought the 
house where I now live. I joined the consortium that built the Dong-hwa 
Market in 1968 and became a manager. In the 1980's I was the senior 
manager of Dong-hwa, and I retired in April, 1992 (Interview, ex-Peace 
Market factory owner, December, 1998). 
5.7 Summary 
It is not for reasons of sentimentality or romanticism that Korea is known as 
the `Land of the Morning Calm'. Its people are industrious, peace loving, spiritual, and 
placid, and war as an instrument of national policy has not featured in the lexicon of 
d 
Korean governance. The Confucian ethic that flatly rejects militarism as a degrading 
form of human endeavour has generated a deep-seated public antipathy to all things 
bellicose, and has manifested itself in the total absence of internal armed conquest 
throughout much of Korea's long history. But this absence of institutionalised internal 
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aggression was complemented by subjugation and exploitation at the hands of external 
forces, extending back over thousands of years. Nowhere was this all-consuming ethos 
of manipulation and plunder more prevalent than in the textile and garment industry 
which, from the very earliest of times until late into the twentieth century, has borne the 
brunt of systematic spoliation. 
The bitter irony was that when occupation administrations and foreign 
adventurers finally left the divided peninsula, and the opportunity for indigenous 
independent self-government was at hand, and almost as though the habit of centuries 
was too deeply ingrained to break, the exploitation, suppression, corruption, and 
brutality continued unabated. Indeed, in many ways this pattern of aggression actually 
gained in ferocity. The facility to accumulate enormous sums of money, as has been 
illustrated in this chapter, was the rule rather than the exception for those Koreans 
fortunate enough to be in a position to take advantage of the opportunities on offer 
during the 1960's and 1970's. What must never be overlooked, however, is that such 
personal and corporate fortunes were possible only because thousands upon thousands 
of downtrodden and impoverished women and young girls who toiled in the sweat- 
shops of the Peace Market had no protection whatsoever against the combined forces of 
a ruthless state and predatory capital. 
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NOTES 
1 The name `Peace Market' is both specific and general. It can be used to refer to the 
Peace Market buildings themselves, or as a collective reference to the Peace Market and 
the Dong-hwa and Tong-il markets, all of which are adjacent. 
2 After Chun Tae-il's death in November, 1970, the tour itineraries of visiting 
luminaries and academic researchers increasingly featured, at their instigation, a visit to 
the Peace Market (Ha Bong-gyu, 1989). 
3 20 May-1 June, 1970, Park Sung-chul, second Vice-Premier of North Korea, returned 
the secret visit paid in the preceding May to Pyongyang by Yi Hoo-rak, Director of the 
Korean Central Intelligence Agency (Ha Bong-gyu, 1989). 
4 Chun Tae-il and a small group of colleagues visited each factory during the summer of 
1970 to collect employment data. Results of the survey were submitted to the Ministry 
of Labour Affairs, and were subsequently published in the Kyunghang national daily 
newspaper on 23 October, 1970. 
5 Job titles derive from the Japanese colonial era and are explained in Chapter Seven. 
6 Park Myong-ok became Vice-President of the Chonggye Union 1972-1974, and 
Secretary of the Women's Section of the union 1974-1977. She started work in the 
Peace Market in 1958. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
A FEMALE LABOUR FORCE: THE PAST MEETS THE FUTURE 
"One is not born a woman, one becomes one " 
(Simone de Beauvoir) 
6.0 Introduction 
Whether women were of the 1960's, the 1970's, or the 1980's generations, 
their mission in the urban area remained constant. While a few may have 
migrated to the city simply to escape from the confines of the family, for 
the most part, young females went to the city to obtain employment so that 
they could send part of their wages back home to help their family survive 
economically. Frequently, their primary responsibility was to pay for the 
education of siblings, especially their younger brothers (Abstract, group 
discussions, female garment workers, December, 1998 - January, 1999). 
Explicit in this study is an exploration of the participation of women in the 
social and economic development of South Korea during the first two decades 
immediately following the military coup of May, 196 1. That is to say, the period 
which may be characterised primarily as that of `modern' industrialisation, the era 
which began with the abrupt and undemocratic assumption of power by General Park 
Chung-hee, and which ended with his assassination on 26 October, 1979. Those two 
decades witnessed a cataclysmic national metamorphosis that reverberated throughout 
every facet of human life in South Korea, and no sector was more affected, or played a 
greater part in determining the eventual outcomes, than young women workers. It is, 
therefore, vital to the achievement of the goals of this study to look closely at the 
development of female wage labour participation in that industrial revolutionary 
period. To that end, this chapter will draw upon evidence gained from empirical 
research to examine some of the pre-eminent issues concerning the female labour 
force, and their social, political, and cultural ramifications. 
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The chapter comprises two sections. The first section offers a discussion of 
the historical origins of the relevant Korean cultural patterns; origins which were much 
influenced by Confucian ideology. In so doing, the rationale that underpinned the 
structures and processes within Korean society facilitating the systematic oppression 
of women is examined. The second section considers the demographic trends of the 
period which reflected the mass-migration of girls and young women from the 
countryside to the city. The family backgrounds and circumstances of these young 
migrants are described, in concert with their reasons for seeking employment in the 
urban areas, and the methods of recruitment they experienced. 
6.1 Culture And Gender: Women's Participation 
In all aspects of social activity, including access to resources for 
production, rewards or remuneration for work, distribution or 
consumption, income or goods, exercise of authoritarian power, and 
participation in cultural and religious activity, gender is important in 
establishing people's behaviour and the outcome of any social interaction 
(Pearson, 1992). 
A reasoned argument could be constructed in support of the assertion that life 
for Korean women underwent a far greater degree of change during the 1960's and 
1970's than had occurred throughout the preceding thousand years. The changes have 
included a dramatic growth of women's social and economic activity concomitant 
with the explosive expansion of Korean industrialisation across its many constituent 
disciplines. To place the magnitude and pace of the structural transformation that took 
place in Korea between 1961 and 1979 in a global context, it can be equated with 
similar developments which required at least forty years in Japan and more than half a 
century in Sweden (Dore, 1975). In common with many, if not all, developed or 
developing countries, however, the issues surrounding gender relations remain 
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problematic and the subject of protracted debate (Park Kyung-ae, 1995, Chang Pil- 
hwa, et al, 1994; Nam Jeong-lim, 1991). In South Korea's case, the sheer speed of 
change magnified the effects of social distortions rooted in the gender conflict. 
What appears to have been overlooked, or discounted, in much published 
`gender literature' is the crucial nature of the role played by geo-disparate social and 
cultural norms, influences which assume fundamental significance in the case of South 
Korea (Adkins, 1995, Barrett, 1988; Humphrey, 1987, Miles, 1986, Kaplinsky, 1984). 
As in many other sociological arenas, the imperative to apply a western model, or 
ideal type, to circumstances where such a model is inappropriate, is frequently and 
clearly evident. 
In addition to the pivotal effect of cultural uniqueness on the character of 
gender relations, two other factors can be considered to have a bearing on the Korean 
case. Firstly, it is reasonable to suppose that the question of gender relations is more 
likely to be neglected in a non-democratic society, in which absolute power is invested 
in the hands of one man, than it would in a liberal democratic society in which every 
citizen had a political voice. As has been explained, the era of Park Chung-hee was 
unequivocally one that was marked by male authoritarianism. Secondly, although 
General Park Chung-hee was overtly disparaging on the question of Confucian 
orthodoxy (Park Chung-hee, 1962), not least because the Korean variant of 
Confucianism held the image of the soldier in supercilious contempt (Cumings, 1997), 
there is no doubt that, as Lee Hyo-jae (1978) points out, the military regime under 
Park laid great emphasis on Confucian mores and disciplines and, by implication, on 
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the Confucian view of the role of women, in its exhortations and directives to the 
Korean people in the concerted drive for economic expansion. 
6.2 Confucian Ideology And Its Impact On Women 
Confucius based his whole teaching about human society upon the 
patriarchal family, ancestor worship, and the duty of filial piety. The 
function of the woman within this system was simple and clear. It could be 
summed-up in one four-letter word: "obey". Woman is a creature born to 
obedience (Mace, 1959). 
There are, perhaps, five predominant factors which have influenced the 
development of South Korea as an independent nation, and which are unique to it: (i) 
the role of the United States, (ii) the role of Japan, (iii) the devastating effects of the 
Korean War, (iv) the ever-present shadow cast by the North-South division, and (v), 
the ingrained and pervasive influence of Confucianism. When considering the way in 
which individual and collective behaviour patterns have evolved, as well as in any 
attempt to unravel and explain the nature of Korean thought and the `Korean 
character', it is submitted that it is the influence of Confucianism, above all else, that 
provides the key. Whilst Chapter Two includes some of the implications of the 
ongoing influence of the Confucian ethic as they impinge upon general hierarchical 
relationships, this chapter will consider the more specific applications of Confucian 
philosophy to the lives of Korean working women. Some of its salient features will be 
discussed, and it is anticipated that such an exposition will provide a flavour of the 
deeply rooted social atmosphere in which Korean women have existed for more than 
five hundred years. 
The teachings of Confucius were first introduced into Korea from China 
during the Yi Dynasty in the 14'h century, and although it ceased to be the official, 
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state-endorsed, creed in 1894, its tenets had so permeated Korean society that its 
influence remains strong to this day (Kim Kihwan and Leipziger, 1993; Janelli, 1993). 
In broad terms, it can be said that Confucianism is centred upon a code of strict 
discipline based on a clear-cut social hierarchy. The king, or ruler, has absolute power 
and any rights or privileges enjoyed by his subjects are gifts which can be arbitrarily 
withdrawn. Below the `wise dictator' are teachers for, in Korean eyes at least, 
education is an essential prerequisite for effective government. Teachers merit respect 
from their students, whereas parents can demand only obedience. Further examination 
of the Confucian `pecking-order' reveals an interesting paradox in the context of 
modern, capitalist development and its relationship with Confucian ideals. For after 
scholars and scholar-bureaucrats, the next most senior position in society is occupied 
by farmers; they are followed by artisans who work with their hands to produce 
artifacts necessary for the conduct of normal life, and it is only then that we arrive at 
the rung of the social ladder allocated to merchants and tradesmen. Little, if any, 
respect is apportioned to the business class; indeed, Confucianism maintains a distinct 
anti-business bias; and yet, as has been indicated above, the Park regime found it 
expeditious to use Confucian teaching selectively in order to invigorate the component 
parts of economic expansion. 
Confucianism places great stress on the importance of the family, and 
although such an emphasis has much to recommend it, it has also been a major 
contributor to the ethos of institutionalised corruption that continues to bedevil 
commercial and political life in Korea. The reason for this is that the Korean 
interpretation of familial loyalty finds its natural extension in the overt encouragement 
of nepotism in both government and business. There is also a tension between the 
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essential ingredients for modern industrial development and the Confucian concept of 
education. The traditional focus has been on improving personal character in order to 
fit the individual for public service, rather than on the acquisition and enhancement of 
specialist knowledge in the sciences and in technology. 
But what of women? Where do they fit into the Confucian scheme of things? 
The simple answer is that, to all intents and purposes, they barely fit in at all. Indeed, 
as we shall see, in Confucian philosophy women were effectively `non-persons'. From 
the moment they were born, girls were located on the very periphery of family and 
society, and were left in no doubt how little they were valued. Whereas boys went 
through naming and age-grade ceremonies, girls did not. Until the beginning of the 
20th century, and especially in rural areas, girls were not considered of sufficient social 
standing even to merit being given formal names at all, but were referred to by what in 
the west is known as a nickname. For example, prior to marriage a young woman 
might be called `sopunne' ('regrettable' or `disappointing'), `koptani' (`pretty'), or 
`kunnyon' ('big one') (Sunoo HK and Kim D S, 1978). As recently as seventy years 
ago, whenever women were required to appear in court for legal purposes they were 
allocated convenient and completely arbitrary names by court officials in order to 
facilitate the judicial process (Kirr Helen, 1968). The anthropologist Soon Young 
Song Yoon (1977) relates an incident experienced in North Chungchong province 
when male interviewees could not recall either the names or the ages of their own 
sisters, and appeared somewhat surprised that such information should be of the 
slightest interest to anyone. It remains the custom to this day for Korean women to be 
identified nominally by their relationship to a rnan. Rather than use a given, or 
familiar, name, or even, as is customary in the west, assume the family name of her 
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husband and, thereby, retain at least a modicum of individuality, a married woman in 
Korea continues to be referred to as `the wife of so-and-so', while an unmarried 
woman will merit the sobriquet `daughter of.... ' or `sister of .... 
'. 
In both sociological and psychological terms, the insidious effect of this 
apparent `namelessness' cannot be overestimated. The name lies at the very core of 
identity, it is the first response to the question: "Who are you"? If that question cannot 
be answered without the need for a reference point in the form of another person, and 
especially if that `reference' person must be of a gender other than that of oneself, that 
is, male, the regard for self, and the value of self, must inevitably diminish. Even 
convicted criminals are granted the privilege of having a unique identifying number. 
Patrilineal descent, whereby the eldest son inherits all the family wealth and 
property, and patrilocal residence, which requires a woman to move to her husband's 
town or village immediately upon marriage, are powerful means of both withholding 
economic security from women, and of inhibiting women's social participation. Not 
only can a daughter be disbarred from ever inheriting money or property from her 
parents but, immediately after her marriage, the Korean form of registration erases her 
completely from membership of her own family: in effect, she now `belongs' to her 
in-laws. It is worth noting that, as a further illustration of the `cultural uniqueness' of 
Korea, Soon Young Song Yoon (1977) records that although patriarchy was not a 
Korean invention, Korea's rigid kinship ideals were, and it came as some surprise to 
sinologists to find that those ideals were `more Confucian' in practice than their 
Chinese origins. 
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We have already seen that from the time of her birth, every Korean woman 
remained obligated to serve three males, her father until she married, her husband after 
her marriage and, in the event of her husband's death, her son. This was far from being 
the full extent of cultural prescription, however, for the Confucian tradition laid down 
five `codes of conduct' for women ('Pu-hcieng pyorn Myongsimpo 'gam '), and seven 
`evil conducts' (`C'hil-ko-ji-ak'), contravention of any one of which would provide 
legitimate grounds for divorce. (Sunoo HK and Kim D S, 1978). The codes were: - 
i. Women must keep their chastity and be obedient, 
ii. Women must not expect anything other than their assigned identity; 
iii. Women must not go outside their own houses for social activities 
after reaching adulthood; 
iv. Women must have pleasure only in cooking food and making wine 
and clothing for men; 
v. Women must not become interested in political or social affairs, but 
only in family activities inside the house. 
The seven grounds for divorce were: - 
i. Disobedience of parents-in-law; 
ii. Failure to produce a son; 
iii. Adultery (NB. The touching 
adultery); 
iv. Jealousy; 
v. Serious illness; 
vi. Talkativeness and gossiping, 
vii. Theft. 
of hands could be construed as 
The fact that, both as children and as married adults, tradition required 
Korean women to remain for most of their lives within the confines of the home, 
makes it clear that opportunities for education were limited to the point of non- 
existence. To this day, there are few, if any, countries that can match the Korean 
respect for education; but until very recently, this enthusiasm was confined to 
education for boys, not girls. Furthermore, not only were young girls and women 
denied the benefits of a formal academic education, they were also discouraged from 
developing any natural ability or talent that might be of value outside the domestic 
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sphere. Should a girl be audacious enough to reveal ambition beyond the home, she 
would be reproved with well-worn maxims such as: "A woman's lack of talent is in 
itself a virtue", or: "If a hen crows, the household crumbles" (Sunoo HK and Kim D 
S, 1978). 
The subject of education provides a useful example of how long a deeply 
ingrained social assumption can remain potent within a collective psyche decades and 
even generations after it has been formally discounted. One of the common themes 
which emerged from the many interviews conducted by the author, and greater 
attention will be afforded to these themes as this study unfolds, were the sacrifices 
made by young women workers in order that their brothers might receive a good 
education. What was most remarkable, however, was that, almost without exception, 
the women had been culturally conditioned to not only accept such an onerous and 
protracted imposition without protest, but to genuinely believe that it was right and 
proper for their brothers to go to school while they, themselves, were deprived of such 
opportunities. It is, of course, by no means unusual to find cultures and societies 
throughout the world and throughout history in which formal academic educational 
structures are designed solely for the benefit and betterment of males. What is less 
common, however, is the degree to which young, `modern' Korean women, in the 
latter half of the 20th century, willingly assumed the duty of provider. After all, it 
would not have been difficult for a young woman from the countryside, who had gone 
to the city to work in a garment factory, to keep her wages entirely to herself, it is 
unlikely that her parents would have been able to coerce her to do otherwise. The fact 
of the matter is that in not a single instance among all the subjects interviewed by the 
author was such a course of action ever contemplated. 
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Thus it can be deduced that Confucian philosophy, as adapted and practised 
by Korean male society, and as imposed upon the females in Korean society until well 
into the 20tß' century, denied absolutely any degree of individual or intellectual 
autonomy to women. Their value was measured only in regard to their ability to 
produce sons. All ritual, political, and economic power was lodged firmly in the hands 
of men. Women in Korea were to be neither seen nor heard, they were, in effect, 
invisible. 
World history has demonstrated all too often how easy it is for one sector of 
society to justify and even legitimise the systematic oppression of another sector of the 
same society if, a priori, the `victimised' sector is classified or categorised as a `sub- 
species'. A classic example is provided by the social history of Germany and the 
Nazis: 
... the whole 
Nazi programme against the Jews and other `people of 
inferior worth' depended on the constant reiteration of the monstrous 
doctrine that there are certain sub-humans, `Untermenschen', who have 
forfeited the right to be treated as human beings (Grunfeld, 1974). 
Whilst the distorted ideology of Adolf Hitler's National Socialist Party and its regard 
for all `non-Aryans' is illustrative of, perhaps, the very extreme to which mankind can 
degenerate, the manifestations of that ideology are, nevertheless, proof positive of the 
underlying assertion being made here. 
Korean history has further reinforced the notion that once a set of social 
norms and values, which disproportionately favour one sector; in this case the male 
sex, become culturally and politically entrenched, the only means whereby any degree 
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of gender impartiality may be restored is when the `unfavoured' sector feels 
sufficiently empowered to take collective initiative. What should also be appreciated, 
and this carries particular resonance in the Korean case, is that when traditional norms 
are so deeply embedded and all-encompassing, there is likely to be no established 
`opposition party' or `radical entity' to which women can pledge their allegiance, and 
thereby manifest their aspirations in what might be regarded as a `constitutional' 
manner. Therefore, and much in line with Marx's concept of the historical process, 
any confrontation between cultural mores and progressive ambition is destined almost 
inevitably to be militant and revolutionary. The value of this observation is revealed 
by the part played in South Korean politics by the women workers from the Peace 
Market. 
6.2.1 Cultural Impact On Women's Status Within The Labour Force 
The fact that the status of women workers in Korea during the period under 
consideration did not keep pace with the nation's economic development and, indeed, 
bore virtually no relation to it, is very much in keeping with the cultural circumstances 
described in the previous section. The role in society that women had been required to 
play for centuries rendered them almost `tailor-made' as participants in a male- 
dominated industrial labour force, and the Park regime was not slow to recognise the 
advantages to be gained by exploiting traditional notions of gender demarcation. 
One of the dominant principles which proved most expedient to apply to the 
workplace was that of familism. We have seen that the position of girls and young 
women within the traditional Korean family was on the very lowest rung of the 
hierarchical ladder. They had no voice either in matters affecting the family as a whole 
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or in the factors which pertained to their own lives. They were expected to remain 
silent and subservient, and show respectful gratitude for any concession they were 
granted, no matter how insubstantial. Such an ethos translated conveniently and 
comfortably, for men, into the delineation of the woman's role in the 20th century 
industrial workplace. Furthermore, the fact that the patrilocal tradition had, over 
centuries, `acclimatised' Korean women to being forced into adopting a new family in 
a new location, made it relatively easy for employers to represent themselves as the 
heads of new, patriarchal families. Imbued, as they were, with such ideals, it is 
understandable that, initially, young women workers were not surprised to meet 
similar familial circumstances when they started work in the factory. Ownership, 
management, and supervision of the factory, as in the family, was almost exclusively 
the domain of men, and those authoritative positions were, more likely than not, 
passed from father to son. The males concerned regarded it as nothing short of their 
birthright to demand the absolute obedience and acquiescence from their female 
underlings that was due to every father from his daughters (Kearney, 1991). Such 
expectations were quite explicit, and it was common for young girls from the 
countryside to arrive at their factory and be confronted with slogans like: "The 
Company Is Your Family, You Must Be Loyal To Your Family, Work For Your 
Family" (Janelli, 1993). 
There are, of course, subtle differences in both atmosphere and outcome 
between a societal group that assumes a set of traditional privileges, and one that 
focuses attention on actively enforcing, and reinforcing, those inherited advantages. In 
the case of Korean males in the textile and garment industry during the 1970's, 
attempts to perpetuate superior status and privilege were excessive. 
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6.3 Growth Trends Of Female Wage Labour 
To leave family and home community was by no means an easy step. It 
implied cutting one's self off from the supportive, highly protective and 
tightly-knit family so vital in the earlier years and moving to a world far 
away and threatening. The anxieties at the thought of being alone and the 
anticipation of homesickness, even if relatives are present in the 
metropolis, places a heavy emotional burden. Even the thought that the 
situation is temporary, that it will one day be possible to return, is 
tempered with the ultimate prospect of marriage, meaning that for most 
girls the move means a virtual final separation (Spencer, 1988). 
I must go, 
don't cry, I must go 
on the hard road to Seoul, 
climbing the white and black parched hills to sell my chastity. 
Without a promise of when I'll return, 
or if I will come back with brightly blooming smiles, 
and without the humble promise of untying the ribbon. 
I must go, 
however hard and miserable life may be. 
How can I ever forget the hills covered with 
green-bean flowers and the smell of wheat 
growing in the fields surrounding the village 
where I was born. 
I will not forget, but will cherish them deeply in my heart. 
I might come back in tearful dreams, 
I might return with starlight in the night. 
I must go, 
don't cry, I must go 
on the painful road to Seoul, 
climbing the many hills which make even the sky weary, 
to sell my labour (Kim Ji-ha, 1980). 
Despite the traditional behavioural norms rooted in Confucianism which 
define the virtuous woman as one who remains within the home, and is obedient and 
subservient to her personal male hierarchy, the 1960's and 1970's witnessed a marked 
increase in the number of young women who not only left their homes prior to 
marriage but whom, in most cases, left their localities, to enter the labour market. In 
1970 there were some 600,000 female workers in the light manufacturing sector, most 
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of whom were employed in the textile and garment industry; by 1980 this figure had 
risen to well over one and half million (Ogle, 1990). Research conducted by the 
author, and reproduced below, confirms that the majority of these recruits to the 
factory floor were not city or town girls, but came instead from rural agricultural 
backgrounds. Land division and ownership in Korea had been characterised for 
centuries by a polarisation between wealthy, elite family dynasties who owned huge 
swathes of the most productive farming land, and small, impoverished tenant farmers 
who worked what were, in effect, little more than smallholdings of some two or three 
acres (Spencer, 1988). It was from the latter that so many young girls were forced by 
circumstances to make the journey to Seoul, or one of the other industrial centres, to 
find work in a totally alien environment. It is important to bear in mind, when we 
come to examine their subsequent actions, the sheltered and restricted nature of these 
girls' backgrounds and culture, and the fact that when they made that traumatic 
journey to the city they were, in effect, to become strangers in a strange land. Such 
recognition will, it is submitted, place in even more admirable perspective both the 
bravery and the magnitude of their social endeavours. 
An interesting and novel source of family tension can be seen to emerge 
during this `modernisation' period. It has been shown that, until the advent of Park 
Chung-hee and his single-minded determination to generate phenomenal growth in 
exports, the conventional template for Korean female upbringing, especially in the 
countryside, was quite clearly enunciated. Daughters remained under the closest 
possible parental supervision and restriction until `suitable' marriage partners had 
been found for them. Immediately after marriage, the daughter would relocate to the 
environs of her in-laws; she would almost cease to exist as far as her natal family was 
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concerned, and responsibility for her would have been transferred absolutely. Her 
parents would have, in effect, completed their duty in accordance with tradition. In the 
1960's and 1970's, however, economic expansion presaged cultural upheaval. 
Life for the small-scale tenant farmer and the even more impecunious 
landless farm labourer had been harsh and unrewarding for centuries. Many of them 
were laden with debt, and the advent of the Park Chung-hee era served only to 
exacerbate what was already a dire situation. The economic ambitions of the Park 
regime had serious repercussions on the farming community during the 1960's and 
1970's, most crucially in the determination to maintain a low-wage competitive 
advantage in the international market. If the remuneration of workers in the export 
sector was to be kept at a minimum, there was a clear imperative to ensure that the 
living costs of those workers were also kept at a minimum. With food being the most 
essential staple commodity, steps were taken both to restrict the level of costly imports 
and to engineer the availability of cheap domestic produce. In order to preclude an 
imbalance between the earnings of workers in the export manufacturing sector and 
those whose output was destined for domestic sale, a downward pressure was exerted 
on domestic manufacturing earnings. This was, of course, to avoid the potential 
problem of export zone workers being able to improve their income by seeking 
employment in the domestic production sphere and thus pose a threat to the success of 
the drive for exports. A major component in Park's prices policy portfolio was the 
strict control of the cost of rice, the main food staple in Korea. The effect of this 
initiative was to render the continued existence of the myriad of small rice-farmers 
virtually untenable. ' As a further indicator of the depressed state of the agricultural 
community in Korea during the 1960's and 1970's, male unemployment levels in the 
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countryside were extremely high, especially in the middle-aged generational sector. 
According to research conducted by Suk Sang-mok (1980), 20% of the heads of rural 
families (that is to say, the ostensible main bread-winners) were out of work in 1974. 
In other societies, the first option available for these impoverished families 
might well have been to send the sons off to search for employment. In Korea, 
however, the enduring legacy of the Confucian ethic still dictated that the males of the 
family must be educated. Thus, according to tradition, and with debts to meet and sons 
to educate, there was no perceived alternative for poverty-stricken farmers and farm 
labourers other than to send their daughters to the factories. So, here we see a 
community torn between the reassuring certainties of tradition and the pragmatic 
imperatives of modernisation. The agrarian family is driven to desperate poverty and 
is forced to consider options previously inconceivable: should the male offspring be 
taken from school and sent to find work, or should it be the daughters? Both options 
would fly in the face of the Confucian ethic, but which would carry the greater 
penalty? It will come as no surprise to any student of Korean affairs that the all- 
consuming concepts of male domination, patriarchy, and primogeniture held the day: 
the daughters would be `sacrificed'. Even so, such a resolution required a major shift 
in social thinking, and it is difficult to imagine the level of concern that rural parents 
must have felt at the prospect of allowing their young, unmarried daughters to set off 
to face the unknown dangers of the city. We will see the extent to which this parental 
concern was used to advantage by factory owners ever on the lookout for cheap and 
compliant labour. 
I was born into a peasant family background and had three brothers and 
one sister. My parents were tenant farmers who worked extremely hard, 
but it was impossible for them to support us all. So every year we had to 
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borrow money from the Agricultural Co-operative Association, but it 
became too much and we were not able to pay it back, so they refused to 
lend us any more money. My older brother was in the army so it was left 
to me to do whatever I could to support my family and provide for the 
education of my younger brothers. After I finished at my primary school, 
there was no choice for me but to go to Seoul to find work. I was fourteen 
years old (Interview, women worker, February, 1999). 
Of the 79 interviews conducted for this area of the study, 60 of the women 
had come from rural backgrounds; the majority of them were aged between 14 and 18 
years when they left home, and 9 had not even reached their teens when they set out to 
find work. 
6.4 Recruitment Methods And Employment 
A variety of recruitment strategies was used by employers in the textile and 
garment industry during the 1970's in order to ensure that the output from their 
factories was never placed in jeopardy by a lack of labour. To some extent the 
particular method used depended upon the size of the factory concerned. In the Peace 
Market which, as we have seen, consisted of a myriad of very small factories, three 
contributory elements were in evidence. First, there was word of mouth, whereby girls 
and young women already employed in the Peace Market would become aware of a 
vacancy in their own place of work and would relay the information to friends or 
relatives. Second, there was what came to be known as the `human market'; an open 
area close to the Peace Market buildings where hundreds of young workers and those 
looking for work would gather during the lunch break. Information about job 
vacancies and wages and conditions would be exchanged, and introductions arranged. 
The third method was the simple expedient of pinning a `Helpers Wanted' notice on 
the door of the factory. 
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Recruitment methods were not without their hazards, however, as one 
interviewee describes: 
When I was fifteen years old and helping my parents on our small farm, a 
female cousin came home for New Year's holiday. She told me about her 
job in a factory in Seoul and she painted a very attractive picture about 
what her life was like. When the holiday was over, three other cousins and 
a friend, five of us, went to Seoul and got jobs in the Peace Market. Our 
parents allowed us to go to the city because they believed that the owner of 
the factory would look after us. What we didn't know was that the factory 
owner had told my cousin that he would give her money for every girl she 
succeeded in recruiting. We lived in a dormitory built into the roof of the 
factory and called `the upper room'. Conditions there were inhuman, and 
nothing like the story we had been told (Interview, woman worker, 
January, 1999). 
Larger companies, like Dong-il Textiles and YH Wig and Garment, 
developed a more sophisticated and systematic recruitment strategy whereby ongoing 
relationships were established between the company and an extensive network of rural 
middle and high schools. In return for per capita payments, school staff were 
encouraged to present young girls and their parents with glowing descriptions of the 
conditions and career prospects awaiting at the particular factory. The students were 
told that they would be well paid and that they would be issued with smart uniforms, 
whilst their parents were reassured that their daughters would be protected and cared 
for in exactly the same way as they were at home. As soon as their time at middle 
school was completed, the fifteen and sixteen year old girls would be taken off to the 
city in company buses. Reality rarely, if ever, matched the promises, however: 
I was sixteen in 1974 and in my second year at high school. Some people 
from the Sam-jin Garment Company visited the school and told us about the 
wonderful opportunities in their factory for girls who wanted a career in the 
clothing industry. My family thought that I should apply so that I could send 
them some money, so with about fifty other girls I was taken by company 
bus all the way to Seoul. It was the first time I had left my village. What we 
found when we arrived at the factory came as a great shock, but by then it 
was too late to change our minds. The dormitory room I lived in with ten 
other girls who I didn't know was dirty and small. The food was horrible, 
but the worst thing of all was how little money we were able to earn even 
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though I had to work harder and longer than I had ever done before. It was 
the unhappiest time (Interview, woman worker, December 1998). 
For significant periods during the 1970's the number of girls and young 
women looking for work was greater than the number of job vacancies, a circumstance 
that placed even more power in the hands of the employers, and one of which they 
were not reticent to take advantage. Research for this study revealed numerous 
examples when a job seeker was given a position only on condition that she agreed to 
give the factory manager her first month's wage. A variation on this theme was when 
girls were promised a job providing they demonstrated that they merited such a 
consideration by working as housemaid and cleaner at the manager's home, without 
pay, for periods of anything up to six months 
It is clear that the overriding atmosphere surrounding the recruitment of 
workers into light manufacturing during the period under consideration was one 
wherein young women, over 60% of whom were between the ages of fourteen to 
twenty-four (Chun Tae-il, 1969; Choi Jang-jip, 1983, Lee Tae-ho, 1984; Ogle, 1990; 
Landsberg, 1993; Kim Young-ok, 1985), were ripe for exploitation by the `big city' 
employers. Those girls and young women who were to became the `fuel' for their 
country's dramatic entry onto the world's industrial stage were, by dint of their 
upbringing, innocent and gullible. They had been nurtured in a cultural environment 
that guaranteed low self-esteem for all females; they had no concept of `rights', and 
they were socialised to obey and comply. Unscrupulous factory owners could ask for 
little more. 
As an indication of the extent to which the textile and garment industry of the 
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1970's relied upon the contributions made by women workers, the following table 
enumerates the gender imbalance of employees in a random selection of companies of 
varying size: 
Table 6.1: Gender Composition of the Work Force in the Textile and Garment 
Industry in the 1970's: 
Factories Number of workers Female Male Female ratio 
Chonggye Garments 27,000 24,000 3,000 85.1% 
Panlim Textiles 6,000 5,874 126 97.9% 
Y. H. Wigs 4,000 3,500 500 87.5% 
Won-pung 2,000 1,800 200 90% 
Seotong Garments 1,800 1,700 100 95% 
Ban-do 2,000 1,800 200 95% 
Dong-il Textiles 1,300 1,200 100 92.3% 
Nam-a Garments 800 782 18 97.8% 
Source 1: Interviews with workers at these factories and with leaders of their unions. 
Source 2: Union records and year books. 
Thus it can be seen that female workers in this sector outnumbered males by a 
ratio in excess of 9: 1. Had there been a more equal distribution, subsequent militant 
activism among textile and garment workers might have been more easily explained 
and more readily anticipated. After all, Korean males had been imbued for aeons with 
the conscious certainty of their superiority and would, it might be supposed, be much 
better equipped to demand and, indeed, merit, working and living conditions 
commensurate with their social and cultural status. Bearing in mind the fact that 
Korean women had long been used to merely accepting their lot and being grateful for 
small mercies, the speed with which these young innocents shed their centuries-old 
cultural trappings and restrictions adds further testimony both to the strength of their 
characters and the harshness of the life circumstances which precipitated them into 
militant activism. 
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6.5 Summary 
The cultural and social upheaval generated by the conflict between tradition, 
largely defined by Confucian prerogatives, and the industrial modernisation 
imperatives of Park Chung-hee's drive for economic expansion, was no more apparent 
than in the absorption of tens of thousands of girls and young women into the South 
Korean textile and garment industry during the 1960's and 1970's. Confucianism, 
selectively applied, and especially in its more `concentrated', Korean form, translated 
conveniently from the family context into that of the industrial workplace, and 
provided an expedient vehicle for the exploitation of women workers. Park Chung- 
hee's military concept of the `disembodied' human being (see Chapter Two) was 
readily adopted by equally opportunist employers and entrepreneurs to embrace the 
`disembodied' female garment worker. At the same time, the phenomenon of 
unmarried daughters leaving the family home and migrating from the countryside to 
the city en masse constituted a major shift in traditional social behaviour; the 
repercussions of which are yet to be fully realised. 
The standard and salient characteristics of working and living conditions are 
clearly intrinsic to any analysis of the degree to which a workforce is exploited by its 
employers and government. By implication, they are also crucial indicators of the 
extent to which workers' grievances, and any subsequent co-operative industrial 
action, may be explained and justified. The following chapter examines in detail the 
circumstances in which naive and poorly educated young women, who were to 
become instrumental in their country's rapid ascent of the world's economic league- 
table, were forced to live and labour. 
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NOTES 
' In practice, however, the downward pressure on the price of rice impacted only upon 
the rice-farming community. In the urban market place the retail price of rice rose by 
more than 62% during the period 1970-1973 (World Bank Economic Report, 1976) 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS, PRODUCTION PROCESS, WAGES, AND LIFE 
CIRCUMSTANCE 
Which of its is to do the hard and dirty it'ork, for the rest - and for what 
pay? Who is to do the pleasant and clean 'ork uiud /oi irhat pay: 
(John Ruskin) 
7.0 Introduction 
Detailed descriptions elsewhere in this study reinforce the seminal importance 
to the evolution of the Korean labour movement of the large body of workers employed 
in the vast warren of `sweat-shop' factories located in what is ironically named the 
Peace Market. It was, after all, the working conditions in the Peace Market and the 
intransigence of the Peace Market employers which so saddened and enraged Chun Tae- 
il, "the father of the Korean labour movement" (Lee Narn-hee, 1991) and which finally 
drove him to make the ultimate sacrifice on 13 November, 1970. 
Having examined the methods of recruitment, largely from the countryside, of 
the girls and young women who were destined to contribute so much both to the 
explosive growth of Korean light manufacturing during the 1970's, and to the birth of 
the democratic labour movement, the next logical step is to consider the work 
environment that lay in wait for the new recruits when they arrived in the capital. To 
that end, this chapter draws upon three sources of first-hand experience of women 
workers. They are: (i) circumstances as described by them to the author in one-to-one 
interviews and in group seminars, (ii) contemporary recollections as detailed in 
personal diaries which were made available to the author and, (iii) reflections of the 
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author's own experience as a teenage worker in the Peace Market during the period 
under consideration. 
With the objective of illustrating the diverse influences and pressures, both 
personal and vocational, which the female workers in the Peace Market were subject to, 
the first sections in this chapter describe the precise nature of the jobs they undertook, 
and the conditions, both material and supervisory, under which they were conducted. 
The production process and management relations are considered, as are some of the 
tensions between the workers themselves, which arose as a direct result of those 
relations. Attention then turns to the question of the standard of domestic 
accommodation, especially with regard to the hundreds of young shidas who laboured 
in the Peace Market and whose plight so incensed Chun Tae-il. The health implications 
of these combined influences is then discussed, as are their impact upon the traditional 
Korean concept of marriage. The final section in the chapter details the wages earned by 
the women workers in the Peace Market; a factual record gained not from 
contemporary government statistics or academic tomes, but from the personal 
recollections of the women themselves. They, and only they, know with certainty the 
sums of money they had at their disposal at the end of each month. The question of the 
purchasing power of that remuneration which, in the view of the author, is by far the 
most pertinent, if not the only, meaningful criterion of income assessment, is also 
addressed. ' 
This examination of the working and living conditions endured by those 
thousands of young country girls will not only suffice to explain their misery, it will 
also serve as confirmation of the extent and the ease by which human dignity can be 
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sacrificed at the altar of unbridled capitalist expansion. What emerges from this chapter 
is a `holistic' picture of the drab environment, the meagre facilities, the gross 
exploitation, and the stifling repression, within and beyond the workplace, which 
formed the backdrop to the lives of so many of the youngest and most vulnerable 
Korean women during the 1970's. 
7.1 Job Descriptions And Production Process 
A typical Peace Market factory, 2 equipped with fourteen sewing machines, had 
a total establishment of thirty-five personnel: two cutters, or jaedanshas, fourteen 
machinists, fourteen shidas, one or two madomes, one shiaggae, one oharoku (a man 
responsible for the maintenance and repair of the over-lock sewing-machines), and a 
man in overall charge of the factory who was either the owner, or a friend or relative of 
the owner. Chun Tae-il's painstaking personal survey of the workers in one building of 
the Peace Market, conducted in 1970, showed that of the 10,000 persons accounted for, 
between 80% and 90% were women. 
In the typical Peace Market garment factory the apex of the employee 
hierarchy was occupied by the, jaedan. sha, the cutter, who was invariably male. As the 
title suggests, the cutter was responsible for cutting out of the bulk cloth each separate 
component part of a garment. Many layers of fabric would be placed on a large table, or 
cutting board, and with the aid of electric shears and pattern templates the, jaedansha 
would produce the required shapes ready for assembly. In many instances, the cutter 
would have an assistant, a jaedan-bocho, who would, also invariably, be male. 
Although this first stage in the production process was clearly of intrinsic importance, as 
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well as requiring considerable skill, it will be shown below that this aspect was by no 
means the most crucial one in the role of the cutter. 
Next to the cutter in order of seniority was the fully-skilled machinist, the oya- 
machinist, who achieved the required level of expertise only after a minimum of four 
years training. Half of a factory's establishment of Japanese-made, high-speed electric 
over-lock sewing machines would be occupied by oya-machinists, who were tasked 
with the most intricate of the garment assembly operations, such as the construction of 
collars, the insertion of sleeves, and the locating of zip fasteners. The remaining 
machines were allocated to assistant machinists, the hocho-machinists, who hoped to 
accrue the skills and experience necessary for promotion to oya-machinist, by executing 
the less demanding tasks involving pockets and linings. It should be noted that although 
the sewing-machines were the most up-to-date available at the time, they still required 
the use of both hands and both feet: the hands to position and manipulate the cloth, and 
one foot to control the speed of stitching while the other selected either forward or 
reverse. 
One imperative of the piece-work remuneration system in effect at the factories 
was to keep to an absolute minimum the time when the sewing-machines were not 
actually in productive operation. It was, therefore, essential for both oya and bocho- 
machinists to be kept continually supplied with new work. One of the many and various 
duties of the shida, or helper, was to ensure that her machinist was never left with 
insufficient material from the cutter's table. 
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Once the machinists had completed their part of the production process the 
almost finished garments were taken over by the mudome. s, who were usually relatively 
mature married women, to have all the tacking seams ripped out and buttons sewn on. 
The final stage of manufacture, conducted by male shiaggaes, was the ironing and 
folding of the garments ready for delivery to the retail and wholesale shops on the 
ground floor of the Peace Market, or for shipping direct to locations elsewhere. The 
reason why men were allocated the ostensibly menial task of ironing and folding the 
completed garments was simply that the industrial steam-ironing equipment as used at 
the time was both relatively antiquated and extremely cumbersome, the efficient use of 
which was beyond the physical capability of young girls. 
The production process that brought these individual skills and responsibilities 
together can be described as follows. After the person in overall charge of the factory 
had instructed the cutter on the type of garment to be produced on one particular day, 
the jaedansha, with the help of the shidas and his assistant, would unroll layers of the 
appropriate material onto the cutting table. Having arranged the most economical 
disposition of the pattern templates, the cutter would cut out the required shapes. Using 
irons lighter and more manageable than those used by the shiaggaes, the shidas would 
turn over and press any hems before taking all the pieces to the oya-machinist. The oya- 
machinist would decide which tasks she would undertake herself, and which were 
within the capabilities of her assistant, and the shida would distribute the material 
accordingly. As each separate component emerged from the sewing machine, the shida 
would cut the threads and, if necessary, press in further hems ready for the next stage in 
the production process. This routine would continue virtually non-stop. When all the 
machining of a single garment was completed, the shida would take that garment to the 
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madome for final tidying-up and the sewing on of buttons. The shiaggae would then 
take over for the final pressing and folding and, with the help of the shidas, would either 
stack and bale the garments or pack them in packets or boxes, depending upon type and 
quality. Early the following morning the cutter would supervise the shidas as they 
carried the previous day's output down to the various outlets on the ground floor of the 
Peace Market building. The process would then begin all over again. 
A contemporary diary entry made by one of the oya-machinists interviewed by the 
author evokes an idea of the factory atmosphere: 
When the sun begins to go down, our voices are lost in the sound of the 
machines. This is the busiest time of the day. The completed clothes take all 
the space and make it impossible to walk around. The shidas are working in 
mountains of material; sometimes it is difficult to tell which is shida and 
which is material. My eyes are blurry and I do not even want to look up and 
down at the needle. My nerves are doing the work, I just move my hands 
and feet automatically. This is the moment when we physically strain 
ourselves. Fatigue attacks us. I want to stop working when this happens, but 
I can't. There are four more hours to go. Even birds can go back to their 
nests when it gets dark. What a condition we live in. Man is supposed to be 
the Lord of Creation, so why are we doing this until late into the night ? 
(Diary, female Peace Market worker, who would later become a Chonggye 
Union activist, 1974). 
Chun Tae-il himself recalls an early visit to the Peace Market: 
The place of work is no bigger than eight pyung (four and a half square 
metres), which means that there are four workers in every pyung. The space 
is so cramped, with tools, fixtures, and sewing equipment taking up so much 
room that there was none remaining for workers to stretch freely in their 
chairs. The height of the ceiling from the floor was so low; it was the 
infamous `attic'. The smell of formalin from the fabrics piled up in the 
corner was enough to suffocate anyone. Not only that, but there is so much 
ravel [fibres] and dust from the fabric that the workers' hair becomes coated 
almost as soon as they begin to work. There were fourteen sewing 
machines, ironing boards, cutting boards, and some more tables where the 
shidas do their work. In the midst of all this were thirty-two pale and 
haggard workers (Quoted in Cho Young-rae, 1984) 
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7.2 Working Conditions 
After a one hour ride, the bus arrived at the Peace Market. The factory is a 
brick building with few windows. It looks like a jail. 3 Our workplace was a 
big hall divided into many sections by thin wooden partitions. On the hall 
side there are no windows, maybe the owner doesn't want people to be able 
to look in. The large messy room smells of dust and is full of sewing 
machines, material, and people. The shida. v have already started their work; 
either preparing the material for today's work or taking care of the dresses 
we finished the night before. Poor girls, only fourteen years old they should 
be at home being spoiled by their parents but, instead, they have to get up 
even earlier than me (Diary, female Peace Market worker, 1974). 
Each of the Peace Market factories consisted of a room just large enough to 
accommodate the number of sewing-machines alluded to previously. The rooms were 
some three metres high and generally had windows on two sides. The windows in the 
external walls were always kept closed and covered with paper in order to preclude the 
intrusion of the prying eyes of passers-by on the nearby fly-over, while those windows 
in the internal wall faced only a darkened corridor. Space was clearly at a premium, and 
in order to maximise what little there was, it became common practice for factory 
owners to build a false ceiling that extended over approximately two-thirds of the room. 
This false ceiling divided the available space into an upper and a lower room, each of 
one-and-a-half metres in height, and connected by ladder. Even allowing for the 
relatively diminutive stature of most Korean girls, few, if any, of them could stand 
upright at any time throughout their working day. During work time the upper room was 
used by the madomes to complete the finishing of the garments; when work was over 
for the day, the upper room became the dormitory for the young shidas. If ever there 
was a manifestation of the maximisation of production assuming absolute dominance 
over any concept of an employer's duty of care for his employees, this was surely it. 
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Obscuring the outside windows of the factories not only resulted in a 
substantial reduction in the amount of natural light admitted to the workplace, the 
practice also had the effect of negating any possibility of adequate ventilation. The 
Peace Market building had been constructed with minimum cost as a primary objective, 
and no extractor fans were included in the specification. Despite the fact that thousands 
of souls were destined to work and, in the case of so many of the shidas, live there, it 
was assumed that windows would suffice to ventilate the entire structure. This was, of 
course, predicated upon the assumption that the windows would be opened. When the 
enormous amount of fabric dust and other small particles that were so much an integral 
part of the production process, and the heat generated by the huge body of workers, the 
machines, and the electric lighting, are all taken into account, the filthy and foetid 
atmosphere, especially in summer, is not difficult to imagine. On the subject of 
lighting, each machine was fitted with a bright white bulb attached immediately in front 
of the machinist: the combination of this close proximity light-source and the dust-laden 
air assured that machinists could easily be recognised by the distinctive prevalence of 
bloodshot eyes, and the perpetual symptoms of conjunctivitis or associated eye 
infections. 
On the face of it, and to the untutored observer, sitting at a sewing machine 
might not appear to be the most arduous of occupations but, in his diaries, Chun Tae-il 
showed greater perception: 
The oya-machinists and bocho-machinists sit all day on hard wooden 
chairs, nobody stands up to take a rest. They sit there with their backs bent 
and their eyes focused on the needle of the sewing-machine while pressing 
the fabric taut with their fingers and operating the pedals with their feet. 
They never rest. Sometimes the machinist will find her fingers bleeding 
because of the pressure necessary on heavy material. Their necks and 
shoulders become unendurably stiff and even the most highly skilled 
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women cannot avoid severe back pain after working like this for several 
hours (Diary, Chun Tae-il, 1969). 
The `lunch break' provided little, if any, real respite, as one ex-oya-machinist 
interviewee recorded: 
Lunchtime has come, I have been sitting here since eight o'clock this 
morning. But no-one feels like moving. It would be pleasant if we could eat 
lunch in a circle together, but I must eat sitting at my own machine and my 
lunch is covered in dust before the first mouthful. No-one bothers to even 
shake off the dust from their bodies. Usually, we have rice and kimchi. 4 
After eating, the workers hurry to the toilet where so many are waiting in 
long lines. The toilets are for the use of both men and women and there are 
so few of them - there were only three for over two thousand workers. The 
water supply is also inadequate, there are only three outlets for every four 
hundred work places in the Peace Market, hardly enough to allow us to have 
a drink, let alone wash our hands. We know that if we did not have to spend 
so much time queuing for the toilet we would be able to rest after lunch and 
even mix socially with our co-workers. But this is not a choice open to us, 
and we must hurry back to our work (Diary, Peace Market woman worker, 
1974). 
7.3 Management And Supervision 
The ever-present influence of Confucianism pervaded the entire work arena, 
and the stamp of paternalism and patriarchy translated, almost without modification, 
from the traditional agrarian society that had developed over centuries, to the 
burgeoning industrial nation of Park Chung-hee's Third Republic (Kim Kihwan and 
Leipziger, 1993). Moreover, it could be argued that the transposition of Confucian 
mores from agrarian to industrial actually magnified and exacerbated the effects of class 
difference and economic inequality. For what emerged in growing numbers from the 
hiatus of `modernisation' was the class of the `entrepreneur'; individuals and families 
who came to wield as much, if not a great deal more, power over subordinates as had 
the aristocratic 'yangban' class of yesteryear. The crucial difference, of course, was that 
whereas the aristocratic families of `old' Korea had long been accustomed to what they 
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regarded as their divinely-ordained superiority, most of the new class of entrepreneurs 
were, to all intents and purposes, peasants one day and possessors of enormous power 
over their erstwhile peers the next. The experiences of the women and young girls who 
toiled in the sweat-shop factories in the Peace Market bear ample testimony to the 
received stereotype of the individual who is suddenly thrust into a position of 
unaccustomed influence behaving in an excessively authoritarian manner. Whereas the 
dominance of the yangban class was maintained by a combination of deeply ingrained 
tradition and the force of arms, the entrepreneurial `lever' was largely defined in 
economic terms; although, as will be shown, a propensity to physical violence as a tool 
to subjugate workers was by no means absent. 
The skill and experience required by a fully qualified cutter has already been 
alluded to, but of equal, if not greater, importance to the factory owner was the degree 
of loyalty demonstrated by his jaedansha, and the extent to which he was prepared to 
represent exclusively the interest of the employer in his day-to-day conduct. Whenever 
the owner was away from the factory on business, or enjoying his wealth in other ways, 
the jaedansha was in absolute charge. Not only was he responsible for ensuring that 
daily production targets were met, he also had the delegated power to `hire and fire'. 
During the protracted periods when job vacancies were hard to find, this latter element 
of the cutter's authority was an extremely effective instrument, and the mere possibility 
of instant dismissal at the discretion of the cutter meant that he was regarded with 
trepidation by all the employees in the factory. Even when alternative employment 
opportunities were available, and accepting the fact that first-grade machinists could, 
theoretically, change their place of work whenever they chose, this did not constitute a 
realistic choice in practice. For one reason, it was more than likely that conditions in a 
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different factory would be no more amenable or rewarding than in the current place of 
work, and for another, none of the women could afford to be out of employment even 
for the few days it might take to secure a new position (Group discussion, Peace 
Market women workers, January, 1999). 
The distribution of work was also entirely at the whim of the jaedansha, and if 
he took a dislike to a particular machinist or shida it was but a trifle for him to restrict 
the amount of work, and thus the potential for earnings, assigned to that unfortunate 
individual. It will be shown in the following section how this personal discrimination 
contributed significantly to inter-worker tension. 
The majority of cutters appeared singularly lacking in any feelings of 
compassion or understanding of the plight of their young subordinates, and it is unclear 
whether or not this can also be ascribed to the aforementioned trait evinced by many of 
those who assume wide-reaching and unaccustomed authority. Whatever the 
explanation, all the evidence and experience drawn upon by the author confirms that, as 
a group, the cutters in the Peace Market contributed at least as much as the owners 
themselves to the alienation of the female workers. One of the cutters from the 1970's 
made the following revealing, and uncharacteristically frank, statement during an 
interview with the author: 
As far as we were concerned, and as far as the workers were concerned, the 
jaedanshas were the bosses. We certainly had the same authority as the 
employer. I could give jobs to people I wanted to, and I could fire anyone I 
wanted to. It was all in my hands. Perhaps we did exceed our authority in 
practice. I did insult the women and used abusive language, but that was 
quite normal. I did use violence as well, especially against the young shidas. 
But actually I was used by the employer as much as the workers were. I was 
promised a share of the profits if I was loyal and made the women work as 
hard as possible, but in the end I got nothing (Interview, Peace Market male 
worker, December, 1998). 
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A woman who began work in the Peace Market as a young girl in 1964, and 
who continued there into the 1970's, picks up on the `management style' of the cutters 
and also highlights a specific practice that the workers found degrading: 
The management behaviour towards the women in the factory was always 
the same, very rough and very insulting. The jucd/uri., ha would never refer to 
us by name, it seemed that it would be humiliating for them to do so, it was 
always "Number Three Machinist", or "Number Five Shida". I felt that I 
had no dignity, no identity. I was treated as though I were not human at all, 
but a 'thing'. There was no difference between me as a person and the 
sewing machine that I was attached to. How well I could understand the last 
words spoken by Chun Tae-il before he died: "Do not mistreat these young 
girls. They are not machines. They are human beings (Interview, Peace 
Market woman worker, January, 1999). 
The economic power of the employers over the employees was most typically 
encapsulated in the system of wage determination and hinged, to a large extent, on an 
element of uncertainty. It is one thing to be remunerated on a piece-work basis, whereby 
a given amount is paid for each completed garment and the individual employee can not 
only exercise a degree of control over the size of her wage packet but can also calculate 
precisely the return on her work. ' It is an entirely different circumstance when the 
employee has no idea how much she will receive for each item. The situation is further 
complicated by the wide variety of garments required to be produced and the 
concomitant diversity of skills and work-time which each garment may demand. 
A Peace Market machinist explains: 
When a new design of garment was required, depending on the season or the 
fashion, we were never consulted about the rate per garment. It made no 
difference to the employer how difficult the work was, or how time 
consuming. It was only after our work was completed that the boss would 
make a sly deal with the cutter and we would find out just how little they 
were going to give us (Interview, Peace Market women worker, January, 
1999). 
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An arrangement such as this would be unsatisfactory and inequitable if the 
worker had only herself to consider. It posed far more of a problem for the oya- 
machinists in the Peace Market because of the `team working' principle that was 
adopted. Whatever money was earned each month was paid to the oya-machinist, the 
leader of the team, who would then have to calculate how much of the total was to be 
allotted to her bocho-machinist and how much remained for the two shidas. It is clear 
that this shifting of responsibility from employer to oya-machinist, insofar as the 
determination of the wages of the shidas was concerned, not only deflected the 
manifestations of the shidas' dissatisfaction away from the owner and focused them 
instead on the oya-machinists, but it also greatly increased the pressures on all 
employees and tended to mitigate against the easy formation of a united worker 
combination. Whether by design or accident, one of the outcomes of the wage 
arrangement operated in the Peace Market was confirmation of the classic `divide and 
rule' axiom. One interviewee who bore the brunt of this system noted in her diary: 
The Peace Market will only live up to its narre when relations between the 
workers and the owners are based on human love and trust. This hard 
driving exploitation and suppression in the workplace must end. It is so 
difficult for me to contain my strong feelings about what is happening to us, 
and when my shida asks me why life is so bad and her wage is so small, I do 
not know how to answer her (Diary, Peace Market woman worker, 1974). 
Uncertainty was not only prevalent in the matter of `the rate for the job', for it 
was also a feature in regard to the length of the working day and the remuneration that 
would be gained from overtime work. In these, as in all other areas of management- 
employee relations, the format was unilateral and unidirectional, and the concept of 
consultation was recognisable only by it's absence. 
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Although it is, perhaps understandably, difficult to gain access to ex-owners of 
factories in the Peace Market for interview purposes, the author did manage to establish 
contact with one owner in whose factory, coincidentally, the author had, herself, worked 
in 1976.6 His general attitude to employer-employee relations during the period of the 
1970's mirrored precisely the traditional mores as described above. By dint of his 
position as an owner he had, in his eyes, become the equivalent of a member of the 
yangban class and, thus, his employees were the equivalent of serfs or tenant farmers. 
The fact that the relationship had been transposed into an industrial setting was 
immaterial, and the assumption of `rights' on the part of his workers was, to him, a 
contradiction in terms. This owner, self-admittedly typical of his ilk, had no awareness 
of `modern' industrial relations, and had scant, if any, knowledge of the Labour 
Standard Law (see Chapter Two). Furthermore, he considered that such a posture was 
entirely appropriate, and he had no reservations whatsoever with regard to the state's 
manifest willingness to allow him free rein to run his business exactly as he saw fit 
(Interview, ex-owner of Peace Market factory, December, 1998). It was not only 
expedient for the centre of gravity of power to be always located on the side of the 
employer, it was also `right'. Thus, it is little wonder that concerted, combined, and 
effective action on the part of the workers was to prove so difficult and dangerous to 
organise. 
7.4 Worker Vulnerability 
The nature of the work system operated in the Peace Market encouraged 
competition between machinists and shidas, whilst the oppressive working conditions 
precluded any relaxed social interaction. Add to these the fact that, for most of the time, 
all the young women employees were tired, hungry, unhappy, and in physical and 
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mental pain, and it will be readily appreciated how easy it was for patience to become 
exhausted and internecine friction to develop. 
But tension between workers was not restricted to spontaneous and quickly 
forgotten squabbles, it was also actively generated by the owners and cutters whenever 
the spectre of employee combination reared its head. Fear of losing one's job was a 
most effective tool when used to isolate perceived troublemakers, and an occurrence in 
one of the Peace Market factories in 1974 casts light upon both the problems of 
initiating united action and the way owners and cutters would respond to the threat of 
such action. ' 
The factory in question was producing jackets for which the previous year's 
rate had been set at 160 won per garment. 8 The 1974 jackets were of a more 
complicated style and it was possible to produce only twenty per day, per team, as 
opposed to the thirty per day that had been achieved with the old style. The rumour in 
the factory was that the rate for the new model would only be increased to 180 won. 
The machinists agreed that anything less than 200 won would not provide enough to 
enable them to survive. A simple calculation confirms that, even 200 won per jacket 
represents a substantial decrease in wages when compared with the previous year. After 
a hasty meeting outside the factory, there was unanimous agreement among the 
machinists that the owner should be approached with the 200 won request and that if he 
did not concede they would all stop work. 
Upon their return to the factory, the machinists were confronted by the 
jaedansha and the owner's son, who had clearly got wind of what was afoot. After 
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demanding to know who was the instigator of the rebellion, the owner's son affirmed to 
Kim Hae-soo, an oya-machinist who had somewhat reluctantly agreed to be the 
spokeswoman, that the new rate would not be set at a figure as high as 200 won per 
garment. Having made clear that this was unacceptable, the women returned to their 
machines and waited to see what would happen. 
Within a very short space of time the owner himself appeared and demanded 
that two of the oya-machinisis accompany him to his office in order to discuss the 
matter. Yet again, timidity overcame the women and, as no-one else was prepared to 
volunteer, Kim Hae-soo felt duty-bound to continue with the lead position that she had 
initially assumed. One other machinist also agreed to go, but only on the condition that 
she would riot be required to speak. 
When the group arrived in the owner's office, he immediately launched into a 
tirade and demanded to know by what right the women were taking this action, 
insisting that it was the duty of the senior employees to prevent petty complaints from 
the juniors from developing into major disputes. Plucking up her courage, the 
spokeswoman explained to the owner that the workers were not only asking for an 
increase in the rate for the job but that, in future, all rates should be fixed before the 
work began so that they would be able to ascertain exactly how much they were 
earning. At this point, the owner turned from bluster to wheedle, and described with a 
pained expression how bad business had been lately and how much his taxes had risen. 
He begged the two women to try to understand his difficult position, asked them not to 
complain anymore, and to keep on working. As soon as business improved, he 
promised, the wages would be looked at again. Until such time, however, the new rate 
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must be set at 180 won per jacket. But Kim Hae-soo stood firm, she had heard this 
response from the owner too many times before and, knowing that she had all the other 
machinists behind her, informed the owner that all work would cease until their 
reasonable requests were met in full. 
While the two women had been absent from the factory, however, the cutter 
and the owner's son had wasted no time in exercising every means of intimidation at 
their disposal: `divide and rule' was, once again, the watchword. By the time the two 
representatives returned, the workers who had remained in the factory had been 
`persuaded' to forget their grievances and get on with their work. 
As the two re-entered the factory none of the other machinists could look them 
in the eyes, they just kept their heads down and appeared to be focusing upon their work 
with absolute concentration. For our spokeswoman's part, she could hardly believe what 
she was seeing: 
What had happened to our decision to stand firn and united? Why are we so 
ignorant? What has made these young girls so cowardly, don't they realise 
that we are playing into the hands of the owner? I began to cry, but I did not 
have any bitterness against them, my anger and hard feelings are directed 
against the system. If we could only have stood together for one day, we 
could have won. We will overcome this barrier somehow (Diary, Kim Hae- 
soo, 1974). 
Subsequent chapters will deal in detail with the achievements of the Chonggye 
Union in the textile and garment industry but, apropos the case highlighted above, one 
factor is particularly pertinent. Although the Chonggye Union was formed in late 1970, 
and the incident retold above occurred in 1974, it is all too apparent that the women 
concerned still had no recourse to the fullest support or assistance from `their' trade 
union. In the instances where a factory owner determinedly set his face against union 
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recognition, as was the case with this particular owner, there was very little that 
Chonggye could do. Even after years of struggle the union remained powerless to 
intervene in every instance of injustice. For reasons which are described at length in 
this study it would certainly have been an exercise in futility to appeal to the NTWU or 
the FKTU. What the union had been able to achieve in the earlier years of its existence, 
however, was the enlightenment of women like Kim Hae-soo, via the labour education 
programme, and the awakening of their consciousness with regard to what was 
potentially possible by the act of combination. Within a few months of the Kim Hae-soo 
`incident' an embryonic negotiation structure would be driven through by the Chonggye 
activists that would change the face of industrial relations in Korea, and mark one of the 
crowning achievements of Korean working women (discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Ten). The second, and somewhat ironic, factor worthy of note here, and yet another 
illustration of the magnitude of the obstacles with which the Chonggye Union would 
continue to be confronted, is that when the structure for negotiation between employers 
and workers was finally established, the spokesperson for the Peace Market employers 
was none other than the owner of the factory in which the above incident took place 
(Chonggye Union records, 1975). 
Mention was made in the previous section of the degree to which the 
jaedanshas could foment antagonism between workers by adopting a discriminatory 
work allocation system. What was frequently the case was that the cutter would have a 
particular favourite shida or machinist and would take every opportunity to direct the 
relatively easy pieces of work toward those individuals, and consistently leave the more 
onerous and time-consuming tasks to the less-favoured. As time was always at a 
premium in the Peace Market factories, with all the machinists' teams trying as hard as 
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they could to finish their day's quota as early as possible, any element of discrimination 
or favouritism was bound to lead to animosity. Even if the cutter did not have personal 
attachments but, instead, disliked everyone equally, the time-based competition was still 
prevalent, and was the source of much anguish for the young shidas. For if they were 
not quick enough to secure the easiest cuts of material, their machinists took longer to 
complete the more difficult work and directed their frustration and anger at the shidas. 
An added disadvantage was that the problem was cumulative insofar as the teams which 
finished early were in a position to appropriate the most favourable cuts for use the 
following morning, whilst for those who finished late, it was very difficult to regain lost 
ground (Group discussion, Peace Market women workers, December, 1998). 
There were so many different ways in which the owners and. jaedanshas could 
capitalise upon the fragility of the over-stretched physiques and psychological 
susceptibility of the girls and young women under their control. The encouragement of 
animosity and the playing-off of one girl against another, were just two strategies which 
were used to great effect. 
7.5 Accommodation Patterns And Conditions 
We have seen that the overwhelming majority of young women who worked in 
the textile and garment industry came from the countryside and, as a consequence, 
needed to find somewhere to live in the city. There was neither the time nor the 
finances for them to consider the possibility of commuting between home and factory. 
An added provision, as discussed earlier, was the serious parental concern at the 
possible consequences of this drastic, yet unavoidable, breach of traditional behaviour, 
and the accompanying imperative that their daughters be protected from the untold 
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dangers which lurked in the city. The ideal solution, of course, was if the young girl had 
relatives already resident in the city who would be prepared to accommodate her. But, 
apart from the Peace Market (see below), this eventuality was rare and so, during the 
initial period of their employment at least, the vast majority of girls were destined to 
occupy the company dormitory. 
Male workers did not usually live in company dormitories primarily because 
the traditional upbringing of Korean men does not equip them to look after themselves 
in the domestic arena. From their earliest days they have grown used to the womenfolk 
in the family cooking, cleaning, and washing for them and, to this day, the Korean male 
is both reluctant and, in many cases, incapable of participating in such mundane and 
routine chores. In most instances, therefore, the comparatively few male workers in the 
garment and textile industry were either married or lodged with a female relative. 
Where neither of these options were available, the fact that male wages were more than 
78% greater than those of female workers meant that they could afford to rent 
accommodation that included meals and laundry (Bauer and Shin Young-soo, 1987). 
From the employers perspective the parental concern for the welfare and 
protection of young single girls offered numerous advantages that far outweighed any 
cost penalties that the provision of dormitory space might incur. The manner in which 
the dormitory system was practised meant that protection equated with control, and 
welfare with exploitation. Knowing, and having access to, the location of the greater 
part of the workforce at any time of the day or night made it relatively simple to 
`persuade' young girls to work overtime without advance notice when rush orders came 
in at the last minute. Such a strategy was greatly facilitated in the Peace Market where 
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the workplace itself actually doubled up as living quarters. 
When we come to consider the arduous working conditions endured by female 
workers it will be readily appreciated that when they were not actually at work, the 
women were too tired to do anything as strenuous as socialise in what otherwise would 
be the normal way. Thus, women who lived in the company dormitory rarely met with 
workers from other companies. They did not have the opportunity to exchange 
information about jobs, vacancies, and conditions in other locations and they were 
unable to compare their lot with that of others. It is not difficult to conceive that, in the 
minds of many of these naive and unsophisticated girls, there was no alternative to the 
miserable lives they were living. Whether they were asleep or awake, their own 
company was all they knew. The outcome was that employers were able to keep 
employee turnover very low. The dormitory system was also an aid to keeping wage 
levels at the absolute minimum. From their cynical standpoint, employers adopted the 
rationale that the longer they were able to keep their workers `captive' within the 
confines of the factory and the dormitory, the less opportunity they would have to spend 
money, therefore the less money they needed to be paid (Group discussion, Peace 
Market women workers, January, 1999). 
Because the individual factories in the Peace Market were so small, the owners 
of those factories were ill-equipped to provide dormitory accommodation, in the 
conventional sense, as was the case with some of the larger organisations. For this 
reason, it was necessary to recruit as many workers as possible from the local, urban 
area, an endeavour that was largely successful as far as cutters and machinists were 
concerned. However, the sheer number of unskilled shidas that was required rendered it 
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imperative to extend the recruiting net into the countryside. This, in turn, made it 
necessary for the Peace Market employers to reassure the parents of the new recruits 
that their offspring would be provided with adequate accommodation and appropriate 
facilities. 
The practice of owners dividing their factories into an upper and a lower room 
has already been described, and it has also been noted that when work was finished for 
the day, the upper room, or `attic', became home for the shidas. Dust from the fabric 
used in the manufacturing process was prevalent throughout all the Peace Market 
factories and, as we will see, constituted a major health hazard. Not only were windows 
left closed, but there was no provision for any alternative form of ventilation. The 
atmosphere was, therefore, an extremely oppressive and uncomfortable one in which to 
work; for the shidas it was also the environment in which they ate and slept. 
By the time the cutters and machinists had finished work for the day, and the 
shidas had cleaned up the mess that remained, it would normally be one or two o'clock 
in the morning before the girls could contemplate making themselves something to eat. 
Bearing in mind that their ages ranged from barely twelve to fifteen or sixteen years, it 
is not surprising that they were frequently too tired to bother. Instead, they would each 
simply unroll a thin mattress on the floor, and fall asleep under a light coverlet. 
Toilet facilities available to these young girls were meagre, to say the least. 
Somewhere in the building there would be a cold water tap that had to be shared by 
hundreds of people. This was where they washed their faces and hands, with more 
extensive ablutions being out of the question. If they were lucky, and could afford it 
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(see below), girls would be able to visit the public baths once every month; more often 
than not, however, that period was nearer once every six months. During the day, 
workers would have access to a small and rudimentary lavatory that was used by both 
men and women. During the night, when most factory owners preferred to lock the 
young shidas inside the workshop, the girls would have the benefit of a bucket in the 
corner of the room. 
Four or five hours, at the most, after the shidas had unrolled their mattresses 
they would be awoken, usually by the cutter, so that he could arrange for the previous 
day's production to be delivered to the wholesale and retail outlets on the ground floor 
of the building. Having completed this chore, the girls would stow away their bedding 
and begin to prepare the food that would have to last them for the day. This food 
normally consisted of rice9 and kimchi and perhaps some salted shrimps or bean soup. 
Cooking facilities were as rudimentary as those available for personal hygiene 
and consisted of a primitive paraffin stove, a bucket of clean water that had to be carried 
from the distant tap, and one for waste. One of the sewing machines would be pressed 
into service as a makeshift dining table and it was, therefore, inevitable that the 
pervading dust became part of the regular diet. Food was purchased out of pitifully low 
wages, and the dual problems of inadequate bulk and poor nutritional value added 
significantly to the drab existence of these young girls; children who, in other 
circumstances, would still have been in the care of their parents and attending school. 
After breakfast, everything had to be cleared away by eight o'clock when the 
machinists would arrive and the day's work begin. No interruptions for drinks or snacks 
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were permitted while work was in progress and there would be a break of, perhaps, 
thirty minutes shortly after midday during which some of the food that had been 
prepared earlier in the morning could be consumed. That short break also offered the 
only opportunity to get outside the factory into the comparatively fresh, albeit still 
highly polluted, air of central Seoul for a few minutes. More often than not, the greater 
part of that respite would likely be spent queuing for the toilet. 
7.6 Effects On Health 
The image of a huge concentration of girls barely into their teens, or a tightly- 
packed mass of young woman, working excessively long hours in an odious and 
polluted atmosphere for grossly inadequate wages is a compelling icon of suffering. 
Even so, the extent of the wretchedness endured by Korean textile and garment workers 
in the 1960's and 1970's extended beyond the primitive working conditions themselves. 
The damage they wreaked upon both short and long-term physical and psychological 
health is readily imaginable. Even the most dispassionate observer would recognise that 
a diet inadequate in both bulk and nutrition, allied with the imperative to eat quickly, on 
the occasions when there was something to eat, and return immediately to work, was 
likely to result in digestive and gastric disorders and fatigue, if such a lifestyle were to 
become routine. Likewise it is reasonable to anticipate that the poor quality of the air 
inhaled throughout the working day and, in the case of many of the shidas, throughout 
the night as well, was highly conducive to the contraction of respiratory diseases such as 
emphysema and tuberculosis. The intricate nature of the work and the speed with which 
it had to be completed, the harsh lighting, and the dust-laden atmosphere, also virtually 
guaranteed that eye infections such as conjunctivitis and retinitis became accepted as 
occupational nouns. Add to these the final ingredients of lack of sleep, physical and 
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verbal abuse from supervisory staff, loneliness and homesickness, and an almost total 
absence of opportunity for exercise and relaxation in unpolluted air, and the recipe for 
utter misery is complete. 
In the admittedly rudimentary, yet totally trustworthy, research they conducted 
in 1970, Chun Tae-il and his Society of Fools (see Chapter Ten) concluded that for a 
woman to have her health intact after five years employment in the Peace Market was 
little short of miraculous: 
The strange thing is that most of the workers don't actually seem to realise 
that they are ill at all. If all of their colleagues are constantly coughing and 
bringing up blood, it is almost as though it is normal, and acceptable, for 
them to do the same. The real sadness is that, even if they did understand the 
seriousness of their condition, there is nothing they can do about it. They 
have no money for treatment, and they have no time for treatment. All they 
can do is keep on going for as long as they can, and when they are too sick 
to work, they will be fired (Diary, Chun Tae-il, September, 1970). 
An interview with a now seriously incapacitated woman who had worked at the 
Ban-do factory in the 1970's supported this sentiment: 
After one and a half years working in the leather jacket section I found that 
my health was getting very bad. The company gave us an X-ray every year'o 
and one day the manager told me that I had tuberculosis and that I would 
have to stop work until I was cured. I had no money for treatment and the 
manager told me that it was not the company's business. I knew that I 
needed rest and medical treatment, but what could I do? I insisted on 
continuing to work in the hope that I could save some money for treatment 
before my health got too bad. I worked for a few more days but then I was 
fired. I didn't get any compensation (Interview, ex-Ban-do worker, January, 
1999). 
A later entry in Chun Tae-il's diary records verbatim the response of another 
female worker in the Peace Market: 
I would be so happy if I could get four days off each month instead of only 
two. Instead of regularly working from 8am to llpm every day, and then 
doing overtime, I would really like to work only from Bam to 5pm. Because 
of the way I am forced to live my health is in a terrible state. I cannot eat 
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because there is something wrong with my stomach. I cannot open my eyes 
in sunlight and I am suffering from neuralgia at the moment. The employer 
refuses to help me with treatment or even get me a medical examination. I 
cannot sleep, my body is aching and all my joints are so painful that it is 
difficult to walk (Diary, Chun Tae-il, September, 1970). 
To offset the possibility that Chun Tae-il and the author, his sister, might be 
regarded as being `too close' to the Peace Market workers to be truly objective in the 
matter of the conditions under which they worked, an extract from Shin Donghwa 
monthly magazine" is included as a fitting postscript to this section: 
Miss Bae informs us that she works until late into the night because there is 
a high demand. This was not unusual when new designs are being 
introduced at the beginning of a season, and winter clothes take longer to 
produce than spring or summer ones. She was in front of her sewing- 
machine before eight o'clock in the morning and did not leave until eleven- 
thirty p. m. at the earliest. She claims that it is better than last year when, 
very often, she stayed up several nights straight. When she rose to take a 
break, even though her mind was clear, she could not hold her balance and 
collapsed on the floor, spitting out blood. Even nowadays, Miss Bae says 
that her body feels like a ton weight every morning when she wakes up. She 
also feels dizzy; her head feels as though it is going to split open whenever 
she tries to blow her nose, and she is constantly coughing out black phlegm 
(Shin Donghwa, January, 1971). 
7.7 Women Workers And Marriage 
Before looking in closer detail at the financial circumstances of women 
workers in the Peace Market in the 1970's, and the dreariness of the lifestyle they were 
able to afford, it is important to highlight a factor that dominated, and continues to 
dominate, the consciousness of all Korean females. The crucial importance of marriage 
in Korean culture cannot be overstated and, if anything, that importance was magnified 
when young, single women entered the factory environment. Magnified, that is, insofar 
as the failure to marry at the prescribed age brought with it far greater economic 
repercussions than had previously been the case for a young woman already branded 
with a serious cultural stigma. 
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Although it was by no means unusual for women to marry at a very early age, 
if they were still spinsters by the time they reached the age of twenty-six they were not 
only regarded as being `on the shelf but were also subject to extreme social contempt if 
they tried to remain at work. It was considered shameful for a young woman to be 
unmarried by the time she reached that critical age and she would become the butt of 
concerted abuse from employers and male co-workers. The reason why she was still 
single, they would assert, was that she was not only inadequate but she was also ugly. 
A woman who worked in the Peace Market in the 1970's, and who still works 
in a garment factory in Seoul, was interviewed by the author in 1998 and showed her 
this extract from her diary: 
My shida, Young-hee, calls me `Ajumoni' (aunt). I'd rather be called 
`sister', but I don't get angry because it is natural to be called `aunt' at the 
age of thirty -a woman of thirty usually had two or three children. My 
younger sister married in 1977 at twenty-eight, she used to complain to me 
"Why don't you marry? You care about our family too much! " I believe 
that her complaint was a strong expression of her love and sympathy for me 
- one who has got old earning money for her family's livelihood. I had been 
working at the factory since I was fifteen, the same age as Young-hee. One 
day my younger sister said to me: "Shall I give my boyfriend to you? " I 
knew that would be impossible, but I felt her love toward me and thanked 
her. Until I had reached 28 or 29 years old some people had wanted to 
arrange a marriage for me, but when I reached thirty no-one suggested 
marriage anymore (Diary, Peace Market woman worker, 1974). 
So, there were two forces motivating young women workers towards marriage 
as they approached their mid-twenties: first, it meant that they would escape the 
humiliation and deprecation that would inevitably be heaped upon them if they 
remained single and, second, they would escape from the awful circumstances in which 
they lived and worked. The fact that such hopes did not always come to fruition is 
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illustrated in an interview with a fifty-eight year old woman who still works from 9 a. m. 
to 11 p. m. in the same garment factory that she entered as a young girl: 
From the time I reached my 23d birthday it was important for me to get 
married. Social pressures were great, and I believed that if I had a husband I 
would not have to work in the factory anymore. But I could not find a 
husband until I was thirty-one and, even then, his wages were not enough to 
cover our family needs so I could not leave work. I am still working in that 
small garment factory, and now I also have parents-in-law and brothers and 
sisters-in-law to support (Interview, Peace Market woman worker, November 
1997). 
Thus, taking all the above into account, we can get some idea of the multi- 
directional and multi-faceted pressures which dominated and directed the lives of 
countless thousands of young women in Korea during the 1960's and 1970's. 
Culturally, socially, economically, and domestically they were forced into subservient 
and, in many instances, inhuman, roles from which it was clearly a task of monumental 
proportions to break free. The fact that the women workers of the 1970's did, 
eventually, manage to establish a collective and cohesive identity in the workplace, and 
thereby lay the foundations for Korean women as a whole to develop individual and 
progressive identities, bears testimony to their courage, their stoicism, and their 
humanity. 
7.8 Earnings And Purchasing Power 
There has been no shortage of professional economists, or commentators upon 
global economic affairs, who have theorised at length on the monetary, fiscal, political, 
and social explanations for what came to be known as the `Korean economic miracle'; 
the phenomenal development, engineered by Park Chung-hee, that transformed a 
shattered and disorganised `third world agrarian' society into one of the world's leading 
industrial nations in less than one generation (Among the many works considered by the 
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author are: Bello (1990); Frank (1975), Jacobs (1985), Kim and Roemer (1979); Mason 
(1980); Michell (1988); Pae Sung-moon (1992), Sipos (1988); Song Byung-nak (1990); 
Steinberg (1989); Woo Jung-en (1991). Macro and micro-economic theories are rarely 
uncontested, however, and it is open to conjecture whether one of the reasons why so 
many works on the subject have been published is that there are as many differing 
opinions on the multifarious contributory factors. There is, therefore, no complete and 
undisputed explanation of how and why the South Korean metamorphosis actually 
occurred, and it does not fall within the remit of this study to add to the theoretical 
debate. 
Beyond the truism that the `miracle' did, indeed, take place, however, there are 
two fundamental elements upon which all commentators are agreed. First, growth was 
rapid and sustained, as John Calverley records: 
Under Park Chung-hee Korea enjoyed 17 years of economic growth 
averaging 10% per annum and became a model for development, analysed 
and admired everywhere. International banks lent more than $US 15 billion 
for development and financed Korean companies world-wide while multi- 
national companies were attracted to Korea by its rapid growth industries, 
industrious workforce and political stability (Calverley, 1982). 
Second, the role played by exports in the explosive success of the Korean economy was 
crucial: 
Exports emerged as the strongest driving force for growth and were directly 
linked to the business boom at home...... Korea established a world record 
by achieving an annual export growth rate of nearly 40% for 12 years from 
the early 1960's and advanced to the status of a newly industrialising 
country thanks to her export-oriented growth strategy...... Export 
performances in 1971 and 1972 even surpassed targets by 2 to 2.5 times and 
in 1973 exports registered a 98.6% increase over the previous year (Kim 
Cae-one, 1986). 
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This section will set out to demonstrate that there is a third contributory 
component to Korea's `miracle' that is equally beyond dispute: the extreme and 
inhumane magnitude of the disparity between the national wealth being accrued via the 
spectacular performances identified in the two extracts above, and the real term rewards 
gained by those manufacturing workers who contributed most to that success. The 
textile and garment industry, as the leading exporter during the 1960's and 1970's, was 
central to this `miracle' (Kim Cae-one, 1986). 
Whilst the author's `problem with averages' is documented in the methodology 
chapter of this study, there are two further, and connected, perceived weaknesses 
evident in the body of literature concerned with the economic circumstances in Korea 
during the Park Chung-hee era. They are, first, the sources of statistical evidence and, 
second, the extent to which individual factors such as wages are `over-generalised' and 
are, thus, rendered nugatory for the purposes of any in-depth analysis in specific areas. 
Those works, for example, which deal with the question of wage levels, appear to 
abstract their evidence primarily from contemporary government publications such as 
those emanating from the Office of Labour Affairs, or from `quasi-governmental' 
sources such as the Bank of Korea and the Korea Annual. 12 In such publications wage 
levels and wage movements are categorised under the headings of `industrial field', 
`mining field', and `manufacturing field', and so on (e. g. Korea Annual, 1979), with the 
textile and garment industry falling somewhere within the latter. Taking into account 
the enormous diversity of both conditions and commodities which are encompassed by 
the term `manufacturing field', it is but a simple step to appreciate the arrant futility of 
attempting to draw meaningful conclusions about conditions in specific areas from such 
broadly based, and suspect, records. 
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The extent to which workers in the textile and garment industry, the majority of 
whom were women and young girls, were denied a share of the fruits of industrial 
prosperity is not evident from aggregate data. To provide such evidence, the amounts of 
money they were actually paid for the work they did, and the way those earnings were 
spent, is itemised in detail. From this simple process the clearest picture of the quality of 
the lives these women were forced to live emerges. The evidence has been gathered 
from lengthy interviews and group discussions, conducted over a period of years, which 
involved a wide representation of women who spent the 1960's and 1970's working as 
oya-machinists, bocho-machinists, and shidas in the Peace Market. Utilising diaries, 
confirmed by the most acute and painful recollections of a time that is deeply etched in 
their memories, a clear picture of wage levels is built up. Most of the sources are long- 
time and trusted friends and colleagues, whose stories accord exactly with the author's 
own experience of working in the Peace Market in the 1970's. To fully appreciate the 
severity of the disparity between national prosperity and personal poverty, however, it 
must be borne in mind throughout that these `financial histories' were played out within 
the context of a booming economy in which Korean politicians, entrepreneurs, and 
major conglomerates were accumulating wealth at an unprecedented rate. 
It will have been noted that, in the warren of small enterprises in the Peace 
Market, a number of factors were in play that determined how much money was 
actually paid to each of the female workers at the end of the month. In essence, those 
considerations included: - 
The `per garment' rate decided upon initially by the employer but, subsequently 
and increasingly, after negotiation between the employers and the Chonggye 
Union. Prior to the time when the union input was taken into account, the rate 
per unit was dependent upon the complexity of the particular garment and the 
whim of the employer; 
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ii. The number of garments each team of oya-machinist, bocho-machinist, and two 
shidas, could complete; 
iii. The decision of the oya-machinist in regard to how she would apportion the 
gross income between the members of her team; 13 
iv. The amount of overtime, either voluntary or enforced, that was worked, and 
whether it was actually remunerated, 14 and 
v. The sum of the deductions made prior to payment. 
Of course, individual financial `outgoings' also varied, with a major variation 
for all grades of female employee being the proportion of pay allotted immediately to 
parents or next of kin, usually, but not exclusively, as a contribution towards the 
education of male siblings (see Chapter Six). Another feature, albeit of lesser 
significance, was the amount of money spent upon basic sustenance items such as food, 
clothing, and toilet requisites. This category of expenditure clearly depended upon 
personal preference, personal priorities, and which retail outlets were used. 
It is, therefore, impossible to itemise a universally precise `domestic budget' 
for each grade of female worker in the Peace Market so, with this caveat firmly in mind, 
the policy adopted for the purpose of this study was to present all the interviewees with 
a draft budget made up of an aggregate of the inputs. A `roundabouts and swings' 
philosophy was adopted by all concerned, insofar as emphasis was placed upon balance 
rather than absolute precision; and if one item was considered by one person to be over 
or under-priced, it was accepted as long as it was counterbalanced elsewhere. 
The final variable centred upon the fact that even in the most stable of 
economies prices and incomes change over time, usually in an upward direction, whilst 
the relationship between them does not necessarily remain synchronised. Thus, between 
the date of Chun Tae-il's death in November, 1970 and the assassination of Park 
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Chung-hee in October, 1979, fluctuations with a generally upward trend occurred. Four 
factors influenced the decision to base the `financial snapshot' presented in this section 
on the circumstances which pertained on or about 1 January, 1974. First, that date is 
close to the mid-point between those two momentous events in Korean history 
identified above and, thus, the mid-point of the period under review in this study. 
Second, on 15 January, 1974 agreement was finally reached between the Chonggye 
Union and the Peace Market employers that enabled Chonggye representatives to 
participate in wage negotiations (Unpublished Chonggye Union document, 1976), and it 
is considered appropriate to represent conditions prior to the time when the union was 
able to achieve real improvements to wages. Third, from the end of March, 1976, and at 
the insistence of the Chonggye Union, shldas were no longer paid by the oya-machinists 
but, instead, were paid directly by the employer (see Chapter Ten). This improvement, 
if included, would further distort the circumstances endured for so many years by those 
thousands of young girls. Finally, and coincidentally, one of the interviewees still 
retains a detailed record of her living expenses for the early months of 1974. 
7.9 Personal Budgets 
(N. B. The exchange rate during the period under consideration in this section was 
approximately 485 won to the US dollar (Calverley. 1982, Korea Annual 1974). 
Income 
The experience of the oya-machinist Kim Hae-soo and her abortive attempt to 
increase the rate paid per finished garment in one particular factory in the Peace Market 
in 1974 is described in Section 7.4 above. The rate insisted upon by her employer was 
180 won per jacket, and her team was capable of completing a maximum of 20 jackets 
in one day: this produced a total income for the team of 3,600 iron per day. However, it 
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was also noted that up to 30 of the previous year's jackets were completed in one day 
because their design and construction had been much simpler. The rate per garment in 
1973 had been 160 won; thereby resulting in a 1973 daily team earning of 4,800 won, 
1,200 won more than what would be possible in 1974. All 860 factories in the Peace 
Market were managed along very similar lines and this circumstance was by no means 
unusual. Although thirty garments per day in 1973, and twenty garments per day in 
1974 represent achievements which could never have been sustained for a full month, it 
is, nevertheless, considered appropriate to use those figures as base lines for subsequent 
calculations. In the interest of balance, therefore, the notional daily sum earned by the 
standard team of two machinists and two shidas is calculated as having been 4,250 won, 
or 25 completed garments at a rate of 170 won per garment; exactly midway between 
the 1973 and the 1974 figures. On the basis of four days off per month, the monthly 
team income amounted to 110,500 won. 
Prior to the arrangement in March, 1976 whereby shidas were paid directly by 
the employer, the universal practice was for the oya-machinist to allow her most junior 
helper 5,000 won per month, rising to 9,000 won for the most senior. The bocho- 
machinist, meanwhile, would receive 12,000 won for each month's work. This left 
84,500 won for the team leader. 
There is one important caveat, however, which made a substantial difference to 
the above amounts. Each year there were two periods when the factories virtually closed 
down while the owners and jaedanshas planned for the following season's schedule. 
These ran from the end of June until the beginning of August, and from the end of 
January until the beginning of March; a total of some eight weeks per year during which 
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there was no work for the teams, and no pay. Thus, the money earned over 44 weeks 
had to be made to last for 52 weeks, effectively reducing income to the following: - 
Table 7.1: Monthly Income, 1974 
Grade Monthly Income (Korean won) US Dollar Equivalent 
Oya-machinist 70,400 145 
Bocho-machinist 10,000 20 
Senior shida 7,500 15 
Junior shida 4,200 9 
Source: Interviews, diaries, women workers, author observation. 
Having established the relative incomes of each team member, the intention 
now is to focus upon the circumstances of the Peace Market shidas, for although Chun 
Tae-il's concern was for all female textile and garment workers, it was towards the 
youngest and most vulnerable of them that he directed the major part of his attention. 
Thus, it was primarily the plight of the shidas that caused him the greatest anguish, and 
which precipitated his final act, the outcome of which was to be the birth of democratic 
trade unionism in Korea. 
To simplify the model, and to continue to observe the imperative of 
maintaining balance and impartiality, the `composite' s"hidcr will be neither the most 
junior nor the most senior, she will fall exactly in the middle of the earning range and, 
thus, be paid 7,500 won per month. (This figure should be rounded down to 6,250 won 
by the pro rata correction identified above but, so as not to fall foul of the temptation to 
paint the picture blacker than it needs to be, the estimate is left at 7,500 won per month, 
or $US 15: our Aida will be left to fend for herself during the eight `fallow' weeks per 
year). 
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As has been described, many of her peers were accommodated in the makeshift 
dormitories in the `attics' constructed in the Peace Market factories, and were not 
charged for this `concession'. A significant number of girls lived elsewhere, however. 
Our model shida conformed to the pattern of the more experienced shidas and, in 
company with three of her colleagues, rented a room in a locality of Seoul which was 
sufficiently close to the Peace Market that she could commute to and from work by bus. 
To complete the picture, she is sixteen years of age and her family lives in Chollado 
province, some two hundred miles south of Seoul. She has one younger brother who is 
attending school in his home village. Her father is what would be referred to in the 
United States as a `sharecropper', who has suffered a substantial fall in the return on his 
rice crop due to Park Chung-hee's predilection for importing cheap rice from the US 
(Park Hyun-chae, 1978). The reason why she has been sent to find work in Seoul is to 
try to make up the severe shortfall in the family income. Finally, she is not yet a paid up 
member of the Chonggye Union and does not, therefore, have the union subscription 
deducted `at source' from her wages. 
Outgoings 
The four shidas rented one room in a slum area of the capital, for which they 
paid 3,000 won ($6) per month. All living expenses were shared equally between the 
four young girls, so each contributed 750 won ($1.50) towards the rent. Bus fares to and 
from the Peace Market were 60 won per day for each shida, or 1,560 won ($3.20) over 
the 26 working days per month: our shida's wage packet of 7,500 won, has already been 
reduced by over 30%. 
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Records kept by one ex-. shida permit a very accurate assessment of the amount 
of money the girls spent on food in 1974, and three daily shopping lists abstracted from 
the period January - March are reproduced here (quantities were for four people, and all 
prices in won): - 
List 1 
Rice 500g - 100 
Barley 1 kilo - 70 
Beansprouts 150g - 50 
Radish 200g - 50 
Spring onions 50g - 20 
Pickled shrimp 100g - 50 
Vegetables - 70 
Total: 410 won 
List 2 
Rice 500g - 100 
Barley 1 kilo - 70 
Mackerel heads - 50 
Vegetables - 50 
Cooking oil - 120 
Radish - 30 
Spring onions - 20 
440 non 
List 3 
Rice 250g - 50 
Barley 500g -35 
Noodles - 80 
Potatoes - 50 
Kimchi - 100 
Beansprouts - 50 
365 won 
From these examples, and from the full record in the author's possession, it is 
clear that the basic daily food bill for four shidcis was in the region of 400 won. Thus, in 
a thirty day month the combined cost would be 12,000 won ($25), or 3,000 won ($6) per 
girl. So, once our notional shida is housed, fed, and able to get to and from work, she is 
left with 2,190 won ($4.50) with which to take care of her remaining commitments and 
expenses for the month. 
It has already been noted that the only reason a traditional rural Korean family 
would consider sending their daughter to find work in Seoul was the seriousness of the 
financial situation in which the family was struggling to survive. Thus, apart from 
keeping herself alive and in work once she had reached Seoul, the imperative for the 
daughter was to send as much money home as she possibly could. But our composite 
shida has only $4.50 left out of her month's pay and there are other requisites which she 
must purchase to meet her own very basic needs. 
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Let us consider sonne of those additional requirements. Cooking was carried 
out on a small stove fuelled with kerosene, which cost approximately 840 won for one 
month's supply. The room was heated by a device which used compressed coal 
briquettes costing 30 won each. Heating was only necessary for six months of the year, 
during which the briquettes would be burned at a rate of 40 per month, resulting in a 
cost of 1,200 won, or 600 won when spread over the whole year. A mains water supply 
was not a feature of the sort of accommodation occupied by shidas in the 1970's, so 
clean water had to be purchased for 5 won for two small buckets. Cooking for four 
people, washing the utensils, and personal ablutions, required a minimum of six such 
small buckets each day at a cost of 15 won, or 450 iuor, per month. Thus far then, we 
have accounted for additional `communal' expenditure of 1,890 i, 'nn, 222 won for each 
girl, to be deducted from the 2,190 won remaining of the monthly wage. What else has 
to be purchased with this 1,968 won ($4) in an attempt to make life sustainable for this 
16 year-old? Bearing in mind the highly polluted nature of the atmosphere in which she 
works, the fact that she is a post-pubescent female, and the need of most human beings 
to maintain at least a modicum of decency, adequate clothing and basic toilet items may 
be regarded as essential. The cost of clothing obviously varied with quality, but purely 
as an indication of the outlay necessary, a blouse would be in the region of 3,000 won 
($6), a skirt 4,000 won ($8), and a pair of shoes 7,000 ti'ori ($14). Considering that she 
has less than 2,000 won left out of her wage, it is clear that the purchase of any one of 
these items will demand a significant amount of planned saving. In general, the girls 
made their own clothing out of offcuts salvaged from the factory or, if there was a little 
money available, they could visit Yi So-sun, or someone in a similar line of business, 
and purchase items of clothing which had been rescued from the city mortuaries (see 
Chapter Nine). Instead of shoes, all the Peace Market workers wore simple canvas 
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plimsolls which, although costing 1.000 won ($2) could, with judicious patching and 
stitching, be made to last for a surprisingly long time. As for toiletries, a bar of the 
cheapest soap cost 160 won, a tube of toothpaste 340 won, one month's supply of 
sanitary towels 200 won, and one packet of washing powder 250 wore. Assuming that 
each of these commodities would last for the full month, and that no clothing or 
footwear is purchased, our shida's 1,968 won has now been reduced to 1,018 won ($2). 
It was of the utmost importance for the country girls working in Seoul, and for 
many of them the only prospect that kept them going in the miserable existence that was 
their lot in the sweat-shops of the Peace Market, that they return to their homes twice 
each year, at Harvest Festival and New Year. For a girl whose family lived in Chollado 
province, for example, this meant two return train tickets costing together 5,600 won 
($11.54), and demanded the saving each month of at least 460 won: our shida's monthly 
cash in hand has now become 558 won ($1.15). Whilst it might be comforting to 
conclude that this remaining sum represented `pocket money' to be spent upon little 
luxuries, that was, regrettably, not the case. It must be recalled that the shidas were 
working, on average, 16 hours a day, six days a week, starting at 7.30am and finishing 
late into the night. By the time they got back to their rented room all they wanted to do 
was sleep and, more often than not, they were too tired on the following morning to 
prepare their lunch-boxes. The only alternative was to visit one of the numerous food 
stalls in the vicinity of the Peace Market and purchase a bowl of noodles for their lunch. 
These cost 20 won, and it is all too apparent that if this practice were to become a habit, 
the monthly wage has been completely spent. There has been no visit to the public baths 
for a proper wash (300 won), no shampoo, no visit to even the lowest of the three 
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grades of cinema in Seoul (700 wore), no books, no magazines, no newspapers, no 
sweets. 
As in comparable situations all over the world, where there is poverty and 
desperation there will also be the money lenders and traders who are prepared to deal 
`on tick' or `on the slate', all for punitive rates of interest, of course. Seoul in the 1960's 
and 1970's was no exception, and it was by no means unusual for a female textile and 
garment worker to owe up to half of her wages to money-lenders and/or local 
shopkeepers before it had even been paid to her. Spirals of dept were commonplace and, 
prior to the advent of the Chonggye Union, it was far from uncommon for young 
machinists at the Peace Market to be driven to prostitution in desperate attempts to 
obtain respite from financial pressure (Interview, Chung In-sook, Secretary, Women's 
Section, Chonggye Union 1971-1974, December, 1997). 
But what of the primary purpose of leaving home and family and going to 
Seoul in the first place, the imperative to supplement the family income and help to fund 
the education of the male siblings? It is clear that for the most junior shidas their own 
survival in the city hung by a thread, and sending home even the most paltry sum was 
simply out of the question. Instead, the primary task for them was to work as hard as 
they could in order to gain experience, promotion, and more pay. A senior shida, 
earning 9,000 won per month, might be able to allot 2,000 won ($4) monthly to her 
parents, and once she was promoted to hocho-machinist, on 12,000 won, that sum 
would normally be in the region of 5,000 ii'o», or $10. The shida in our example is 
neither the most senior nor the most junior, and out of her 7,500 won income, she could 
not be expected to set aside more than 500 woii towards her obligation to her parents. It 
186 
must be borne in mind that, as has been demonstrated, sufficient food to keep one 
person alive for one day in the city could be bought for 100 woii, a cost probably greater 
than would be found in the countryside, so five times that amount represented a very 
valuable addition indeed to the budget of an impoverished village family. 
It was not normal practice, however, for the more senior shidas and the bocho 
and oya-machinists to actually send money home every month. Instead, a group of 
colleagues, usually no more than twelve and of similar seniority, would form a savings 
club, or `gae'. Each time they were paid, the members of the gae would each deposit an 
agreed amount with the organiser, or treasurer: for the better paid oya-machinists that 
agreed amount might be as much as 5,000 won, whereas for shidas of the seniority 
being discussed in this section it would more likely be in the region of 500 won. When 
the gae first started, each member would draw a number representing her turn to take 
possession of the combined savings, thus, in the latter instance, and assuming that there 
were twelve members of the gae, if our notional shida'. s number was 5 and it was the 
fifth month, she would collect the lump sum of 6,000 iron. Clearly, as the members of 
the gae gained in seniority the size of the lump sum would increase and would become 
invaluable for paying off debts, indulging in tiny luxuries and, most importantly, 
sending home. 
7.10 The `Wage Deposit' System 
One means whereby employers kept their employee turnover low has been 
described in Section 6.5 above. There was, however, another ploy used by unscrupulous 
factory owners which appears to have been unique to the Peace Market and which was 
the cause of considerable problems both for the workers themselves and for the 
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Chonggye Union (Chonggye Union Annual Report, 1976). Under the `wage deposit' 
system a worker starting at a new factory did not receive the money she had earned 
during her first two weeks. Instead, it was placed `on deposit' with the employer and the 
worker was told that she would receive that money when she left the factory either to 
marry or to take up another job. This gave rise to two distinct difficulties. First, 
withholding the first two weeks' wages meant that the new employee had to work for 
six weeks before she received any money at all. Details of personal budgets outlined 
above make it quite clear that such an imposition would inevitably result in real 
hardship; although, in the event, friends and co-workers invariably rallied round to 
ensure the survival of the new girl. 
The second implication was more problematic insofar as when the time 
eventually came for the wage deposit to be given to its rightful owner, the employer 
would prove both elusive and evasive. Chonggye Union records abound with cases of 
unpaid deposits, the details of which are uncannily similar. The `retiring' worker asks 
her employer for her deposit and he assures her that it will be included in her final 
month's wage packet. When she finds that it is not, she confronts the owner who 
apologises profusely for someone else's mistake and asks her to return the following 
week when her money will be ready for collection. The worker returns to the Peace 
Market the following week but the owner is nowhere to be found, he is `out of town', 
and she should try again at the end of the month. This charade continues until the 
inevitable occurs, the distance the ex-employee has to travel, or the difficulty in getting 
time off from her new place of work, forces her to give up the chase and she resigns 
herself to the loss of the money owed to her. Until the formation of a democratic trade 
union dedicated to the protection of her rights she has no-one to whom she can turn for 
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help, and her colleagues have no means whereby they can prevent such additional and 
blatant exploitation occurring to there. The only action they could take in practice was 
to try to keep the number of times they were robbed of their earnings to the absolute 
minimum, which, of course, meant remaining in one job for as long as possible. From 
the factory owners' perspective this widespread tactic represented a substantial 
reduction in the already pitifully low wages being paid to workers in the Peace Market 
and, considering that they retained the wage deposits of all, or most of their employees, 
a commensurate and not inconsiderable boost to profits. 
The magnitude of the problem of unpaid deposits is highlighted by the fact that 
after the formation of the Chonggye Union at the end of 1970, eight full-time union 
officers devoted all of their working time to assisting the huge number of women to 
secure the payment of their deposits and back wages: 
Hundreds of workers came to report about unpaid deposits and unpaid wages. 
It is no exaggeration to say that our first year of union activity was dominated 
by solving the unpaid deposit wage. But it was not an easy job for union staff 
because the employers tried very hard not to pay and sometimes violence was 
involved between employers and union staff. There were occasions when we 
had to take legal action (Interview, Choi Chong-in, Vice-President, Chonggye 
Union 1971; President, Chonggye Union, 1971-1976, February, 1999). 
7.11 Summary 
This chapter has ranged across the entirety of the day to day lives led by the 
thousands of female workers whose labour contributed more than any other single 
industrial group towards Park Chung-hee's `economic miracle'. It has examined the 
diverse, intense, and relentless pressures with which those girls and young women were 
perpetually confronted; and has provided numerous examples of the deeply ingrained 
cultural conviction held by most Korean males of their inherent superiority. The sheer 
drudgery of the work and the drabness of the lifestyle have both been portrayed, as has 
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their combined and quite inexcusable effects upon the health of an already impoverished 
and deprived `sub-class'. 
Against this background, it is submitted that in not only surviving the 
unmitigated exploitation by cynical and ruthless employers, rnen who were allowed to 
prosecute their profit-centred conduct unimpeded by an authoritarian regime intent only 
upon national growth, but in having the strength and determination to fight back, to 
combine, and to overcome, the women of the textile and garment industry changed 
forever the face of Korean society and wrote a new chapter into Korean history. 
The fight back by these women involved union organistion and action. Before 
examining the detail of union struggle in the Peace Market and elsewhere, it is 
necessary to consider the nature and character of trade unionism in Korea at the time. 
This is the subject of the next chapter. 
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NOTES 
1 The financial collapse of the Weimar Republic in 1922-3 is a classic exemplar of the 
meaninglessness of `wage levels' being recorded in isolation as an index of prosperity 
or poverty. At the height of German inflation, one US dollar equated with 
136,000,000,000 marks. Thus, a `Deutschmark billionaire' could not even afford to buy 
half a kilo of butter (Grunfeld, 1974). 
2 As described by the many ex-Peace Market workers interviewed November, 1997- 
January, 1998 and November, 1998-February, 1999. The description also accords with 
the author's own experience, and the research of Chun Tae-il. 
3 This was despite the fact that the exterior of the building had been freshly decorated 
for the benefit of visiting delegates from North Korea (Interview, diary author, 
December, 1997). 
4 Kimchi is made by pickling the large Korean radish, cabbage, or the Korean equivalent 
of Chinese leaves, in salt, garlic, red chilli peppers, and other ingredients to taste. It can 
be eaten cold, or cooked with rice and fish, etc.. Kimchi is arguably the most important 
single food item to a Korean, more so even than rice, because it has deep cultural and 
emotional connotations which no other staple possesses (Chu Young-ha, 1995). Korean 
women, and some Korean men, take great pride in the quality of their home-made 
kimchi, and if there is one thing a Korean abroad misses more than anything else, other 
than family, it is the distinctive taste of kinnchi. Kimchi of the highest quality is 
expensive, however, and workers in the Peace Market could afford only the lowest. 
5 Whilst this might appear to be the only rational means of conducting wage assessment 
under the piece-work scheme, it was not normal procedure in the Peace Market during 
the 1960's and 1970's, where workers rarely knew how much they would receive until 
the job had been completed. Thus, the owners and the. jaedanshas would regularly 
collude in order to maintain profit and shift the effects of any business downturn away 
from their own returns and onto the remuneration of the workers (Group discussion, 
Peace Market women workers, January, 1999). Furthermore, they clearly took 
advantage of the truism that there is little leverage to be gained by workers contesting a 
piece-work rate after the job is finished. 
This fact did not emerge until the interview itself, because throughout the author's 
time of employment in the factory the owner left the day-to-day management to others 
while he attended to business elsewhere. 
7 This case was related to the author by Kim Hae-soo, the oya-machinist who was the 
prime mover in the action. Kim Hae-soo was a member of the Chonggye Union and had 
attended the Acacia Meeting labour education programme (see Chapter Ten). 
8 Wage rates and purchasing power are discussed in later sections of this chapter, but in 
order to place this incident in sharper perspective it should be noted that in 1974,160 
won would buy two cups of rice or a bar of soap (Office of Labour Affairs, Korea 
Annual, 1974). Furthermore, this 160 won had to be shared between two machinists and 
two shidas. (NB This statistic, emanating from a Park Chung-hee government 
department, is supported by the author's own experience). 
9 What is euphemistically called `rice' in most literature concerned with the diet of 
Korean workers was, in reality, a mixture of rice and barley, `undiluted' rice being eaten 
on a regular basis only by the affluent. During the 1960's and 1970's the price of barley 
was almost exactly half that of rice, so the normal practice of the lower paid was to mix 
the two grains together. The degree to which the rice was `diluted' with barley in any 
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particular household was a matter of considerable significance, especially when guests 
were entertained; the greater the proportion of rice to barley, the greater the social 
cachet. In normal domestic circumstances, the wife and mother would apportion the rice 
and barley in accordance with family `seniority', with the husband receiving the largest 
proportion of rice and the junior member of the family receiving the largest proportion 
of barley. 
10 The agreement by the Ban-do company to conduct annual X-ray examinations for its 
workers was a progressive, and rare, concession that was one of the most significant 
early achievements of the Ban-do Union under the leadership of Han Soon-nim (see 
Chapter Nine). 
11 A weighty and relatively middle-of-the-road political and economic publication that 
has been held in generally high regard throughout Korea for many years. 
12 For example, Calverley (1982) makes much use of the Bank of Korea Monthly 
Economic Statistics, the Bank of Korea Economic Statistics Yearbook, and the 
Economic Planning Board's Monthly Statistics of Korea. Frank (1975) uses identical 
figures as source material and, indeed, refers to Calverley's earlier writing on the topic; 
and Kim Cae-one (1986) relies upon all of the aforementioned and material issued by 
the Korean Development Institute. This tendency to repeat previously quoted and 
otherwise unsubstantiated data and, thus, to treat `questionable' statistics as adequate 
bases for serious comment is widespread, and should be the cause for concern and 
reflection. 
13 This arrangement was prior to the agreement reached between the Chonggye Union 
and the Peace Market employers whereby the shidas would receive a wage direct from 
the employer and not as a share of the team income (see Chapter Eleven). 
14 Between 1971 and 1979 the major cause of industrial action was the non-payment for 
overtime worked and back wages (see Chapter Three). 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
KOREAN TRADE UNIONS 
8.0 Introduction 
Preceding chapters have described the changes in the position of women, both 
in the workplace and in the wider society, during the first two decades of Korean 
industrialisation, which were determined to a large extent by state-centred development 
strategies and policies. Although these strategies included the organisation of trade 
unions, the government-sanctioned institutions which emerged afforded no indication 
that their primary purpose was to safeguard the interests of their members. This 
fundamental disregard of obligation was nowhere more apparent than in the textile and 
garment industry where some 85% of workers were women. The effects of this 
insouciance on the part of the textile workers' union was further magnified by the fact 
that of the seventeen national industrial unions in being at the time, the National Textile 
Workers Union (NTWU) was the second largest in terms of membership. Furthermore, 
it maintained this position in the membership league table throughout the 1970's 
(FKTU Annual Report, 1979). The majority of those seventeen industries had become 
unionised during the period shortly after liberation from Japan. The Dong-il Textile 
branch union, for example, was formed by Chung Pyong (see below) in 1946 (History 
of the Dong-il Textile Branch Union, 1985), whereas some factories remained 
unorganised until early into the 1970's. The reason why it took so long for many 
enterprises to gain union recognition was not because they were considered too small to 
merit recognition, or that their workforces lacked the initiative to seek recognition, but 
was, instead, a clear reflection of national-level union policy. Put in simple terms, that 
position might be expressed thus: national leaders did not attempt to organise these 
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workers unless there was evidence of open revolt at a particular factory location. The 
view was that introducing unions, and thereby giving the workers the impression that 
they had institutional support, and a voice beyond their own workplace, served only to 
generate unnecessary conflict. A prime example of this selective resistance to recruiting 
was the YH Garment factory, opened in January, 1966, and which, despite employing 
approximately 4,000 girls and young women in appalling conditions, had no trade union 
until 1975 (YH Textile Branch Union Report, 1984). 
This chapter will show that the salient characteristics of the `official' trade 
unions in existence in Korea during the period under review were that they were 
dominated by men and, further, were fully expressive of a `classical' male hegemony. 
Women were systematically excluded from all positions of influence and, regardless of 
their overwhelming numerical dominance in the workforce, were exploited 
economically, physically, and culturally. By various means, including the levying of 
compulsory union dues and the selective appointments of union officials, the state 
machinery of President Park Chung-hee secured the loyalty of union officers to the 
state, and their commitment to the interests of capital. This calculated endeavour on the 
part of the Park regime resulted in the consolidation of the positions of union leaders as 
`labour aristocrats', and the reinforcement of their privileged status by close 
collaboration between unions and management. 
In accord with the ideological bias of the Park administration, the philosophy 
of the union leadership was essentially anti-communist and, like their political masters, 
union leaders appeared unable to differentiate between communism and democracy. 
Any effort to widen democratic representation in the workplace was automatically 
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branded as `pro-communist'. The state-sponsored labour organisations so constructed 
can aptly be described as being little more than instruments for use by the state to 
control the national labour force. They were epitomised by the FKTU, which will be 
shown to have been concerned only with facilitating the achievement of the Park 
government's economic policies, without regard for the costs incurred by its 
membership. 
What will also be discussed in this chapter is the paradox whereby the FKTU 
and the national-level textile and garment union sowed the seeds of their own 
attenuation by their adherence to a state-inspired posture in dealings with their 
members. By their overt male chauvinism, in a work environment dominated by 
women, and by their affinity for management rather than for employees, the official 
labour institutions succeeded in intensifying the vacuum between workers and 
employers and, in so doing, prepared the ground for a grassroots collective movement. 
This grassroots movement was set in motion by women: 
We needed to ensure that the fullest expression of our predicament and our 
needs was carried right to the heart of union business. We needed collective 
bargaining. We had to deal direct with the owners and the government 
because we could not depend upon male leaders who would not represent 
our interests (Group discussion, women workers, Ban-do, Won-pung, YH, 
So-tong, Nam-a, Chonggye, and Dong-il, branch unions, January, 1999). 
One outcome was direct confrontation, not only between women workers and their 
employers but, more bitterly, between the women who were trying to organise 
enterprise-level unions and their industry's national-level union officers. 
The first section in this chapter focuses upon the FKTU and the national-level 
textile union, the NTWU, and, in so doing, will explain the symbiotic relationship 
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between the state and the union leadership of the textile industry. The second section 
provides an overview of the trade union situation as it existed in Korea during the 
1970's and will describe briefly the linear and `one-way' characteristic of its `chain of 
command' structure and the incidence and degree of government intervention in the 
shaping and control of the resultant institutions. Section Three discusses the practical 
implications of the malfunction, from the workers' point of view, of the official trade 
union structure previously described and will, thereby, explain the bases of the 
escalating conflict that developed between national-level and branch-level union 
administrations. The penultimate section contains examples of critical reaction by the 
international labour community to the standards and practices of President Park Chung- 
hee's industrial relations organisation, whilst the final section consists of an overall 
assessment of the circumstances described in the chapter. 
8.1 Historical Development Of The FKTU 
The evolution of Korean trade unionism differs from that of most industrialised 
countries insofar as, in the Korean case, the foundation of unions and the formulation of 
their procedures have been driven primarily by political imperatives. As the political 
atmosphere changed over time, so did the nature of trade union organisation and 
structure (Park Young-ki, 1969). 1 After the First World War, and as a reflection of the 
upsurge of nationalism throughout Asia, Korean socialist intellectuals began to form 
social movements such as the Labourer's Mutual Relief Association, begun in 1919 and, 
five years later, the Korean Federation of Labourers and Farmers (Kim Nak-jung, et al., 
1970; Lee Jeong-taik, 1988). Although the titles of many of the organisations were 
suggestive of a focus on worker welfare or agricultural co-operation, most of them 
were, in fact, socialist political groups rather than embryonic trade unions, whose 
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principal objective was liberation from Japan (Park Young-ki, 1969). Due, primarily, to 
their ambition for independence, all of these groups were driven underground after the 
Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, but the mould had been set for the continued 
dominance of the political over the social. 
After World War II, the country's infrastructure was in chaos; many factories 
and firms, over 80% of which had been Japanese-owned, were at a standstill because 
Japanese managers and technicians were no longer present and Korean businessmen and 
workers had insufficient knowledge and expertise to replace them. Unemployment was 
very high during the period of transition from Japanese rule to an administration 
overseen by the AMG, and many socio-political organisations, including communist- 
inspired factions, sprang up and attempted to capitalise on the widespread social unrest 
by working within the labour movement. It was in this chaotic climate that the General 
Council for Korean Trade Unions, or Chung Pyong, was formed in November, 1945. 
Consisting mainly of communists or fellow travellers, and despite proclaiming that its 
sole purpose was to represent the workers, Chung Pyong soon revealed its political 
agenda by demanding the withdrawal of all US forces in Korea and worker-ownership 
of all industries and firms (Ogle, 1990; Lee Jeong-taik, 1988; Hart-Landsberg, 1993; 
Kim Nak-joong, et al., 1970). 
The anti-communist AMG and the capitalist employers, confronted with the 
very real political and industrial threat posed by this leftist organisation, actively 
encouraged the establishment of anti-communist trade unions at company level (Kim 
Yoon-hwan, 1985; Lee Jeong-taik, 1988). In March, 1946, the `government-favoured' 
unions thus organised came together and formed the Federation of Korean Trade Unions 
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(FKTU) (Rauenhorst, 1990). This confederation had two primary incentives, neither of 
which were directly concerned with the interests of their grassroots associate members. 
The first objective was to foster the fullest support for the conservative government and 
its policies, whilst the second was to diligently seek out communists within the trade 
union movement and expel them. One expedient for facilitating this latter endeavour 
was that it was held that any worker who refused association with the FKTU 
automatically identified his, or her, self as, at best, a leftist sympathiser or, at worst, an 
outright communist, and was, therefore, ripe for persecution. 
Conflict between Chung Pyong on the left and the FKTU on the right was 
inevitable, and it could be argued that, taking into account the level of governmental 
and capital support being afforded to the FKTU, the outcome was also inevitable. 
Matters came to a head when Chung Pyong called for widespread industrial action in 
October, 1946, and the FKTU stepped in and brokered a successful settlement 
(Rauenhorst, 1990, Kim Yoon-hwan, 1985). From that moment on, membership of 
Chung Pyong began to decrease, although the organisation continued to make every 
effort to foment industrial unrest in an attempt to destabilise the political order. In 
March, 1947, the few remaining committed members of Chung Pyong went 
underground after formal proscription by the AMG, and the organisation was finally 
disbanded in 1949. The field was then left clear for the FKTU. 
When the Republic of Korea was established in August, 1948, the FKTU 
became the only organisation in South Korea nominally representative of the entire 
trade union movement. Korean labour took its place for the first time on the 
international stage when, in December, 1949, representatives of the FKTU attended the 
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inaugural congress of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in London 
(Park Young-ki 1969). 
However, with the demise of Chung Pyong, the usefulness to the state of the 
FKTU as a militant anti-communist agency declined, and the leadership of the FKTU 
had to look elsewhere for a primary objective to justify governmental patronage. The 
first, and most worthy, objective might have been to transform the FKTU into an 
institution dedicated to the furtherance of the interests of its grassroots members, but 
this was unlikely. Central and provincial government had grown accustomed to their 
supervisory roles where trade union matters were concerned and were unwilling to 
disrupt what had proven to be a convenient and effective status quo. Conversely, the 
unilateral relationship between government and the FKTU that had existed from the 
beginning resulted in the leaders of the FKTU being dependent upon government 
patronage. The prospect of opening up lines of meaningful communication between 
themselves and their members, and even confronting the government with workers' 
demands, was entirely alien to them. Nevertheless, between 1948 and 1950, tentative 
internal moves which had the support of the rank and file membership were made to 
introduce what, in the context of the time, represented a radical shift in philosophy; a 
shift that was aimed at distancing the FKTU from direct political control and instituting 
avenues of dialogue with the grass-roots (Park Young-ki, 1969). 
The outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950 brought chaos to the peninsula 
in general and the FKTU in particular. Genuine efforts to engineer philosophical reform 
were brought to an abrupt halt whilst, in their stead, internecine squabbles intensified 
between those who remained unflinchingly loyal to Rhee Seung-man's Liberal Party 
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and the minority who favoured continuing to explore the `new' philosophy. The 
increasing discord among the leadership broke into open conflict in December, 1951, 
when one faction of the FKTU leadership supported the employer, 2 whilst the other 
faction gave its allegiance to the workers, in a dispute at the Chosun Textile Company 
in the city of Pusan. The incident ended in defeat for the pro-worker faction in the 
FKTU leadership and the loss of their jobs. It was also a defeat for the Chosun workers, 
600 of whom were dismissed (Whang Duk-young, quoted in Park Young-ki, 1969). 
Between 1954 and 1960 the FKTU, with support from the Rhee administration, 
succeeded in restoring its membership to pre-Korean War levels. The degree of 
attachment to the ruling party, and the extent to which the FKTU had become more 
overtly political, was evidenced in December, 1955 when, without consultation with 
any of its affiliate members, the FKTU actually became part of Rhee's Liberal Party. 
Leading figures in the FKTU hierarchy were appointed ex-officio members of the 
party's Central Committee (Kim Yoon-hwan, 1985; Park Young-ki, 1969). The linkage 
between state and trade union federation was now complete; the FKTU was an arm of 
government, and any deviation from the party-line in matters connected with industrial 
relations was out of the question. 
Just how unprincipled and opportunist were the leaders of the FKTU was 
amply demonstrated in April, 1960 when, after a student revolt had ousted the Rhee 
Seung-man regime, the FKTU called an extraordinary meeting of the executive board 
and issued a statement of support for the revolutionaries and a declaration that all ties to 
the Liberal Party had been severed (Park Young-ki, 1969). The FKTU's shift of 
allegiance to the Democratic Party of Chang Myon was not to be tested to any great 
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extent because, after just one year, South Korea's very first experiment with 
parliamentary democracy was terminated abruptly by the military coup led by General 
Park Chung-hee. The interregnum had, though, been of sufficient duration to allow the 
internal squabbles and petty jealousies, which had long characterised the FKTU 
executive, to rise to the surface yet again. In November, 1960, after six months of 
wrangling, the executive fell into disarray when some delegates walked out because of 
disagreements over nominations for the leadership (Park Young-ki, 1969). Premier 
Chang Myon's troubled time in office had also been long enough for the FKTU to 
demonstrate its collective inexperience and incompetence. With deep-rooted corruption 
and institutional disorder being the only legacies of the Rhee era, with inflation and 
unemployment rising rapidly, and with social confusion and uncertainty ever widening, 
an independent, well-intentioned, and determined trade union organisation could have 
helped restore social cohesion and national stability. This, however, was beyond the 
capability of the FKTU. 
Among the first measures taken by Park Chung-hee's Supreme Council for 
National Reconstruction following the 16 May coup was the dismantling of all political 
and social institutions, including trade unions. As far as the FKTU was concerned, 
Park's intention was clear from the outset: deconstruct the organisation and then 
reconstruct it as an `umbrella' institution fully supportive of the regime's industrial and 
labour policies, whose primary objective was to help to achieve and maintain a high- 
output/low-cost, and passive, workforce. Reference is made below to the means by 
which the Korean Central Intelligence Agency ensured that the reconstructed FKTU 
was equipped to fulfil Park's intentions. It became a compliant trade union movement 
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composed of national, industrial-level trade unions, of which the NTWU was but one of 
seventeen. 
8.2 Korean Trade Unionism In The 1970's 
In an exposition that translates directly to the circumstances extant in Korea 
during the 1960's and 1970's, Gospel and Palmer (1993) describe the existence of 
`sweetheart' unions, known in Korea as `oyong', or `yellow', unions: 
In some countries employee institutions have been established and shaped 
by government action. Where this has been the case, as in former 
Communist and in some Third World countries, unions usually follow 
administrative or industrial structures as laid down by government. Such 
unions provide governments with channels of communication and 
consultation with employees and are often used in attempts to mobilise 
worker support for government policy. Lesser degrees of government 
influence may occur if, rather than forming or reshaping unions, legislation 
is passed to license or permit only those unions that conform to certain 
specifications in terms of their objectives or methods of operation..... 
Employee institutions may also be established by employers..... They are 
rarely intended to do more than inform management of staff views before 
decisions are taken, and the typical staff association does not have the right 
or the necessary sanctions seriously to challenge managerial decisions. 
Institutions of this type are resented by independent trade unions, on the 
grounds that they were formed as part of a managerial strategy to prevent 
the spread of real trade unionism and thereby to protect managerial 
prerogatives (Gospel and Palmer, 1993). 
According to figures published in the Korea Annual 1973, the total number of 
employed persons eligible to join a trade union as of 31 August, 1971 was fractionally 
in excess of two million. 3 Of this number, 504,624; that is 25.2% of the total eligible, 
were actually members of a trade union. By August, 1976, trade union membership had 
increased to 823,130, although this represented an increase of only 0.1% of the total 
eligible to join, which had risen to over three and a quarter million in the same period 
(Korea Annual 1977). 
202 
Almost immediately after the leadership of the military coup succeeded in 
overthrowing the nascent administration of Chang Myon in May, 1961, Park Chung- 
hee commenced what he referred to as `resolute surgery' on the body politic of South 
Korea (Park Chung-hee, 1962). A major component of the operation was the complete 
restructuring of the trade union organisation. Park set about dissolving the more than 
one thousand registered local and national trade union organisations in existence in 
April, 1961 (Park Young-ki, 1969) and replacing this chaotic, fragmented, and largely 
unregulated scene with what might well appear, on the surface, to have been an ideal 
form of union structure. In reality, however, the structure Park put in place 
circumscribed the conventional interpretation of legitimate trade union activity, leaving 
the trade unions themselves solely dependent upon the continuing favour of the Park 
regime. 
At the apex of the newly constituted industrial relations pyramid was the 
reshaped FKTU, which was administered by an executive committee made up of nine 
men, each one hand-picked by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) (FKTU 
Report, 1979). The nine placemen underwent a two-week special education programme 
conducted by the KCIA during which it was impressed upon them that: 
Participation in the FKTU was the duty of all patriotic labourers. Those who 
refused were to be considered as communists or collaborators of the left 
wing. From the earliest stage it was known that the FKTU had two 
purposes: to organise support for the conservative policies of the 
government, and to eliminate communists from the industrialised society 
(Park Young-ki, 1979). 
The FKTU was the only legal organisation able to co-ordinate trade union 
activity throughout the country, and this study will show that the driving imperatives of 
members of its executive committee were, first and foremost, to adhere slavishly to the 
dictates of the state and, second, to further their own individual ends. In practical terms, 
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the FKTU's role was to relay government policy down to the national-level unions, and 
to filter out as much as possible all adverse representation from those same subordinate 
institutions. 
Seventeen national-level trade unions formed the next stage in the hierarchy, 
and they ranged from the two largest, the National Automobile Workers Union and the 
National Textile Workers Union, down to the two smallest, the National Printing 
Workers Union and the National Tourist Service Workers Union. The means of 
selecting the leaders of each of these industrial trade unions was similar to that 
employed in the staffing of the FKTU executive committee; that is, they were all men, 
and they could all demonstrate affinity with the political and industrial policies of Park 
Chung-hee. In all, thirty men were nominated by the KCIA to form the seventeen 
national-level unions and, in company with the nine members of the FKTU executive 
committee, were afforded a one-week indoctrination course at KCIA headquarters. Not 
only were these `representatives of the workers' selected and trained by the agents of 
Park Chung-hee, they were also paid substantial monthly retainers by the state 
(American Friendship Charity Committee Field Research Report 1978). In accordance 
with the Labour Union Law enacted by the Park regime, it was mandatory for all 
national-level unions to be affiliated to the FKTU, and affiliation meant compliance. 
Beneath the national-level unions the structure bifurcated into branch-level and 
regional-level. Branch-level unions could be formed within companies which employed 
more than one thousand workers, whereas companies with smaller workforces were 
eligible to combine at regional level. According to figures promulgated by the FKTU 
(FKTU Report, 1979), the 417 branch unions registered in 1970 had increased to 533 in 
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1979, whereas the 3,628 unions affiliated to regional-level unions in 1970 had grown to 
4,392 unions by 1979. In accord with the procedures adopted at the higher levels, 
selection of regional and branch leaders was restricted to conservative males already 
located either in workplace management or other supervisory positions, despite the 
prodigious numerical dominance of women over men in the textile and garment, and 
electronics assembly, industries. This restriction precluded even the consideration of a 
female as union leader at branch or regional level. 
Article 3(5) of the Labour Union statute ordained that only one union would be 
permitted in each enterprise or industry, while Article 13 required all unions to register 
with the authorities and gain approval before recognition would be afforded. Tight 
control from the outset by the national-level leadership over their regional and branch 
subsidiaries was ensured by the necessity for formal applications for union recognition 
to be countersigned by a national-level officer. Furthermore, this national-level 
representative was required to have actively participated in the formation of the new 
applicant union. External control did not end with approval for registration being 
granted; detailed procedural instructions continued to flow from national to regional and 
branch levels, each of which was required to submit daily reports of all activity to 
national level. The administrative structure in place empowered national-level 
representatives to intervene and take control of all collective bargaining, election, and 
dispute procedures. Any recalcitrance at local level was greeted with temporary 
suspension of recognition whilst a `re-examination' of the on-site leadership was 
conducted by the KCIA. The outcome was that any independent action at local level 
was strictly proscribed by national-level rules and procedures. 
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Ostensibly, and setting aside the fact that no women were permitted to be 
involved, a situation within which all trade unions were bound together under a single 
federation banner, and with a two-way line of communication between grassroots union 
members and the Ministry of Labour Affairs that was uncluttered, rational, and direct, 
should have greatly facilitated a well-focused and effective pursuance of worker 
interest. In practice, however, and unquestionably by design, what should have been a 
channel of representation for workers was nothing more than a `top-down' chain of 
command. Union leaders at all levels were appointed by the state, which issued 
mandatory directives to the FKTU. The FKTU charter gave it complete control over the 
seventeen national-level industrial unions which, in turn, exercised statutory powers 
over regional and branch-levels. Systematic legislative rationalisation had transformed a 
national labour force made up of a huge number of disparate organisations into a unified 
and regimented extension of government within which the opportunity and facility for 
fair worker representation was non-existent. A critique of Soviet trade unions is 
apposite in reference to their counterparts in the South Korea of the 1960's and 1970's: 
.... their role was at 
best an advisory one, and more often was merely to 
rubber-stamp proposals drawn up unilaterally by the administration 
(Fairbrother and Clarke, 1994). 
A fitting conclusion to this overview of the trade union situation in Korea is 
provided by four examples of the propensity of the Park Chung-hee regime to intervene 
in trade union affairs. Of greater significance, however, these examples also illustrate 
an underlying, and growing, opposition to the machinations of an authoritarian 
bureaucracy. The first three examples are taken from the field research document 
compiled by the American Friendship Charity Committee in 1978 referred to above. 
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Example 1 
The periodic election of union leaders was of particular interest to the 
government and although it was expedient to preserve at least the facade of democratic 
process, the KCIA was, nevertheless, almost invariably able to achieve its desired ends 
by behind the scenes chicanery. The National United Workers Union (NUWU) was the 
fifth largest national-level union in South Korea, catering for a wide variety of worker 
specification; its members ranging from street cleaners to security guards and apartment 
janitors. Due to the amorphous nature of the organisation, both in geographical 
disposition and job specialisation, it was difficult for the KCIA to maintain as close a 
degree of supervision over its conduct as was possible with the other, more `tightly 
structured', national-level unions (Research document, Japanese Textile Workers 
Union, 1979). Thus, in 1967, the majority of NUWU workers voted for Kim Marl-yong 
to be their new president. Kim had long been an outspoken opponent of government 
industrial policies as well as a vociferous advocate of FKTU reform. Greatly 
disconcerted by this turn of events, the FKTU immediately declared the election 
unconstitutional and suspended all union activities. For the next nineteen months, 
during which time the NUWU remained in suspension, Kim Marl-yong and his 
associates fought a battle of attrition with the FKTU. Finally tiring of the impasse, the 
KCIA ordered in a gang of thugs who physically evicted Kim and his followers from 
their offices. They were replaced by a group more in sympathy with the wishes of the 
state. 
Example 2 
Kim Marl-yong appeared again in 1971 when he offered himself as a candidate 
for president of the FKTU. In the decade since its reformation by Park Chung-hee, the 
FKTU had been confronted by increasing opposition from the growing number of 
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unions affiliated to it, organisations large and small which were becoming restless and 
dissatisfied with the level of control exercised from above. The KCIA was aware that 
the leaders of four national-level unions were seriously considering throwing their 
support behind Kim Marl-yong, and there was a degree of uncertainty with regard to the 
way some of the remaining leaders might vote if others took the initiative. It was clearly 
not the time for finesse, and agents of the KCIA simply `persuaded' the four dissidents 
not to attend the meeting at which votes would be cast, and the `problem' was solved. 
In the absence of those who might have been principled enough to make a stand, those 
leaders who were permitted to attend fell meekly into line. 
Example 3 
The next election for president of the FKTU took place in 1976, by which time 
it was clear that the KCIA had learned from the previous unsettling event and was 
determined to take no chances. The agency itself nominated four candidates, in a 
pretence of providing actual choice, and prevented the proposal of any other candidates. 
One week prior to the election two of the nominees were ordered to withdraw and, on 
the day of the election itself, one of the remaining candidates, Kim Yi-sam, was 
instructed to stand down in favour of the eventual winner, Chung Dong-ho, the leader of 
the National Chemical Workers Union. From beginning to end the positioning of the 
most senior figure in the South Korean labour movement had been overtly, and 
successfully, engineered by agents of the state. 
Example 4 
On 20 January, 1979, delegates from the National Printing Workers Union, 
representative of some ten thousand print workers, convened to hold a ballot on a 
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proposal of `no confidence' in their president. Dissatisfied with the incumbent, Han Te- 
soo, who had demonstrated almost preternatural acquiescence to the whim of Park 
Chung-hee, the delegates voted by 22 votes to 12 for his removal. Soo Yon-kwan, the 
KCIA agent responsible for ensuring the `smooth running' of the print workers union, 
and who normally remained in the background, leapt to the podium and berated the 
assembly for its shameful behaviour. How dare they criticise publicly their exemplary 
leader; furthermore, did they not understand that a vote for the removal of an incumbent 
president required a majority in favour of at least two to one? Thus, not only was the 
assembly guilty of disgraceful behaviour in the casting of aspersions upon Han Te-soo, 
but the vote of 22 to 12 fell short of the necessary majority by 0.6. The incumbent 
president should continue in office, and there should be no repeat of such action. 
(Research document, Japanese Textile Workers Union, 1979). 
The first of the four examples quoted is indicative both of a relatively early 
attempt by predominantly male trade unionists to exercise some degree of democratic 
choice within their union fora. The arbitrary response to the possibility of an unfavoured 
candidate gaining office, the determined siege that was laid against him, and the ready 
willingness to publicly employ violence when all else had failed, is indicative of a 
regime seeking the ensure its control over trade unions. Although, as is shown in the 
second case, Kim Marl-yong himself continued bravely with his struggle against 
reactionary forces within the FKTU, the union leadership remained under the control of 
the KCIA. 
The second example is important for three reasons. First, it is symptomatic of 
the growing discontent among the national-level unions affiliated to the FKTU; a 
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measure of dissatisfaction that had become sufficiently pressing that some of them 
would dare to even consider overtly attacking the federation hierarchy. Second, it 
underlines the extent and the efficiency of the KCIA intelligence network that 
permeated every level of Korean society, including the labour movement; and third, it 
suggests perhaps the beginning of a slight reduction in the degree of confidence felt by 
the state in its ability to continue to exercise the fullest control over the trade unions. 
Faced with a weakening of its control over the voting behaviour of the national-level 
union leaders must have given the regime some cause for concern, and lent added 
impetus to the formulation of the oppressive Yushin reforms which were to be 
implemented in the following year. 
The third example took place some four years into the period dominated by the 
Yushin model of economic, social, and industrial management, and clearly illustrates 
the fulfilment of Park Chung-hee's determination to re-impose his will upon the 
organisation of the Korean labour force. The old hubris has returned and the way 
control over the list of candidates was exercised, and the subsequent conduct of the 
election, confirmed that the KCIA was in control from the outset; a classic case of 
centralised control negating the democratic process. 
The final example quoted offers something of a mixed signal. The final year of 
the lives of both the Yushin reforms and of Park Chung-hee himself has begun, 
although no-one could have been aware of that at the time. Repression of labour 
organisations, and the arrogance of the KCIA, had reached such levels that it was not, 
as would normally be the case, the chairman of the delegate's assembly who pointed out 
that the `no confidence' vote had been lost, but a KCIA agent. It was not necessary for 
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him to take this action, everyone knew that the motion was lost, albeit by the smallest of 
margins, and he could have remained quietly in the background satisfied that his 
master's will had been done. So confident was he of the invincible nature of his position 
by the beginning of 1979, and so disdainful of the trade unionists over whom he 
wielded such power, that he could arbitrarily take over control of the proceedings 
without compunction or reservation. And yet, at a time when the effects of punitive anti- 
democratic labour policies were at their height, the actions of the print workers' 
delegates, in initiating a revolt against a known `government man', is not only an 
indication of courage and determination, but can also be regarded as a suggestion of a 
growing confidence among the lower echelons of the union. In the same vein, it may 
well have been the case that the display of apparent hubris by Soo Yon-kwan, the KCIA 
agent, had as much to do with desperation and frustration as it did with arrogance and 
contempt. 
While these four examples cast some light on the processes of union control in 
the country during the 1960's and 1970's, it is also necessary to examine the situation in 
the textile and garment industry. For this, the examination turns to the National Textile 
Workers Union, a constituent union of the FKTU. During the 1970's the NTWU 
became the focus for resistance by women workers from the Peace Market and 
elsewhere. 
8.3 National Textile Workers Union: Structural Reorganisation 
Prior to 1961 there had been branch and regional-level unions in the textile and 
garment industry which were affiliated under the aegis of the Federation of Textile 
Unions. Immediately following the military coup, all these organisations were dissolved 
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to make way for the construction of Park's `ideal type' labour organisation for the 
textile and garment industry. Having selected and `educated' the nine labour leaders 
considered the most suitable to put into effect Park's plan for the FKTU, the KCIA 
instructed one of them, Kim Kang-soo, to organise branch unions in each of the 23 
largest textile companies, and to appoint local leaders for each one. By the beginning of 
August, 1961 these branch unions had all been formed, and on the 17 August the 
national body to oversee them was inaugurated as the National Textile Workers Union 
(NTWU). The first president of the NTWU was none other than Kim Kang-soo himself, 
and he was supported by an establishment consisting of a part-time vice-president, a 
full-time secretary, four departmental heads, and ten full-time office staff. 
Thus, the inextricable linkage between the head of state, the FKTU, the 
NTWU, and individual trade union branches in the garment and textile industry, was 
established. Park Chung-hee, through his nephew-in-law, Kim Jong-pil4, the founder of 
the KCIA, personally appointed the executive committee of the Federation of Korean 
Trade Unions. In turn, one member of that committee, Kim Kang-soo, appointed the 
leaders of every trade union branch in the 23 dominant textile companies, and was 
himself appointed president of the national textile union. When it is appreciated that it 
was economically imperative for Park Chung-hee to gain competitive advantage by 
presiding over a low-wage, tightly regimented workforce, it is difficult to conceive of a 
system more functionally guaranteed to facilitate the achievement of such an objective 
than the one described. As the logical corollary, it is also difficult to imagine a trade 
union structure less likely to attend to the interests and ambitions of its ill-fated 
members. 
212 
8.3.1 Park's Misjudgement 
Park Chung-hee carried through his reconstruction of the Korean trade union 
organisation in the early 1960's, and routinely tightened labour legislation throughout 
the almost two decades of his stewardship. However, it might be considered anomalous 
that, for all his self-confessed debt to social history, he appeared to pay little, if any, 
heed to the inevitability of the consequences of unremitting oppression. This was a 
nation, Park Chung-hee noted, in which: 
... organised political corruption and 
injustice [had] gradually permeated 
our way of living, [where] even upright and honest persons fell into the 
degenerate practice of pursuing personal gains once they were allowed to 
hold public office (Park Chung-hee, 1962). 
However, while Park Chung-hee pledged himself to the eradication of such collective 
malfeasance, it is somewhat paradoxical that the trade union structure which was so 
much his personal brainchild was characterised, from its beginning, as a hotbed of 
duplicity, intrigue, avarice, and unscrupulous opportunism. Nowhere was this 
circumstance more in evidence than in the garment and textile industry. 
The gulf, in both lifestyle and communication, between ordinary workers and 
the leadership of the NTWU could hardly have been wider, and was epitomised by the 
dilemma in which most women workers in the 1970's found themselves: 
Actually, one of the biggest problems for us in the 1970's was that we didn't 
really know who our enemy was. If you know who you are fighting it is 
easier to decide what your strategy should be. But in our case we were never 
quite sure whether it was the government, the factory owners, or the union 
leaders who were the cause of our troubles. We didn't know who to talk to 
or who to trust (Group discussion, women workers, January, 1999). 
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Some of the pre-eminent causes, and practical effects, of a workplace situation wherein 
trade union members were as suspicious of the partiality and bias of their own union 
leadership as they were of their employers will now be examined. 
In common with their counterparts world-wide, the dominant characteristic of 
employment for Korean manual workers in the 1970's, and the deciding factor in 
determining the quality of their lives, was the magnitude and purchasing power of the 
accessible wage. Working conditions which otherwise might have been regarded as 
unsustainable may have been bearable if the remuneration at the end of each month was 
sufficient to guarantee the continuing survival of self and dependants. Furthermore, 
harsh working conditions and long hours, concomitant with adequate earnings, may 
have been more tenable if the worker was able to appreciate that, first, the conditions 
were unavoidable and, hopefully, temporary; second, that by accepting the immediate 
circumstances the nation as a whole would benefit and progress to better things, and 
finally, that the `pain' was being equally distributed throughout the workforce. Beyond 
these fundamental considerations, however, there is a deeper implication. In a capitalist 
society the size of income, relative to that of others, is a tangible indicator of the degree 
to which the recipient is valued by that society. Thus, wage magnitude becomes a direct 
determinant of self-worth. Based upon the aforementioned considerations, women 
workers in the Korean textile and garment industry of the 1970's lost out on every 
count. 
A corollary of the detailed exposition in the previous chapter of wages earned 
in the textile and garment industry and the purchasing power those wages accessed, is 
the income disparity across the breadth of the Korean National Textile Workers Union 
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membership. According to research conducted by the Amalgamated Clothing and 
Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) of the USA, the President of the NTWU in the mid- 
1970's, Kim Young-tae (see below), was paid an annual salary of 5,400,000 won; equal 
to just over $US 11,000 (ACTWU, 1979). In addition, he occupied salaried positions as 
chairperson of the Pusan Textile Union Council and the FKTU Pusan Regional Council; 
each of which provided a personal limousine. One of the thousands of shidas in the 
Peace Market, and a member of Kim Young-tae's union, would have considered herself 
fortunate to have earned 100,000 won, $US206, after a year in which she would have 
worked a minimum of 340 days5 (Interviews, ex-shidas, January, 1999). It could not be 
regarded as unreasonable for such an impoverished and over-worked young girl to 
expect at least a modicum of sympathy and support from the leader of her union, who 
was receiving, in addition to numerous `perks', in excess of fifty-five times the wage 
she was getting, part of which was made up by her own subscription. 
From the point of view of the likely support that workers in the industry might 
expect to receive from their trade union representatives, the decade did not have a 
propitious beginning. On 6 December, 1971, Park Chung-hee declared a State of 
National Emergency, ostensibly as a response to increasing domestic and foreign 
tension, but also as a prelude to the inauguration of the Fourth Republic (Ha Bong-gyu, 
1989). 6 Included in the emergency provisions were the banning of the exercise of 
collective bargaining and participation in collective action. Trade union reaction was 
immediate and unequivocal: 
We welcome and fully support the declaration of a State of Emergency 
with all our hearts. We believe that our top priority is to help the 
government to establish a strong state and strong economic growth. Trade 
union interests will come later. Without our nation there will be no trade 
union (FKTU Annual Report, 1972). 
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This document was signed by Bai Sang-ho, President of the FKTU, and the presidents 
of all 17 national-level trade unions, in December, 1971. 
On October 17,1972, a State of Martial Law was proclaimed, the Constitution 
was suspended, the National Assembly dissolved, freedoms of speech and assembly 
were revoked, and all political activities banned. These draconian measures were to 
pave the way for the Yushin reforms, the succession of radical legislation that would 
both legitimise Park Chung-hee's lifetime presidency and take the repression of workers 
to new depths. Apparently oblivious to the waves of public outrage and large scale 
protests taking place throughout their country, the same trade union signatories to the 
previously mentioned document felt able to append their names and, by implication, 
those of all of their members to another encomium: 
We offer the positive support of 500,000 organised and determined 
workers for President Park Chung-hee's prompt and decisive declaration of 
the October Yushin Constitution (FKTU Annual Report, 1973). 
Park Chung-hee's five year economic plans, the first of which was 
implemented in 1962, each heralded increasing hardship for workers in all industries 
and a diminution of the instruments of worker representation: at the same time, 
however, integral components of these plans reinforced the status and security of tenure 
of the leaders of trade unions. In 1974, for example, legislation was introduced which 
extended from two years to three years the fixed term in office of union leaders, and 
which also included measures designed to make it more difficult for union members to 
express a lack of confidence in their leadership. Under the amended rule at least two- 
thirds of the mandated representatives of the entire membership needed to be present 
when a vote was taken, and the majority in favour of removal of the leader had to be at 
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least two to one (Korea Annual 1975). The combined effect of these factors was to 
encourage national-level leaders to become even more beholden to the state, make them 
feel more secure in their authoritarianism, and remove from them the last vestiges of 
any sense of responsibility or duty to their membership. Cumulative legislation also 
weakened the position of branch-level unions vis-ä-vis their ability to challenge, or even 
moderate, decisions made at national-level, thereby markedly reducing the extent to 
which branch unions could attend in any meaningful way to the interests of their 
members. They became little more than obedient extensions of the national 
organisations, and the inevitable consequence was a further widening of the gulf, and an 
increase in the distrust, between the leadership of both national and branch levels and 
the grassroots membership. 
The exclusively male dominated trade union structure, allied with its 
repeatedly demonstrated inability and/or disinclination to engage with management on 
behalf of grass-roots members, provided a signal lesson to the majority of textile and 
garment workers; that is, women. Learning from each successive abrogation of duty and 
responsibility on the part of their union leadership, women workers became increasingly 
aware that the only hope for salvation lay in their own hands. What is of particular 
interest in this context, and certainly worthy of a separate study, is the fact that 
although male workers in the industry were in the minority, the number of shiaggaes 
and obarokus working in the Peace Market, for example, was both significant and, apart 
from substantially higher rates of pay, subject to working conditions similar to those 
endured by women. Yet despite this apparent comparability of circumstances, the 
preparedness of these men to ally themselves with the initiatives taken by their female 
co-workers was notable by its absence. 
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Awareness of gross social injustice is, alone, insufficient to motivate social 
revolution. As Karl Marx wrote in the New York Tribune on 2 February, 1854, in 
anticipation of a proletarian uprising throughout Europe: "A signal only is wanted,..... " 
(Quoted in Wheen, 1999). For the women workers in the Korean textile and garment 
industry that signal came in the form of Chun Tae-il's self-immolation on 13 November, 
1970. Just two weeks later, on 27 November, 1970, the Chonggye Garment Workers 
Union was formed - by women (Chonggye Garment Workers Union Annual Report 
1971). In February, 1972, the Dong-il Textile Company branch union elected a woman 
leader; the first woman to take over an already established union (Dong-il Textile 
Branch Union Report 1985), and in the same year, on 17 August, the female 
membership of Won-pung Textile Company branch union disassociated themselves 
from the `oyong' philosophy that had previously held sway in the company and 
formally adopted an `independent' line (Ten Years of a Democratic Trade Union, Won- 
pung Textile Branch Union, 1988). On 15 April, 1974, the Ban-do Textile Company 
branch union was formed - by women (Unpublished minutes, Ban-do Inaugural 
Meeting, 1974) and on 10 May, 1975, women combined to found the YH Wig and 
Garment Company textile branch union (History of the YH Textile Branch Union, 
1984). 
In 1972, the year of the introduction of the Yushin Constitution, the registered 
number of labour disputes stood at 452; by 1979, the year in which Park Chung-hee 
was assassinated, they had increased to 2,039 (KDI Report, 1980). 8 The majority of 
this escalating number of industrial actions had working conditions as the primary 
cause, and one example is offered as being typical of the remainder. The example also 
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underscores the fact that, although women workers had established the exemplar for 
independent and democratic trade union organisation as early as November, 1970, 
neither the state, the employers, nor the male dominated `oyong' trade unions were 
prepared to countenance with equanimity such female usurpation. 
In 1976, some six years after the formation of the Chonggye Union, the 
Pangnim Textile Company, one of Korea's largest firms, employed approximately six 
thousand workers, more than 80% of whom were women (Choi Jang-jip, 1989). To 
add to what was an already extremely harsh working situation, this spinning and 
weaving company introduced a requirement for all workers to `donate' up to one hour 
of extra work, unpaid, every morning: it was the final straw. Fully aware that their 
branch union was all-male, unsympathetic to their plight, and powerless anyway to 
intervene on their behalf, 9 the women workers assembled a petition, signed by ten 
thousand fellow employees in the industry and members of the general public, and 
delivered it to the factory management and the Ministry of Labour Affairs. The petition 
included the following statements: 
We have no time off, the night shift is too much and we are exhausted. We 
are given pills to keep us awake and some of us have taken so many that we 
are addicted to them. If we fall asleep we are reprimanded and beaten. We 
are ashamed to say that often we cannot go to the toilet and so use the 
factory floor. The machines never stop. We work continuously throughout 
the year and get very little time off. When special public holidays come we 
want to visit our parents, but we must work by our machines. It is a crime 
that workers cannot fulfil their filial duty to their parents. Animals have a 
rest time, why must we work harder than animals? (Quoted in Ogle, 1990) 
In the dark shadows of this pride and glory, we women workers, young and 
weak, have for too long worked too hard and experienced too much pain. 
Our one reason for working is to help our poor parents. We want to wear a 
student's uniform, but instead we have left our beautiful homes in the 
country and have come to the strange surroundings of Seoul to work in a 
factory. We came to earn money, but it has been more difficult than we 
thought possible (Asian Labour magazine, 1976). 
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The two main requests submitted by the women workers were for payment of 
all outstanding overtime wages and a reduction in working hours. Whilst they were 
obviously fully aware of the events as they unfolded, the branch-level and national-level 
union leadership were content merely to stand by and allow matters to take their 
course. 1° When the company refused to consider the requests, the women declared 
strike action. All too conscious of the financial implications for their already low paid 
workers, the company made a token offer after a few days, which the impoverished 
women were obliged to accept. At least they had made a stand independent of their 
branch union and had won some concession from management - they thought. 
Unbeknown to the women activists, however, the KCIA and the police had been 
maintaining a watching brief and were biding their time before taking action. Shortly 
after work at the factory resumed, the police arrived and arrested all those women who 
were thought to have been instrumental in the action: they were interrogated at length 
and dismissed from the company (Asian Labour magazine, 1976). 
The escalating number of disputes in which women played leading roles gave 
the FKTU and the NTWU much cause for concern as the 1970's progressed, and the 
lack of judgement and understanding that these organisations had demonstrated all too 
clearly in the previous decade came to the fore yet again. The predominant line taken by 
both the state and the `oyong' organisation leadership was succinctly enunciated in a 
publication, alluded to previously in Chapter Three, written by an ex-KCIA agent who 
had been seconded to the FKTU and tasked with `re-educating' workers: 
First, it is part of the female nature to be far more susceptible than men to 
the supposedly humanitarian appeal of communist and religion-based labour 
reform organisations. Lacking the capacity for logical thought and moral 
judgement, women are unable to distinguish between right and wrong, truth 
and falsehood; they are easy prey for articulate and persuasive demagogues. 
Second, the congenital sentimentality, especially of young girls, draws them 
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inexorably toward group situations where they can find comfort in numbers, 
and preclude the development of individuality and self-respect. At the same 
time, women are far more vain than men, and are driven to seek higher 
wages simply by the desire to have more money to spend upon themselves 
and upon their appearance (Hong Ji-young, 1977). 
This short extract from his writings, which formed the basis of a series of 
seminars held throughout the country, reflects precisely the Confucian view of the 
inherent character of women, the overt chauvinism that pervaded Korean society and, 
perhaps most important of all, in the context of this study, the conviction that external, 
subversive, and male, forces were manipulating intellectually and emotionally 
inadequate women for their own, anti-establishment, ends. 
Propaganda of this ilk might well be considered as crude, simplistic, and 
transparent in the extreme, yet it was to be easily outstripped by more robust measures 
adopted by the FKTU in that organisation's attempt to curb the ever more troublesome 
women. On 10 January, 1978, a directive was issued by the FKTU requiring each 
national-level union to organise `action squads' of between 100 and 200 men. The 
recruits should all be trained in martial arts and were to be specifically tasked to use as 
much physical violence as necessary to suppress any local union which posed a threat to 
national-level authority. Additionally, smaller numbers of `top secret' agents should be 
recruited and trained to infiltrate the local organisations and identify the leading 
dissidents. With, presumably, unintended irony, the initiative was entitled the 
Programme for Improving the Working Environment (Report in "Labour Unity", 
January, 1979, published by the ACGWU, USA, and interviews with Dong-il workers 
and UIM members, November 1998 - April 1999). 
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For its part, the NTWU followed the instructions from the FKTU to the letter, 
and the NTWU president, Kim Young-tae, issued the following warning: 
.... 
if branch unions cannot handle their members I will mobilise the Action 
Squads of all the unions to pull the roots out myself. And if any workers 
continue to have any connections with religious Christians I will order the 
Action Squads to tear them apart, even if I have to destroy the houses of 
ministers or priests, or churches or cathedrals, to do it (American Friendship 
Charity Committee Field Research Report, 1978). 
True to his word, Kim Young-tae ordered in a 200 strong squad to intimidate 
and harass workers in the Dong-il Textile Company (see below) prior to elections for 
union officers scheduled for 21 February, 1978 and, on the morning of the election, to 
smash the ballot boxes and smear with human excrement the women workers when they 
arrived to cast their votes. 
As clear expression of the national-level concern that physical violence alone 
might not succeed in quelling `troublesome' branches which, it was asserted, were being 
increasingly influenced by externally inspired women workers, the NTWU took steps to 
tighten its regulatory grip on the branches. On 23 January, 1978, Kim Young-tae called 
a special meeting, which he chaired, at which he ruled that all limitations placed upon 
the National Executive Committee to declare a branch as being a `problem union' were 
to be removed forthwith. " In future, the NTWU would be empowered to void any 
action taken by branch unions, expel without recourse to appeal the officers of the 
branch, and assume direct control of all branch business. Present at the meeting was 
Pang Yong-suk, President of Won-pung Textile branch union, and one of the few male 
trade unionists who did empathise with the plight of the female members of his union. 
Also present were the women leaders of Ban-do Textile and YH Wig and Garment 
branch unions. Having given voice to their disquiet about both the legality and the 
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morality of this blatant attempt to deprive the branches of their last vestiges of authority 
and influence, Pang and the two women were promptly ordered to leave the meeting 
(Interview, Pang Yong-suk, March, 2000). 
Because it was deemed that her status did not merit inclusion, Lee Chong-gak, 
the chairperson of Dong-il Textile branch union, was forbidden to attend Kim Young- 
tae's meeting, nevertheless, there can be little doubt that she was one of the main 
targets of the NTWU's initiatives (Interview, former NTWU officer, February, 1999). 
One month after the meeting, on 25 February, 1978, the NTWU Executive Committee 
put the new regulations into practice. They charged Lee Chong-gak and the women 
leaders of Ban-do and YH with instigating labour disputes and distributing leaflets 
critical of the NTWU and company management; declared their branches as `problems' 
and, on 6 March, expelled all three, in company with Pang Yong-suk of the Won-pung 
branch, from the NTWU (NTWU Report 1978 cited in ACGWU Report 1978, and 
Dong-il Textile Branch Union, 1985). 
The extent to which the NTWU and company management were by now 
working so closely together was amply illustrated by the fact that, having rid themselves 
of the female leader of their fractious labour force, the owners of Dong-il Textiles 
immediately set about dismissing all those whom they suspected of being `subversive'. 
One hundred and twenty-six women were sacked on 2 April, with the active collusion 
of the NTWU. Indeed, on the very next day Kim Young-tae drew up a `blacklist' of all 
126 dismissed women, including home addresses and government registration numbers, 
and circulated it to all textile companies and union branches in Korea with a warning 
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that none of the persons so named should be employed again in the industry (Quoted in 
a letter from the dismissed workers to the ACTWU, dated 3 November, 1978). 
The relationship between the NTWU and the owners of Dong-il Textiles was 
not only very close, it was also shown to be deeply corrupt. As was subsequently 
revealed, the break-up of the independent union by the national-level leadership was 
actually funded by the company. Seven million won, approximately $US 14,500, was 
donated by the company to finance the operation and, in an attempt to disguise its 
source, was channelled through the accounts of a number of NTWU branch unions. 
Additionally, and as a gesture of appreciation for his efforts on the company's behalf, 
Kim Young-tae was rewarded with a `bonus' of six million won (ACTWU Report, 
1978). 
Whilst it is not intended to focus too acutely upon one single personality, it is, 
nevertheless, considered that Kim Young-tae was, in many regards, the epitome of 
Korean male trade union leadership, and a personification of the magnitude and nature 
of the obstacles which women activists had to overcome in their quest for recognition, 
respect, and fair treatment in the workplace. The matter of his election to the presidency 
of the NTWU in July, 1976, is a case in point. The body supervising the election was 
the government's Joint Labour Policy Council, made up of representatives of the 
Ministry of Labour Affairs and the FKTU. However, behind the scenes, as in all areas 
connected with labour and trade unionism, lay the shadow of the KCIA (American 
Friendship Charity Committee Field Research Report, 1978). 
In his application statement submitted to the Council, Kim pledged that: 
224 
If I am elected as president of the NTWU I will follow all instructions from 
the Council. I promise that under my leadership all concerned authorities; 
government officials, police in charge of labour affairs, and the KCIA, will 
be invited to all assemblies of the NTWU, while union members who are 
not official delegates will be excluded. I also promise that I will follow the 
instructions of concerned government authorities in granting or not granting 
voting and speaking rights to delegates from branch unions which have been 
designated as problem unions (ACTWU Report, 1978). 
Evidently impressed with his application and credentials, the KCIA took the 
necessary steps to ensure the appropriate result. On the day of the election, four union 
delegates who were known to oppose Kim's candidature were arbitrarily denied voting 
rights, while eight of his supporters, none of whom were technically qualified to vote, 
were given permission so to do. Kim Young-tae was elected by the narrowest of 
margins and proceeded to fulfil the promises he had made to the government (Interview, 
former NTWU officer, December, 1998). 
In retrospect, and when all circumstances are taken into account, it was 
inevitable that conflict between national-level and branch-level unions in the textile and 
garment industry would both begin and escalate. In a workplace dominated numerically 
by women, but governed in all aspects by men, the first ingredient for potential 
confrontation is in place. When this circumstance is reinforced by deeply ingrained 
social and cultural prejudices, heavily weighted in favour of the perpetuation of male 
superiority, and when those prejudices are underpinned by a state regime that embraces 
and encourages all the most exploitative endeavours of self-regarding capital, the 
outcome is almost certain. The final, and most telling, prerequisite for guaranteeing 
industrial strife is when the structures entrusted and funded by workers to represent their 
best interests and protect them from abuse renege upon those trusts and, instead, 
become the main enemy. 
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8.4 International Reaction 
Note has already been made in this chapter that the FKTU valued its 
association with the international trade union movement, and had been formally 
recognised since 1949. Such recognition and acceptance became of vital importance 
after the military coup of 1961, and Park Chung-hee's subsequent concentration on 
industrial expansion and an export-oriented economy. As manufacturing output 
increased, so did the imperative to nurture and develop overseas markets. Any 
indication of infringements of human rights and exploitation of the labour force by the 
producer nation would have impeded this development and had, therefore, to be 
avoided. Additionally, and as has been alluded to elsewhere in this study, Park Chung- 
hee made much of the skilled, compliant, and turbulence-free characteristics of the 
Korean workforce in his wooing of foreign investors in general, and in his attempts to 
reassure American and Japanese capital, in particular. In other words, if the truth about 
working conditions, and the abject failure of the Korean trade union organisation in its 
duty to Korean workers were to gain credence abroad, the repercussions on trade could 
be severe. What is more, it must always be borne in mind that, in the final analysis, the 
legitimacy of the Park Chung-hee regime hinged quintessentially upon economic 
success. Failure to become economically self-sustaining would mean failure to become 
militarily independent, the lynch-pin of Park's `strength through growth' appeal to the 
Korean nation. 
A key dimension of the Park Chung-hee policy on economic growth was to 
secure the position and place of the textile and garment industry. As has been noted, 
during the 1970's women workers began to challenge the dominant leadership of the 
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NTWU and the policies pursued by that leadership. In an attempt to counter these 
developments, the NTWU leadership made efforts to present the labour situation as one 
of harmony, at least internally. The problem for the NTWU leadership and the Park 
Chung-hee regime was that sections of the international press began to report and 
publicise the situation of women textile and garment workers, as well as their attempts 
at challenging the dominant union in the industry. 
As indicated, Korean women workers were all too aware of the shortcomings 
of their `official' trade union representation from the late 1960's onwards. Furthermore, 
in the absence of any meaningful representation in Korea, they became increasingly 
conscious that changes would only come about with the support and intervention of 
trade unionists in the `outside world'. The women felt sure that if they could just 
communicate their plight to labour organisations in the more democratic countries, that 
support and intervention would be forthcoming (Interview, Lee Chong-gak, female 
president of Dong-il Textile branch union 1976-1978, March, 2000). 
One of the ways in which their message could be transmitted was via the 
medium of the foreign press, and examples abound of factual reports on the Korean 
industrial situation appearing in foreign national newspapers, labour organisation 
publications, and television documentaries. Whilst, from 197412 until his death in 1979, 
Park Chung-hee maintained rigid censorial control over the Korean media, his policy 
with regard to foreign correspondents and church figures, who were mainly American13, 
remained ambivalent. On the one hand, he did not wish the image of industrial South 
Korea that he had so carefully constructed to be blemished in the eyes of overseas 
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agencies; whilst, on the other, he was never in a position to impose editorial bias too 
forcefully upon foreign national journalists and socially-minded missionaries. 
An example of coverage of the labour situation in Korea by an international 
trade union publication, and one that was to have major repercussions which are 
addressed below, is an article that appeared in `Labour Affairs', the organ of the Asian 
Regional Organisation of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ARO- 
ICFTU) in September, 1978. The author goes into graphic detail about the privations 
visited upon the Dong-il women: 
The [election] meeting could not be held because the union room was being 
ransacked by a gang of thugs, who included male workers at the plant. 
When the women appeared, they were beaten and kicked and buckets of 
excrement were thrown at them, rubbed into their clothes and into their 
faces. Policemen who had been called to the plant by the management stood 
by and watched without interfering. When the women appealed to them for 
help, the policemen shouted at them to keep quiet...... The workers at the 
Dong-il plant, and all others who attempt to organise themselves 
democratically to bargain collectively with their employers and stand up for 
their rights, face a strong and well-managed alliance of management, 
government and certain union officials, whose mechanisms for suppressing 
the workers' demands are brutal and effective. 
Agents of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency maintain constant 
surveillance on all worker-related movements; those that support workers' 
demands are labelled `communist', a charge that can bring about 
imprisonment. Unions are infiltrated and controlled from the inside and help 
to organise gangs of thugs to disrupt workers' meetings, as at the Dong-il 
plant...... This is the grim background to South Korea's `economic miracle' 
founded on income from exports, especially of textiles ... 
(Asian Labour, 
1978). 
Publicity of the type illustrated above, and a documentary programme 
commissioned by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and shown on nation- 
wide television, generated direct response from organisations and individuals world- 
wide; a reaction that was to prove the cause of much concern on the part of the NTWU. 
Two hand-written letters, both from Hawaii, were located in the files of the NTWU and 
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are typical of others received. The first one, dated 7 January, 1979, and signed `Eileen 
Cain', reads as follows: 
I am very concerned about reports from reliable sources about political and 
economic injustices in the textile industry, particularly regarding 126 Dong- 
il textile workers who were fired and blacklisted. 
I urge enforcement of the Labour Standard Law, to protect workers' rights 
to a living wage, safe working conditions, breaks for meals, and other 
workers' rights. The abuses that the Dong-i1 workers have been subjected to 
are shocking and are an affront to decency and justice. 
Workers have the inherent right to organise without interference from 
management or government. The legitimate Dong-il Union must be 
recognised and allowed to function autonomously. 
As long as this shocking situation continues in your country, I resolve not to 
buy any goods produced in South Korea, and will encourage others to do the 
same. 
14 
The second example is from the Honolulu Friends Meeting, a Quaker 
organisation, and is signed `Wendy Bobbitt': 
I am writing concerning working conditions for women at your local at the 
Dong-il Textile Plant in Inchon. Reliable documentation has shown the lack 
of enforcement throughout the textile industry of labour standards 
concerning wages, hours and working conditions, and the firings, beatings 
and blacklistings of women at the Dong-il plant who attempted to improve 
their situation are being widely publicised here. 
I cannot support an industry where workers are so exploited and will 
boycott South Korean textiles and work to convince groups and 
organisations I am in contact with to boycott Korean textiles as well. 
Let me urge you as representatives of workers to monitor and correct 
working conditions in these 
splants 
and to support the people whose rights 
you are supposed to protect. ' 
That these letters, and others in similar vein, were, indeed, a cause for concern 
on the part of the NTWU is confirmed in a memo (Unpublished NTWU internal 
document, dated 23 March, 1979), written by Kim Young-tae, President of the NTWU, 
to the Ministry of Labour Affairs, in which he says: 
We have received a number of letters from abroad indicating that a 
campaign to boycott Korean produce may be initiated. This is a serious 
matter about which we must take positive action. 
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It is uncertain whether or not the `reliable documentation' and the `reliable 
sources' referred to in the letters from Hawaii included the article in `Asian Labour' 
quoted above. What is certain, however, is that it did catch the attention of Charles 
Ford, the English General Secretary of the International Textile, Garment and Leather 
Workers' Federation (ITGLWF), which is the largest and most influential organisation 
representing textile and clothing industry unions throughout the world, and which has 
its headquarters in Brussels. In a letter, located in the files of the NTWU, to Leong 
Fook- kee, the Japanese Assistant Secretary of the Asian Regional Organisation (ARO) 
of the ITGLWF, dated 5 January, 1979, Charles Ford, says: 
I should welcome, as soon as possible, the comments of our Korean affiliate 
on the enclosed news item that appeared in `Asian Labour' in its September 
edition. 
Ford's concern about the Korean labour situation was sharpened a month later 
by a letter from the Chairperson of the German Textile and Clothing Union (GTB), B. 
Keller, enclosing a detailed exposition of working conditions in South Korea that had 
been received by that organisation from a church associate (This letter, also located in 
the files of the NTWU, is dated 4 August, 1978). The gist of the GTB's covering letter 
was as follows: first, was the ITGLWF aware of what was going on in Korea. Second, 
was the NTVWU, a member union of the ITGLWF, under the control of the Park Chung- 
hee regime or was it a properly autonomous organisation. Third, should not the 
ITGLWF treat as a matter of urgency the clarification of the facts? 
In the meantime, Leong Fook-kee had contacted the Japanese President of the 
Asian Regional Organisation of the ITGLWF, and one of the four Vice-Presidents of the 
ITGLWF itself, in Tokyo, Taranobu Usami, who telephoned Kim Young-tae in Seoul 
on 23 March and advised him that the ITGLWF would be holding a conference in Milan 
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on 6-7 April and that Kim should present himself at the conference and explain the 
circumstances behind the growing number of worrying reports about the textile industry 
being disseminated throughout the world. It was this telephone call, details of which 
were located in the files of the NTWU, that precipitated the memo, referred to above, 
from Kim to the Korean Ministry of Labour Affairs. Having thus been alerted to the 
gathering international disquiet over the series of occurrences in his bailiwick, and 
having been summoned to defend the position of the NTWU to the governing council of 
the ITGLWF, Kim Young-tae's memo canvassed support from the Park government, 
both financial and diplomatic, for his impending trip to Milan. '6 
At the meeting in Italy, the President of the ITGLWF, Karl Buschmann, began 
by asking Kim about the nature of the tripartite relationship in Korea between the 
government, the employers, and the trade unions. Kim replied that the government and 
employers co-operated well together but that the unions had remained largely 
uncooperative and obstructive. H. Gibson, President of the British Textile and Garment 
Workers Union and Vice-President of the ITGLWF, said that he had gained the 
impression from a BBC Television programme, which had included interviews with 
workers, that the NTWU was actually controlled by the government. The NTWU 
president responded by claiming that if such a circumstance were true he would not be 
free to come to Milan to explain the facts. Kim added that he did not consider it 
appropriate for the ITGLWF to have included the Dong-il incident on its agenda 
because the ITGLWF's first duty was to its associate union members, of which the 
NTWU was one, and to support them in any conflict they had with renegade branches. 
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Kim Young-tae was then asked about the pictures of women workers with 
human excrement smeared over them. The main thrust of his reply was that first, the 
photographs were totally misleading; they were black and white pictures and, therefore, 
did not convey the fact that the Dong-il women workers' uniforms were the same colour 
as excrement, and that even if excrement had been thrown at them, it would not show. 17 
The marks were, in fact, ink stains which the women had deliberately applied 
themselves. Second, the trouble was caused by the women, who were fighting among 
themselves and pulling each other's hair. Male co-workers had to intervene only to stop 
the women fighting. Third, if the Central Committee members cared to visit Korea, Kim 
would be able to prove to them that the stains were ink, and not human excrement. The 
NTWU president then detracted somewhat from his denial by admitting that a few male 
Dong-il workers did touch some of the women with pieces of paper on which there was 
excrement but they certainly did not put it on their faces or in their mouths. 
Furthermore, the guilty men had been arrested immediately and sentenced to eight 
months imprisonment. 
When asked to comment about the `action squads' of thugs and gangsters 
which had allegedly been organised by the NTWU and mobilised to break up the Dong- 
il dispute, Kim Young-tae insisted that such an accusation was totally unfounded. These 
were, in fact, illicit organisations set up by the workers themselves to combat what they 
saw as unfair working practices. They were used against the employers, not the 
employees. As for the Dong-il dispute, the men were all Dong-il workers, not specially 
hired from outside, and the NTWU had had no involvement whatsoever in their 
behaviour. 
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Finally, when asked about the 126 dismissed women workers and the reported 
blacklist that had been drawn up, Kim advised the committee that all of the women had 
been members of the Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) who, despite repeated invitations 
from the Dong-il company and the NTWU to return to work, had refused so to do. It 
was impossible for the company to continue with so many workers absent, so it was 
forced to hire replacements. As for the alleged blacklist, this was part of a church- 
inspired conspiracy to get rid of the NTWU president. The document had been forged 
by the women themselves and circulated in Kim Young-tae's name. Clear proof of the 
forgery, claimed Kim, lay in the fact that the women had used an incorrect NTWU 
official seal on the document. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, Kim's representation, the ITGLWF committee 
felt that it would be appropriate to send a fact-finding mission, made up of Buschmann, 
Ford, Usami, and Gibson, to Seoul in May, the following month. In an effort to 
moderate the possibly dire consequences of such an `uncontrolled' visit, Kim Young-tae 
issued a formal invitation to the ITGLWF, on behalf of the NTWU. The full intent of 
this gesture was revealed in an NTWU internal memo (Unpublished NTWU internal 
document) drafted immediately after his return to Seoul from Milan, in which Kim 
states quite bluntly that one of the most important of his achievements in Italy was: 
... that they accepted our invitation to visit Korea instead of 
dispatching an 
independent delegation to investigate the Dong-il incident. This means we 
can organise their schedule ourselves and explain to them about the incident. 
In a written confirmation, dated 26 April, 1979, (Unpublished NTWU internal 
document) of the verbal invitation made in Milan, Kim concludes by saying to Charles 
Ford: 
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We want to take this opportunity to increase your understanding [of] Korea 
and to more strengthen our fraternal relationship. May we cordially request 
you that all the expenses such as hotel accommodation and domestic travels, 
etc., to be [incurred] during your stay in Korea will be met by our union. We 
will also provide you with interpreter service. 18 
One example of international newspaper coverage, and one that helped to 
initiate further action on the part of the international trade union community, was an 
article by Philippe Pons published in Le Monde on 14 August, 1979. The occurrence 
that sparked off the article was the demonstration by some two hundred women 
workers from the YH Wig and Garment Company who staged a sit-in at the 
headquarters of the New Democratic Party, the main party of opposition to Park Chung 
Hee's Democratic Republican Party, on 11 August, 1979. In the piece, Pons reports 
that: 
A 21 year old women driven to commit suicide, fifty others injured, political 
leaders of the opposition molested: that is the result of the police action 
against a peaceful demonstration of women textile workers ..... several hundred policemen broke into the premises ..... to turn out the women demonstrators with unusual brutality and with the help of tear gas .... Three journalists covering the event had to be taken into hospital and ...... Mr Kim Young-sam19 who, a month ago, had held discussions with Mr Carter 
[US President], was arrested. 
With no small measure of perspicacity, Pons goes on to cast doubt upon the 
sincerity of the Korean president: 
The brutality to which the Korean authorities resorted against women who 
can hardly be qualified as being `communist agents' - an accusation 
which, in South Korea, makes any repression legitimate - makes you 
question the significance of the gesture of clemency of Mr Park who, last 
month, arranged for 86 prisoners (mainly students) to be released. Since 
this occurred after President Carter's visit to Seoul, who then mentioned 
the question of human rights in a country that, although claiming to be a 
democracy, cares little about it, it could have led one to believe that the 
authorities were going towards a relative relaxing of the regime. Not only 
is it not so, but in addition, the apparent lack of control of the police 
towards women who were not in the least `subversive elements' reveals 
the edginess of the authorities. 
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Le Monde then looks beneath the surface of the state's over-reaction to what 
was an entirely non-militant demonstration by women workers: 
It [the demonstration] annoyed the authorities because it brought to light, 
and particularly to the American press, realities that the authorities, worried 
about their image abroad, were reluctant to spread around. 
Philippe Pons then broadens the focus of his report by saying: 
In recent years, some women workers have made an attempt to rebel against 
their conditions. For example, the workers in the Dong-il textile factory, 
located in Inchon, created in 1972 the first trade union grouping women. 20 
The management rapidly considered this as being too active and, therefore, 
`subversive'. In February, 1978, during the election of women trade union 
leaders, management thugs broke into the room and threw over the women 
workers buckets of excrement. Six months later, during another meeting, 40 
women workers were simply arrested (Philippe Pons, Le Monde, 14 August, 
1979). 
The article in Le Monde stimulated an immediate response from Charles Ford. 
Less than one month after its publication he wrote direct to Kim Young-tae, rather than 
to the ITGLWF Asian representative as he had done previously: 
The attached article was published in `Le Monde', one of the major French 
newspapers, on 14'x' August 1979. It concerns an event involving textile 
workers that occurred in Seoul on 11'x' August 1979 and refers to the Dong- 
il incident. I would appreciate it if you could send me more information on 
the above incident and let me have your comments on this article 
(Unpublished letter). 
Whilst details of Kim Young-tae's reply to this request are unavailable, what 
has been clearly shown in this section is that, of the Korean textile industry workforce, 
only the women workers were courageous enough to take the necessary steps to 
communicate their difficulties to the wider global community. Whether or not male 
workers appreciated the importance of such a strategy is open to question. What is not 
open to question, however, is that, as a collective, these male workers proved 
themselves either too complacent or too intimidated to contribute to the 
initiative. 
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Meanwhile, the male dominated institutional nexus of state, employer, and trade union 
understood all too well the likely outcome of publicising the truth abroad, and combined 
their efforts to construct a facade based upon misrepresentation, mendacity, and denial. 
It was exclusively as a result of the actions of oppressed, impoverished, and exploited 
women and young girls that these powerful institutions were coerced into such a 
defensive and, ultimately, untenable posture. 
8.5 Summary 
The two salient truths which emerge from the discussion contained in this 
chapter are, firstly, that throughout the entire history of the `organised' Korean trade 
union movement, the interests of grass-roots members and ordinary working people 
have never figured high, if at all, on the agendas of those who are mandated to attend to 
those interests, the trade union leadership. Indeed, despite frequent protestations to the 
contrary, union leaders adhered consistently to the imperative to actively and 
systematically exclude worker participation, rather than to encourage its inclusion. If 
measures are put in place to prevent problems from being voiced, it is but a short step to 
be able to pretend that problems do not exist. Secondly, and as a logical corollary of the 
first point, if change for the better in the conditions under which Korean people 
laboured was ever to be realised, that change had to be initiated and sustained from 
below. 
Beyond, and contributory to, those conclusions, other important factors are 
revealed in the exposition of Korean trade unionism during the first eighty years of the 
twentieth century. Among the most crucial is the apparent blindness evidenced on the 
part of both the leaders of the state regime and their minions who headed the FKTU and 
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the national-level unions to the historical certainty that intense repression of the mass of 
the populace cannot be sustained indefinitely. No matter upon what pretext it is based, 
or how it is explained or rationalised, alienation on such a scale, created by the 
distancing of workers from effective representation, will inevitably result in 
spontaneous and/or premeditated rebellion. In the words of Abraham Lincoln a century 
before: "You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the 
time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time" (Speech, 8 September, 1858). 
Of course, this commonality of view shared by state and labour institutions was 
merely a reflection of the extraordinary extent to which those `official' labour 
institutions were politically, rather than socially and industrially, oriented. In retrospect, 
it is clear that, from the outset, there was very little probability of Korean trade unions 
fulfilling the role as independent representative organisations. Political polarisation, 
whether based upon nationalism, independence from colonial rule, unification with the 
north, or communism, was the dominant factor in the ideology, philosophy, and 
structure of the succession of labour organisations which appeared on, and frequently 
disappeared from, the Korean industrial scene. This is not to suggest that the trade union 
movement in any country can, or should, remain aloof from political considerations, or 
that it is necessarily detrimental to have political affiliations. The problem in Korea was 
that the FKTU, having been, to all intents and purposes, formed by the government for a 
specifically political purpose; that is, to counter the leftist aspirations of Chung Pyong, 
never subsequently succeeded in divorcing itself from state influence in favour of the 
interests of its members. Not only that, but having never won for itself even the vestiges 
of independence and autonomy, it was left to cling to the coat-tails of whichever 
political party happened to be in the ascendancy at any particular time. 
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The repercussions from this circumstance were as serious as they were 
inevitable. Devoid of any freedom from state direction, and certain of state intervention 
in the event of any signs that some of the FKTU hierarchy might wish to adopt a 
progressive trade union philosophy, the leadership of the FKTU was never able to 
develop the qualities and industrial relations skills to achieve such an objective. Instead, 
they became increasingly characterised by internal squabbling and plotting which, in 
turn, resulted in further diminution of respect from below. Not only did this 
ineffectiveness result in the loss of a real opportunity to stabilise the social chaos of the 
Chang Myon era, an opportunity that could have changed the face of modern Korean 
history, but it rendered the FKTU easy prey to the assault on all social institutions that 
was to be launched by Park Chung-hee. It is open to conjecture whether Park's 
`reconstruction' and `radical surgery' would have been quite so easy, and followed quite 
the same pattern, had the FKTU established itself as a powerful and independent 
organisation truly representative of, and fully supported by, the Korean labour force. 
It has been shown that the exercise of minority male domination, both in the 
trade union context and on the factory floor, was most evident in the textile and garment 
industry. Furthermore, and due at least in part to reasons of tradition and culture, male 
workers were reluctant to ally themselves with female activists in their efforts to 
stimulate improvements to working conditions. Had the male workers been more 
prepared to combine with women, it is difficult not to construe that the added weight 
they would have brought to the movement would have increased markedly its impetus 
and its effect. Therefore, in the absence of indigenous male involvement, and from their 
enforced position of cultural and industrial isolation, Korean women workers took the 
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initiative to recruit the aid of foreign journalists and other arms of the international 
media. The power of such a strategy, and the genuine and serious concern this 
substantial widening of the women's sphere of influence generated both at national 
trade union level and, especially, at the highest levels in the Park Chung-hee 
administration, became apparent almost immediately. Despite the implementation of the 
harshest and most violent of repressive methods, the `wrong' message had got out and 
was garnering a world-wide, and highly unfavourable, reaction. Not only was the 
economy thus threatened and, along with it, the very bedrock of Park Chung-hee's 
domestic and international legitimacy, but the spectrum of Korean political, economic, 
and industrial administration was condemned abroad as corrupt and inhumane. That 
inexorable pressure from below was gathering momentum and the institutions which 
had been designed and constructed with the express purpose of total social control were 
seen to be fundamentally flawed. 
So as to explore the dynamics behind the resistance by women textile and 
garment workers, attention is now turned to the roles of significant leaders in the worker 
and union struggle in the Peace Market and elsewhere. Whilst individual leaders operate 
in a complex socio-political context, involving many others, they are nonetheless 
indicative of the social forces effecting those workers as well as the choices they faced. 
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NOTES 
1 Park Young-ki was International Secretary at the FKTU in the early 1970's and is 
currently Professor of Industrial Relations at Sokang University, Seoul. 
2 Owned by President Rhee Seung-man's adopted son (see Chapter 5.3). 
3 Korean Labour Law prohibited all government employees, including teachers, from 
trade union participation. 
4 The Machiavellian eminence grise of Korean politics. Kim Jong-pil has played pivotal 
roles in every administration, of no matter what political hue, since 1961. He was Prime 
Minister in the Kim Dae-jung administration until April, 2000. 
5 This figure does not take into account the customary `fallow' periods discussed in 
Chapter Seven. 
6 Social unrest at home, Sino-US rapprochement, Sino-Japanese normalisation, 
withdrawal from Korea of 20,000 US troops, and uncertainty about North/South 
dialogue, all contributed to Park's unease. 
7 These companies were among the largest in Korea, and details of the formation of the 
`democratic' unions within them are included in Chapters Nine and Ten. 
8 Few commentators agree even upon an approximate number of disputes and `wildcat' 
strikes which took place during the 1970's; thus, for the purposes of this study, and in 
the sure knowledge that they will have been manipulated downwards*, the statistics 
issued by the Ministry of Labour Affairs are considered sufficient to make the point. 
(*Throughout his presidency, and frequently for the benefit of prospective foreign 
investors and trading partners, Park Chung-hee made it a priority to place great 
emphasis on the disciplined nature, and stability, of the Korean workforce) 
9 It is worthy of note that the leader of the Pangnim Branch Union in 1976, Lee Chun- 
sun, became Vice-President of the FKTU in 1979. 
10 In the textile and garment industry there was, effectively, little, if any, distinction 
between branch-level and national-level leadership, inasmuch as it was quite usual for 
the president of one of the largest branches to be also president of the NTWU. In the 
Pangnim case, the president of the Pangnim branch union in 1976 was Lee Chun-sun, 
who had already served two terms as NTWU president, 1966-70; 1973-1974 (FKTU 
Centre Research Institute 1998). 
11 Previous to this ruling, a prescribed procedure had to be followed before a branch 
could be declared a `problem' and, thus, before a branch leader could be required by 
law to turn over control of his organisation to the NTWU. 12 Donga Ilbo is cited as being the last Korean newspaper to lose its independence, in 
1974. (Kang Sug-won, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 1977). 
13 Irish, English, French, German and, of course, Korean, church figures were also 
actively involved in ensuring that details of the working and living conditions of Korean 
women were disseminated world-wide. 14 Eileen Cain was traced in Hawaii and confirms that that the letter-writing protest was 
initiated by the Hawaii Council of Churches (HCC). A copy of the HCC circular, dated 
January, 1979, urging the protest and inviting cash donations to assist the Dong-il 
women, was provided by the archivist of the Honolulu Friends Meeting, Professor KA 
W Crook. The circular makes it clear that the plight of women textile and garment 
workers in Korea was the focus of attention of a number of organisations 
internationally including the Japan Council of Churches, the Quaker International 
Program of East Asia, and the Friends of the Orient Committee. The circular ends with 
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an extract from a letter written by Ahn Soon-ae, one of the Dong-il women activists, 
and presumably sent to other sympathetic organisations: 
To Friends Overseas .... We are not 
disheartened 
... and ... will continue 
our struggle until our demands are met, in the firm belief that justice and 
truth will soon prevail. We request your continued concern and support for 
our cause (Quoted in Enclosure to HCC letter, January, 1979). 
15 The whereabouts of Wendy Bobbitt could not be ascertained. 
16 Perhaps surprisingly, the NTWU retained a transcript of the ITGLWF governing 
body's `interview' with Kim Young-tae at the Milan meeting on 6 May, 1979; a precis 
of this unpublished NTWU internal document indicates all too clearly the NTWU's 
obduracy. 
17 That the uniforms were, in fact, light blue is confirmed both by the author's personal 
knowledge and the evidence of colour photographs taken at the time and in the author's 
possession. 
' Contact was established with Charles Ford on 10 March, 2000, and arrangements 
were made to interview him with regard to the ITGLWF trip to Seoul. Unfortunately, he 
died on the following day. However, his companion generously offered to place all of 
his records at the author's disposal. A search of these records was conducted in April, 
2000 but, although they appear comprehensive and cover all aspects of Charles Ford's 
life-long involvement in the international trade union community, no trace could be 
found of any comment concerning the outcome of the investigative trip to Seoul by the 
ITGLWF Presidium in May-June, 1979. What was found of interest, however, was the 
ITGLWF Report On Third World Congress, an assembly that took place in Vienna in 
October, 1980, in which a comment made by ITGLWF Vice-President Taranobu Usami 
(see main text) was recorded: 
..... the 
KNTWU [Korean National Textile Workers Union] has somewhat 
suffered from a tarnished image due to the spread of misinformation and 
misunderstanding. As the President of TWARO [Textile Workers Asian 
Regional Organisation] I sympathise with our Korean friends and I would 
like to emphasise that our common affiliate, a founding member of 
TWARO, is seeking to carry out its free and democratic labour movement 
based on the same ideals as advanced by TWARO and ITGLWF though 
under difficult circumstances (author's italics). 
At approximately the same time Kim Young-tae was elected to the ITGLWF Executive 
Committee (ITGLWF Annual Report 1980). In the light of the above, it is easy to jump 
to the conclusion that Charles Ford and the other members of the ITGLWF Presidium 
were completely `taken in' by Kim Young-tae during their visit to Seoul. However, the 
impression of the late General Secretary of the ITGLWF, gained by the author from the 
lengthy research into his copious files and other records, and from conversations with 
his partner, was that of a socially dedicated, industrious, and scrupulously honest man. 
It was, therefore, essential to ensure that his name was not unfairly besmirched. Contact 
was established with the Brussels headquarters office of the current (2000) 
General 
Secretary of the ITGLWF, Neil Kearney, on 8 May, 2000, and specific questions 
concerning the outcome of the 1979 investigative visit were facsimiled, 
including 
ITGLWF correspondence reference numbers to facilitate the search of headquarters 
records. Numerous telephone calls, e-mails, and repeat facsimiles elicited an e-mail 
message from the General Secretary on 21 June, 2000 in which he promised a 
full 
response to the specific questions: " on return from Congress the week of 3 
July 2000". 
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Further communications, over a period of months, failed to elicit any meaningful reply, 
even though, in the final facsimile, the General Secretary was assured that any statement 
that the ITGLWF was prepared to issue on the matter would be reproduced verbatim in 
this study. There clearly remains an element of doubt concerning this issue, but after 
balanced consideration of the details recorded above, the author is forced to the 
conclusion that Kim Young-tae's deviousness and `managerial expertise' proved more 
than a match for the ITGLWF Presidium, and he not only succeeded in `pulling the 
wool over their eyes' with regard to the true nature of conditions in the South Korean 
textile and garment industry, but he so persuaded them of his personal qualities and 
devotion to the ethic of trade unionism that they elected him to serve as a full member 
of their ruling body. 
19 Leader of the New Democratic Party and President of South Korea 1992-1998. 
20 A slightly ambiguous statement: Dong-il was the first union to elect a woman leader, 
but the first `grouping' of women, in the trade union context, was the Chonggye Union, 
in 1970. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESISTANCE 
"There is properly no history; only biography" 
(Ralph Waldo Emerson) 
9.0 Introduction 
Although the power of a collective social dynamic is undeniable, the 
extraordinary and disproportionate effect that one individual can have on the generation 
and sustenance of such collective action is equally apparent. Whether it be by the 
exercise of charismatic leadership or the investment of symbolic regard, it is clear that 
the role played by a single person can be crucial to the outcome of combined endeavour. 
It is submitted that the biography of one such individual can encapsulate the atmosphere 
of the period and, in so doing, draw together the diverse strands of influence which were 
prevalent at the time, and measure them one against the other. 
Biographies do not constitute mere snapshots of social circumstance, as do 
some other methods of research but, instead, can provide objective accounts of lives 
which, in turn, illuminate the protracted historical processes which are fundamental to 
the fullest understanding of social change (Evans, 1993). The societal changes, for both 
good and ill, which took place in South Korea during the 1970's involved the actions of 
individuals, albeit acting within a broader social context. To fully understand how and 
why those changes came about, it is necessary to examine closely the individuals who 
set them in motion. 
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9.1 Apathy And Opposition Among Women 
One of the weaknesses of many studies which have the issue of gender as an 
intrinsic component is the tendency to group together all women, and all men, into 
discrete, and internally unified, entities. However, it is important to disentangle the 
complex relationships which underpin these social entities. The important point to note 
is that individuals' lives are shaped by `structural pressures of norms, values, and 
opportunities' (Humphreys, 1993). To illustrate, it may appear in the account to date 
that Korean men, of all social and economic strata, are rabid male chauvinists intent 
only upon maintaining and reinforcing the status quo. However, impressions thus 
gained would be erroneous, and their perpetuation would serve only to weaken the 
overall thrust of this study. As far as Korean men are concerned, the mere mention of 
Chun tae-il is sufficient to discount the myth of male unanimity, and this study includes 
other examples of men who were palpably sympathetic to the women's cause. 
In relation to women workers in South Korea, commentators such as Kim 
Seung-kyung (1997) quote many cases to confirm that women workers were not 
unanimous in the determination to contest the circumstances in which they were forced 
to labour. It is submitted that, in perhaps the majority of instances, the failure of Korean 
women workers in the textile industry to present an entirely united front against 
jaedanshas, factory owners, national-level union leadership, and the state, is perfectly 
comprehensible. In all workforces there will be those whose ambitions are personal and 
modest: the imperative to earn money, no matter how little, overrides all other 
considerations, and any perceived threat to the continuing earning facility generates fear 
and antipathy. The simple philosophy subscribed to by such individuals is that the 
expression of opposition to the work system, in any form whatsoever, can result only 
in 
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further pain and increased deprivation for themselves, and that the only rational option 
is to avoid confrontation at all cost, put up with the working conditions, however harsh, 
and be grateful for small mercies (Interviews, women workers and ex-workers, 
December, 1998). The propensity to adhere to such a philosophy is considered likely to 
be more prevalent in a low-wage, exploitative, and oppressive society than it is in a 
democratic environment in which individuals at all levels are encouraged, and 
empowered, to have their voices heard: fear of retribution being a most effective 
deterrent. Furthermore, the phenomenon is magnified in the case of girls and young 
women, especially those from rural communities, for whom a rigid social order in 
which the female is subordinate to the male in all regards is deeply ingrained. 
The birth and development in the 1970's of the democratic labour movement in 
Korea bears out the above submissions. It would be remiss of any serious work on the 
subject to fail to draw attention to, and explore the complexity of, the forces 
underpinning acquiescence and the circumstances for resistance. 
9.2 Two Women Leaders 
The unique nature of Chun Tae-il's statistical research in the Peace Market, 
and the catalystic significance of his self-sacrifice in November, 1970, are referred to 
throughout this study. His contribution to the evolution of the movement is invaluable 
and unquestioned, and is commented upon at length in a vast array of literature: Chun 
Tae-il's place in the pantheon of heroes of working people is assured. On the other 
hand, the detailed story of his mother, Yi So-sun, has gone largely unrecorded, despite 
the fact that there is a persuasive argument in support of the premise that hers was, and 
continues to be, a role of even greater consequence than that of her eldest son. 
One of 
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the reasons for this contention being that by the time the most oppressive period for 
Korean workers in the Park Chung-hee era began, inaugurated by the declaration of the 
Yushin Constitution in October, 1972; when the merest hint of an affinity for 
democratic trade unionism carried the very greatest risk, Chun Tae-il had already been 
dead for almost exactly two years. Yi So-sun struggled and suffered throughout that 
difficult time, and the story of her experience tells us much about Park Chung-hee's fear 
of organised labour; governmental interference in the judiciary; institutional corruption; 
the guilt of the Peace Market Corporation, and the bravery of a doubly-bereaved 
woman. 
Because the manifestation of fear, naivety, self-regard, or apathy on the factory 
floor, referred to at the beginning of this chapter, has been well documented elsewhere 
(for example, Sheila Rowbotham, 1973), it is considered that the drawing of attention 
to it, rather than the provision of a detailed analysis, is sufficient for the purposes of this 
study. What has not been subject to as close a scrutiny, however, is the far more rare 
circumstance wherein a dedicated, courageous, popular, and successful woman trade 
union leader betrays her membership and her birthright and collaborates with the 
employers. Just as the `positive' contribution of one such as Yi So-sun brought benefits 
beyond measure to the cause of Korean working women, so the `negative' contribution 
of a renegade union leader incurred penalties equally difficult to quantify. Thus, the 
activities of Han Soon-nim merit closer examination and comment. 
9.3 Yi So-sun 
(Note: Details of Yi So-sun's life have been communicated to the author, her daughter, 
over a period of many years. The author was present, and intimately involved, in most 
of the post-1954 events described below. Numerous subject-specific interviews have 
been conducted with Yi So-sun during the writing of this study). 
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The first woman leader to be considered is Yi So-sun. Born in 1929 into a poor 
farming family in a village near to the city of Taegu, in the south-east of the Korean 
peninsula, Yi So-sun was destined for a life of the very greatest hardship. Whilst she 
was still a baby, her father was arrested by the Japanese occupation police for his 
activities in the popular movement for Korean independence. He was taken into the hills 
close to the village and executed. When Yi-So-sun was three years old, ' her mother 
remarried. The young girl and her elder brother were not welcomed by their step-father 
or his parents and, as soon as they were able, were put to work on the farm. Her formal 
education was rudimentary in the extreme, and was foreshortened in 1942 when, at the 
age of thirteen, she was taken by the Japanese as part of their `daishintai', or slave 
labour, programme and forced to work in a factory where uniforms were manufactured. 
Having escaped from the factory after two years, the fifteen-year-old Yi So-sun walked 
for ten days to the home of her aunt, where she was hidden in a hole for six months until 
Korea was liberated from Japan in 1945. In 1948, at age nineteen, she married Chun 
Sang-soo, a skilled and hard-working tailor from Taegu who was five years her senior; 
their first son, Chun Tae-il, was born in the same year. There were to be three more 
offspring born during the following twelve years; another son and two daughters. 
Caught up in the havoc of the Korean War and its aftermath, and having been 
bankrupted when his entire stock of fabric was ruined during a protracted rainy season, 
Chun Sang-soo and his family joined the desperate migration to Seoul in 1954 in search 
of work. For most of the first year in the capital they lived under the Yomchunkyo 
Bridge and only survived because Yi So-sun was able to prepare and sell food in the 
streets. It was frequently necessary to resort to begging. Chun Sang-soo worked 
wherever he could, and by 1955 had saved enough to build a wooden shack 
for his 
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family and rent a small shop in the Namdaemoon Market. Relatively speaking, the 
business prospered, but the improved circumstances were not to last. After winning a 
contract to manufacture students' uniforms, and having completed the order in the early 
Spring of 1960, Chun Sang-soo was overtaken by events. The self-same students for 
whom he had manufactured uniforms participated in the uprising on 19 April, 1960, 
which unseated the administration of incumbent president Rhee Seung-man. In the 
confusion following the revolt, the broker who had handled the uniform contract 
vanished with all of the money, leaving Yi So-sun's husband confronted by creditors 
and forced to sell everything, including the family shack, in order to pay them off. 
This was the last straw for Yi So-sun, whose health had never been particularly 
robust. The cumulative effect of the misery of her early life, the perpetual struggle to 
keep her children clothed and fed in circumstances of absolute poverty, the repeated 
failures of her husband's business endeavours, and the blow of being reduced, yet again, 
to the situation where the family did not have even a roof over their heads, caused her to 
suffer a severe mental and physical breakdown. The family was now in real crisis; one 
that was exacerbated by Chun Sang-soo's own feelings of failure, feelings which led 
him into depression, and an increasing reliance upon alcohol. Sympathetic friends 
provided the distressed family with a hut on top of a hill in the Itaewon district, but 
there was to be no respite. Park Chung-hee's earliest slum clearance programme, 
discussed in Chapter Five, embraced Itaewon, and the hut, along with hundreds of 
similar constructions, was bulldozed to the ground. 
Somehow Yi So-sun struggled on. Her husband was contributing less and 
less 
to the family income, so she had little choice. With the help of her eldest son, Chun 
Tae- 
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il, she gathered plastic sheeting and pieces of wood and erected a tent; at least then her 
children had some shelter from the elements. She fed them on rotting vegetables fished 
out of the river, and earned a few paltry won by collecting bottles, washing them, and 
selling them in the nearby market. Such a circumstance clearly could not be sustained, 
and the family split up in 1964. Barely in his teens, Chun Tae-il took responsibility for 
his brother and youngest sister. Yi So-sun went to work in the kitchen in a restaurant in 
Seoul, until the owner dismissed her because she kept collapsing through ill-health. The 
remaining daughter stayed with her father. 
After a prolonged series of bitter experiences, the family was reunited, but in 
1968 Chun Sang-soo died. He was forty-four years old. Beset by ill-fortune, and in 
circumstances which even the strongest of characters would have found daunting, he 
had done the best he could, and is remembered with affection and understanding by his 
widow and three remaining children. Perhaps the greatest contribution Chun Sang-soo 
made, particularly in the context of this study, is that it was he who made his son, Chun 
Tae-il, aware for the first time of the existence of the Korean Labour Standard Law, and 
encouraged him to struggle to improve working conditions and become involved in the 
labour movement. On his deathbed, Chun Sang-soo asked his wife's forgiveness for his 
failures, and told her that she should try not to discourage their son in his efforts for 
working people because he might just be able to bring about some change for the better. 
Her husband's last request was, however, one that was extremely difficult with 
which to comply. Indeed, prior to the dreadful events of 13 November, 1970, when, in 
desperation at government indifference and employer chicanery, her son poured petrol 
over himself and burned to death, Yi So-sun could muster little enthusiasm for matters 
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related to the labour movement. On the contrary, she frequently castigated Chun Tae-il 
for his own involvement, and for its detrimental effects on the already meagre family 
income. Her husband was dead, and the problems of feeding and providing for a family 
of five were severe enough without having the major breadwinner frequently thrown out 
of work due to his `subversive' activities. 
All this was to change when Yi So-sun stood by her son's bedside in the 
hospital where he died. With his last words to her, Chun Tae-il begged his mother to 
promise that she would take up the cause for which he had sacrificed himself. Despite 
all of her long-held misgivings and outright antipathy, Yi So-sun pledged that she 
would devote the remainder of her life to the endeavours which her son had initiated. It 
was a vow that would bring great hardship, persecution, imprisonment, and humiliation 
to her and to her family, but it was also one to which she has remained, to this day, 
unquestioningly faithful. 
Chun Tae-il's body rested in the hospital mortuary for almost a week but, 
although Yi So-sun remained in attendance throughout, she was afforded no privacy to 
grieve undisturbed. The police were also present, and in an attempt to forestall any anti- 
government demonstrations that would likely take place at a public funeral of Chun 
Tae-il, they attempted to coerce Yi So-sun into signing the release for the body so that 
they could remove it and dispose of it quietly. Despite their `persuasiveness', the police 
found Yi So-sun implacable in her refusal to accede to their demands. This ploy to 
avoid unfavourable publicity having failed, the next visitors to the hospital were 
representatives of the Peace Market Corporation, accompanied by a senior civil servant 
from the Ministry of Labour Affairs. However, unlike the police, they 
did not come 
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with threats; instead, they arrived armed with a more tangible inducement, a grey plastic 
holdall containing approximately three million won (approximately $US6,000). Profuse 
expressions of condolence were followed by a plea to Yi So-sun to accept the gift and, 
in addition, to allow the Corporation to make and fund the funeral arrangements. Never 
before had the Peace Market employers shown more than a passing interest in the 
welfare of their employees (see Chapter Seven), let alone consider making a 
spontaneous offer of `compensation' to the family of an incapacitated worker. This 
gesture was, therefore, ample evidence both of the very real fear of popular reaction felt 
by the Park regime, evidenced by the overt role played in the incident by the Ministry of 
Labour Affairs, and the awareness of culpability on the part of the Peace Market 
Corporation. 
Pressure on Yi So-sun to accept the money came not only come from the state 
and the employers, for also present at the hospital were Chun Tae-il's paternal uncles 
and aunts. In accordance with Korean tradition, responsibility for financial support for 
their sister-in-law and her remaining children fell upon them, and the prospect of such a 
burden was one that they were unprepared to countenance. In the face of all attempts to 
persuade her to the contrary, Yi So-sun remained resolute. At one stage in the often 
heated exchanges, and as a measure of her grief and frustration, she opened the bag and 
threw handfuls of notes in the air. The delegation persisted, however, and having 
regained her composure, Yi So-sun explained to them the only resolution she would 
agree to was one whereby her promise to her son might be fulfilled. The money could 
not be accepted but, instead, the Peace Market employers could demonstrate their 
goodwill to all their workers, not solely to the family of Chun Tae-il. Remarkably, in the 
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circumstances, Yi So-sun recalled a list of eight conditions which reflected her son's 
wishes, and she spelled them out to the members of the delegation: - 
Approval for the establishment of a trade union in the Peace Market; 
ii. Reduce the working day from 16 hours to 8 hours; 
iii. Every Sunday off (i. e. four days per month off instead of two); 
iv. Regular wage reviews, 
v. Health checks for all workers at least once per year; 
vi. The `upper rooms', or `attics', to be dismantled; 
vii. The shidas' wages to be doubled, and paid directly by the employer; 2 
viii. Adequate ventilation installed throughout the Peace Market buildings 
(Chonggye Union Annual Report, 1971). 
Set aback by the scope of the provisions, the representatives of the employers 
and the Ministry of Labour Affairs declared that they would need time to consider. In 
the meantime, Yi So-sun assured them that she would withhold her permission for the 
burial of Chun Tae-il until a positive response was forthcoming. Four days later, the 
employers agreed that: - 
i. The day of Chun Tae-il's funeral would be declared a general holiday for all 
Peace Market workers; 
ii. The FKTU would assist in the formation of a Peace Market union and provision 
would be made for a union office to be located in the Peace Market buildings; 
iii. The remaining conditions made by Yi So-sun would be implemented under the 
guidance of the Ministry of Labour Affairs (Chonggye Union Annual Report, 
1971). 
Although this agreement was in the form of a document signed by the Minister 
of Labour Affairs, Yi Seung-taek, himself, subsequent events were to show that this was 
a ploy. 3 Nevertheless, and irrespective of setbacks to come, barely a week after the 
funeral of her son, which took place on 18 November, 1970, Yi So-sun officiated at the 
252 
ceremony marking the formation of the Chonggye Garment Worker's Union (for a 
detailed account see Chapter Ten), the first democratic union in her country. A bulwark 
of Bonarpartist authoritarianism in post-war South Korea had been breached, in a very 
minor way, for the first time. What is more, the breakthrough had not been achieved by 
popular revolt or by mass action of any kind, but by the obduracy and the courage of a 
single, and highly principled, woman, albeit within a context that her son and others had 
initiated. 
From that time on, trade union activity dominated Yi So-sun's life. She was 
instrumental in setting up educational programmes for workers, which encompassed 
vocational and basic academic courses, as well as instruction in trade unionism and 
labour law. This latter inclusion was to be the cause of much conflict with both the 
Ministry and the Peace Market employers (for more detail see Chapter Ten). In 1971, 
Chonggye organised a canteen at the Peace Market and provided free lunches daily to 
approximately five hundred workers. For the next four years Yi So-sun would begin 
work in the canteen at lam every morning and work through until 3pm, at which time 
she would make her way to the union office where she would remain, usually until late 
into the night. 
With the main breadwinner now lost to the family, and having rebuffed the 
offer of three million won from the Peace Market employers, Yi So-sun had only the 
minuscule wage of her eldest daughter, the author, who worked as a shida in the Peace 
Market, to keep her family fed, housed, and clothed. To supplement this inadequate 
income, Yi So-sun began to sell second-hand clothes in the streets of Chonggy-chun 
in 
the early hours of each morning. It is interesting to note, as well as being a pertinent 
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commentary of the times, that the only sources of second-hand clothes in the Korea of 
the 1970's were the hospitals and mortuaries; the precarious financial circumstances of 
the mass of the people dictated that they wore their clothes until they literally 
disintegrated and became of no use for anything other than cleaning rags. Most of the 
clothes sold by Yi So-sun could have been readily identified as having belonged to a 
corpse by the distinctive manner in which they had been removed from the bodies by 
mortuary staff by the simple expedient of cutting down the front of every garment with 
scissors. But those who spent their lives manufacturing clothing could not afford to buy 
new items for themselves, and any serviceable garment, no matter its source or 
mutilation, was better than none at all. Never was the axiom: `beggars cannot be 
choosers' more apt. 
The early experience of the Chonggye Union was fraught with difficulties and 
setbacks, in the light of which it might be expected that Yi So-sun would have had scant 
inclination, or opportunity, to direct her efforts elsewhere (for fuller details see Chapter 
Ten). But her vision was broader even than that of Chun Tae-il, and her oft-repeated 
maxim that: "Every worker is my son now", rapidly earned her the soubriquet `Mother' 
in the common parlance of workers throughout the length and breadth of Korea. 4 It was 
also to further alienate her from Park Chung-hee and his administration. Irrespective of 
industry or location, if workers were in conflict with their employers, Yi So-sun, `their 
mother', was likely to be there offering support and leadership. 
As awareness of her tireless efforts in the cause of working people spread, so 
did her acquaintance with political figures who were, or who were to become, of great 
influence. For example, the then leader of the main opposition party, and current 
(2000) 
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President of South Korea, Kim Dae-jung, paid the first of many visits to Yi So-sun's 
makeshift home in January, 1971. The two became, and remain, close friends, and Kim 
Dae-jung was especially grateful to Yi So-sun for the support she gave to his wife and 
family after he was kidnapped in Tokyo by KCIA agents on 8 August, 1973.5 In 1987, 
and in recognition of her singular contribution, Kim Dae-jung offered a seat in the 
National Assembly to Yi So-sun. 6 Her response, even to a request from an old and 
valued friend, was typical: if she thought that the workers considered that she would be 
more effective on their behalf as a member of the National Assembly, rather than 
continuing her activities independent of any political party, she would accept. She did 
not believe this to be the view of ordinary working people, however, and so she refused. 
As the effects of the Yushin reforms bit deeper into the daily lives of the 
Korean labour force, Yi So-sun's personality and persistence, and the perceived threat 
of her activities, assumed an increasingly high profile in the eyes of state administrators. 
The Peace Market canteen was closed down, on the grounds that it was a front for the 
dissemination of pro-Communist propaganda and, in February 1975, Yi So-sun led a 
sit-in strike of some 250 workers protesting against government interference in the 
education programmes organised by the Chonggye Union. The `classroom' in the Peace 
Market was under constant police surveillance, and it was only the stubbornness of the 
union members that ensured that the facility reopened after its frequent enforced 
closures. It was clear that the only way these classes could continue would be for the 
union to have premises of its own, rather than relying upon the `generosity' of the Peace 
Market Corporation. But premises cost money, and the resolution of the dilemma 
encapsulated perfectly Yi So-sun's mind-set and sense of priorities. Despite their 
inadequate, and hard-earned, remuneration, the Peace Market employees 
had all 
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contributed to a fund to pay for a decent headstone and surround for Chun Tae-il's 
grave. Yi So-sun proposed that the money that had been raised should not be spent on 
her son but should, instead, be used to rent a building that could be used by all workers 
to improve their education. The proposal was accepted (see Chapter Ten). 
The KCIA was not an organisation noted for its subtlety and, in May, 1977, it 
demonstrated a particular heavy-handedness in its ongoing attempts to `manage' Yi So- 
sun. Whilst working in the Chonggye Union office one afternoon, she received a 
telephone call from a man who said that he wished to discuss urgently a matter of 
importance with her. She agreed to meet him in a nearby coffee shop where, upon her 
arrival, she was immediately taken into custody by two agents and escorted to an hotel. 
For the next two days Yi So-sun was subjected to an almost non-stop barrage of 
pressure to accept an offer which, it was thought, she could not refuse. Throughout the 
period of her enforced detention, and denied permission to tell her whereabouts to either 
her family or her work colleagues, the two agents took it in turn to try to persuade Yi 
So-sun to accept the deeds of a luxurious apartment south of the River Han that had 
been purchased for her, and papers conferring ownership to her of a bank account 
containing 30 million won ($US60,000). The line of approach followed by the KCIA 
was that the President himself appreciated the value of her work for the labour 
movement over the previous six years and had decided to make a special concession in 
recognition of her dedication. Now that, in their words, the union was firmly established 
and that all of her son's wishes were in the process of being fulfilled, it was time for Yi 
So-sun to look after herself and her family. She should move into the new apartment 
and use the money to open a business. They suggested that a restaurant might 
be 
appropriate, and that she could then support the Chonggye Union even more effectively 
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by making financial donations rather than by merely organising and agitating. Despite 
the concerted and protracted efforts of the KCIA representatives, and the alluring nature 
of the bribe, Yi So-sun once again stood firm and, at the end of the two days, the agents 
gave up and released her. 
One of the most dedicated teachers in the workers' educational programme was 
a young law student at Seoul National University named Chang Ki-pyo. In February, 
1977, he was arrested and charged with inciting anti-state protest, both by his 
involvement in the workers' education programme and by the publication of a pamphlet 
entitled `The People's Voice'. At his trial, on 15 July, 1977,7 the prosecution based its 
case upon the most simplistic accusation and, in its way, most difficult to contest. The 
charge was formulated as follows: the activities of the accused had encouraged public 
demonstrations, and public demonstrations created social unrest. Social unrest in the 
South was the objective of North Korea, and the accused had, therefore, aided the North 
in the achievement of its objective. Chang Ki-pyo had shown himself to be anti-state 
and pro-Communist, and was in violation of Presidential Emergency Measure No. 9 
For Safeguarding National Security and Public Order8 (Interview, Chang Ki-pyo, 
December, 1998) 
Yi So-sun had attended the trial to show support for a man who had risked 
much in the cause of worker education (Chang Ki-pyo was found guilty and sentenced 
to 7 years imprisonment). When she heard the precise nature of the charge she could not 
restrain herself from standing up in court and voicing an equally simplistic, and equally 
difficult to contest, rebuttal. If the South Korean state is suggesting that it 
is pro- 
Communist to create an educated workforce and improved working conditions, then 
the 
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South Korean state is actively encouraging a pro-Communist stance by equating such 
conditions with Communism. This interjection was duly reported in national 
newspapers, and it could be argued that it constituted a watershed in the already uneasy 
relationship between Yi So-sun and the machinery of political authority. From that 
moment onwards, the Park regime adopted a decidedly harder line in their response to 
the `problem' of Yi So-sun. 
Earlier in the year, and apparently as a result of some inexplicable bureaucratic 
oversight, Yi So-sun had been granted a passport and visa to enable her to travel to the 
United States. She had been invited by the Asian-American Free Trade Union 
Organisation to spend the month of August, 1977 touring the US and speaking at a 
series of labour conferences. Although it can only be speculation, it is, nevertheless, 
reasonable to draw the conclusion that the Park regime had become increasingly 
anxious at the prospect of Yi So-sun being given free rein to address labour 
organisations in America. She had demonstrated the effectiveness of her oratory on 
countless occasions, and the likelihood of her speeches gaining wide international 
publicity, beyond the reach of the Blue House censor machine, would be more worrying 
still. Thus, the effect of the aforementioned policy shift did not take long to manifest 
itself. On 22 July, 1977, barely one week after Yi So-sun had made her representation at 
the trial of the young law student, her house was surrounded by a cordon of armed 
policemen, and she was arrested. Yi So-sun had been bathing when the police burst 
in 
and, such was the urgency of their mission, she was not even permitted the courtesy of 
being allowed time to dress before being taken to Sungdong prison. 
9 Whilst this small 
woman was being bundled into a heavily guarded police vehicle in her underclothes, the 
officer in charge was standing outside the house addressing the neighbourhood through 
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a battery-powered loud hailer. The gist of his disclosures to the gathering crowd was 
that Yi So-sun's brother lived in Japan (which was true) and that he was a known 
Communist spy working for North Korea (which was untrue). Although her neighbours 
understood that Yi So-sun was travelling to America, the KCIA had detected that she 
was, in fact, going to Japan, a known hotbed of Communist activism, 10 to collude with 
her brother in an anti-Park Chung-hee plot. Yi So-sun's proven sympathy for the North 
Korean cause placed her in direct contravention of the aforementioned National 
Security Law, and she would be charged as such. 
On the same day that Yi So-sun was arrested, the labour education building 
rented by the Chonggye Union was raided by the police and closed down. The 
combination of these simultaneous events was the trigger for widely supported mass 
protest, which included among its protagonists Peace Market and many other workers; 
church leaders of the stature of Cardinal Kim Soo-hwan, and former President of South 
Korea Yun Po-sun who, together, formed the `Countermeasure Committee for the Peace 
Market Incident' (Sohn Hak-kyu, 1989). On the day following the arrest, and 
confirming what must have been the Park regime's worst fears, hundreds of workers 
gathered outside the prison in a tangible demonstration of support and anger. State 
concern about the frailty of the prosecution case was now compounded by the certainty 
of public reaction, but the administration was committed, and the case proceeded 
quickly, with the government hoping for a low-key trial. 
The Central Court list for 24 August, 1977 was cleared of all other business 
and the court authorities restricted admission to 300 ticket-holders only. More than one 
thousand people, from all sectors of society, turned up for the opening of the trial, and 
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those hundreds who were refused tickets remained outside the courtroom protesting 
vociferously. Faced with a prosecution case that was, to all intents and purposes, 
baseless, increasing public disquiet, and a heightened awareness of international 
sympathy for Yi So-sun, the court still handed down a sentence of three years 
imprisonment. The strength of the groundswell of opposition was reflected in the 
sentence being reduced on first appeal to two years imprisonment, and to one year on 
the second appeal. In all, Yi So-sun served 14 months in solitary confinement in Su- 
won women's prison, without access to physical exercise, before being released on 28 
September, 1978. 
During her time in prison, opposition to the Yushin reforms gained strength 
and spread throughout the country, fuelled, not least, by public awareness of her 
predicament. The Japanese trade union federation Chunpyoung made a film about her 
entitled simply: "Mother", which was banned from being shown in South Korea, and 
her plight was given world-wide publicity. ' 1 After her release, and utterly undeterred, 
Yi So-sun immediately resumed her endeavours to further the cause of democratic trade 
unionism. 12 She would be arrested again and again; serve more time in prison, spend 
more than six months in hiding from the police, be held for twenty days in KCIA 
headquarters, and endure physical beatings. Her resolve never weakened, and there can 
be no doubt that her contribution played a significant part in the mobilisation of public 
and international opinion, and the eventual downfall of the Park regime. It was to be 
only one year after she walked out of Su-won prison, after her first period of 
incarceration, before President Park Chung-hee was assassinated, and his infamous 
Yushin reforms brought to an abrupt end. 
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9.4 Summary 
This is not the `story' of Yi So-sun, and there are two reasons why it is not. 
First, because it is grossly incomplete and barely scratches the surface of the entirety of 
her experience in connection with the fight for democratic trade unionism over the last 
three decades. Second, and of far more importance, because it describes events and 
circumstances which pertain to countless other disenfranchised South Korean women 
who suffered the same impositions and who fought against them with equal tenacity and 
courage. The value of the experiences of Yi So-sun, in the context of this study, is that 
she acted as a `dual' focus: a focus for the aspirations of all workers in their struggle 
against brutal authoritarianism (and the investiture of the soubriquet `Mother' is graphic 
evidence of this), and a focus for the discrimination, the dishonesty, the inhumanity and, 
ultimately, the illegitimacy, of the state/capital/labour nexus in South Korea. Thus, any 
discussion about Yi So-sun inevitably draws together all the strands of the diverse 
social forces which dominated the scene throughout the Park Chung-hee era, and 
beyond. Furthermore, the focal nature of her experience and her achievement, added to 
the understanding that they were shared, and even surpassed, by so many other women, 
reinforces the fundamental proposition that forms the basis of this study. 
9.5 Han Soon-nim 
A different history is encapsulated in the life of Han Soon-nim, the second 
women leader. Little is known of the personal background of Han Soon-nim other than 
that she was born in 1951 and left school at age sixteen to work in a textile and garment 
factory. In 1971, after four years with her first employer, she changed jobs and was 
taken on at the Ban-do Sangsa Bu-pyung factory in Inchon, the major seaport and 
industrial Free Trade Zone, some twenty kilometres west of Seoul. As an intelligent and 
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articulate 20-year-old, Han Soon-nim worked in quality control where, within a short 
time, she was promoted to team leader of a quality control section. 
The Ban-do factory which Han Soon-nim joined was part of what was to 
become the Lucky Goldstar group, and manufactured wigs, leather garments, and shoes. 
Opened in May, 1969, the factory started with approximately thirty employees, but 
grew very rapidly indeed. After eighteen months the establishment had increased to 
eight hundred, and a two-shift system, each one of twelve hours duration, was 
introduced. By the time Han Soon-nirn arrived there were in excess of two thousand 
workers on the Ban-do payroll, and by the end of 1972, there were more than three 
thousand (Unpublished internal document, Ban-do Textile Branch Union, 1975). The 
ratio of female to male workers at that specific time cannot be ascertained with any 
degree of accuracy, but is estimated to have been in excess of nine to one (Interviews, 
ex-Ban-do women workers, January, 1999 and March, 2000). 
From the time it first opened, working conditions in the Ban-do factory were 
among the worst in the industry. Wages were low, even in comparison with other 
women textile workers in the locality, and overtime was compulsory when demanded 
by management. Dormitory standards were especially spartan: as in the Peace Market, 
no space was specifically designed for living accommodation and in the early part of the 
1970's some 800 women and young girls were expected to live in the factory 
warehouse, in makeshift `rooms', and sleep on concrete floors without the benefit of 
mattresses. At the beginning of 1974 there was a fire in this `dormitory' area 
in which 
thirty female workers were burned, and others injured in the panic to get out of a 
building for which no fire escape provision had been made. No compensation, of any 
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kind, for all those incapacitated was forthcoming from the Ban-do compan\' 
(Interviews, ex-Ban-do women workers, January, 1999) 
The glue used in the manufacture of wigs and leather garments was both 
pungent and toxic, so much so that it was necessary for the workers to tie dampened 
cloths over their mouths and noses throughout the working day. Although the women 
were all too aware that the fumes were injurious to health, and despite the fact that the 
size of the Ban-do workforce made the company, ostensibly, subject to the Labour 
Standard Law, no routine medical checks were conducted, and workers were afforded 
no legal protection (Interview, Chang Hyun-ja, former Vice-President of Ban-do Textile 
Branch Union, and President in 1977, December, 1998). The Ban-do Sangsa Bu-pyung 
factory had gained a reputation for encouraging a particularly violent management style, 
where the customary admonishment of female workers took the form of a slap of the 
face or a kick in the posterior (Unpublished internal memo, Ban-do Textile Branch 
Union, June, 1974, and interviews, ex-Ban-do workers, December, 1998). 
Bearing in mind the conditions so described, the reason why Han Soon-nim 
decided to take a position at Ban-do in the first place is open to conjecture. One factor is 
certain, however, it was not to be long before she was taking the initiative in organising 
her fellow-workers in protest against these working conditions. This opposition came to 
a head on 28 February, 1974, when the factory management found that a body of 
women workers, led by Han Soon-nim, had barricaded themselves in on the second 
floor of the factory declaring that this was not only a withdrawal of labour, but also a 
hunger strike, and that it would continue until six demands were met: 
i. A 60% increase in wages and abolition of enforced overtime, 
ii. Cessation of face slapping and other physical abuse, 
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iii. Violent members of supervisory staff to be punished, 
iv. Dormitory conditions to be improved, 
v. Workers to be provided with written job descriptions and company 
work policies; 
vi. The company President to sign an oath that the above provisions would be carried out 
(Unpublished Ban-do Textile Branch Union internal minutes, 1974) 
This first example of organised and determined industrial action clearly shook 
the company hierarchy. The strike had lasted for barely one day before the management 
made an offer which, on the face of it, constituted major concessions. However, in ways 
reminiscent of the Chonggye `agreement' described previously, the devil was to be both 
in the detail, and in the implementation. 
The Ban-do company agreed that: - 
i. Workers would be permitted to organise a trade union, and the 
company would enter into negotiation with the union over the question 
of wage increases, 
ii. Staff members who had been violent would be required to apologise. 
iii. Work on improving dormitories would begin as soon as weather 
permitted; 
iv. Company employment and work policies would be printed and 
promulgated, 
v. Overtime work would be on a voluntary basis, 
vi. Those who had participated in the industrial action would not be 
punished, 
vii. There must, henceforth, be a `no strike' agreement. 
(Unpublished Ban-do Textile Branch Union internal minutes, May, 1975). 
The women wasted no time in making the necessary arrangements 
for the 
setting up of Ban-do's first trade union, and the election of union officers was scheduled 
for 15 April, 1974. Sixteen candidates put themselves forward for the position of 
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President; eleven men and five women, of whom Han Soon-nim was one. The disparity 
in numbers between male and female aspirants had as much to do with the 
overwhelming popularity of Han Soon-nim among the women workers, and the 
consequential disinclination of other women to oppose her, as it did to the traditional 
Korean male assumption that if there was to be a position of leadership, it was assumed 
that it should be filled by a man. In the event, Han Soon-nim won the ballot by a large 
majority, receiving more than ten times the number of votes cast than her closest male 
rival, Park Chan-sik. 
In her inauguration speech, and after thanking her supporters, Han Soon-nim 
emphasised the importance of mutuality, and identified the areas to which she would 
immediately turn her attention: 
I now take responsibility for improving and developing our working 
conditions through the union. But the union is not mine, it is yours, and I 
ask for your continued support and participation in all union activities. I see 
as my priorities an immediate increase in wages, the introduction of a new 
scheme for retirement payment, an annual bonus scheme for skilled 
workers; improvements to our dormitories, and the introduction of an 
education programme for the 90% of women workers who have received no 
more than primary school education (Unpublished minutes, Formation of 
Union Conference, 15 April, 1974). 
Shortly after her election as president of the new Ban-do Textile Branch Union, 
Han Soon-nim was interviewed by a journalist from the Joong-Ang Ilbo national daily 
newspaper. In an article published on 2 May, 1974, under the headline: "23 Year-old 
Single Woman Han Soon-nirn Elected President of Ban-do Textile Branch Union", she 
is quoted as saying: 
There were so many problems to overcome before we were able to form a 
union, but I learned much from the Urban Industrial Mission13 and 
from 
other unions (see Chapter Ten) in the Inchon Free Trade Zone, they were all 
very supportive of our attempts to organise at the Ban-do company 
(Joong- 
Ang Ilbo, 1974). 
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The article came to the attention of Park Chan-sik, Han Soon-nim's beaten 
rival in the presidential election, who set about raising a petition opposing Han Soon- 
nim's legitimacy as president. He sent the petition, with a copy of the article attached, to 
the Ministry of Labour Affairs claiming that it proved that the union had not been 
organised with the best interests of the workers at heart, but was manipulated by 
external forces (the UIM) for its own, political, purposes. Because the union leadership 
was externally influenced it was, therefore, illegitimate and had no right to the union 
dues of `real' workers. Park's petition went on to claim that as Han Soon-nim did not 
truly represent Ban-do employees, the union should be disbanded and reformed along 
`proper' lines (Unpublished Ban-do Textile Branch Union document, 8 May, 1974). 
There was no question that the company fully endorsed Park Chan-sik's efforts 
to destabilise Han Soon-nim's leadership, but circumspection was necessary if public 
outcry, and considerable disquiet among the workforce, were to be avoided (Interview, 
former Vice-President Ban-do Textile Branch Union, March, 2000). Management and 
union met in negotiation for the first time on 30 May, 1974, with four representatives 
from each side being present. As a direct result of Han Soon-nim's confident, informed, 
and forceful presentation, normal business proceeded very satisfactorily, from the 
union perspective, and agreement was gained from management that: - 
i. Consideration would be given to the matter of compensation for the 
women injured in the fire at the beginning of the year [see above], 
ii. A written constitution, including an agreement on collective bargaining, 
would be produced by the company, 
iii. Work would begin shortly on improvements to the dormitories and 
associated facilities, 
iv. Union and management would meet on a regular basis on the 
15th of 
every month, 
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v. The company affirmed its intention to work closely with the union to 
ensure high productivity and the achievement of export targets. (Unpublished minutes, 30 May, 1974). 
With regard to Item v. above, however, the management representatives raised 
the issue of the Joong-Ang Ilbo article, and made it clear that its contents compromised 
the possibility of the fullest co-operation between the company and the union. The 
company said that Han Soon-nirn should not have discussed working conditions at Ban- 
do with the journalist, and her admitted influence by the UIM and other union 
organisations placed union recognition within Ban-do in jeopardy. As far as the 
company was concerned, Han Soon-nim must sever all contact with outside agencies 
forthwith. Han Soon-nim countered by insisting that unless Park Chan-sik withdrew his 
petition unreservedly, and taking into account the sweeping majority support she 
enjoyed, the establishment of a meaningful and effective industrial relations dialogue 
would not be possible. Management then played its trump card by first of all agreeing 
with Han Soon-nim's assessment of the situation and then declaring that the only 
resolution acceptable to the company was for the appointment of Park Chan-sik to the 
position of full-time Vice-President of the union in addition to the female, Chang Hyun- 
ja, who had already been elected to the post (a part-time post). So keen was the 
company to have Park infiltrated into the highest decision-making level of the union 
that it agreed to meet the cost of funding a full-time Vice-President14 (Unpublished 
negotiation minutes, 30 May, 1974). 
Despite Park Chan-sik's continued efforts to neutralise her effectiveness, Han 
Soon-nim achieved an extraordinary amount of improvement to working conditions at 
the Ban-do factory during the first year or so of her time in office. 
With untiring 
persistence and astute negotiation her successes included a 30% wage 
increase; the 
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abandonment of compulsory overtime, improvements to the dormitories, compensation 
paid to the women injured in the factory fire, observance of the Labour Standard Law 
with regard to the introduction of regular health checks, and an agreement on 
retirement pay, dependent upon the length of time served, backdated for three years 
(Unpublished Ban-do union records, 1975). For a woman to be elected leader of the first 
union in the Ban-do organisation was remarkable enough, but the exemplary manner in 
which she furthered the interests of her members in the face of great opposition won for 
Han Soon-nim the popularity and respect not only of those members, but of the far 
wider working community in Korea (Interviews, ex-Ban-do workers, December, 1998). 
The 1974 oil shock and the accompanying devaluation of the Korean won 
exacerbated an already high inflation rate and precipitated a substantial fall in real 
wages (Calverley, 1982). The inevitable corollary of such a circumstance was an 
increase in wage demands being submitted to employers by workers' representatives in 
early 1975. In March of that year, Han Soon-nim led the Ban-do Textile branch union 
delegation in its demand for a further 30% rise. 15 The company refused to countenance 
such an increase, and offered less than 20%. Despite protracted negotiation, no 
compromise could be found, and the union was forced to withdraw and reconsider. The 
executive committee decided that the company offer was unacceptable and, in the light 
of the Ban-do management's obduracy, agreed to recommend to their members a ban on 
all overtime, and a strict `work to rule' policy. 
This posed a real problem for the company: a major export order was nearing 
completion and shipping contracts had been signed for early April. The 
banning of 
voluntary overtime would place achievement of the deadline at severe risk. 
After four 
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days, management representatives returned to the bargaining table with an offer of a 
23% increase which, albeit with great reluctance, the union accepted (Interview, ex- 
members Ban-do branch union executive committee, April, 2000) 
The owners of Ban-do were deeply angered by this overt demonstration of 
organised opposition, and were determined to re-establish and reinforce what they 
regarded as their rightful, authoritarian, position vi. ti a ''is internal industrial relations. 
This marked cooling of the atmosphere between management and union coincided with 
the first indications that Han Soon-nirn was shifting her allegiance. 
9.5.1 From Rebel To (ollaborator 
Towards the middle of 1975, Han Soon-nim's colleagues began to detect a 
change both in her demeanour and in the performance of her presidential duties. It 
became increasingly noticeable that she was distancing herself from the other union 
officers on the executive committee, and spending more and more time with 
management, national-level union figures, and representatives of Park Chung-hee's 
labour administration. Han Soon-nim's social life also began to provide cause for 
concern among activists and rank and file members. Whereas she had previously always 
associated with her fellow-workers, and had used `out-of-working-hours' opportunities 
to foster two-way communication between union officers and union membership, 
reports began to filter back of her being regularly sighted at restaurants and nightclubs 
in the company of KCIA agents and leading figures in the NTWU16 (Interviews, ex- 
Ban-do Textile Branch Union executive committee members and ex-Ban-do workers, 
December, 1998). 
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Han Soon-nim had been so popular and so productive throughout her time at 
Ban-do, and especially so during her first year in office, that it was tempting for her 
colleagues to cling initially to the possibility that her association with individuals who 
might, in normal circumstances, be regarded as inappropriate, was actually being 
effected for the benefit of her constituents. After all, if their president could establish 
such good relations with those who had the power of change within their hands, her 
effectiveness on their behalf could be greatly enhanced, and the outcomes of these 
`extra-curricular' associations could be highly beneficial to the workforce. The first 
intimation that such hopes were groundless came at the 1975 annual meeting of the 
Ban-do Textile Branch Union, held in May. From her very earliest days at the company, 
Han Soon-nim had focused her efforts exclusively on the interests of workers, and 
during her first year as president of the union she had not deviated from the pursuit of 
those interests. In her opening speech to the assembled union members, however, she 
revealed a political facet much in line with her erstwhile adversaries at the NTWU, '7 the 
FKTU, and the anti-communist ideologues in the Park Chung-hee administration: 
Fellow delegates, comrades. Our nation faces serious insecurity because of 
the problems posed by the idiotic leader of North Korea, Kim Il-sung, who 
remains ever vigilant for the opportunity to overthrow South Korea by 
military force. We are living in a divided land, we know what happened in 
Vietnam, and we must prepare ourselves to fight against communism. Only 
a strong anti-communist spirit will bring us victory. We must be prepared to 
sacrifice ourselves for the achievement of high productivity because 
economic success is the only way to protect our nation from communist 
invasion. Fellow comrades, this year's wage increase may not be 
satisfactory, but we must bear in mind that the textile industry has been less 
successful than last year, so the export situation is not as bright. With this in 
mind, I hope you all understand that we must accept the wage that has been 
offered by the company (Unpublished record of Ban-do union annual 
meeting, 1975). 
It is not difficult to imagine the concern and confusion with which these words 
were greeted; words which could so easily have been uttered by Park 
Chung-hee 
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himself, and certainly not expressive of sentiments expected from one in Han Soon- 
nim's position. 
One month after the May speech, and as the result of the recently introduced 
routine health checks, thirty women workers were diagnosed as having contracted 
tuberculosis of the lungs. '8 Fifteen of these women were in the advanced stages of the 
illness, and were clearly in need of urgent medical treatment. What they actually 
received was instant dismissal, without compensation. Han Soon-min accepted the 
decision on behalf of the union with apparent equanimity and, without even consulting 
her fellow executive committee members, placed the union seal on the company's 
dismissal notice. This was but the first example of an increasing number of instances 
when Han Soon-nim failed to consult with her fellow union officers and, instead, 
assumed dictatorial authority, much in line with the leadership style of those erstwhile 
adversaries (Interviews, ex-Ban-do branch union executive committee members, 
December, 1998). 
The most blatant act of disloyalty occurred a few weeks after the tuberculosis 
incident and concerned repercussions from the four day work-to-rule action of the 
previous March. It is clear that the Ban-do owners and management continued to nurse 
a growing antipathy towards those who had been instrumental in organising the protest. 
The early April shipping date had been missed and Ban-do had been required to pay 
compensation both to the customer and to the shipping company. Reprisals were clearly 
high on the management agenda (Interview, ex-Ban-do branch union executive 
committee members, December, 1998). 
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The monthly meeting in July between management and union delegates lasted 
all day, and the item that caused such protracted debate was the management demand to 
know the names of the prime movers in the organisation of the March work to rule. 
When Chang Hyun-ja, the female Vice-President, was accused directly of playing the 
leading role she responded by saying that the executive committee, including the 
President, Han Soon-nim, had been unanimous in their support of the action. When 
pressed, Han Soon-nim agreed that such was the case. The company representatives 
appeared reluctant to accept this assertion and the meeting finally closed after it had 
been mutually agreed that resolution of the problem would be left in the hands of Han 
Soon-nim and the factory director (Interview, Chang Hyun-ja, March, 2000). 
Prior to her meeting with the factory director, Han Soon-nim avoided all 
contact with the other members of the executive committee. She was equally reclusive 
after the meeting. The first intimation of what had been agreed was provided by a young 
woman who, in her role as union secretary, saw a document, signed by both the factory 
director and Han Soon-nim, which decreed that the female Vice-President and six 
executive committee members should be dismissed. Fortunately, the union secretary had 
the initiative to show the document immediately to Chang Hyun-ja, who set out to 
locate Han Soon-nim and confront her with the evidence of her duplicity. 
19 The result 
of the heated exchange that ensued between the two women was that Han Soon-nim was 
left with no alternative other than to go back to management and advise them that if the 
dismissals were to go ahead there would be very serious reaction from the workforce 
(Interview, Chang Hyun-ja, March, 2000). 
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Although the company had been forced to withdraw the notice of dismissal of 
the seven union executive committee members, the die had clearly been cast with regard 
to the tripartite relationship between Ban-do, the branch union, and the branch union 
president. Conflicts between Han Soon-nim and her fellow executive committee 
members escalated, while the rank and file membership rapidly lost all respect and trust 
in their president. Two factors mitigated against her removal from office, however, and 
union members had to stand by and watch the organisation for which they had fought so 
hard lose virtually all effectiveness. The first factor was a purely constitutional one: no 
mechanism existed whereby Han Soon-nim could be legitimately removed from the 
presidency before the end of her three year term, and she certainly showed no 
inclination to consider resignation. The second factor in her favour was that she had by 
now, to all intents and purposes, converted an autonomous, democratic, and progressive 
branch union into little more than a toothless and obedient `oyong' organisation. This 
turn of events suited the Ban-do company very well, and the level of support afforded 
by management to the union president reflected that appreciation. A number of 
approaches to Han Soon-nim were made during 1976 by union members who tried to 
persuade her to sever her ties with management and national-level figures, and to regain 
the deserved reputation as a dedicated fighter for the cause of democratic labour that she 
had previously enjoyed. All entreaties fell upon deaf, and angry, ears (Interviews, ex- 
Ban-do workers and ex-executive committee members, December, 1998). 
Han Soon-nim's first, and final, term of office ended at the annual branch 
union conference, held on 27 March, 1977, when she was voted out by a majority 
comparable with that by which she had been elected three years previously. 
Chang 
Hyun-ja, the embattled female Vice-President who had been betrayed by Han 
Soon- 
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nim, and so nearly dismissed in July, 1975, replaced her, and became the second 
president of Ban-do Textile branch union20 (Unpublished conference minutes, Ban-do 
Union, 1977). 
As tacit confirmation that Han Soon-nim's loyalty had, indeed, undergone a 
diametric shift, she was appointed as a full-time officer of the NTWU in August, 1977, 
with specific responsibility for the women's section of that government-controlled 
organisation. As an `education' lecturer, her objective was to `realign' and `refocus' 
women workers' attitudes towards organised labour. What this meant in reality was the 
systematic undermining of female worker initiative throughout the country (Interview, 
ex-NTWU officer, February, 1999). 
A more obvious case of `the poacher turned gamekeeper' would be difficult to 
find, and Han Soon-nim's first target of significance after being taken on by the NTWU 
was the Dong-il Textile Company branch union and, more specifically, its female 
president, Lee Chong-gak (see Chapter Eight). The NTWU rented rooms at the 
Moonwha Hotel, close to the Dong-il factory in Inchon, for Han Soon-mm to use as her 
operational base. Dong-il women workers were invited to attend lectures at the hotel in 
the belief that they would concern safety at work, quality control, or some other work- 
related topic. 21 When assembled, they were addressed by Han Soon-nim along the 
following lines: 
The Dong-il branch union is linked with the UIM, and the UIM is a 
communist organisation, you cannot believe anything they say, but you can 
trust your management, so you must listen to them. I know what I am 
talking about because I, myself, was once a member of a UIM team until 
I 
discovered that they are led by communists. Be careful, do not meet with 
any UIM members or even speak to them (Unpublished record compiled 
by 
Dong-il branch union, 1978). 
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On occasions when members of the audience voiced objections either to having been 
brought to the hotel under false pretences or, more frequently, to the content of the 
lectures themselves, the objectors were manhandled by NTWU thugs disguised as hotel 
employees, and subjected to various indignities designed to preclude further dissent. As 
knowledge of what was going on at the Moonwha Hotel became more widely 
disseminated, Han Soon-nim simply moved her locus of operation to another hotel, and 
worker `education' proceeded as normal (Interviews, ex-Dong-il workers, November, 
1998 - April, 1999, and ex-NTWU officer, February, 1999). It is worthy of note that, 
according to the ex-NTWU officer interviewed, the individual in overall charge of Han 
Soon-nim's programme was the then Organising Secretary of the NTWU, Park Kun-sik, 
whom Han Soon-nim married in 1981. 
9.6 Summary 
The experiences of Yi So-sun and Han Soon-nim are important, in the context 
of this study because, although differing in substance, they complement each other in 
the illumination of the wider social, economic, political, and cultural circumstances 
which pertained in South Korea during the period under consideration. Circumstances 
which are crucial to the fullest understanding of the pattern of evolution of `modern' 
Korea. Whereas little is known of Han Soon-vim's early years, those of Yi So-sun 
provide graphic evidence of what life was like for the majority of the Korean population 
both before and after the Korean War. As a young woman, Han Soon-nim was an 
independently minded and fervent trade unionist with pronounced leadership qualities 
whilst, on the other hand, Yi So-sun was struggling to rear her children within a 
traditionally patriarchal family, and was as vehemently opposed to all trade union 
activity as Han Soon-nirn was supportive of it. Then the lives of both women underwent 
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diametric changes in remarkably similar ways. For Yi So-sun, the emotional trauma of 
the death of her eldest son converted her, in a matter of hours, from an anti-trade 
unionist into the most dedicated proponent of the cause of working people. For Han 
Soon-nim, some other event, possibly emotional, possibly financial, caused her to 
abandon her oppressed constituents and join the `enemy'. Negative became positive, 
and positive became negative, negative, that is, insofar as it retarded, negated, or even 
reversed, the dynamic toward the achievement of democratic trade unionism. 
From the very beginning, Korean women labour activists met varying degrees 
of opposition from other women workers in their endeavours to elevate their social 
identity and industrial circumstance. That opposition which was grounded in fear, 
naivete, or self-interest could be alleviated, if not eradicated, by processes of education, 
persuasion, example, and collective strength. Furthermore, they were manifestations of 
readily understandable human emotions with which most activists could relate, if not 
actually sympathise. The detrimental effect of one such as Han Soon-nim, however, 
proved far more difficult to counter. In the first place, her activities must certainly have 
lent strength to the male dominated national-level union and the FKTU and, by 
extension, to the Park Chung-hee regime itself. Whether this very high profile woman 
had been targeted and `turned' by the instruments of the state, or whether she had `seen 
the error of her ways' of her own volition, the outcome was the same. She had seen, and 
been deeply involved in, the activities of women trade unionists and she had come to 
recognise that, in her assessment, they were misguided, manipulated, and ultimately 
subversive. 
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As far as uncommitted young women workers were concerned, and not only 
those in the textile industry, the state-funded publicity afforded to Han Soon-nim's 
newly acquired convictions must have acted as a further deterrent against becoming 
involved in trade unionism. She was, after all, speaking from a position of knowledge 
and experience and, perhaps most important of all, she was, or had been, `one of them'. 
Others among the uncommitted may well have been fully converted to her assertions 
about where their duties to their country lay. Han Soon-nim had been a member of a 
UIM, she knew all about that supposedly Christian organisation, and so if anyone was 
in a position to comprehend its communist agenda and the threat it posed to South 
Korean security, surely it was she. Meanwhile others, perhaps the youngest or the more 
timid, would have been, understandably, frightened off both by the power of the rhetoric 
and the violence of the tactics employed. Even among the most fervent and dedicated of 
activists, the shock of seeing and hearing a woman leader who had been so successful 
and so respected turn against her colleagues and fellow workers and, in effect, admit 
publicly that she had been wrong, must have given cause for deep concern and 
introspection and, perhaps, even doubt. 
Finally, and arguably most damaging of all considering the great importance of 
public support, were the repercussions of the Han Soon-nim case in the wider Korean 
community. As has been discussed previously in this study, deeply ingrained Confucian 
ethics and codes of social behaviour continue to exert influence, even to the present day, 
and fundamental to that philosophy is the place and role of women. Women were 
subordinate to men; they did what they were told without question, and it was certainly 
an affront for them to even consider combining in mass protest against their male 
superiors. When workers in the textile industry did just that, and when they actually 
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started to make real headway, attitudes in society must have begun to change: perhaps 
women had rights after all. When details of Han Soon-vim's apostasy reached beyond 
the industrial confines, how easy it must have been for the unenlightened to regard the 
recent initiatives of young working women merely as a transient aberration. 
A more perceptive examination of the two cases discussed in this chapter will, 
however, reveal that the positive contributions made by women such as Yi So-sun not 
only far outweighed the counter effects of reactionary propaganda, but also made 
substantial inroads into the refutation of `the conventional view'. The assertion that the 
women's labour movement in the 1970's was characterised by its predominantly 
economic nature is undercut by the experience of Yi So-sun. Far from being a young, 
single woman devoid of family responsibilities and seeking only to increase the amount 
of money she could take home and spend upon herself, as the `typical' female activist 
was portrayed, Yi So-sun was a widow approaching middle-age who, after 1970, was 
left alone to provide for three young children. Had personal economics been at the 
forefront of her mind, the extravagant bribes which she was offered on at least two 
occasions, allied with the gross indignities she suffered, would have engineered an 
abrupt cessation of all of her `subversive' activities. Whereas, on the contrary, they 
served only to reinvigorate her determination to struggle on for democracy. 
The conventional belief that the women's labour movement did not, in reality, 
have that democratic principle as its bedrock is clearly thrown into question by the 
departure from the trade union scene of Han Soon-nim. After being elected as president 
on a free vote, and despite the very substantial power and institutional support she 
accrued to herself whilst in office, she was removed from the presidency at the earliest 
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time possible, and with equal facility, once she had demonstrated that she was no longer 
acting in the interests of her constituents. Hard as she might have tried to convert the 
Ban-do industrial relations structure into what de Tocqueville (1856) termed 
`democratic despotism', and regardless of the backing she enjoyed from the machinery 
of an authoritarian state, Han Soon-nim was ultimately unable to overcome the growing 
strength of a nascent, and democratically based, worker organisation. 
In the final analysis, it is fortunate indeed that there were women of sufficient 
grit and determination among the workers at the Peace Market, Ban-do, Dong-il, YH, 
and all the other sweat-shop factories throughout Korea who knew that they had right on 
their side, and that it would take considerably more than the machinations of the state, 
the national-level unions, and one renegade ex-branch union president to deflect them 
from their purpose. 
The next chapter examines the way the nascent trade unionism in the textile 
and garment industry developed so as to provide a base and reference point for the two 
women leaders just portrayed. Their activity on behalf of unions and in relation to trade 
unionism is defined by the struggle of the women workers to establish progressive 
forms of collective organisation in the face of marked opposition from employers and 
the state. These are the themes that are now addressed. 
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NOTES 
' It should be noted that, in many Asian countries including Korea, the method of age 
calculation differs in two main respects from that used in Europe. In Korea, the Lunar, 
rather than the Gregorian, calendar is adhered to, and a child is `aged 1' from the date of 
conception. 
2 The extant practice was for the shidas to be paid by, and at the discretion of, the oya- 
machinists (see Chapter Seven). 
3 The document was placed on file in the Chonggye Union headquarters but was 
confiscated and, presumably, destroyed during one of the many raids on the office 
carried out by the KCIA in the 1970's (Interview, Yi So-sun, February, 2000). 
4 For example, in September, 1977, five workers on trial under national security 
legislation each referred to their `Mother', Yi So-sun, in their evidence. The officiating 
magistrate remonstrated with the accused for using this form of address, and advised the 
court that such a practice was clear confirmation of the influence of North Korea, 
where the leader, Kim Il-sung, was always afforded the title `Father'. 
5 Park Chung-hee despised Kim Dae-jung, his vocal, civilian, opponent, who he had 
defeated by the most unimpressive margin in the 1971 presidential election. The 
President's paranoia did not stop with the drastic changes of the Yushin reforms, 
however, and on 8 August, 1973, KCIA agents kidnapped Kim Dae-jung from a Tokyo 
hotel and planned to dispose of him at sea somewhere between Japan and Korea. The 
Japanese police had learned about the abduction and informed the American CIA. The 
American ambassador to Korea, Phillip Habib, rushed to the Blue House and bluntly 
told Park Chung-hee that the US government wanted Kim returned alive. Five days after 
the kidnapping, a bruised and drugged Kim Dae-jung was abandoned on the street near 
his Seoul home (Oh Kie-chiang, 1999) Although American pressure secured his release 
he, nevertheless, spent most of the time between 1973 and 1979 either in prison or 
under house arrest. In 1980 he was sentenced to death, the international community, 
once again, came to his aid and the sentence was rescinded (Clifford, 1994). 
6 Under the proportional representation system in effect at the time, the award of a 
specified number of parliamentary seats was within the gift of party leaders. 
It was customary for the Park regime to hold `political' prisoners in custody between 
the time of their arrest and the time of their trial; this period was frequently of many 
months, even years, duration. 
8 This statute was put into effect on 13 May, 1975. Article 1 set the tone for the 
remaining thirteen Articles by stating: 
It shall be prohibited for any person to deny, oppose, distort or defame the 
Constitution (Laws and Documents, Korea Annual, 1979). 
9 This was highly unusual procedure. Normally, arrested persons were taken to police 
HQ and held for 72 hours before being committed to prison to await trial. During the 72 
hour period they would be escorted to the Public Prosecutor's office, allowed access to 
legal advice, and family visits were permitted. So concerned were the authorities at the 
prospect of public disorder taking place during Yi So-sun's subsequent transfers from 
police HQ to and from the Prosecutor's office, and eventually to prison, that they 
bypassed the intermediate custody location, took Yi So-sun direct to prison, where the 
Public Prosecutor visited her, and held her there incommunicado. 
10 A belief greatly reinforced in the mind of Park Chung-hee after the assassination of 
his wife, Yook Yung-soo, by a Korean who was resident in Japan, on 15 August, 1974 
(Yang Sung-chul, 1981). 
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11 For example, in their October 1978 press release concerning a `Women and Global Corporations' conference, held in Des Moines, Iowa, USA, the American Friends 
Service Committee focussed on Yi So-sun's case. 12 Indeed, a mere two weeks after her release from prison, Yi So-sun was arrested for 
attending a rally in support of the 126 dismissed women workers at the Dong-il textile 
factory. She was severely beaten and held for one week in Dongdaernoon police station. 13 The UIM was a pivotal Protestant organisation which, along with its Catholic 
counterpart, Jeunesse Ouvriere Chretienne (JOC) or Young Catholic Workers 
Organisation, offered unique support to the Korean labour movement. 
In the vanguard of Christian action in the struggle for democracy were the 
UIM and the JOC. Recognising the miserable working conditions of Korean 
labourers, these two organisations were founded for powerless low-income 
workers to help them gain their basic rights as workers and human beings. 
Though labour unions in Korea have long since become instruments of the 
government and are completely controlled by the KCIA, the UIM and JOC 
organisations have not yielded to all kinds of pressures and threats, but have 
worked fearlessly to throw light on the darkened existence of the Korean 
workers (Emergency Christian Conference on Korean Problems (ECCKP) 
Documents on the Struggle for Democracy in Korea, 1975). 
14 The union executive committee reluctantly accepted the proposal but, from that time 
onwards, it became necessary to conduct `dual' committee meetings, one with Park 
Chan-sik present and one without his knowledge. The reason for this duplication was 
that it became immediately apparent that when Park participated, a full report of 
everything said by the committee was relayed back to management (Interview, female 
Vice-President, March 2000). 
15 The magnitude of this demand, and the award achieved in the previous year, must be 
measured against the excessively low base-line of wages paid by the Ban-do company. 
16 In 1981, Han Soon-nim married Park Kun-sik, the Organising Secretary of the 
NTWU. 
17 The Financial Secretary of the Ban-do union confirmed that the relationship between 
Han Soon-nim and officers of the NTWU became very close, and that Han Soon-nim 
gave every indication that she was actually acting under instructions from that 
organisation (Interview, Education Secretary, December, 1998). It is pertinent to note 
the NTWU's philosophy with regard to the manner in which presidents of branch 
unions should view their responsibilities. In 1975, the NTWU's recruitment officer, 
Nim Dong-soo, advised women activists at the YH Textile Company, who were in the 
process of organising a branch union: 
The president's job is very simple and easy. All you have to do is walk 
around the workplace in the morning to see if there are any problems, then 
spend the remainder of the day sitting in a well-upholstered swivel chair, 
swinging from side to side, and reading the newspaper. Or you can go to the 
coffee-shop and drink coffee (History of the YH Textile branch union, 
18 
1984). 
Bad social and environmental conditions are conducive to the contraction of 
tuberculosis, and the symptoms can include the spitting of blood, fatigue, loss of weight, 
and the cessation of menstruation (Brown, 1965). All of these signs were commonplace 
among women textile workers in the 1960's and 1970's. 
281 
19 The legal process in effect at the time required appeal against dismissal to be lodged 
prior to the actual date of termination of employment, thus prior knowledge of 
management intent was imperative. 
20 Immediately prior to the election, Chang Hyun-ja was approached by representatives 
of the NTWU who threatened that unless she withdrew her candidature and threw her 
support behind Han Soon-nim the Ban-do branch union would be expelled from the 
NTWU. Confident of her grass-roots support, and understandably dismissive of the 
worth of NTWU membership, Chang Hyun-ja refused to step down. After her election 
as president, the relationship between branch and national-level deteriorated rapidly, 
and the Ban-do union was expelled from the NTWU in 1978 (Interview, Chang Hyun- 
ja, March, 2000). 
21 On occasions, they were invited to the hotel to attend a `farewell party' for a worker 
who was leaving (Interviews, ex-Dong-il workers, November, 1998 - April, 1999) 
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CHAPTER TEN 
THE BIRTH OF DEMOCRATIC TRADE UNIONISM AND THE DEATH OF A 
DICTATOR 
"Large streams from little fountains flow, tall oaks from little acorns grow ". 
(David Everett) 
10.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter emphasis was placed on the importance of biography, 
as a history of action, in the study of social conditions and social change. As far as 
women workers in the Korean textile and garment industry in the 1970's were 
concerned, their vision of the world was determined by their position in a system of 
production relations and a growing awareness that that position located them within a 
`class'. Having already examined some of the actions, and the resultant contributions to 
the democratisation project, of two pre-eminent individuals, the theme of `action' is 
developed further in this chapter although, in this case, the action will be predominantly 
collective rather than individual. Encompassed within that thematic umbrella will be a 
number of diverse, yet interconnected, strands which, together, reinforce the main thrust 
of this study and, most critically, constitute the empirical base upon which its argument 
stands. 
This chapter will set out to establish, first of all, the seminal importance of the 
role of women in the formation and development of the Chonggye Union; then illustrate 
the significance of the Chonggye Union in the spread of democratic unionism across 
industrial boundaries in South Korea during the 1970's and, finally, demonstrate the 
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linkage between the growth of democratic unionism and the rise of popular political 
protest that culminated in the assassination of President Park Chung-hee and the 
termination of his pernicious Yushin reforms. As a corollary to this endeavour, the 
degree of misunderstanding, misinterpretation, and deliberate misrepresentation that 
combined to produce the `conventional view' of modern Korean history, enunciated in 
Chapter Three, will be fully revealed. 
The chapter includes a description of the beginning, and the subsequent `ripple' 
effect, of the expansion of democratic trade unionism, and show that, far from being a 
random series of isolated occurrences, it was, in fact, a chain of connected and mutually 
sustaining events. The inability of both the state and the employers to abandon their 
deeply ingrained propensity for sophistry, collusion, and deceit, despite written and 
legally binding agreements, will be proven beyond doubt, as will the true extent of the 
personal sacrifices that female, and some male, workers were collectively prepared to 
make in order to achieve their human and industrial rights. Also described will be an 
ideal example of a circumstance where the `factory consciousness' (Beynon, 1973), 
grounded in work experience, extended beyond the factory into a political expression of 
the interests of the embryonic Korean working class. Thus, in the process these women 
began to question and challenge the constraints of capitalist and state institutions. That 
the project of the Korean textile and garment workers developed beyond the parochial 
into the political, in its most acute sense, will be amply demonstrated in the 
establishment of direct linkages between the increasingly potent and widespread impact 
of the activities and achievements of those women workers, and the groundswell of 
public opinion that culminated in the assassination of President Park Chung-hee 
in 
October, 1979. There are, however, two `background' matters to which attention should 
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first be drawn in order that the fullest appreciation of the points raised in the main body 
of the chapter may be gained. 
In the light of the singular and specific raison d'etre of this study; that is, the 
establishment of the rightful place of women textile and garment workers in the 
conception and practical implementation of the democratic ethos in the South Korean 
labour movement, the degree of male involvement in the establishment of the first 
democratic trade union may appear anomalous. Furthermore, and taking into account 
the highly critical tenor of this study's account of the activities of the Federation of 
Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), an accusatory strand that has been consistent throughout 
the work, the fact that officials of that discredited organisation should be welcomed by 
women into positions of leadership in their new union is likely to give rise to even 
greater confusion and ambiguity. With regard to the former, it should be explained that 
during 1969 and 1970, Chun Tae-il gathered around him a small group of like-minded 
male friends who were determined to bring about radical change in the conditions of 
garment workers in the Peace Market. They called themselves `The Society of Fools': 
`fools' in the ironic sense of their quixotic awareness of the magnitude of the task they 
were undertaking. After Chun Tae-il's death, the remaining `fools' joined with Yi So- 
sun, Chun Tae-il's mother, and supported her in the formation of the Chonggye Union 
(Cho Yong-rae, 1984). Because they were all Korean males, as opposed to females, 
their general level of education and, indeed, self-confidence, was markedly higher than 
that of their female colleagues, whilst their close association with Chun Tae-il meant 
that they were held in esteem by the women workers in the Peace Market. These two 
factors combined to make members of the Society of Fools eminently acceptable as 
leading figures in the new trade union. 
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With regard to the point concerning FKTU involvement, what must be 
understood, and what may be more difficult to comprehend in the western industrial 
relations context, is the degree of naivety, indeed ignorance, that existed in that country 
and during that period on the part of workers with regard to the existence, the purpose, 
and the achievements, of their national and federation-level trade institutions. Although 
union subscriptions were deducted at source from their already minuscule wages, few of 
the women and young girls in the textile industry had more than the faintest idea of 
what precisely they were funding (Interviews, women workers, November, 1997- 
January, 1998, November, 1998-February, 1999). In addition to this lack of awareness 
and knowledge was the underlying, yet ever-present, deferment to hierarchy, and the 
inordinate respect for education, which remain two of the hallmarks of Confucian 
ideology (Kim Kihwan, 1993). 
The second imperative is to try to convey the physical and emotional condition 
of the worker participants in the events post-November, 1970. We are here discussing 
thousands of workers, most of whom were girls or young women from under-privileged 
rural backgrounds, whose working conditions were universally appalling, and which are 
described in detail elsewhere in this study. As a result of routine ill-treatment, 
inadequate facilities, and bare subsistence wages, the great mass of workers were under- 
nourished, in very poor health, and emotionally and physically exhausted. Even had 
they, as a group, been at the peak of intellectual and physical strength, the 
overwhelming power of the state/employer opposition axis would still have been 
daunting in the extreme. Added to this, of course, was the perennial handicap of 
being 
female, and bearing the weight of centuries of oppression justified merely by 
biological 
difference. In such circumstances it is entirely comprehensible that these women were 
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frequently driven close to the edge of despair and, therefore, could be excused for not 
always acting, and responding to events, in a calm and rational manner (Interviews, 
women workers, December, 1997). 
10.1 The First Democratic Trade Union 
Despite having gained formal approval, signed by the Minister of Labour 
Affairs on 17 November, 1970, for the formation of a trade union and for the siting of 
two union offices, one in the Peace Market building and the other at the nearby Dong- 
hwa Market (see Chapter Nine), Yi So-sun and her worker associates found, to their 
dismay, that when they attempted to begin making preparations for the launch of the 
new union, the employers at both locations had locked the allocated rooms and refused 
to allow entry to the union organisers. Saddened and angered by this early 
demonstration of the employers unwillingness to cooperate, Yi So-sun and her group 
repaired to a lodging house where they rented a room in which debate concerning the 
nature of their response strategy continued throughout the night. Agreement was finally 
reached to mount a protest demonstration outside the Ministry of Labour to insist upon 
the full implementation of the original agreement. After listening to their representation, 
a Senior Secretary at the ministry agreed to discuss the matter with the employers. The 
following day, 24 November, 1970, he contacted Yi So-sun and advised her that a `new 
agreement' had been reached with the employers and that instead of two offices the new 
union would be permitted to use only one small room, situated on the roof of the Peace 
Market building. The room was the size of the average western domestic lounge, some 
twenty-five square metres, and was to house a trade union organisation whose 
catchment membership was in excess of 27,000, and which encompassed well 
in excess 
of 800 separate factories, none of which had any legal protection whatsoever 
for their 
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employees (Unpublished record, Chonggye Union, 1971, and interview, Yi So-sun, 
March, 2000). 
Three important lessons were learned, or re-emphasised, as a result of this first, 
albeit relatively minor, experience at the interface between theory and practice. First, 
the employers would continue to place every possible obstacle in the path of those who 
were striving to establish a democratic union; second, the state bureaucracy was unable, 
or unwilling, to strictly enforce legal agreements into which it had entered with 
elements of the democratic labour movement and, third, Yi So-sun and her colleagues 
did not possess either the experience or the expertise to spearhead the formation of an 
institution that could shift the centre of gravity of South Korean industrial relations and 
effectively represent the mass of textile and garment workers. Not only were they 
cognisant of their inadequacy for the task, but they were also aware that there was 
nowhere they could go, and no-one to whom they could turn, for advice and guidance. 
10.2 FKTU And Employer Involvement 
Chun Tae-il's death on 13 November, 1970, was the trigger for major 
demonstrations in and around the textile and garment district of central Seoul, and many 
protestors were arrested and held in custody in the headquarters of the 
Seoul 
Metropolitan Police. Among those confined in the Dong-daemoon cells as a 
consequence of their participation in the public demonstration was 
Choi Chong-in, one 
of Chun Tae-il's closest friends and a member of the `Society of Fools'. 
He recalls: 
Whilst I was being held by the police, Kim Song-gil, who 
introduced 
himself as the International Secretary of the FKTU, came to visit me. 
This 
was the first time I had even heard of the FKTU, and 
he was very 
convincing. He promised me that the federation was on the side of 
the 
democratic labour movement and that he would do everything 
in his power 
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to help and guide us in our attempts to improve working conditions. I had no 
reason not to believe him (Interview, Choi Chong-in, January, 1999). 1 
Two days after Yi So-sun and the remainder of the Chonggye organisers had 
been allocated the `office' on the roof of the Peace Market, three men, all of whom were 
unknown to the Chonggye group, introduced themselves and declared that they were 
well versed in the intricacies of industrial relations and wished to offer their services in 
organising the new union. One of them, Hwang Kyung-un, went so far as to nominate 
himself as a candidate for the position of President. An older, and much respected male 
garment worker, who was not one of the central core of organisers, warned Yi So-sun 
and her colleagues to exercise the greatest caution in their dealings with these three 
characters because of their close affiliation with the employers. At approximately the 
same time, Kim Song-gil, the FKTU official who had visited Choi Chong-in when he 
was in police custody, also offered himself for consideration as first president of the 
union (Interviews, Yi So-sun and Choi Chong-in, March, 2000). 
Thus, the group of democratic activists, so naive and untutored in the arena of 
institutional procedures and organisational imperatives, found themselves 
in an 
invidious position at the very moment when informed and impartial advice was most 
desperately required, and was most conspicuously absent. They were all too conscious 
that none of them was sufficiently qualified, experienced, or confident to undertake 
the 
leadership role, whilst the only alternatives which had presented themselves were 
in the 
form of representatives from either the employers or the FKTU. 
This would have 
proved a totally untenable situation had it not been for the fact that none of 
the workers 
knew anything about the disreputable history of the FKTU and, therefore, 
had no reason 
to question the sincerity of its representative, Kim Song-gil. 
Furthermore, it will be 
289 
recalled that the two most crucial provisions agreed to by the Ministry of Labour in its 
negotiations with Yi So-sun at the time of Chun Tae-il's death (see Chapter Nine) 
centred around the involvement of the FKTU and the Ministry itself in assisting in the 
implementation of Yi So-sun's demands. It was, therefore, not unreasonable, especially 
in the light of their pressing need to maintain momentum, for the Chonggye activists, 
and their constituents, to look upon the FKTU's initiatives with more favour than those 
of the employers. 
The imperative to maintain momentum is very relevant here, and it should not 
be overlooked that it took only nine days from the date of Chun Tae-il's funeral, which 
took place on 18 November, 1970, to officially inaugurate the first democratic trade 
union in South Korea on 27 November, 1970. The inaugural conference was held on 
FKTU premises and was chaired by the FKTU General Secretary. It was attended by 56 
delegates, representing the 560 workers who had already joined the union during the 
nine day preparation period, who duly elected Kim Song-gil, the ex-International 
Secretary of the FKTU, as first president in preference to the `employer's 
representative', Hwang Kyung-un. Chun Tae-il's close friend, Choi Chong-in, was 
elected to the office of full-time Vice-President. A female worker, Yoo Chong-sook, 
was elected as part-time Vice-President, whilst the remaining staff posts all went to ex- 
members of the Society of Fools (Chonggye Union Annual Report, 1971). The state, in 
the guise of the Ministry of Labour and the FKTU, had publicly declared its support for 
the democratic aspirations of the workers in one of the most important sectors of the 
Korean economy: the employers, meanwhile, had remained obdurate in their opposition. 
That such an overt gesture on the part of the Park Chung-hee regime was 
little more 
than a sham, and that the employers, with the full connivance of government, would not 
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shrink from any tactic to obstruct the endeavours of the new union, would not take long 
to become apparent. 
Shortly after the Chonggye Union was formed, members of staff erected a 
placard near to the office on the roof of the Peace Market which was designed to 
publicise the union and attract new members. Its message read: 
Let us unite all workers in the Peace Market. Join the union that was 
achieved through the death of a colleague, and fight for your rights. 
Immediately the placard was sighted by members of the Peace Market Corporation, the 
police were called and union staff were ordered to remove the sign. When they refused 
to comply with the instruction, the police stood guard while Peace Market security 
officers tore the offending placard down (Chonggye Union Annual Report, 1971). The 
relevance of this incident is to be found in the fact that because workers in the Peace 
Market were employed in a myriad of small, independent factories, it was not easy for a 
trade union organisation to communicate directly with each and every member of the 
workforce. One way of overcoming this was to display publicity material at a location 
readily observable by everyone travelling to and from their place of work, and the roof 
of the Peace Market was ideally suited. It was, however, clearly in the interest of the 
employers to restrict as much as they possibly could their employees' awareness of the 
close proximity, and ready accessibility, of a `profit threatening' and, therefore, highly 
undesirable, organisation. It was, equally clearly, within the remit of the state police to 
facilitate the removal of such threats to profit. 
But this was merely the beginning of a campaign waged by both employers and 
the Park administration to negate and vilify the efforts and activities of those who 
had 
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mounted this first serious threat to the institutional control of organised labour. Two 
female garment workers, and subsequent full-time officers in the Chonggye Union, Shin 
Soon-ae and Lee Sook-hee, 2 recall their experiences in the early days of the union's 
existence: 
Our boss and the jaedansha in the factory warned us against having any 
contact with the new union. They told us that the people behind it were all 
connected with North Korea and that if we did associate with them it would 
be very dangerous not only for us but for our families as well. They also 
told us that all the union officials were men who used their positions of 
authority to sexually abuse young women who attempted to join the union. 
One of our senior co-workers had told us about the objectives of the union 
and we were interested in finding out more. The problem was that because 
of the propaganda that was being spread by the employers we were too 
afraid to visit the union office (Interviews, Shin Soon-ae and Lee Sook-hee, 
December, 1998). 
There can be no doubt that the Peace Market employers, and those from the 
other markets, conspired together to co-ordinate the spreading of false rumours 
denigrating the organisers of the new union. As alluded to above, the systematic 
dissemination of information to all 27,000 garment workers in the Chonggye-chun 
district was as difficult for a few individual employers as it was for the Chonggye trade 
unionists themselves; it was, therefore, self-evident that the anti-union propaganda was 
an orchestrated exercise. It was also a highly successful one. After an initial rush of 
applicants to join the union, the number of workers going to the office to seek 
membership dwindled rapidly to virtually nil. When union officers attempted to visit 
individual factories to recruit members at their places of work, word of their intentions 
spread with extraordinary speed and they were greeted by locked factory doors 
wherever they went3 (Interviews, ex-union officers, December, 1998). This continued 
for three weeks, and by the end of the fourth week, during which not a single worker 
had sought membership, the union organisers, including Yi So-sun, finally reached the 
ends of their tethers. They had fought so hard and for so long and when, after all of their 
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trials and tribulations, they thought they had at last achieved their goal, they found that 
it had turned to ashes in their hands after less than one month. 
Overcome by hopelessness, frustration, anger, and disappointment, the hard 
core of the Chonggye Union activists, twelve in all, came to the desperate conclusion on 
30 December, 1970, that as it had taken the death of Chun Tae-il, some six weeks 
previously, to galvanise the movement into action, sacrifice of a similar nature was 
necessary now that the movement had stalled. The twelve unanimously agreed to 
barricade themselves in their rooftop office and, in a manner reminiscent of Chun Tae- 
il's sacrifice, use petrol and other inflammable material to burn themselves to death. 
The police, aware of the union organisers' every movement as a matter of routine, 
turned up in force at 2 am the following morning accompanied by a unit of the fire 
service and, just as the protestors were making their final preparations, broke down the 
door, and placed all of the activists under arrest. When they arrived at the Seoul 
Metropolitan Police Headquarters, the group declared that they would begin a hunger 
strike and would persevere with it until their just demands were met in full. They had 
had enough of being patronised, obstructed, lied to, and lied about. If something 
positive was not seen to be done on this occasion, the authorities would show 
themselves publicly as being responsible for the deaths of twelve people (Chonggye 
Union Annual Report, 1971). 
The protest continued for two days, and on the evening of the second 
day 
officials from the Ministry of Labour and the FKTU arrived at police 
headquarters and 
suggested that they should all go to another location and discuss the matter. 
This was 
unacceptable to the protestors, who reiterated their determination to remain on 
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government property and persist with their hunger strike until the answers they were 
looking for were forthcoming. Finally, the representative of the Ministry of Labour, 
with the agreement of the Peace Market Corporation, guaranteed to arrange and mediate 
a joint labour-management conference at which all contentious matters could be 
negotiated on a formal basis. More in hope than in expectation the union officers 
accepted the guarantee, and on 6 January, 1971, the first official and properly conducted 
meeting between representatives of the employers in the three main markets and the 
Chonggye Union negotiating team took place (Chonggye Union Annual Report, 1971). 
At the conclusion of a protracted period of negotiation, the union demand for 
every Sunday off resulted in an agreement to grant every other Sunday off, whilst the 
demand for a reduction in working hours from sixteen to thirteen per day resulted in the 
employers accepting a fourteen hour day. Additional gains on the part of the union team 
included overtime work only for those who volunteered; approval for union officers to 
visit workers at their places of work, and clearance to open a health centre and a canteen 
to serve free lunches (Chonggye Union Annual Report, 1971). 
It was apparent from that first meeting4 that the employers and the state had, 
for the time being at least, accepted the union as representative of the workforce, and 
that attending these joint meetings would not be regarded merely as an empty gesture to 
placate the union membership but as an avenue of dialogue that could, possibly, be 
turned to the employers' advantage. Thus, genuine negotiation did, indeed, take place 
and, although the union failed to get their demands met in full, positive gains were 
achieved and, for the first time, the union was actually functioning as a union. 
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10.3 Union Leadership 
The case of Kim Song-gil, ex-International Secretary of the FKTU and first 
president of Chonggye Union, is both interesting and enigmatic. Whilst no concrete 
evidence is available, the general consensus among all those with whom he worked at 
the Chonggye Union, and whom the author has interviewed at great length, is that he 
was originally tasked by his superiors at the FKTU with `infiltrating' the new union and 
moderating, or nullifying, its activities. The attainment of the first presidency must, 
therefore, have appeared to be a most fortuitous opening gambit. What transpired, 
however, was far from being in accord with what is widely alleged to be the FKTU 
scheme. 
Kim Song-gil turned out to be a compassionate and honourable man who 
rapidly gained sympathy for the objectives of the democratic labour movement, and 
respect for its proponents, once he came into close contact with the Chonggye activists. 
Thus, far from manipulating the union in accordance with the wishes of the state and his 
erstwhile masters at the FKTU, he actually led them from the front with distinction and 
courage through all the early events described above, including the collective suicide 
pledge and the hunger strike. The reaction of the FKTU and the Ministry of Labour to 
this aberrant behaviour on the part of one of their `agents' is not known; what 
is known, 
however, is that at the beginning of March, 1971, barely two months after 
he had led the 
Chonggye negotiating team at the first labour-management conference, and 
little more 
than three months after he had been elected president, Kim Song-gil announced that 
he 
was resigning the presidency `for personal reasons' and emigrating to America. 
5 
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This unexpected occurrence left the Chonggye Union officers in a quandary. 
The reservations which they had previously held about one of their own number being 
capable of assuming leadership remained uppermost in their minds. The union had, after 
all, only been functioning for a brief period, certainly an insufficient time in which to 
gain the experience necessary for leadership. In an attempt to alleviate the dilemma, and 
prior to his departure from office, Kim Song-gil introduced a middle-aged man, Ku 
Kun-hae, who had served as President of the Transport Union and who said that he was 
prepared to assume the presidency of Chonggye if the full-time officers so wished. Yet 
again, naivety, this time enhanced by a degree of desperation and the considerable trust 
they had come to place in Kim Song-gil's judgement, surfaced in the deliberations of 
the union staff, and they accepted the offer. Ku Kun-hae was duly elected president as 
from 1 April, 1971 (Chonggye Union Annual Report, 1972). The second leader of the 
Chonggye Union would remain as President for barely four months before, in a bitterly 
ironic fulfilment of the Peace Market employers' earlier false prophesy, Ku Kun-hae 
was caught, in flagrante delicto, sexually abusing a female worker in the union office 
(Interview, Lee Sung-chul 
, 
General Secretary Chonggye Union, April, 2000). This was 
the final straw in what had been an inauspicious presidential incumbency. The 
suspicions of the union executive committee had been aroused soon after Ku Kun-hae 
took over the leadership, as members became increasingly certain that he was making 
private deals with individual employers in which he would receive money for 
`overlooking' infringements of the maximum number of hours to be worked in any one 
day, thereby undermining one of the most valued achievements of the Chonggye Union 
at the first labour-management conference. 
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In August, 1971, the resignation of Ku Kun-hae was accepted at an emergency 
meeting of the executive board, and on 20 September, 1971, Choi Chong-in, the long- 
time friend of Chun Tae-il and founder member of the Society of Fools, was elected 
third president of the Chonggye Union (Chonggye Union Annual Report, 1972). Naive 
and politically ignorant they may have been, but the inner circle of democratic union 
activists had been placed by circumstances on the steepest of learning curves. After 
being repeatedly disillusioned and taken advantage of by external agencies, the message 
had finally been driven home that if their trade union was to function and evolve in the 
manner envisioned by their spiritual inspiration, Chun Tae-il, leadership must spring 
from within, not from without. 
10.4 Disillusionment With The FKTU 
From the very beginning of the Chonggye Union, and despite the enormous 
internal difficulties experienced in getting the organisation established on a firm footing, 
the executive members maintained a broad and outward looking philosophy with regard 
to working conditions not only in the Chonggye-chun district, but throughout all of 
Seoul. In May, 1971, six months or so after the union was formed and during the first 
few weeks of Ku Kun-hae's presidency, trouble flared at the Hanyoung textile factory, 
situated across the Han River some forty minutes by bus from the Peace Market, and 
where workers were striving to organise a union in the face of stiff opposition from the 
owners. Knowing that the Chonggye workers were at a more advanced stage, 
Hanyoung activists had sought advice and guidance from their colleagues on the other 
side of the river, assistance that was freely and enthusiastically given. Violence broke 
out at the Hanyoung factory between pro-union workers and those who were being paid 
by the company to oppose them, and Kim Jin-soo, a union activist, was stabbed in the 
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back of his head with a screwdriver. Yi So-sun and Lee Sung-chul, the General 
Secretary of the Chonggye Union, visited Kim Jin-soo in hospital where he was in a 
vegetative state, and were asked by Kim Jin-soo's distraught and angry friends for 
advice on what their next move should be. At this time, the FKTU was held in high 
regard by the Chonggye people; after all, the FKTU had helped set up the Chonggye 
Union, they had intervened with the Peace Market employers and helped initiate the 
monthly joint labour-management meetings and, most telling of all, Kim Song-gil, the 
popular and sincere first president, had been, in effect, an FKTU appointee. It was, 
therefore, with some confidence that Yi So-sun and Lee Sung-chul advised the 
Hanyoung workers to ask the FKTU for help (Interviews, Yi So-sun and Lee Sung-chul, 
December, 1998). 
It came as a great shock to all workers concerned when FKTU officials not 
only refused to even listen to the representatives of the Hanyoung unionists, but also 
formally reprimanded the Chonggye activists for directing the Hanyoung people to 
FKTU headquarters. The distinct impression gained by the executive committee at 
Chonggye was that the FKTU had been stung by the failure of the state/employer 
machine to preclude the formation of a democratic trade union at the Peace Market, 
largely due to the involvement of personalities like Chun Tae-il and Yi So-sun, and that 
they were determined to ensure that the `contagion' would not spread. Hanyoung 
Textiles did not have a Chun Tae-il or a Yi So-sun. Forty-five days later, and never 
having regained consciousness, Kim Jin-soo died. The workers at Hanyoung Textiles 
failed in their attempt to form a democratic trade union; and from that moment on, the 
Chonggye Union knew where FKTU allegiance resided. 6 
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10.5 The Role Of Women In The Chonggye Union 
Yi So-sun suggested to me that I should contest the union leadership, but in 
those days it was still difficult for women to stand up and speak in front of a 
lot of people, and especially because all the employers were men and were 
quite frequently abusive and violent in their dealings with union 
representatives. I was deeply involved in the activities of Chonggye and was 
a member of the negotiating team but, like most of the other women 
workers, I preferred to remain in the background and support the leadership. 
We trusted our leaders because they were all Chun Tae-11's friends and were 
dedicated to working for the membership. They had also attended education 
programmes and were much more politically aware than we were in those 
days (Interview, Park Myong-ok, female Vice-President, Chonggye Union 
1971-1976, December, 1998). 
From what has been said previously, and from the general tenor of the above 
quotation, the impression might be gained that it was men who made all the strategic 
and tactical decisions in the Chonggye Union, while the mass of the female membership 
merely followed along meekly and accepted whatever policies the male leaders laid 
before them. In reality, nothing could be further from the truth, for although it is a 
matter of record that women did not occupy the highest position in the Chonggye Union 
hierarchy, it was women who decided what initiatives should be taken, and it was 
women who constituted the motive force, the energy, behind everything the union 
accomplished. Members of the Society of Fools were placed in a unique position by dint 
of their close association with Chun Tae-il, a position that could not be duplicated in 
any other organisation, and whilst it would be stretching the point rather too far to 
suggest that those privileged males were, in effect, `honorary females' in the eyes of 
their constituents, such a concept does help to illustrate how unlike the relationship 
between men and women in the Chonggye Union was to the traditional Korean notion 
of `gender relations'. A fitting example of the way women constituted the real `engine' 
of the union, and a further demonstration of the state's ongoing determination to use 
whatever means at its disposal to manipulate and inhibit the activities of this 
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`troublesome' democratic movement, as well as its deep uncertainty as to precisely how 
such intent should be put into effect, is the case of the `Acacia Meeting'. 
Some six months after the inauguration of the union, the Secretary of the 
Women's Section, Chung In-sook, devised a scheme to help overcome the difficulty in 
recruiting, organising, and communicating with, a widely scattered workforce employed 
by more than eight hundred less than enthusiastic factory owners. Selected union 
activists were given the responsibility of supervising small groups of members, between 
ten and fifteen in each, who worked in their own factory locality, this system became 
known as the Acacia Meeting. By 1973, there were in excess of fifty such groups spread 
throughout the three main markets and they proved highly effective, especially in 
recruiting. For example, rather than rely upon the efforts of a few executive committee 
members to try to visit frequently all those different factories, efforts which could 
readily be frustrated by a determined employer or, jaedansha, it was so much easier, and 
more difficult to counter, for someone within the factory itself or who perhaps worked 
in the factory next door or along the corridor, to pop in for a chat with the machinists 
and shidas during the lunch break (Interview, Chung In-sook, November, 1997). So 
effective was the Acacia Meeting in penetrating the widely dispersed warren of sweat- 
shops that by the middle of 1972 union membership had passed 8,000 and was still 
rising (The First Twenty Years of the Chonggye Union, 1990). In time, the Acacia 
Meeting, this network of centrally supervised yet largely autonomous `cells', would 
become the core opinion finding and policy making mechanism of the Chonggye Union 
(Interview, Chung In-sook, November, 1997). 
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Membership of the Acacia Meeting consisted mostly of oya-machinists, the 
more senior and mature of the women workers, and a few bocho-machinists. As the 
young shidas made up the bulk of the union membership, however, it was important to 
the Chonggye Union that their views and needs were taken fully into account. On 
Christmas Eve 1971, the Acacia Meeting organised a party for the shidas, and more 
than 500 of them attended. During the party, members of the Acacia Meeting circulated 
among the young shidas to elicit their advice on what they most wanted from their new 
union. The overwhelming majority confirmed that they wanted to improve their 
education to middle-school level. In accordance with their wishes, a 6-month education 
programme was devised, and the first class commenced in February, 1972. It was 
conducted in the Chonggye Union office, and although more than 200 shidas applied for 
places on the course, the limited space available in the union office meant that only 40 
applicants could participate. There was clearly a pressing need to expand facilities 
(Chonggye Union Annual Report, 1973 and interview, Yoo Chong-sook, the first leader 
of the Acacia Meeting and Vice-President, Chonggye Union, January, 1999). 
Illustrative, yet again, of the quirky and arbitrary nature of the Park regime, and 
of its frequently amateurish, heavy-handed, and transparent attempts to engineer the 
democratic movement to its own advantage, was that in September 1972, Chung In- 
sook, the originator of the Acacia Meeting system, was informed by the Ministry of 
Labour that she had been selected as an `exemplary woman worker' and was to be 
presented at the Blue House, the President's official residence, to meet the First Lady, 
Yook Yung-soo. 7 At the reception, Park Chung-hee's wife offered Chung In-sook her 
personal support in the development and expansion of the educational programme for 
the young women workers in the Chonggye Union that the Acacia Meeting had 
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pioneered in the previous February. The suspicion that this unexpected offer was not 
entirely unpremeditated was reinforced by the fact that within two weeks of the 
reception the KCIA had instructed the employer organisations at the three markets to 
co-operate in, and fund, the establishment of a labour classroom to be located in the 
Dong-hwa market (Chonggye Union Annual Report, 1973, unpublished union minute, 
1973). Furthermore, the First Lady let it be known that she would donate all the books 
and publications necessary to stock an appropriate library (Interviews, Chung-in Sook, 
November, 1997 and February, 1999). What was to transpire would confirm the KCIA's 
intention to use this educational facility as a convenient and opportune means of 
disseminating propaganda rather than for the furtherance of democratic and vocational 
enlightenment. 
Having completed all the structural work and fitted out the premises with 
furniture and teaching aids donated by the US-based Asian American Free Labour 
Institute (AAFLI), arrangements were made to hold the opening ceremony on 21 May, 
1973, with the guest of honour being the First Lady herself. The President's wife did not 
attend, however, and immediately after the formal opening of the new labour classroom 
and library, it was summarily closed on the orders of the KCIA. The reason given for 
this debacle was that the Chonggye Union executive committee had invalidated the 
agreement between the state, the employers and the union by inviting leading figures 
from the church and the main opposition political party to attend the ceremony. They 
had also invited Ham Suk-hun, a high profile opponent of the Park Chung-hee regime, 
and an ardent advocate of non-violent civil protest. 8 From the union perspective, this 
bombshell constituted the first intimation that there had been any such agreement 
regarding who could, and who could not, be invited to witness the opening of the 
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facility. From the regime's perspective, on the other hand, the public association of such 
`subversive' individuals with a `state sponsored' worker education programme was 
clearly anathema. Furthermore, the fact that the KCIA had been embarrassed by its lack 
of foreknowledge of the nature of the guest list, and had thus been unable to take the 
necessary preventative measures, would become painfully apparent when the General 
Secretary of the Chonggye Union, Lee Sung-chul, 9 was arrested after the opening 
ceremony and taken to police headquarters for interrogation. 10 
During three days in custody, throughout which he was physically beaten, Lee 
Sung-chul was made aware of the KCIA's original intention to use the Chonggye 
worker education classroom as a conduit for propaganda and as yet another mechanism 
for the control of organised labour. He also bore the brunt of the agency's frustration 
that their intelligence ineptitude had been exposed to their political masters. A theme 
that ran through the period of his interrogation by the KCIA was that much as the 
regime would have preferred to strangle the Chonggye Union at birth, they had been 
unable to realise that preference because of the potency of the threat of popular protest. 
Nevertheless, having been forced into a less than ideal position, the state intended to 
use all of its guile and power to preclude the further spread of such `destabilising' 
phenomena whilst, at the same time, exerting influence to minimise the `detrimental' 
effects of the democratic activists in the Chonggye Union and deflect their initiatives 
toward more propitious objectives. Lee Sung-chul had patently failed to carry out the 
duties of General Secretary in accordance with the wishes of the state and he was, 
therefore, ordered to resign from office (Interviews, Lee Sung-chul, December, 1998 
and April, 2000). 
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After his release from custody, Lee Sung-chul refused to comply with this 
unlawful command and, with the full support of the Chonggye Union membership, 
continued as General Secretary. Finally, after two months of mounting pressure from 
the KCIA, and only after the employers made it known that unless he left office they 
would withdraw the funding of full-time officers and would cease to deduct union 
subscriptions from the wages of union members, Lee Sung-chul submitted his 
resignation (Chonggye Union Annual Report, 1973). 
10.6 The Role Of Education In The Chonggye Union 
Deprived of the use of the educational facility almost from the moment of its 
opening, the Chonggye Union was forced to resort to using the already inadequate union 
office in which to conduct teaching classes in the evenings and on Sundays. Meanwhile, 
the activists within the organisation, largely in the form of the Acacia Meeting groups, 
explored every possible avenue, including appeals to the Ministry of Labour and Seoul 
City Hall, in a concerted effort to regain the use of the new classroom. Aided by 
bureaucracy's inherent propensity for delay, these endeavours dragged on fruitlessly for 
many months until the Acacia Meeting groups finally ran out of patience on 7 February, 
1975. Some two hundred and fifty women workers assembled outside the classroom in 
the Dong-hwa Market and demanded that responsibility for its management be returned 
to the Chonggye Union. After a two day stand-off, during which time the 
representatives of the employers threatened to withdraw recognition of the union 
altogether unless the women dispersed, it was finally decided that Chonggye would set 
up their own labour education institution on three floors of the nearby Yoorim Building 
(see Chapter Nine), and that they would furnish it with the equipment that had been 
donated by the AAFLI (Chonggye Union Annual Report, 1975). The Chonggye 
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Labourers' Classroom opened on 21 April, 1975 and its inaugural ceremony was 
conducted on 30 April. An even broader section of the civil rights and democratic 
movement organisations attended than had been the case two years previously, but on 
this occasion there was no discernible response from the KCIA. As will be shown 
below, however, this absence of reaction was not indicative of any softening of the 
state's posture. 
The relevance of the Chonggye education programme, in the context of this 
study, is twofold. First, it is symptomatic of the efforts women textile and garment 
workers made to elevate themselves both individually, and as a means of enhancing 
their collective strength and effectiveness. Second, it was the primary, but by no means 
only, medium whereby workers from other factories and industries could benefit from 
the Chonggye experience. The programme included academic subjects to primary and 
middle-school levels taught in accordance with the national curriculum by fully 
qualified volunteer teachers; vocational training courses focused upon textile and 
garment making skills and aimed at facilitating the advancement of the younger girls; a 
political education course consisting of politics, economics, labour law, and trade union 
law; a course in leadership and confidence building; and a special programme which 
combined students, workers, and intellectuals in a 'social solidarity' workshop. Choi 
Jang-jip comments upon this important innovation: 
Above all, perhaps the one thing that makes the Chonggye Union 
extraordinary was the well-organised and effectively operated education for 
workers programme through the Labourers' Classroom, [an institution] from 
which the name of the Chonggye Union cannot be separated. It was 
instrumental in making the workers - most of them were only elementary 
school graduates, possessing among the lowest education level in the 
manufacturing sector - more conscious, and in forming a stable block of 
rank and file members. Also it was a channel that linked this famous local 
union to other various outside groups, like college students and church 
groups (Choi Jang-jip, 1989). 
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10.7 The Spread Of Democratic Trade Unionism 
Four factors combined to ensure that the phenomenon of the Chonggye Union 
did not remain a unique and isolated event. First, the impact of Chun Tae-il's personal 
sacrifice was unconstrained by social or industrial boundaries. Although, of itself, not 
constituting a blueprint for civil action, the extent of the spiritual inspiration it afforded 
to the great mass of working people, and its effect of awakening widespread 
consciousness, beyond the confines of industrial society, to the plight of workers, has 
been referenced in this study and a substantial body of literature. " Second, the very act 
of the successful establishment of the Chonggye Union demonstrated in the most 
conspicuous manner that such a mould-breaking achievement was actually possible 
even in the face of the most daunting odds, and that the aspiration of all workers to 
combine in common cause could, indeed, become reality. Third, the determination of Yi 
So-sun and her many colleagues in the Chonggye Union to actively support, and 
participate in, the struggles of workers in all industries and at all locations resulted in 
the bolstering of confidence among women both within and outside the Chonggye-chun 
district and who were employed in factories not necessarily connected with textile and 
garment manufacture. 12 This first expansive and systematic policy of mutual support 
and solidarity became self-perpetuating as women workers who had gained courage and 
fortitude from the visible presence of the Chonggye activists lent their support, in turn, 
to the struggles of others. During this process, bonds were forged between a broad 
swathe of women workers which would sustain them through many difficult times to 
come (Interview, Yi So-sun, December, 1999). Finally, and perhaps the most tangible of 
the four factors, is the extent to which women from other factories and other industries 
benefited from their access to, and involvement in, the educational programmes 
organised by the Chonggye Union. In addition to participation in the broad range of 
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topics included in the syllabus described above, workers from many sectors of industry 
were given detailed guidance upon all aspects of trade union formation, organisation, 
and administration. 
One group of activists recalled: 
The Chonggye Union and the Labourers' Classroom were like lights being 
turned on in a dark society, they had a great influence on the Korean labour 
movement. It gave us hope, and it became the spiritual centre of democratic 
trade unionism. It was not only the physical and educational help we got 
from Chonggye that was important to us, but also the example they had 
provided; if the Chonggye women could do it, we could do it. This 
confidence spread rapidly throughout the Korean workforce, and where 
there were non-unionised factories we were encouraged to set up democratic 
unions; where there were oyong unions dominated by men we were shown 
how to transform them into organisations which would bring us fairness and 
justice. The Chonggye Union showed us what could be achieved within the 
existing institutional framework and became the criterion by which the 
degree of independence of a democratic union could be judged. When there 
were difficult times, the comfort we got from Chonggye was like the 
warmth of a mother's breast" (Abstracted from a group discussion 
conducted with women trade union activists in the 1970's at which 
representatives from Chonggye, Dong-il, Won-pung, Ban-do, and YH 
branch unions were present, January, 1999). 13 
This `outreach' philosophy and practice on the part of the Chonggye Union constituted 
a substantial and meaningful contribution to the blossoming across the entire spectrum 
of Korean industry of new democratic trade unions, many of which used Chonggye as 
their model and Chonggye activists as their mentors (Choi Jang-jip, 1983). 
It is important to note, however, and especially in the context of this study's 
analysis of the role of women in the Korean labour movement, that due to differing 
local circumstances, by no means all the democratic unions which emerged after 
Chonggye's first appearance followed a developmental pattern or hierarchical structure 
identical to that of Chonggye itself. In the textile and garment industry, as indeed in 
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other industries such as electronics, there were locations at which women workers, the 
overwhelming majority of the workforce, were `represented' by male dominated oyong, 
or company controlled, unions which needed to be transformed into democratic 
institutions if de facto representation was to be achieved. At other factories there had 
been no previous representation whatsoever and, as a consequence, the organisation had 
to be started `from scratch'. To further complicate the issue, in some instances women 
felt sufficiently confident to assume immediately the presidency of the newly formed, or 
transformed, unions, whereas in others men were voted into that position whilst women 
occupied most, if not all, of the lower offices. In some instances male workers 
continued to serve as president of the union, and in others they were replaced at a later 
date by women as self-confidence and leadership experience was gained. The crucial 
point to note, however, is that in all cases, and in accord with the fundamental 
democratic principle, whether the presidency of a union was male or female; whether it 
alternated between genders, or has remained permanently with either, the power of 
decision lay firmly in the hands, and the votes, of the grass roots membership. In the 
case of the textile and garment industry, this meant that, for the very first time in Korea, 
women had real influence over their own working conditions, living conditions, and 
financial circumstances. 
A brief examination of the chronology and the leadership structures of the five 
democratic trade unions focused upon in this study is illustrative both of the time span 
involved and of the diverse circumstances alluded to above. First, it has been shown that 
the Chonggye Union was formed in November, 1970 in a location where there had been 
no previous worker representation. For reasons which have been explained, and 
following the early and brief aberrations, a member of Chun Tae-il's Society of Fools 
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was elected to the union presidency by the women of the Peace Market, whilst the lower 
offices were shared between other male members of the society and leading women 
activists. It would not be until the mid-1980's before the first woman president of 
Chonggye, Kim Han-young, was voted into that office (Chonggye Union: The First 20 
Years Evaluation of Struggle, 1990). Second, in February, 1972, the exclusively male 
led oyong union at the Dong-il Textile Company (see Chapter Nine) was converted into 
a democratic organisation led by Ju Kil ja, the first female president of a trade union in 
Korean history. Such was the radical nature of the transformation at Dong-il that not 
only was the male president of the oyong union ousted by a woman, but the entire 
executive committee also comprised women (Dong-il Textile Branch Union Report, 
1985). Third, in August, 1973, a similar conversion was effected at the Won-pung 
Textile Company (see Chapter Eight), although in this instance a man was elected 
president while all other offices were filled by women (Won-pung Textile Branch 
Union, 1988). Fourth, it has been described in Chapter Nine how, in April, 1974, Han 
Soon-nim swept the board at the first democratic election for president of the newly 
formed trade union in the Ban-do Textile Company and how, in response, the company 
management demonstrated its fear of the democratic process by insisting that a non- 
elected male, Park Chan-sik, be appointed full-time Vice-President in order to 
ameliorate the `damaging' endeavours of the otherwise all-female union leadership. 
Finally, in May, 1975, the YH Wig and Garment Company workers who, like their 
counterparts at Chonggye and Ban-do, had not previously enjoyed any form of 
representation, formed their own democratic trade union, run entirely by women 
workers. This organisation was destined to play a pivotal role in the abrupt demise of 
President Park Chung-hee and the curtailment of his infamous Yushin reforms. 
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As a measure of the pace with which women labour activists followed the 1970 
example set by the workers in the Peace Market, by 1980 the number of women trade 
union leaders across the entirety of Korean industry had risen from zero to nineteen, 
whilst the number of women serving as full-time union officers rose from twenty-two in 
1972 to four hundred and twenty-three (Labour Perspective Data Base, 1988). 14 The 
ground-breaking and courageous initiative of the Chonggye women and their male 
colleagues in the Society of Fools almost a decade earlier had defined what in Korean 
industrial relations terms was a new and refreshing ideology; one in which workers, and 
in the context of this study that implies predominantly women, were entitled and 
enabled to take a measure of control over their own destinies. The pace of the spread of 
the democratic principle in the Korean workplace from the mid- 1970's onward matched 
increasing social and economic difficulties being experienced by the Park Chung-hee 
regime (see Chapter Seven). As opposition to his tyrannical and vengeful administration 
grew; and the very idea, let alone the practice, of worker democracy was the apotheosis 
of `opposition' in Park's scheme of things, so did the palpable indications of paranoia 
emanating from the Blue House (Oh Kie-chiang, 1999; Lee Jeong-taik, 1987; Choi 
Jang-jip, 1983). Circumstances described below rendered it inevitable that serious 
confrontation between civil society and the state machine would ensue. In the same way 
that Chun Tae-il's death in 1970 had provided the initial spark to galvanise the 
democratic labour movement, all that was required in the volatile circumstances of 1979 
was a catalyst, or watershed, to precipitate major rebellion. 
10.8 The YH Women: The Politicisation Of Trade Unionism 
The YH Company incident 
...... 
in retrospect marks the start of the Park 
regime's panic, which led ultimately to the collapse of the Yushin system 
(Sohn Hak-kyu, 1989). 
310 
Founded in January, 1966, and bearing the initials of its owner, Chang Young- 
ho, the YH Wig and Garment Company benefited greatly from the export oriented 
provisions laid down in Park Chung-hee's First and Second Five Year Economic 
Plans. 15 From an original establishment of ten employees and a start-up capital of one 
million won, little more than $US2,000, YH grew rapidly until, after only four years of 
trading, it became the country's largest wig manufacturing company, employing some 
four thousand workers in two factories; one in Seoul and the second in Inchon. By 1970, 
it was ranked 15th in the nation-wide league table of export companies across all 
industries, and was the recipient of many prizes for exports, including the prestigious 
Presidential Commendation. In common with all other textile and garment companies in 
South Korea, the vast majority of the YH workforce were girls and young women from 
rural backgrounds (Choi Jang-jip, 1983, YE Branch Union History, 1984). From that 
high point in 1970, however, the fortunes of the company went into decline for a variety 
of complex and convoluted reasons. 16 The deteriorating economic climate discussed in 
Chapter Eight, which witnessed an inflation rate in excess of 42% in 1974 (Lim Young- 
il, 1981); gross mismanagement of the company by its founder and other members of 
his family; stock manipulation; secret sub-contracting; massively excessive borrowing, 
and the flight of loan capital and liquid assets to the United States, all combined to give 
great cause for concern on the part of the YH workforce which, by 1975, had shrunk to 
less than half of its 1970 figure (YH Branch Union History, 1984). Driven primarily by 
a desire to stem the increasing tide of wage cuts, job relocations, and mass 
redundancies, and in the face of substantial opposition from management, the YH 
women succeeded in forming a democratic union on 24 May, 1975. 
We had been attending the Christian Academic Education Programme (see 
Note 13) and had met women leaders from other democratic unions. The 
women from Chonggye, Ban-do, Dong-il, and Won-pung shared their 
experiences with us and we used them as a model for our own union and for 
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an education programme of our own. Without their encouragement we could 
easily have given up when life became difficult (Interview, Choi Soon- 
young, first president of the YH Union, December, 1998). 
The company management had a hidden agenda to cease trading as 
surreptitiously as possible and disappear abroad leaving behind huge debts and equally 
substantial un-repaid government loans. Countering this prospect was a new and 
inexperienced democratic trade union fighting for the continued employment of its 
membership. Nevertheless, and despite the company's many devious attempts to divert 
their endeavours, the YH Union did manage to achieve some improvements to working 
conditions. " The nature of the struggle gave the appearance of being one of trying to 
stave off the inevitable rather than prevent its occurrence, however, and at the end of 
March, 1979, by which time the workforce had been reduced to a mere three hundred 
women, the management declared that the company would cease to trade at the end of 
the following month. The imminence of the loss of their jobs, allied with the fact that 
many of them had not received any wages for almost three months and that the 
threatened closure rendered it likely that they would never be paid what was already 
owed, persuaded the YH women that they must take positive action to oppose the 
company's decision to close. The union executive committee decided to stage a sit-in 
strike as a delaying tactic while they formulated a plan to publicise their plight. 
Although the company called in the police to break up the strike on 13 April, 1979, a 
mission that was fulfilled with obvious relish and considerable violence (Interviews, 
women participants in the strike, December, 1998 and January, 1999), the decision to 
close the factory at the end of April was rescinded. The YH Union negotiators were left 
in no doubt, however, that the company was not going to be diverted from its plan to 
cease trading at the earliest opportunity (Interview, Choi Soon-young, December, 1998). 
312 
The following three months were turbulent in the extreme, with the company 
trying every ruse it could think of to persuade the remaining women workers to abandon 
their opposition to closure and accept their redundancies. Encouraged and supported by 
other democratic unions, however, the women refused to give way and, at the beginning 
of August, began another sit-in strike, this time in the company dormitory. 
We knew that we had to continue with our struggle because we believed that 
we were doing it not only for ourselves but for all workers who had been 
taken advantage of by government and entrepreneurs. We also owed it to the 
union, because without the union we would have been expelled and 
wandering the streets of economic depression much earlier. The company 
cut off the telephone to the dormitory, our only means of communicating 
with our supporters outside, so our vice-president acted as a link with some 
people in the solidarity movement. '8 They cut off the electricity and the 
water, and they stopped any food coming in. We were united in our decision 
to starve to death rather than submit to being abandoned like worn out shoes 
(Interviews, Choi Soon-young and Park Tae-yun, President and Secretary 
YH Union, and other participants, February, 1999). 
Although the strikers had barricaded themselves in, they were all too 
conscious of the precariousness of their situation and the imperative to take their 
struggle into the wider community. Following a failed attempt by the YH Company 
security staff to break into the dormitory and evict them on the evening of 8 August, the 
women finally accepted that they must find a more propitious location for their action. 
Members of the union executive also came to the shrewd and crucial conclusion that 
whichever site they chose, it must serve to raise the political profile of their case, and 
not allow it to remain as a purely industrial and localised dispute. Their conflict was not 
simply one between YH workers and the YH owner, it was a microcosm of the divide 
between the Korean working class and the punitive Yushin reforms. 19 Four alternatives 
presented themselves: the American embassy, because by then Chang Young-ho, the 
founder of the YH Company, had fled to the United States; the Cho Heung Bank, the 
`manager' of the company's finances and a major creditor; the headquarters of Park 
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Chung-hee's ruling Democratic Republican Party, the political home of the `villain' of 
the piece; and the headquarters of the New Democratic Party (NDP), the main 
opposition party, led by Kim Young-sam. 2° All except one of the alternatives posed 
serious doubts about ease of entry, the likelihood of physical violence, and overall 
effectiveness. The decision was made, therefore, to shift the locus of protest from the 
YH Company dormitory to Kim Young-sam's NDP headquarters, a building situated in 
central Seoul, some forty-five minutes by bus from the YH factory (Interview Choi 
Soon-young, February, 1999; Rhee Jong-chan, 1994; Helgeson, 1998). At 4am on the 
morning of 9 August, 1979, the two hundred or so YH women began to make their way, 
in two's and three's, across the city. Lee Moon-young, the dismissed professor from 
Korea University, recalls: 
I received a telephone call at about 5 o'clock in the morning of 9 August 
from the vice-president of the YH Union asking if we could meet urgently. I 
agreed to go to the Korean Missionary Education Centre in Ma-po21 
accompanied by my colleague Ko Un. The vice-president explained to us 
what was happening and asked us if we would go to see Kim Young-sam 
and try to get his support. It was clear to us that the YH workers had no 
alternative, and we agreed to do everything we could to help. Three of us, 
myself, Ko Un, and Professor Moon Dong-hwan, 22 hurried to Kim Young- 
sam's house in Sangdo-dong and arrived there at about 8.30am. When we 
explained the reason for our visit Kim Young-sam agreed immediately to 
offer every assistance. He said that he would make the strongest possible 
representation to the government on behalf of the YH workers and he also 
telephoned to his headquarters and instructed his staff to let the YH women 
into the building and to look after them until he arrived (Interviews, Ko Un, 
December, 1998; Kim Young-sam, December, 1998; Lee Moon-young, 
January, 1999, Im Myong-jin, February, 1999). 
The protest at NDP Headquarters gained widespread attention from the Korean 
national media and increasing support from the Korean public. Front page photographs 
and headlines, as well as in-depth coverage on radio and television, encouraged large 
crowds of well-wishers to gather outside the building. Other democratic unions were 
also noticeable by their presence, with volunteers from Dong-il, Ban-do, Won-pung, 
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Control-Data Electronics and, of course, Chonggye, ensuring that their embattled 
colleagues were provided with all the necessities of life. Religious groups, academics, 
journalists, and civil rights activists all lent their physical and moral support, whilst the 
national and industrial-level trade union institutions, the FKTU and the NTWU, were 
most conspicuous by their absence23 (YH Branch Union History, 1984). 
Upon reflection it might be construed that, if negotiation was out of the 
question, the most expedient and, indeed, the most politically astute response on the part 
of government to a sit-in protest by some two hundred girls and young women, 
conducted at a location where they were welcomed, would be to simply allow them to 
get on with it. As the novelty wore off, the media and the general public would likely 
shift their attention to some other news story, and the protestors would be left isolated 
and irrelevant. The YH Company management, no longer troubled by the irritating 
presence of its disenchanted workforce, would be free to put its closure plans into effect, 
whilst the main opposition party would be burdened with the day-to-day care of two 
hundred protestors. After eighteen years in power, however, and having manoeuvred 
himself into a position of absolute, dictatorial, rule for the previous seven years, Park 
Chung-hee's facility for such reflection had long since deserted him. 24 Thus, in the 
early hours of 11 August, just as the protest was entering its third day, more than one 
thousand riot police stormed the NDP building and set about the young women with 
boots, fists, truncheons, and tear gas . 
15 In the process of beating the protestors into 
submission and throwing them bodily into waiting police vans, nineteen year-old Kim 
Kyung-sook was killed, more than one hundred others, including thirty opposition party 
MP's and twelve journalists, were wounded, and Kim Young-sam was arrested (Dong- 
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a Ilbo daily newspaper, 12 August, 1979, and interviews with Kim Young-sam and YH 
participants, December, 1998). 
As news of this extraordinarily heavy-handed and brutal event spread, so did 
the feelings of anger and affront among all levels of Korean society (Choi Jang-jip, 
1983). Much in accord with the intentions of the YH women protestors, the `YH 
incident' had voiced a rallying cry to coalesce the radical, anti-Park Chung-hee, factions 
within that society, and the first tangible signs of what was to come occurred, as has so 
often been the case in modern Korean history, on the campuses of many Korean 
universities. 26 Student demonstrations in Taegu, the capital city of North Kyongsang 
province, led to fierce street fighting between students and police on 4 September (Sohn 
Hak-kyu, 1989), with the added significance that this event took place in the `home 
province' of Park Chung-hee, and in the very heartland of his political support. 27 
It was clear, even to the most casual observer, that only one more act of 
provocation on the part of government was required to ignite the shortened fuse of 
popular rebellion, a rebellion that would embrace not only volatile and idealistic 
university students and the long-oppressed and exploited labour force, but the erstwhile 
`conservative' middle class as well. It would not be long before Park Chung-hee, with 
his customary arrogance and haughty disregard of reality, committed that act. 
From the moment of his release from custody following his arrest at the 
eviction of the YH women from his headquarters, Kim Young-sam launched a 
persistent and vociferous attack against Park Chung-hee in the media and in the 
National Assembly. The YH incident was the focus of his onslaught, and he repeatedly 
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denounced Park for the way his reaction to the protest had confirmed the extent to 
which he had lost touch with the will of the people, and exposed the bankruptcy of his 
moral authority to govern (Interview, Kim Young-sam, December, 1998). As Oh Kie- 
chiang (1999) records: 
Park's fury in return was unleashed in a hitherto unprecedented 
parliamentary move. While the police blocked opposition legislators from 
entering the National Assembly chamber, the pro-government assemblymen 
slavishly voted on 4 October, 1979 to punish Kim [Young-sam] by stripping 
him of his Assembly seat. As a result, on 13 October, an event that the Park 
regime probably did not foresee occurred. All sixty-nine opposition 
assemblymen resigned their seats - an unprecedented event in the history of 
the Korean legislature. Political paralysis resulted. The floor of the National 
Assembly was the only arena in which criticisms of the Park government 
could be voiced. Now even that outlet was blocked (Oh Kie-chiang, 1999). 
There was, of course, one remaining arena in which popular opposition could find a 
voice; it was what Purdie (1990) referred to as `politics in the streets'. 
Immediately upon learning of their representative, Kim Young-sam's, 
banishment from the National Assembly, residents of Pusan, the southern city port and 
Kim's legislative district, poured out into the thoroughfares. Rioting began on 15 
October, two days after the mass resignation of opposition assemblymen, and observers 
noted that the participants appeared to come spontaneously from all strata of society; 
workers, students, church figures, business people, intellectuals, the young, the old, 
everyone (Sohn Hak-kyu, 1989). Furthermore, the demonstrations were no longer 
restricted to the shouting of slogans and calls for Park Chung-hee to stand down: on this 
occasion the nightly confrontations included hand-to-hand fighting with the police and 
organised attacks with missiles and firebombs on police stations and government 
buildings. Entirely in character, Park Chung-hee's response was to declare a State of 
Martial Law in Pusan on 18 October but, by then, the nation-wide situation had got out 
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of hand and any initiative that the Park regime had previously held was now lost. No 
sooner had the army taken over responsibility for public order from the police in Pusan, 
than rioting of similar intensity erupted in the nearby city of Masan. Immediately a 
`garrison order' was placed on Masan, civil disorder and violence broke out in Taegu, 
Park's `home city'; Chongju, a city in central Korea and the political base of the wily 
eminence Brise, Kim Jong-pil (see Chapter Eight), and Seoul, the capital city, itself (Oh 
Kie-chiang, 1999). Anyone witnessing the scenes, and who had experienced the 
uprising almost twenty years previously that had overthrown the First Republic of Rhee 
Seung-man would, inevitably, have been struck by a distinct feeling of dejä vu. The 
major difference between April, 1960 and October, 1979, however, was that within a 
few days the President of the Republic of Korea would not only be deposed, as was the 
case with Rhee Seung-man, he would be dead. 
10.9 The Assassination Of Park Chung-hee 
(NB. The events described below derive mainly from four sources. First, the official 
Investigation Report on the Assassination of President Park, published by the Combined 
Investigation Headquarters on 6 November, 1979. Second, the Indictment Against Kim 
Jae-kyu and Seven Other Codefendants, published on 4 December, 1979. Third, the 
Court Martial Verdict on the Assassination of President Park, published on 20 
December, 1979, and finally, a tape recording of the trial of Kim Jae-kyu, which took 
place between 4 December, 1979 and 20 December, 1979, which has come into the 
hands of the author). 
At a few minutes after 6pm on the evening of 26 October, 1979, and in a Korea 
where the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary had been rendered all but 
impotent, and where civil disorder was raging out of control, the four most powerful 
men in the nation sat down to dine in a restaurant in the KCIA annex in the Blue House 
compound. The four diners were: President Park Chung-hee; his chief bodyguard, Cha 
Ji-chol; the Chief Secretary to the President and former Director of the KCIA, Kim 
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Gae-won, and the current Director of the KCIA, Kim Jae-kyu. All were ex-senior army 
officers who had played central roles in the military coup of May, 1961 and who had 
remained in positions of great influence throughout the succeeding eighteen years. 
Completing the party were two young women, one a model and the other a singer, who 
sat either side of the President at the dining, table. Shortly after 7,40pm Kim Jae-kyu 
drew a handgun from the waistband of his trousers and shot Cha Ji-chol, hitting him in 
the right wrist. Cha Ji-chol scrambled into the en . viiite 
bathroom in an attempt to escape 
further injury. Kim Jae-kyu then shot Park Chung-hee in the chest. On hearing the 
shots, KCIA subordinates of Kim Jae-kyu, who were waiting in an outer room and who 
had been pre-briefed by their Director, killed three other members of Park Chung-hee's 
security staff and seriously wounded another. Having exchanged his . 32 calibre 
handgun, which had jammed, for a . 38 calibre weapon, Kim Jae-kyu returned to the 
dining room where he encountered the wounded Cha Ji-chol, whom he dispatched with 
one shot to the stomach. The KCIA Director then approached the President, who was 
lying on the floor being attended to by the two young women, and shot him behind the 
right ear. These facts are undisputed. What has never been fully resolved, however, is 
why Kim Jae-kyu killed Park Chung-hee. 
According to the `official' version, Park Chung-hee had become increasingly 
dissatisfied with Kim Jae-kyu's performance as head of the security services, and was 
especially unhappy that Kim had failed to anticipate the Pusan-Masan uprisings and, 
once they had occurred, had not dealt with them in a sufficiently robust manner. The 
investigation report states: 
During the dinner, the President reprimanded Kim Jae-kyu by asking 
whether developments in Pusan occurred because the KCIA had no prior 
information on them..... At around 7pm the President's chief bodyguard 
Cha assailed Kim Jae-kyu for incompetent handling of the situation in 
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Pusan, in conjunction with the declaration on October 18 of martial law in 
the second largest city in Korea ..... 
Kim Jae-kyu had been also fearful that 
he might be dismissed in connection with the then developments, in a 
rumoured impending cabinet reshuffle (Investigation Report, 6 November, 
1979). 
At the dinner, Cha Ji-chol who, by that time had become the president's main advisor in 
addition to his role as chief of the presidential security guard, openly berated Kim for 
his failure to foresee the Pusan-Masan situation and for being `soft' on demonstrators. 
He added that tanks should have been sent in to mow down the protestors (Oh Kie- 
chiang, 1999). Thus, the explanation that was presented to the Korean people was that 
the president's trusted and long-term friend, fearful that he was about to lose his job, 
and embarrassed and angered by aspersions being cast, in the presence of two women, 
on his professional competence and the manner in which he had dealt with the Pusan- 
Masan crisis, lost control of himself and murdered his most outspoken critic, and his 
president. 28 
In the early hours of 27 October, 1979, some four hours after the shootings, 
Kim Jae-kyu was arrested on the orders of the Minister of Defence and the Army Chief 
of Staff, General Chong Sung-hwa. 29 His trial in the military court began on 4 
December, 1979 when, in company with six alleged accomplices, he was accused of 
`murder and attempted insurrection'. A seventh alleged accomplice was charged with 
`hiding evidence'. Kim Jae-kyu's appeal to the military court, which had imposed the 
death penalty, was heard on 24 - 28 January, 1980, and his appeal to the Supreme Court 
began on 28 February, 1980, and the verdict to uphold the death penalty was passed 
down on 20 May. He was hanged in Serdaemoon Prison, Seoul on 24 May, 1980. 
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Kim Jae-kyu's version of the events leading up to the assassination differ 
markedly from those outlined above. According to him, his concern about the manner in 
which Park was running the country began almost immediately after the 1961 military 
coup. In the early years, however, Kim was prepared to continue to give his friend and 
superior the benefit of the doubt, and only occasionally attempted to intervene with 
suggestions to modify or ameliorate policies being introduced by the president. The 
introduction of the Yushin reforms in 1972, and the accompanying added constraints on 
the democratic process, made Kim increasingly uneasy and fearful for the future of 
Korea, but it was not until he was made Director of the KCIA in 1976 that he felt 
sufficiently able to make more forcefiul representations to Park Chung-hee. Kim claimed 
that he confronted Park and voiced serious reservations on at least four occasions, in 
1976,1977, and twice in 1978, each time being met with angry rebuffs, and an apparent 
determination to act even more harshly. 
In his evidence Kim Jae-kyu makes special reference to the `YH incident' and 
declares that although such occurrences were not normally the concern of the KCIA, he 
decided, as Director, that this was not a run-of-the-mill industrial action that could be 
left safely in the hands of the police but was, in fact, an event with potentially serious 
political consequences. Kim states that he believed that the YH women had reached the 
stage where they were genuinely prepared to die for their cause, and that he instructed 
his subordinates to ensure that the number of injuries inflicted on the protestors were 
kept as low as possible. Matters came to a head at the time of the Pusan-Masan riots: 
The situation in Pusan was far more serious than I thought. Before I went to 
see the scene of the demonstrations for myself I had been under the 
impression that they were being controlled by impure elements. What I 
found was that the protestors were angry civilians. For example, out of the 
first 160 people we arrested only 16 were students, the rest of them were 
ordinary people. Residents were bringing food and drinks out for the 
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demonstrators and welcoming them into their houses to hide from the 
police. The whole civilian population was collaborating. About twelve of 
the police stations were burned and thirteen police cars were set alight. The 
main complaints of the demonstrators were a comprehensive discontent with 
the Park government and a deep anger at the expulsion of Kim Young-sam. 
I became certain that this rebellion was going to spread over the entire 
country (Transcript from recording of Kim Jae-kyu's trial evidence, 
December, 1979). 
Immediately upon his return to Seoul from Pusan, Kim states that he reported 
to Park Chung-hee in the Blue House and briefed him on the salient points of his trip: 
The President had just finished his supper and Cha Ji-chol was with him. 
Park Chung-hee went into a tantrum when I told him what I had seen in 
Pusan and Masan. He said that if the situation gets any worse he will give 
the order to open fire. He added that although in 1960 Choi In-kyu ordered 
the shooting of demonstrators and that he and Kwak Young ju30 were both 
executed for their troubles, he, Park, was the president, who could execute 
him? Then Cha Ji-chol spoke up and said: "Look at the Cambodia case, the 
state remained intact despite killing five million people. If we kill one or 
two million demonstrators it will not make any difference to us". I could 
hardly believe my ears but, in truth, my judgement was that these were not 
just empty words, and that Park was actually going to do it. I knew him 
better than anybody else, and he meant what he said. He was from an army 
background, and he was a person who could never take a backward step. 
The protests and demands of others would not move him one inch 
(Transcript from recording of Kirn Jae-kyu's trial evidence, December, 
1979). 
Kim Jae-kyu completed his evidence by declaring that he believed in the 
principles of liberal democracy and that it was the duty of government to protect not 
only the capitalist and the entrepreneur but the workers as well. During the preceding 
eighteen years, however, all that had been achieved was that the rich had got richer 
while the poor had got poorer. In destroying the `fountainhead of the Yushin system' he 
had successfully completed his `mission'; immediately after Park Chung-hee's death, 
the Prime Minister and acting-President, Choi Kyu-ha, had announced the abolition of 
the Yushin reforms. 
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Whichever account of Kim Jae-kyu's motives for killing Park Chung-hee is 
closer to the truth is immaterial in the context of this study, although, having studied 
both versions in detail, and having noted the number of obvious inconsistencies in the 
case put forward by the state, the author is inclined to accept Kim's testimony in 
preference to that of prosecuting counsel. What is of crucial importance, however, is the 
pivotal role, in both versions, of the civil uprisings in Pusan and Masan. The single 
trigger for those riots was the expulsion from the National Assembly of Kim Young- 
sam, and the reason for his expulsion was his outspoken attack on Park Chung-hee that 
was precipitated by the treatment meted out to the YH women protestors demonstrating 
in Kim Young-sam's NDP headquarters. The chain of events linking the formation of 
the first democratic trade union in Korea in 1970, to the assassination of Park Chung- 
hee, the end of the hated Yushin reforms, and the spread of democracy in the workplace 
nation-wide in the 1980's, is manifest and incontrovertible. The defining characteristic 
of that chain is similarly unequivocal - it was forged by women. As Ogle so 
perceptively observed: 
When, in the mid-eighties, the male workers began to take action on their 
own, they found that they were standing on the shoulders of women who 
had struggled for justice for over ten years (Ogle, 1990). 
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NOTES 
' Choi Chong-in would later become President of the Chonggye Union from 1971 to 
1976. 
2 Lee Sook-hee's husband, Kim Young-dae, would later become President of the 
Chonggye Union (1987), and is currently (2000) Vice-President of the Korean 
Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU). Lee Sook-hee still works as an oya-machinist 
in the Peace Market (Interview, Lee Sook-hee, March, 2000). 
3 All of the Chonggye Union officers were under 24-hour police surveillance from the 
day the union officially came into being, it is, therefore, not inconceivable that it was 
the police who provided factory owners with advance information of the movements of 
union staff (Interview, Yi So-sun, March, 1999). 
4 From January, 1971, these joint union-management meetings were held on a monthly 
basis. 
5 To the best of the author's knowledge, and that of all those with whom she has been in 
contact, nothing more was ever heard of, or from, Kim Song-gil. It is known that his 
brother was a member of the state's military intelligence service, and it is open to 
conjecture whether or not Kim Song-gil was warned in advance that reneging on his 
mission had given rise to much displeasure at the highest levels of government, and that 
it would, therefore, be in his best interests to `disappear'. 
6 The details of this event are abstracted from a series of interviews conducted with 
members of the Chonggye Union executive committee and Yi So-sun, November, 1997 
- January, 1998; December, 1998 - February, 1999. 
Yook Yung-soo was assassinated in 1974. 
8 Ham Suk-hun was of a wealthy family and had lived in Canada for many years. His 
growing disquiet with Park Chung-hee's Yushin reforms precipitated his return to 
Korea, where he founded a `progressive' magazine that was highly critical of Park. Ham 
Suk-hun was a Quaker, and an admirer of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King 
(Interview, Ham Suk-hun, 1987). 
9 Lee Sung-chul had been a friend of Chun Tae-il and a member of the Society of Fools. 
10 It is of interest, and an example of petty vindictiveness, that when the KCIA went to 
Lee Sung-chul's office to take him into custody, they began by chastising him for 
having a photograph of Chun Tae-il next to that of the President on his office wall, and 
ordered him to replace it with a picture of the First Lady (Interview, Lee Sung-chul, 
April, 2000). It should be noted that throughout Park Chung-hee's incumbency it was 
mandatory for all offices, private and public, to display a photograph of the President in 
a prominent position (Clifford, 1994). 
11 The iconic status afforded to Chun Tae-il by the democratic labour movement in 
Korea and, to some degree, world-wide is well evidenced. What has not been 
commented upon, however, is the effect his self-sacrifice had among the employer and 
entrepreneur communities in Korea. The author is unaware of any research conducted in 
this sensitive area but it does not appear unrealistic to presuppose that Chun Tae-il's 
action at least caused alarm bells to ring, and may well have precipitated serious 
introspection on the part of individual employers with regard to the treatment of their 
employees, and the serious threat to their businesses if Chun Tae-il's example were to 
spark off popular rebellion. 
1 Random examples of industrial disputes attended and supported by Chonggye Union 
activists include: Nam-Yang Mulsan leather export company - 1973; Dong-Ban 
garment company - 1974; Poong-Chun textile company - 1976; In-Sunsa print 
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company - 1977; Sabuck coal miners - 1980, Min-Young taxi company - 1984 
(Interviews, Chonggye Union activists, November, 1998). 
13 Although the most readily accessible to workers at the time, the education programme 
organised by the Chonggye Union was not the only `academic' situation in which 
Chonggye activists could share their experiences. For example, from the mid-1970's the 
Kyungdong Presbyterian Institute conducted a Christian Academic Education 
Programme (CAEP) which included leadership training for mniddle-level trade union 
officers. Women from a number of unions attended and representatives from Chonggye 
frequently gave lectures which were considered the highlights of the course (Interviews, 
Kim Sae-kun and Lee Kan-taik, organisers of the CAEP, January, 1999). 
14 As an indication of company size at the time of the formation, or transformation, of 
the five example democratic unions, the total employee establishments, and the number 
of women employees at each company, were: - Chonggye (1970) - 27,000/c. 23,000 
women; Dong-il (1972) - 1,338/c. 1,200 women, Won-pun`s (1973) - 2,000/c. 1,700 
women, Ban-do (1974) - 3,000/c. 2,700 women; YH (1975) - 2000/c. 1,700 women 
(Individual branch union records). 
15 Park Chung-hee's series of Five Year Plans began in 1962 and included extraordinary 
`export promotion policy tools'; tax incentives, tariff incentives, financial incentives, 
preferential loan arrangements, and other export discount schemes, which all shared two 
fundamental characteristics; first, they represented extremely attractive inducements to 
entrepreneurs to enter, and become highly cost-efficient in, the export field and, second, 
they were open to the most excessive and corrupt exploitation (Lim Young-il, 1981). 
16 The full account of the rise and fall of the YH Company provides a fascinating 
commentary on the industrial and economic climate in the 1960's and 1970's, as well as 
a detailed insight into the ready corruptibility of Korean business and the Korean state 
under Park Chung-hee. It is, however, beyond the scope of this study and space permits 
only a truncated version. A comprehensive account is to be found in The History of the 
YH Branch Union (1984). 
17 Examples of the YH Company's concept of industrial relations include the offer in 
July, 1977 to the union president, Choi Soon-young, of a sub-contracting factory of her 
own, and assistance with her marriage expenses and the fees for her younger brother's 
education if she would abandon her trade union activities. Later in the same year the 
union vice-president, Kwon Soon-gap, was offered a cash payment of 4 million won, 
approximately $US8,000, on similar conditions. Both women refused the offers 
(Interviews, Choi Soon-young, December, 1998 and Kwon Soon-gap, January, 1999). 
18 Principal among these were Lee Moon-young, a dismissed professor at Korea 
University, Moon Dong-hwan, a professor at Hanshin Presbyterian Theology College, 
and Ko Un, a `progressive' poet (Interview, Choi Soon-young, December, 1998). 
19 Unlike the `Doug-il incident' in the previous year (see Chapter Eight) which, despite 
world-wide publicity, had been, to a large extent, contained by the Park Chung-hee 
government and represented as a localised, purely industrial, issue with no political 
connotation (Choi Jang-jip, 1983). 
20 Kim Young-sam was President of South Korea 1992-1998. 
21 Ma-po is a district on the western side of central Seoul, the NDP Headquarters 
building is also located in Ma-po. 
22 All three sympathisers, and two Protestant ministers who accompanied the YH vice- 
president to the meeting with Kim Young-sam, were subsequently arrested. They were 
all released without trial after the assassination of Park Chung-hee. 
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23 Kim Seung-ho, a full-time officer at the NTWU in 1979, was ordered to write a press 
release for the NTWU stating that the YH women's industrial action was communist 
inspired (Interview, Kim Seung-hoon, January, 1999). 
24 Ha Bong-gyu (1989) records: 
In the Yushin System, Park Chung-hee was at the centre of a vast patronage 
system....... Whether by conscious design on the part of Park Chung-hee, or 
because the decision-making style minimises the propensity for taking 
responsibility at the lower levels and maximises the reluctance of higher 
personnel to delegate authority, the nio., i IninrtlL' c/L'L I., IQl/. S /1111., t crv s., ' the 
president's desk. (author's italics) 
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that even if Park did not prescribe personally the 
magnitude of the police response to the action of the YH women, he did approve it. 
25 The almost incredible number of riot police employed on this mission is confirmed in 
a wide body of literature, including Oh Kie-chiang (1999) and Choi Jang-jip, (1983). A 
photograph in the possession of the author shows the almost farcical disproportionality 
of the number of riot police compared with the number of `, irls and young women 
sitting on the floor of the NDP conference room. 
26 Among the major campus demonstrations in September were. Kangwon University, 3 
September, Seoul National University, 11,20, and 21 September; Ehwa Women's 
University, 26 September, Yonsei University, 27 September, Korea University, 28 
September (Sohn Hak-kyu, 1989). 
27 The `home provinces' of politicians play a more important part in the political process 
in Korea than is the case with the `constituencies' of MP's in many western countries. 
In Korea, home province voter loyalty is very strong indeed, thus, the slightest critical 
reaction from the home province sends a serious signal to any Korean politician. 
28 The contrast between the intense reaction and ongoing conspiracy theories generated 
in the United States by the assassination of John F Kennedy in 1963, and the almost 
complete absence of interest or curiosity among Korean people about the true 
circumstances surrounding the assassination of Park Chung-hee, is startling. Kennedy 
had been in office for less than three years, whereas Park had ruled for eighteen years 
and, in less than a generation, had changed his country from a devastated agrarian 
society to being among the world's leading, industrial economies. His assassination must 
rate among the most important single events to have occurred in Korean history, yet the 
reasons for it remain a matter of supreme indifference even to those who suffered under 
his governance. 
29 On 31 December, 1979 Chong Sung-hwa was himself arrested and charged with 
`aiding an attempted rebellion' (Court Martial of the Ministry of Defence document, 5 
March, 1980). 
30 Choi In-kyu was the last Home Secretary in the Rhee Seung-man administration and 
Kwak Young-ju was a senior member of the presidential staff. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
"One owes respect to the living; hui to the dead one owes nothing hut the truth " 
(Voltaire) 
11.0 Introduction 
The objective of this thesis has been twofold: first, to demonstrate that the 
process of the democratisation of the labour movement in South Korea was begun by 
women workers in the textile and garment industry in the decade of the 1970's and, 
second, that their achievement has gone unrecognised and unrecorded. This final 
chapter will draw together and catalogue briefly the salient points made in previous 
chapters. Although the magnitude and lasting significance of the contribution made by 
the women of the 1970's has been established, to merely locate their contribution in its 
rightful place in the history of South Korea does those courageous individuals an added 
injustice. In order to present a fully coherent analysis of their struggle, it is also 
necessary to explore the reasons why their contribution has remained, until now, 
unacknowledged and uncelebrated. 
11.1 Salient Factors 
This study is focused upon an era that began and ended with a violent and 
symbolic death, and women workers were inextricably interlinked with both events. In 
1970, a young man who had dedicated his life to relieving the suffering of the thousands 
of girls and young women who laboured in the textile and garment industry, and whose 
plight he had assiduously researched and graphically recorded, sacrificed himself in 
their name. In 1979, the autocratic head of state who, above all others, bore the brunt of 
327 
the responsibility for the inhuman conditions endured by those who had made the 
`Korean miracle' possible, was assassinated by his oldest friend. The first link in the 
chain of events that culminated in this act was the deliberate and determined 
politicisation of labour protests staged by women. 
Evidence has been presented in the main body of this work which establishes 
the following: - 
From 1948, statute law governing all aspects of labour organisation and worker 
protection had existed in South Korea. This body of instruments followed closely the 
pattern set by the United States in post-World War II Japan but, unlike Japan, the 
legislation was not complementary to the social and industrial circumstances pertaining 
in South Korea. From the moment of the successful execution of the military coup on 16 
May, 1961, Park Chung-hee regarded national economic development as the only 
means whereby his regime might gain domestic and international legitimacy. In 
pursuance of this imperative, the government of Park Chung-hee found it both 
expedient and penalty-free to collude with employers in the routine evasion of even the 
most fundamental requirements of the law. 
The combination of a ruthless drive for economic expansion, led by a 
government that regarded contravention of employment law with equanimity, an 
emergent `class' of first generation entrepreneurs presented with the opportunity to 
accrue unprecedented wealth, a society that held the status of the female to be little 
more than that of a slave, and a mass of poverty stricken, naive, and poorly educated 
girls and young women desperate for work, resulted in the most appalling and degrading 
working and living conditions being regarded not only as acceptable, but as normal. 
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As part of its root and branch remodelling of South Korean institutions, Park 
Chung-hee's Supreme Council for National Reconstruction dismantled the disparate and 
factionalised trade union organisations and rebuilt them `in his own image'. Overseeing 
the resultant `official' labour organisation structure was the Federation of Korean Trade 
Unions (FKTU), led by the regime's placemen, and dedicated to the furtherance of Park 
Chung-hee's economic ambitions. All attempts at extra-institutional labour organisation 
were branded automatically as communist, or communist inspired, and were, thus, 
categorised as serious threats to national security. The FKTU's positive achievements 
on behalf of its rank and file membership were negligible, and any concept of the 
democratic involvement of those for whom the organisation was supposed to be 
representative was entirely foreign. 
From 1961 until at least the middle of the 1970's, the textile and garment 
industry was the spearhead both of Park Chung-hee's imperative for the rapid 
industrialisation of South Korea and of his extraordinarily successful penetration of 
overseas export markets. From the mid-1970's onwards the industry remained among 
the most crucial elements of economic progress. The great majority, certainly in excess 
of 80%, of the workers in the textile and garment industry were girls and young women, 
mostly from rural backgrounds. Although, by the 1970's, some eighty years had elapsed 
since Confucianism had ceased to be formally recognised as the national creed, its 
deeply ingrained and all-pervasive influence, especially in regard to gender relations, 
remained virtually undiminished. 
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Whilst the image of `modern industrial South Korea' transmitted abroad; the 
emergent `employer class' of first generation capitalists, and the leadership of the 
officially sanctioned trade union institutions, at both national and industrial-level, were 
all beneficiaries of the explosive expansion of the Korean manufacturim, economy, the 
disparity between the life circumstances of the working people and those of the 
authority', in whatever guise, grew increasingly stark. In concert with this exacerbation 
of the demarcation between the `haves' and the `have nots' was a growing sense of 
collective dissatisfaction within the new `working class'. All that was required was a 
catalyst to trigger off positive action. The self-sacrifice of the young, male, Peace 
Market garment worker, Chun Tae-il, on 1-3) November, 1970 provided that catalyst. 
Spurred on by Chun Tae-il's desperate example, and encouraged and assisted 
by fellow members of his Society of Fools, women workers in the Peace Market, with 
Chun Tae-il's mother, Yi So-sun, in the vanguard, came together within days of his 
death and formed the first fully democratic trade union organisation in the history of 
Korea. Apart from those few young men who had been close associates of Chun Tae-il, 
and who had assisted in his painstaking research into conditions in the Peace Market, 
the support and co-operation of male textile and garment workers was conspicuous by 
its absence. 
Despite concerted and protracted efforts on the part of employers and 
departments of state to impede and restrict the activities of the Chonggye Union, the 
leadership succeeded in not only surmounting every obstacle placed in its path, but also 
in encouraging and actively facilitating the spread of democratic trade unionism 
throughout, and beyond, the manufacturing sector. The achievements of the Chonggye 
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women, taking place as they did during the most socially oppressive period in South 
Korean history, constituted a beacon of hope for countless other exploited women, 
whilst the provisions put in place by the Chonggye Union for the education of workers, 
from both personal and vocational self-improvement perspectives, empowered and 
enabled those others to spread the democratic gospel. 
The most elusive element in this brief resume is the quantification, in tangible 
form, of the legacy bequeathed by the women workers of the 1970's. It is, therefore, 
timely that, at the moment of completing this thesis, the national celebration of the 
thirtieth anniversary of the death of Chun Tae-i1 took place in South Korea. Timely, that 
is, because the underlying and self-perpetuating dynamic of these annual ceremonies of 
remembrance encapsulates the character and the substance of his legacy. 
Commemorative events extended over a period of three weeks and included mass 
rallies, academic symposia, church services, theatrical performances, and readings in 
public of extracts from his diaries. The celebrations culminated with the joining up of 
many separate processions at the graveside in the cemetery where Chun Tae-il is buried. 
But who are the tens of thousands of people who attended and participated, and what 
precisely were they celebrating? The first question is easy to answer for, in common 
with previous years' events and the degree and content of the wide media coverage, it is 
clear that no single sector of Korean society dominated the representation. Just as the 
civil uprisings across South Korea in 1979 united all elements of the population and 
precipitated the downfall of the Park Chung-hee regime, those who publicly and 
privately paid their respects in November, 2000 constituted a microcosm of the whole 
nation. It would, however, be erroneous to construe that the object of their collective 
remembrance is simply the premature and self-inflicted death of a 22 year-old male 
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garment worker, of whom no-one outside his own immediate circle knew anything, 
however brave and dramatic it may have been. In the minds of the Korean people, 
workers, politicians, religious groups, the poor, the rich, the elderly, and the youthful, 
the image of Chun Tae-il's sacrifice represents a beginning, rather than an end, a birth 
rather than a death. These annual celebrations are symbolic tokens of the widespread 
recognition that Chun Tae-il's final, despairing, gesture provided the seed from which 
democratic trade unionism and the emancipation of Korean women would grow. 
11.2 An Anomaly: The Invisibility Of Struggle 
This study began by drawing attention to two extraordinary lacunae in the 
collective psyche of the people of South Korea: this final chapter will dwell upon a third 
anomalous circumstance, the substance of which is revealed above. On the one hand we 
have nation-wide annual celebrations on the anniversary of the death of `the father of 
democratic trade unionism', celebrations which cut across the entire grain of South 
Korean society whilst, on the other, there is a marked reluctance on the part of writers 
and historians to acknowledge the significance of the contribution made by the very 
people about whom Chun Tae-il was most concerned and who, in turn, were most 
inspired and motivated by his example. What compounds the anomaly is the fact that 
although few, if any, works on the period fail to refer to Chun Tae-11's death, without 
exception they locate the birth of democracy in the labour movement as having taken 
place not immediately, or even shortly, after the event, but almost two decades later. 
No-one questions the illogicality implicit in the recognition of the crucial importance of 
an event that apparently had no tangible effect for the better part of twenty years. 
Quotations illustrative of the `collective amnesia' concerning the struggle of the 1970's 
women activists are presented below: 
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That date marks a watershed in Korean history. The country's political and 
social climate changed virtually overnight, but nowhere was the change 
more dramatic than in the conduct of labour relations (Kearney, 1991). 
This extract could, and should, have been in reference to the formation of the Chonggye 
Union in November, 1970 and the emergence of Korean women as a force in their own 
right. It refers to neither; instead it is a commentary upon the `birth of democracy' 
announced in a statement made by President Roh Tae-woo in June, 1987. 
A kind of `nzinjung', or `people', power had become apparent throughout 
the weeks of protest, as Koreans of all backgrounds sent a powerful message 
to the government demanding immediate democratic reforms ..... 
Moreover, 
Korea's middle-class citizens demonstrated a willingness to risk their 
futures for democracy and human rights. The government learned that .... the nation risked a bloody civil war. Thus, South Korea's democratisation 
movement appeared irreversible (Lee Man-woo, 1990). 
This extract could, and should, have been in reference to the nation-wide civil uprisings 
which began in October, 1979, initiated by the actions of Korean women, and which are 
described in the preceding chapter. It is not, instead it is a commentary upon the `birth 
of democracy' that, allegedly, took place as a response to Roh's statement in June, 
1987. 
Interestingly, and tellingly, examples of the misplaced location of the `birth of 
democracy' in South Korea often contain the seeds of their own contradiction. On the 
page previous to that from which the first of the above quotations is extracted, an 
account of an incident experienced by the author is recorded: 
The five radical unionists ...... 
do not seem a hard lot. But in their early 
twenties, these women are already seasoned veterans of two exacting 
economic campaigns. In the first, the launching of Korean goods into the 
world marketplace, they are late recruits. In the second campaign, to win 
basic workers' rights from Korean employers, they are the shock troops. For 
their efforts they have been harassed and threatened and finally fired from 
their jobs. They have stood up to their male managers in verbal 
confrontations and in pitched battles ...... 
Several of these young women 
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have been roughed up, and they have photographs to prove it. Here, in the 
offices of the Federation of Korean Metalworkers Trade Unions, the 
president of the union and several of her rank and file detail their grievances 
(Kearney, 1991). 
The incident took place in 1988, and what seems to have been unworthy even of 
comment is the fact that not only were the `radical unionists' female, but the president 
of their union was also a woman. The extract includes blatant absurdities. Firstly, if the 
women were, indeed, in their `early twenties' in 1988, they were not `late recruits' to 
the `campaign' of the `launching of Korean goods into the world marketplace', 
whatever that may mean, they were not even born in 1961 when Park Chung-hee began 
to focus attention upon export-oriented policies. Furthermore, the women activists from 
Chonggye, Dong-il, Ban-do, YH, and all the others who suffered through the 1970's 
would be baffled and, with every justification, take some exception to young women in 
1988 being referred to as the `shock troops' in the struggle to achieve basic rights from 
Korean employers. The Dong-il women, in particular, might be excused for finding it 
ironic that these `shock troops' of 1988 merited commendation for `standing up to their 
male managers' whilst their own experiences of a decade before, which aroused world- 
wide protest, and which brought about the downfall of Park Chung-hee, by implication 
go unacknowledged. As Lee Chong-gak (see Chapter Eight), a female activist 
throughout the 1970's and president of the Dong-il Textile branch union from 1976 to 
1978, remarked when interviewed in January, 1998: 
It cannot be denied that the Korean labour movement has made tremendous 
advances since 1987, but somehow outsiders have got the impression that it 
all happened overnight. The easy life that union leaders are enjoying 
nowadays is not due to their own efforts but is the result of the struggles of a 
previous generation. For some reason the sacrifices made by our senior 
workers in the 1970's have all been forgotten. 
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It is the history of Lee Chong-gak, of Yi So-sun, of the Choii-, ve women, and the 
Dong-il women, and of all the other Korean women who fought so hard, and who 
sacrificed so much in the 1970's, that this thesis aims to recover. 
11.3 Why Are The 1970's Women `Invisible'? 
Having presented an exposition of the irrefutable circumstance wherein the 
truly seminal nature of the contribution by women workers of the 1970's to the 
democratisation of the South Korean labour movement has remained unrecognised, and 
having also indicated the implicit denial that the process of democratisation began in 
that decade, it is important finally to explore some of the prime reasons for such 
outcomes. As with most societal phenomena, the underlying explanation for these 
incidences of dismissal and denial comprises a number of diverse strands, each of 
which, or a combination of which, has exerted varying degrees of influence, dependent 
upon specific circumstances and particular personalities. With that caveat in mind, it is 
submitted that there are three pre-eminent factors which have contributed most to the 
distortion and misinterpretation of history which this study seeks to rectify. First, the 
nature of the political succession to Park Chung-hee. Second, the ever-present influence 
of Confucianism in South Korean society and, third, the ideological agenda of 
university students in the 1970's and 1980's. 
11.3.1 Korean Politics Mier Park ('hung hee 
This study has shown that from the time of the military coup in May, 1961, 
until his death in October, 1979, Park Chung-hee controlled a regime that developed 
increasingly authoritarian characteristics, and introduced social and economic policies 
which made life harsh and oppressive for all but the `chosen few'. There is every 
likelihood that had his successor been democratically elected, been sympathetic to the 
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plight of the working population, and taken immediate steps to put in place measures to 
improve the circumstances under which ordinary people had been forced to survive, the 
momentum built up by women in the labour movement in the 1970's would have 
gathered additional pace. The spread of democracy in the workplace would have won 
growing support from male workers as the women's successes became impossible to 
ignore and, because of a `democratic continuum', the fact that women had started it all 
in the first place could not have gone unrecognised. Such was not to be the case, 
however, for the demise of Park Chung-hee did not herald a new dawn of freedom and 
liberalisation. Instead, far from enjoying the privilege of choosing their next president, 
the Korean people were to witness yet another military take-over and endure twelve 
more years ruled by corrupt and autocratic army generals. ' 
The administration of General Chun Doo-hwan, fron 1980 until 1987, was in 
many respects even more onerous than that of his predecessor, indeed, it was not long 
after his accession before the bitter aphorism "he's more Park than Park" entered into 
common parlance, echoing popular disappointment and frustration. Chun exhibited a 
virulent antipathy toward the elements of democratic trade unionism that had taken root 
and begun to blossom since 1970. Within months of his assumption of the presidency 
he had dissolved more than 100 local unions and forced almost 200 union officers to 
resign their posts. Those who refused were sent to army `purification' camps where they 
endured the most brutal of punishments for periods of anything up to six months. 
Needless to say, the Chonggye Union did not escape these strictures and, in January, 
1981, immediately prior to his first visit to the United States as the new President of 
South Korea, Chun dissolved the Chonggye Union by administrative decree. 2 For the 
following six years the Chonggye women were forced to conduct their `illegal 
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activities' underground. As a further demonstration that, as far as the democratic 
organisation of labour was concerned, he meant business, Chun Doo-hwan created a 
white-helmeted squad of `paekkol', or `white skull', strike-breakers trained in martial 
arts and equipped with motorcycles and dressed in specially padded uniforms. They 
would arrive promptly and in considerable numbers at the scene of any worker protest 
and wade in with clubs and shields (Cumings, 1997). During the early years of the 
1980's, workers arrested under the provisions of the National Security Law constituted 
one-third of all political prisoners, while human rights organisations estimated that as 
many as 1,000 former union full-time staff remained blacklisted by the Chun 
administration for periods in excess of five years (CISJD, 1987). 
Chun Doo-hwan was all too aware of the direct connection between the actions 
of the YH Union women and the death of his mentor, Park Chung-hee, and he was 
determined to isolate the democratic activists and nullify their organisations to ensure 
that there was no repeat of the events of 1979. He speedily introduced new labour 
legislation aimed at banning `third party intervention' which effectively precluded the 
possibility of solidarity between individual unions (KCTU, 1992). So, from 1981 until 
1987 exceptionally repressive measures were employed to restrict the activities of the 
democratic trade union activists. This bore the inevitable consequences of reducing 
substantially the unions' practical effectiveness on behalf of their now `outlawed' 
membership, and acted as a very real deterrent to uncommitted workers who might have 
considered joining. It seriously countered the high public profiles that the female-led 
unions had attained previously, and drove them underground. Against this background, 
it is not difficult to conceive how relatively easy it was to erase entirely the 
achievements of that decade. 
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11.3.2 The Influence Of Con iicianism 
Frequent references are made throughout this study to the practical effects of 
Confucianism in South Korea, and the statement by Song Young Song Yoon (1977) is 
recorded affirming that sinologists have been surprised to discover that, in many areas 
of social life, Confucian ideals were observed even more strictly in Korea than in China. 
Within a culture steeped in the concept of male superiority; where females are 
traditionally denied any marked degree of individual or intellectual autonomy, and 
where it is manifestly in accord with the natural order that all matters outside the private 
domestic sphere are the preordained preserve of men, any encroachments by women 
into the `male domain' are regarded, by Korean mnen, as being presumptuous, abhorrent, 
and in direct contravention of natural law. 
The female textile and garment workers of the 1960's and 1970's had already 
participated, albeit as a matter of necessity, in a fundamental departure from the cultural 
norm by leaving their homes prior to marriage and travelling, often great 
distances, to 
live in the city. This radical shift in social circumstance and demographic pattern was 
unsettling enough from a conservative male perspective, but for many of those girls and 
young women to begin to `behave like men'; to show initiative, courage, individuality, 
intelligence, and determination, was a shock of even greater proportion. Not only that, 
but by the end of 1970 women were actually outmanoeuvring male authority and 
establishing themselves as a collective force of some consequence. The women had not 
only escaped from the controlling authority of the head of the family, but they were now 
seriously undercutting the very bases of male superiority. Ally this eventuality with the 
uncomfortable awareness, on the part of male workers and male observers, that men had 
shown a marked and consistent reluctance, or inability, to exhibit similar qualities of 
338 
spirit and resolve, and the precursors for a process of belittling, or outright denial, of the 
achievements of those women are in place. Throughout the Park Chung-hee era, and 
with relatively few notable exceptions, some of which are highli-hted in this thesis, 
Korean male trade unionists have little of which to be proud, it is, therefore, propitious 
for them to erase it from the `official memory'. 3 
11.3.3 The Ideological A enda Of Activists ('Hwaldon a 
The history of the Korean student movement's involvement in political affairs 
dates back to February, 1919 and a demonstration staged in Tokyo by Korean students 
protesting against the annexation of Korea by Japan. However, its most dramatic 
achievement was in 1960, when the `April 19 Student Revolution' brought down the 
government of Rhee Seung-man. The student population is divided roughly into two 
factions; one of which holds to the view that the task of a student is to study as 
assiduously as possible, putting aside all other considerations and distractions until after 
graduation. Meanwhile, the other faction is more inclined to the view that, as a force of 
intellectualism and enlightenment, the student body has a duty to lead public opinion 
and show the older generations the errors of their ways. Of the latter group, Kuah 
Kwang-man, the then President of Pusan National University, wrote in 1968: 
With this event [the April, 1960 Revolution], the Korean students instantly 
drew the focal attention of the world, and they posed as young heroes. From 
then on, students began to take issue in trivial matters to such an extent that 
it appeared to them that nobody else could straighten out the social order, a 
way of thinking that more often destroyed than corrected the social order. 
....... the 
Korean students, being prisoners of their own heroic psychology, 
became so sensitive to realities that they tended to interfere with all 
governments policies and projects. ........ when 
they are confronted with a 
national crisis, they tend to have a strong subjective consciousness that only 
they can save the nation from the crisis, and they have a stronger sense of 
`elitism', beyond comparison with that of their counterparts in advanced 
countries...... So instead of taking their college life as a preparatory process 
for their future participation in society, they rather take it as the very centre 
of social participation, and hastily reach the conclusion that the college 
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campus is the home ground for social reforms. ...... 
Present day student 
movements [in Korea], which more and more tend to interfere with 
international issues to find a means of escape from trivial intercampus 
problems, have helped change and reform societies, but they have also 
caused in many cases the destruction of the existing social order they 
professed to uphold and straighten out. We have witnessed many examples 
in which the extreme students, assuming themselves infallible, have 
achieved more harm than constructive results in their search for drastic 
ideals instead of gradual results (Kuah Kwang-man, 1968). 
It was the members of this element of the university population that viewed the 
labour movement as a convenient vehicle for the furtherance of their political ambitions, 
and who set about infiltrating it at every level. Whilst it must be conceded that some 
students did make meaningful contributions to the workers' cause, especially where 
they involved themselves in the education programmes discussed in Chapter Ten; 
others, perhaps the majority, did not. What became common practice was for individual 
students to lie about their backgrounds and qualifications in order to gain employment 
in a textile and garment factory, or in some other industry. Clearly, the reason they had 
to lie was that even the most unwary of employers would have cause to be suspicious if, 
for example, a university graduate applied to work as a Aida in the Peace Market. Once 
engaged as an `ordinary' worker, and after carefully taking time to settle in and become 
accepted by their fellow workers, the infiltrator, or `hwaldongga', would begin to 
`organise'. 
.... the workers 
do not know about my identity. I do not tell them because 
the relationship we built on the basis of equal status changes once I tell 
them, "I am a college graduate and I came down here to help you to 
organise". Rather than preaching to them about what to do from the outside, 
I would bury myself among them and make changes from within (A female 
hwaldongga who infiltrated an electronics factory in Masan in the 1980's, 
quoted in Kim Seung-kyung, 1997). 
Radical students who professed Marxist/Leninist provenance, and whose 
hidden agendas were focused more upon anti-capitalism, national unification, and civil 
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revolution, failed in their efforts to manipulate the labour movement to their own ends. 
Although, as has been stated, some positive contributions were forthcoming, the 
presence of these dilettantes was not welcomed by working people 
The problems with these so-called hirulc/nflggu are many. First, they are 
impatient. They would like to do something very quickly. They feel that 
they have to do something, so they start a strike that cannot succeed. And 
then they just leave. No wonder many politically conscious workers 
despised students and did not want them (Interview, woman worker in 
Inchon, quoted in Kim Seung-kyung, 1997). 
I hated the way students got involved for a limited period and also hated that 
the workplace became their experimental ground (Interview, female Vice- 
President of a Seoul garment factory union, quoted in Kim Seung-kyung, 
1997). 
The fact that they had failed in their project to use the democratic labour 
movement as a convenient means of achieving their revolutionary ends came, as events 
were to show, as the most profound shock to the radical young `intellectuals' who had 
joined the labour movement and who, until then, had been convinced of their 
infallibility. One example of the way in which they vented their- frustration was by 
orchestrating very public `character assassinations' aimed at leading figures in the 
democratic movement. At the annual workers' rally in May, 1986, for example, they 
presented a theatrical drama, the script of which was constructed around a personal and 
virulent attack upon Yi So-sun, the `mother' of democratic trade unionism. In the play 
she was accused of betraying, through her ignorance, the `scientific' principles of the 
labour movement because of her opposition to the students' demands to disband all 
trade unions so that workers could be free to fight for their rights in the streets. The 
high, or low, point of the diatribe was the most hurtful and distressing accusation that 
her behaviour in regard to her son, Chun Tae-il, equated to that of Judas Iscariot's to 
Jesus Christ. 
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But how does this affect the conventional view? What relevance do those hot- 
headed, and ideologically radical, university students of the 1960's, the 1970's, and the 
1980's have to the absence from mainstream South Korean history of the exploits of 
women garment workers in the 1970's? The answer lies in the means by which public 
opinion is formed, because `public opinion' is merely another way of saying 
`conventional view'. 
Reference has been made in this thesis to the fact that Koreans have a deeply 
ingrained respect for scholastic attainment, and hold academic personalities in the very 
highest regard. Even in the 21st century, the unquestioned order of personal hierarchy in 
South Korea remains: King, Teacher, Father. In such a social atmosphere it is possible 
for poorly substantiated theory to assume seminal status solely on the grounds that it 
appeared in print and bore the imprimatur of a highly qualified academic. Paradoxically, 
and as the result of bitter experience, female activists from the 1970's lost their 
traditional respect for academics and intellectuals and, instead came to regard them with 
suspicion, and their agendas with distrust (see Chapter Four). The combination of these 
two circumstances: the preparedness on the part of its readership to accept as fact the 
published theories of academics, and the reluctance of women trade unionists to 
participate fully in research conducted by those academics, can result in the presentation 
of research which contains a clear potential for the distortion, or misrepresentation, of 
history. 
Because of their wide circulation, and the greater social depth they permeate, 
newspapers and periodicals share with more specialist academic works the power to 
shape public perception. Professional journalists who write in the popular press upon 
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social and political matters not only tend to come from academic backgrounds 
themselves, but are equally susceptible to the influence of flawed research. They 
usually have deadlines to meet, and the opportunity to embark upon independent 
investigative journalism, even if it were deemed necessary, is frequently precluded. The 
alternative is to draw upon evidence that has emanated from a respected source, and 
which accords with the individual journalist's prejudice. 
Thus, public opinion and, by association, the `conventional view', is informed 
to a large extent by the endeavours of academic writers and journalists. To establish a 
direct connection between contemporary unargued assumption and erstwhile thwarted 
radicals, it is necessarily only to ask, "Where now are those university students, those 
hwaldongga of a generation ago"? The answer is that many of them are professors, 
university lecturers, the authors of academic works, politicians, and journalists. 
11.4. The Bases of Collective Workers' Struggle 
In seeking to redress the flawed portrayal of the role played by women in the 
democratisation of the South Korean labour movement, this thesis has revealed, or 
reinforced, three important social truths. First, there is the extent to which planned 
social change can have unanticipated and far-reaching consequences. Prior to Park 
Chung-hee's radical and rapid industrial development initiatives, absolute male 
dominance in both the public and private spheres was culturally embedded and 
unchallenged. For centuries, women had not only been forced to occupy the subordinate 
position in society, but they were, to all intents and purposes, devoid of personal 
identity. It is not surprising that, in a culture such as this, Korean men did not anticipate 
that the abandonment of one tradition, that is, the imperative for unmarried girls to 
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remain in the paternal home until they became the `possessions' of their husbands' 
family, would lead to such a radical shift in the balance of gender relations. What 
triggered the liberation of Korean women, and enabled there to begin to realise both 
their identity and their potential, was that suddenly, and almost c/i iiru.,. sc, their life 
circumstances changed. At one moment they were living in the strictly controlled and 
relatively isolated domestic environment, one that had remained virtually unaltered for 
many generations and, at the next, they were working and living in the city, beyond the 
limits of immediate parental influence. Although, as this thesis has demonstrated, the 
lives of the girls and young women in the textile and garment industry were far from 
leisurely, they did, nevertheless, gain the unprecedented opportunity to share 
experiences and relationships with many other women whom otherwise they would 
never have met. This inevitably broadened their perspectives and kindled their self- 
awareness. It was through this novel circumstance, more than any other single factor, 
that the bonds of the past began to weaken. 
The second important component of collective worker struggle, and one upon 
which emphasis has been placed in Chapter Nine, is the frequently disproportionate, and 
crucial, impact of charismatic personalities and symbolic events. This consideration is 
especially relevant for projects or campaigns attempting to challenge forces of 
opposition which are powerful, brutal, and unremitting. In such difficult circumstances 
it is to be expected that collective determination and application may flag during periods 
when little progress is evident, or when the opposing force is reacting in a particularly 
harsh manner. At times such as those, it is vital to the success, or even the continuation, 
of the collective endeavour that the timid are strengthened and the doubters are 
reinvigorated. The charismatic leader is able, by sheer strength of personality, by 
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example, and by the power of persuasion, to instil a similar fervour in those who are as 
yet uncommitted, and rekindle motivation and optimism in those who may be on the 
verge of apostasy. The pivotal importance of symbolic events is also explicit in this 
account of the Korean women workers' struggle, and it is clear that they can serve to 
provide at least three significant benefits. First, they represent tangible indicators of 
actual achievement and, thus, add to confidence and determination: the inauguration of 
the Chonggye Union in December, 1970 and the opening of the Labourer's Classroom 
in April, 1975 are but two of many examples which are recorded in this thesis. Second, 
particular dramatic events which `punctuate' the history of a social movement become 
part of the folklore of that movement, and are the sources of justifiable pride for 
participants who are able to say: "I was there". This is not as trivial as it might appear, 
for pride in association is one of the basic ingredients of loyalty. Finally, symbolic 
events can `electrify' entire communities and draw them together in common cause: it is 
necessary only to mention Chun Tae-il in this context in order to make the point. 
The third `lesson' that emerges from this recovered history, and one that is 
especially pertinent for labour movements in undeveloped or developing countries, is 
the importance of the systematic organisation of collective education programmes. Such 
arrangements can have a number of advantages. It is clear that for a trade union to 
flourish it is essential that membership and active support is seen to be positively 
beneficial by each individual member, and every prospective member. In simple terms, 
workers will not join if it is not worth joining. Furthermore, benefits thus gained should 
not be confined only to improvements in working conditions. That the young shidas in 
the Peace Market wanted more than anything else to improve their education is 
described in Chapter Ten, and the fact that the first classes to be organised were 
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substantially oversubscribed is testament to their sincerity. The important point to note 
is that improving the academic and vocational skills of its members is as much of an 
advantage to the union itself as it is to the individual. Ignorance is frequently the main 
reason for apathy, and an apathetic membership is little better than no membership at 
all. On the other hand, properly conducted education programmes which include 
vocational and academic instruction, and which also focus upon developing an 
awareness of the objectives and functions of trade unionism, reap many rewards. 
Regular classes provide the opportunity for social interaction, a forum for the exchange 
of ideas in a structured setting, the fostering of individual self-confidence through 
achievement, and the development of the sense of community. Most importantly, they 
also help to supply the basic foundations for nurturing the trade union leaders of the 
future. 
11.5 The Future 
In truth, little can be said with confidence or certainty about the prospects for 
the future of the South Korean labour movement. As discussed above, the end of the 
Park Chung-hee regime did not herald a bright new beginning for Korean trade 
unionism. On the contrary, there were to be many more years of conflict and 
suppression. The success of Kim Dae-jung in the 1997 presidential election might well 
have been the watershed in Korean industrial relations. For the first time in its brief 
history South Korea had a leader who had personally fought as hard against 
authoritarian governments, and had suffered as much, as any of the democratic trade 
union activists of the 1960's and 1970's. One of his first initiatives was to officially 
recognise the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, the `umbrella' organisation of the 
democratic trade unions. Regrettably, Kirn's inauguration coincided with the virtual 
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collapse of the Korean economy in December, 1997. The International Monetary Fund 
was called in and the strictures imposed by its representatives reduced almost to nothing 
Kim Dae-jung's room for manoeuvre with regard to national labour policy. The 
imperative for radical industrial restructuring, allied with a labour movement now 
forced onto the defensive and deeply divided by political and ideological differences, 
has resulted in an unstable trade union movement that is signally lacking in direction 
and purpose. The future is unclear. 
What can be declared with absolute certainty, however, is that the democratic 
principle is now firmly embedded in the South Korean labour movement, and it is due 
to the efforts of the female textile and garment workers of the 1960's and 1970's that 
this is so. Just as the full extent of the achievements of those pioneers can no longer be 
denied, the `genie of democracy' that they so courageously liberated can never be put 
back into the bottle. 
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NOTES 
1 In December, 1995 former Presidents Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1987) and Roh Tae-woo 
(1987-1992) were sent to trial charged with bribery, treason, and murder. Chun was 
sentenced to death (later rescinded) and ordered to repay $US 283) million to the state, 
and Roh was sentenced to 22 years imprisonment and ordered to repay $US355 million 
(Oh Kie-chiang, 1999). 
2 Yi So-sun and thirteen full-time union officers, including her remaining son Chun Tae- 
sam, were imprisoned for periods ranging between one and two-and-a-half years. 
3 It is recognised that `male chauvinism' is often an all too easy hook upon which to 
hang sometimes unwarranted grievances. In Korean society, however, where the ethos 
of the dominant male flourishes as much at the beginning of the 21" Century as it did in 
the 1960's and 1970's, it is a tangible entity. Furthermore, it would be a mistake to 
assume that such bigotry is restricted to the lesser educated and more narrowly 
experienced sections of the populace. For example, whenever Korean academics 
congregate, whether it be in Korea itself or abroad, it is noticeable even to the most 
unjaundiced eye how difficult and uncomfortable it is for male academics to relate on 
anything approaching equal terms with similarly qualified females. Whatever subjects 
the female academics are specialising in, they are trivial, at best, in comparison with 
those being studied by the males. The inherent insecurity of Korean males manifested 
here translates precisely to their inability to concede any degree of respect for the 
achievements of the 1970's women trade unionists. 
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